Case law

Rao v. Board of County Commissioners

80 Wash. 2d 695 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 1, 1972

The license attests that the applicant has acquired the minimum knowledge necessary to qualify him at the time he takes the test. … Clearly, the denial of an application, based upon such a consideration, would constitute an arbitrary act, and this court would be called upon to reconsider the rule which it announced in Group Health Cooperative of Puget

Bertsch v. Brewer

97 Wash. 2d 83 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 11, 1982

We, therefore, conclude that ER 801(d)(2) did not qualify the admittance of such test at trial. … The instruction and special verdict form used clearly informed the jury that the issue of contributory negligence was not to be considered until an initial conclusion as to Brewer's negligence had been made.

White v. Department of Labor & Industries

48 Wash. 2d 470 · Washington Supreme Court · Mar 8, 1956

This is clearly the type of contract which the legislature had in mind as representing a situation where the personal labor of the independent contractor is the essence of the contract. In Haller v. … RCW 51.08.180, part]), does not prevent him from having the protection of the act if he desires to qualify as a working employer under the Laws of 1939, chapter 41, § 2, p. 123 (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 7675, part [cf.

State Ex Rel. Washington Mutual Savings Bank v. City of Bellingham

8 Wash. 2d 233 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 3, 1941

Respondents argue that § 2 of the act, in so far as the question now under consideration is concerned, is not ambiguous, and so clearly provides for establishing a guaranty fund in an amount equal to no more than five per … That portion of the act establishing the tax pledge is not qualified or contradicted by any other portion *244 of the act, which contains no intimation that the tax pledge was to be supported by any tax levy other than that

Vasquez v. Washington Department of Veterans Affairs

District Court, W.D. Washington · Dec 4, 2024

“It is well established that new arguments and evidence presented for the first time in 22 Reply are waived.” Docusign, Inc. v. Sertifi, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1307 (W.D. … or if Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity.

Pearson v. Department of Labor & Industries

164 Wash. App. 426 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 24, 2011

. ¶14 Washington’s Industrial Insurance Act provides injured workers a swift, certain, no fault remedy that is primarily enforced in an administrative process that the act establishes. 7 The act generally provides finality … communicated’ as used in this statute to require only that the worker received the order, not understood it.” 70 Even if Pearson were to argue that he was somehow unable to understand the DLI’s order, he stipulated that it was clearly

State v. Bello

142 Wash. App. 930 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Feb 4, 2008

. ¶11 It is well established that article I, section 7 provides greater protection of the privacy interest in a vehicle and its contents than does the Fourth Amendment. Parker, 139 Wn.2d at 493-95 . … therefore, not subject to the vehicle exigency exception to the warrant requirement. ¶20 Lopez’s contention—that, because a vehicle subject to a traffic stop may be presumed to be the property of the driver, the vehicle is immune

Matter of Marriage of Knight

75 Wash. App. 721 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Sep 8, 1994

Ramtha Dialogues was a business established to market items related to Ramtha, an invisible personage. … The party challenging the award bears the burden of proving that the trial court exercised this discretion in a way that was clearly untenable or manifestly unreasonable. Abel v.

City of Wenatchee v. Boundary Review Board

39 Wash. App. 249 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Dec 20, 1984

Second, a statute is presumed constitutional unless its invalidity clearly appears or is made to appear beyond a reasonable doubt. Port of Tacoma v. Parosa, supra at 184. … The court held the benefits of the act encompassed any area of the state which may elect to qualify under it, and therefore the act was a general, not special, law. See also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.

State v. Davis

73 Wash. 2d 271 · Washington Supreme Court · Mar 6, 1968

Wigmore qualifies this limitation by saying that it depends on the facts of each case for its application and that it “should not be enforced with any strictness; otherwise it would become practically objectionable . . . … This question is clearly within the scope of the constitutional requirements as defined in Miranda .

State v. Faford

128 Wash. 2d 476 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 1, 1996

. *483 Nowhere does the statute imply a radio interception demands a second conveyance to qualify as a transmission. … Whether a conversation qualifies as private is a question of fact determined by the intent or reasonable expectations of the parties. Kadoranian, 119 Wn.2d at 190 .

State v. Thomas

166 Wash. 2d 380 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 11, 2009

The prosecution characterized this exchange as being “clearly hostile toward the State.” 7RP at 120. The trial court denied Thomas’ challenge to the removal of the juror under Batson v. … that “ ‘a consistent pattern of official racial discrimination’ is not ‘a necessary predicate to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,’ ” and that “ ‘[a] single invidiously discriminatory governmental act’ is not ‘immunized

United States v. Washington

506 F. Supp. 187 · District Court, W.D. Washington · Sep 26, 1980

Clearly, the treaties reserved to the tribes more than a share of the 1854 and 1855 salmon runs; they also reserved the right to share in all future runs. … The Supreme Court held that although the tribe was immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the individual members of *196 the tribe were proper parties and were subject to regulation by the state both on

Preston v. SB&C, Ltd.

Washington Supreme Court · Apr 30, 2026

At the time Preston received care, her alleged income fell within the limit that would allow her to qualify for charity 1 Three amicus briefs were filed in this case. … But this is not the exclusive way the first two elements can be established. In Klem v.

Families of Manito v. City of Spokane

172 Wash. App. 727 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jan 10, 2013

Mark’s contended that the choir area also qualified as part of the main assembly area and the allowed maximum should be 102 spaces. … RCW 36.70C.130(1)(d) is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. ¶23 Hearing Examiner’s Modification of the City Planner’s Decision.

State Ex Rel. McFerran v. Justice Court of Evangeline Starr

32 Wash. 2d 544 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 11, 1949

This is an appeal from an order made and entered by the superior court for King county, prohibiting Evangeline Starr, a duly elected, qualified, and acting justice of the peace for Seattle precinct, King county, Washington … “The legislature shall prescribe by law the jurisdiction and powers of any of the inferior courts which may be established in pursuance of this constitution.” Washington constitution, Art. IV, § 12.

State v. Bello

176 P.3d 554 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Feb 4, 2008

. ¶ 11 It is well established that article 1, section 7 provides greater protection of the privacy interest in a vehicle and its contents than does the Fourth Amendment. Parker, 139 Wash.2d at 493-95 , 987 P.2d 73 . … therefore, not subject to the vehicle exigency exception to the warrant requirement. ¶ 20 Lopez's contention—that because a vehicle subject to a traffic stop may be presumed to be the property of the driver, the vehicle is immune

Bulman v. Safeway, Inc.

144 Wash. 2d 335 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 2, 2001

Not only is this “atmospheric” test an overly broad interpretation of Thompson , it also clearly conflicts with a jury instruction in this case. … He only ambiguously qualified those admissions in the following exchange: Q. So Mr. Bulman, it wasn’t until November 20th, 1995 that you were aware of the remedy articulated in this policy; isn’t that correct? A.

State v. Ieremia

78 Wash. App. 746 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jul 31, 1995

The court denied the request on the ground that the evidence established either second degree rape or no rape at all. The jury found Singh guilty as charged. … However, none of these cases establishes that third degree rape is a lesser included offense of second degree rape.

Keough v. Kittleman

74 Wash. 2d 814 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 7, 1968

The Highline Savings and Loan Association was founded in 1949, pursuant to the savings and loan statutes of the state of Washington, as a membership organization, and in 1959 its Articles of Incorporation were amended to qualify … Shaw and Keough brought this action to establish their right to serve as directors, contending that none of the depositors’ proxies held by the board could be voted, the board not being unanimous in exercising the proxies