Case law

Gallagher v. State

925 N.E.2d 350 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 23, 2010

During that period of time, however, the defendant was principally engaged in conduct related to unlawful drug activities clearly visible to anyone present, and thus his thirteen and one half minutes in the proscribed zone … does not qualify as "briefly."

Board of Commissioners of Clarke Co. v. State, ex rel. Lewis

61 Ind. 75 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 15, 1878

It is claimed that the affidavit should have shown more clearly when the paper containing the notice was published. … But the defendant in this case was the Board of Commissioners of Clarke County, a corporation established by *85 the laws of the State. The paper filed did not purport to be filed by the defendant.

Degussa Corp., Pigment Division v. Mullens

695 N.E.2d 172 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 5, 1998

Watkins and her worker’s compensation claim clearly establishes that she suspected her work environment was a possible cause of her illness. … This medical condition, which included serious chest pains, coughing, and difficulty breathing, qualifies as an injury for purposes of determining the statute of limitations period. 3 .

Hayman v. Potter

598 F. Supp. 2d 904 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Feb 11, 2009

Hayman clearly states that he was assigned to the same route from August 2006, 2 months prior to his EEOC complaint, until March 2007, when he requested a new route. 4 Even assuming, that a route transfer would qualify as … Hayman admits that this departure was voluntary. 5 A voluntary departure does not qualify as an adverse employment action unless it qualifies as a “constructive termination.” Indeed, Mr.

HALL v. SCUDDER

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Aug 24, 2021

Additionally, Officer Scudder argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. A. … Because of the Court's determinations above, the Court need not address Officer Scudder's qualified immunity argument. IV.

Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. United States Steel Corp.

907 N.E.2d 1012 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 23, 2009

We therefore apply the established standard of review for judicial review of Commission orders. … Steel counters that though the number is the same for each period, it clearly includes five distinct prices for the Energy Charge, which allows for the plural. (App. at 3838-34, Appellee's Br. at 23.)

Hohenegger v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co.

967 F. Supp. 350 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Jun 10, 1997

Rather, only “critical acts” qualify. Coward v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 686 F.2d 1230, 1233-34 (7th Cir.1982). … The Seventh Circuit seems to have endorsed the definition of “critical acts” as “those significant facts which give rise to a claim but which fall short of establishing a cause of action.”

Widmeyer v. Faulk

612 N.E.2d 1119 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 4, 1993

Faulk was not a "qualified health care provider" under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. IND. CODE 16-9.5-1 et. seq. On September 24, 1990, Widmeyer filed a complaint for damages in the Marion County Superior Court. … Even taking as true the facts Widmeyer asserts, as we must do, see Whiteco Industries, supra, at 1139 , Widmeyer's expert clearly failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact whether Dr.

Rolland v. State

851 N.E.2d 1042 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 3, 2006

An abuse of discretion occurs if a trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. … Rolland, Rolland argues that there was no evidence establishing that he was the person who committed these acts.

Patrick v. Staples

780 F. Supp. 1528 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Oct 31, 1991

As this massive Report and Recommendation clearly indicate, the disposition and management of pro se prisoner litigation is just plain hard, time-consuming work. … Patrick could prove facts establishing deliberate indifference on the part of Officer Nornes with respect to her refusal of his requests to obtain his medication.

United States v. Nunn

435 F. Supp. 294 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Aug 10, 1977

. *296 Moreover, it clearly was entirely proper for this Court to postpone sentencing until the other pending charge, Cause No. H Cr 74-51 was resolved. 1 In United States v. … The Constitution does not require that sentencing should be a game in which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the prisoner.” Here there was no error whatsoever.

Greco v. KMA Auto Exchange, Inc.

765 N.E.2d 140 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 1, 2002

We will not set aside the trial court's findings and conclusions unless they are clearly erroneous. See id. … Thus, Greco established the elements of criminal conversion by a preponderance of the evidence.

Firestone v. State

838 N.E.2d 468 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 1, 2005

In regard to the use of documents to establish the existence of prior convictions our supreme court stated in Tyson v. … We will reverse the trial court's determination only when an abuse of discretion can be established. Id.

Kiplinger v. State

922 N.E.2d 1261 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 22, 2010

. § 35-42-1-1(2). 2 out parole based on the qualifying aggravating circumstance that the Defendant intentionally killed Braunecker while committing or attempting to commit … while committing or attempting to commit rape, the aggra- vating circumstances enumerated by the Court in the record at the Sentencing Hearing, and the Court’s finding that the aggravating circumstances clearly

Mayes v. State

162 Ind. App. 186 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 13, 1974

The testimony in question falls clearly within the proscription of the Glover case and was therefore improperly admitted. … IV CHAIN OF CUSTODY ADEQUATELY ESTABLISHED TO QUALIFY TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AS TO IDENTITY OF SUBSTANCE ALTHOUGH SUBSTANCE ITSELF NOT ADMISSIBLE It is Mayes’ contention that there was a substantial break in the chain of custody

Indiana Department of State Revenue, Gross Income Tax Division v. Beemer Enterprises, Inc.

179 Ind. App. 447 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 26, 1979

This definition clearly excludes from gross income any gross receipts from sources outside Indiana. However, the language does not clearly exclude commissions which were generated from business sources outside Indiana. … The exemption in # 6 of the original act and all revisions thereof as heretofore noted, clearly indicate it has never so intended.

City of Indianapolis v. Kingsbury

101 Ind. 200 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 30, 1884

The first conclusion of law is clearly right. … The immunity from taxation is attributable to the fact that the community and the owners regarded it as a public highway, and, for that reason, not taxable.

MR v. State

605 N.E.2d 204 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 28, 1992

the commentary to IC 31-6-7-3 in support of that proposition, which reads, in part, "[a] parent who had referred the child to court as an incorrigible, and who therefore is the chief witness against the child, would not qualify … Clearly, she had no interest adverse to M.R. at the time. She was a loving parent, obviously concerned about her son and his future.

Behavioral Health & Human Services Licensing Board v. Williams

5 N.E.3d 452 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 18, 2014

See Tr. p. 59 (“As I read the record and from my finding[s] it’s obvious I mean I, I thought there was evidence from which boundaries violations could clearly be established. … The record herein established that Patient A suffered from Dissociative Identity Disorder, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Depression, and Schizophrenia.

In Re Paternity of HRM

864 N.E.2d 442 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 20, 2007

We will conclude that a trial court abused its discretion when its decision is clearly erroneous, or against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. … Also, evidence is not cumulative when the other evidence tending to prove the same facts is clearly not persuasive and therefore requires further support.