Case law

Doty v. Town of South Prairie

155 Wash. 2d 527 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 6, 2005

The question on appeal was whether the inmate qualified for IIA medical benefits under RCW 51.12.035(2). Id. at 873. … Second, if a volunteer does qualify under RCW 51.12.035, it only provides eligibility for medical aid benefits. Coverage is not comprehensive, and immunity from liability does not attach.

Teevin v. Wyatt

75 Wash. App. 110 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jul 25, 1994

It also filed a counterclaim against Teevin for damage to the firetruck in an amount to be established at trial. … As evidence that the issue was "clearly argued” to the trial court, the City points to the "meretricious buncombe” language in its trial memorandum opposing prejudgment interest.

Mancini v. City Of Tacoma

196 Wash. 2d 864 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 28, 2021

City of Paris, 378 F.3d 476, 480- 81 (5th Cir. 2004) (denying qualified immunity and finding factual dispute where plaintiffs “offered evidence that defendants did not immediately depart after learning that they were in the … Beltran-Serrano, 193 Wn.2d at 549 (citing 11 Even if the officers in this case could claim some form of immunity, “[a]n agent’s immunity from civil liability generally does not establish a defense for the

Wright v. Colville Tribal Enterprise Corp.

147 P.3d 1275 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 7, 2006

For any business enterprise established with the express purpose of promoting tribal economic development, the extension of immunity arguably furthers "federal policies intended to promote Indian tribal autonomy." … Accordingly, we adopt a bright-line rule enabling tribes to clearly demarcate which tribal corporations are protected by tribal sovereign immunity and which are not. [1] In North Sea Products, we held that tribal immunity

Finch v. Matthews

74 Wash. 2d 161 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 18, 1968

an absolute, but only a qualified or limited immunity. … In many cases the rule of immunity of the state from the doctrine of estoppel is not stated as an absolute, but merely as a qualified, immunity.

Schwartz v. King County

Washington Supreme Court · Sep 1, 2022

We hold that Schwartz has established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the bollard was dangerous within the meaning of Washington’s recreational use immunity statute. C. … This photograph clearly shows the bollard’s visibility, no matter the alleged contrast between the bollard and the pavement.

Worthington v. WestNET

Washington Supreme Court · Jan 22, 2015

However, the ability to provide for task force immunity is qualified both by the PRA and the ICA itself. 8 First, as we noted above, the PRA explicitly subordinates all other statutes to its … Second, the ICA further qualifies the contributing agencies' ability to provide immunity for their own task forces: No agreement made pursuant to this chapter relieves any public

Snyder v. Munro

106 Wash. 2d 380 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 10, 1986

Plaintiffs are qualified registered voters residing in Washington state legislative districts 19-A, 19-B, 39-A, and 39-B. … Thus, plaintiffs claim they do not enjoy the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by citizens and qualified voters in the other districts.

State v. Tracy

158 Wash. 2d 683 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 22, 2006

We conclude that she did not establish she was a “qualifying patient” entitled to present a compassionate use defense under RCW 69.51A.010(3). … . ¶12 We turn to the meaning of “qualified physician” under the statute. Chapter 18.71 RCW establishes the statutory system which regulates physicians. Relevantly, it does two things.

Farnsworth v. Armstrong

District Court, W.D. Washington · Mar 23, 2023

and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was 12 ‘clearly established at the time.’” … It finds that it has not. 21 “For the second step in the qualified immunity analysis – whether the constitutional right 22 was clearly established at the time of the conduct – the critical question

Avellaneda v. State

167 Wash. App. 474 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 27, 2012

The court held, “If these preliminary questions can be clearly and unequivocally answered in the affirmative, then the challenged act, omission, or decision can, with a reasonable degree of assurance, be classified as *481 … In order for a decision to qualify as discretionary, the State must show that the decision was the outcome of a conscious balancing of risks and advantages. Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 214-15 .

Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Associates Engineers, Inc.

113 Wash. 2d 123 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 20, 1989

The immunity of parties and witnesses from subsequent damages liability for their testimony in judicial proceedings was well established in English common law. Cutler v. Dixon, 4 Co. Rep. 14b, 76 Eng. Rep. 886 (Q. … The present case is clearly more like Middlesex than Twelker . Byrne-Stevens was hired specifically for litigation purposes.

Andersen v. King County

158 Wash. 2d 1 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 26, 2006

” and whether respondents’ claim qualifies. … of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental: to which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state

McCluskey v. Handorff-Sherman

68 Wash. App. 96 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Dec 21, 1992

The dicta in Forks suggests a farther effort to qualify a government's duty to protect its inhabitants from third party conduct. There are unique policy reasons for limiting liability in these circumstances. … Any error in the giving of this instruction would be harmless because the jury clearly rejected the emergency theory when it found Handorff-Sherman 50 percent negligent. See Thomas v.

Shakir

District Court, W.D. Washington · May 12, 2026

immunity doctrine shields 4 government officials performing discretionary functions “from liability for civil damages 5 insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 6 rights … A two-part test resolves claims of qualified immunity 8 by determining whether plaintiffs have alleged facts that “make out a violation of a 9 constitutional right,” and if so, whether the “right at issue was ‘clearly

Silas Mason, Inc. v. State Tax Commission

188 Wash. 98 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 28, 1936

claim of immunity was upheld because the instrumentalities taxed were all so intimately connected with the necessary functions of government as to fall within the established exemption. … In a dissenting opinion, Justice Bradley, after contending that the rule established in McCulloch v.

Brown v. State

130 Wash. 2d 430 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 17, 1996

Burlington N., Inc., 105 Wn.2d 567 , 716 P.2d 855 *438 (1986) (deed in statutory form grants easement where additional language in the deed expressly and clearly limits or qualifies the interest granted); Veach v. … Rather than identifying the purpose of the conveyances, we must conduct a deed-by-deed analysis to ascertain whether the parties clearly and expressly limited or qualified the interest granted, considering the express language

Foss v. King County

District Court, W.D. Washington · May 23, 2024

Section 1983 First Amendment Retaliation Claims & Qualified Immunity 13 Defendants Alspach and Henderson—who, as law enforcement officers, investigated 14 allegations against Plaintiff—say that the doctrine of qualified … Thus, the Court may determine that there is qualified immunity on the 2 “clearly established” prong without deciding whether a constitutional violation occurred. 3 This second prong of the qualified immunity analysis

Dan Young, V. Todd S. Rayan

533 P.3d 123 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jul 24, 2023

As applied to witnesses, the privilege is sometimes referred to as witness immunity, and under it, “[a]s a general rule, witnesses in judicial proceedings are absolutely immune from suit based on their testimony.” … Bender, however, discussed the difference between doctrines of absolute and qualified (and discretionary) immunity in the abstract, not as applied to any particular set of facts. 99 Wn.2d at 600.

Clipse v. Gillis

20 Wash. App. 691 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jul 17, 1978

Counsel has not called to our attention, nor do we find from our own examination of the record, any facts which would tend to establish the illegality of the warrants, or their illegal execution. … If these preliminary questions can be clearly and unequivocally answered in the affirmative, then the challenged act, omission, or decision can, with a reasonable degree of assurance, be classified as a discretionary governmental