Shakir

1

2

3

4

5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT TACOMA

7

ZAKEE SHAKIR, CASE NO. C24-5879 BHS

8

Plaintiff, ORDER

9 v.

10 JONATHON DOUGLAS,

11 Defendant.

12

13 THIS MATTER is before the Court on defendant Jonathan Douglas’s motion for

14 summary judgment, Dkt. 46, and on pro se plaintiff Zakee Shakir’s responsive, third

15 motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 57.

16 Shakir’s complaint, Dkt. 8, alleges that on August 15, 2023, Tacoma Police

17 Officer Douglas used excessive force in arresting1 Shakir, and that the incident was

18 videotaped by the officers’ “body cams,” or Body Worn Cameras (BWC). Dkt. 8 at 6. He

19

1 Shakir was arrested on suspicion of malicious mischief and assault. He threw a rock

20 through a storefront window, repeatedly cut a construction water hose with a knife, and was

reported to have threatened a construction worker with that knife. There was apparently a knife

21 on the passenger seat of Shakir’s minivan when Douglas and Franco initially approached him, in

his vehicle near the scene of the incidents, before he was tasered and fled. Shakir pled guilty to

22 malicious mischief and resisting arrest. Dkt. 46 at 7.

1 alleges and claims that Douglas “unlawfully grabbed my right leg, twisting it, and from

2 that unlawful excessive force he broke my leg putting me in the hospital on 8-17-23.” Id.

3 Shakir alleges that Douglas “bent down and grabbed my right foot twisting my leg

4 breaking my leg on purpose intentionally under color of state law.” Id. He asserts a single

5 § 1983 claim for violation of his Fourth Amendment constitutional rights. Shakir

6 “accepts” that he was tased for non-compliance with the officers’ orders to get out of his

7 car, but “does not agree with” the use of excessive force to break his leg. Id.

8 Douglas moves for summary judgment, arguing that Shakir’s factual allegations

9 are flatly contradicted by the footage of the entire event, taken from Douglas’s BWC, and

10 especially the footage taken from non-party Officer Ruanni Franco’s BWC. Dkt. 46. The

11 videos are in the record, Dkt. 54, and the Court has reviewed them. Douglas argues that

12 Shakir cannot prove that anything Douglas did caused his broken leg, that the BWC

13 footage demonstrates the falsity of his allegations about what happened. He argues

14 Douglas’s conduct was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, and that he is

15 entitled therefore to qualified immunity even if the force he used was excessive. Dkt. 46

16 at 2.

17 Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

18 materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is “no genuine dispute as to any

19 material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

20 P. 56(a). In determining whether an issue of fact exists, the Court must view all evidence

21 in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in

22 that party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–50 (1986);

1 Bagdadi v. Nazar, 84 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1996). A genuine issue of material fact

2 exists where there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to find for the

3 nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The inquiry is “whether the evidence

4 presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-

5 sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251–52. The moving party

6 bears the initial burden of showing that there is no evidence that supports an element

7 essential to the nonmovant’s claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

8 Once the movant has met this burden, the nonmoving party then must show that there is

9 a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. If the nonmoving party fails

10 to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, “the moving party is entitled

11 to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323–24.

12 There is no requirement that the moving party negate elements of the non-

13 movant’s case. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). Once the moving

14 party has met its burden, the non-movant must then produce concrete evidence, without

15 merely relying on allegations in the pleadings, that there remain genuine factual

16 issues. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

17 Shakir’s response, and his own summary judgment motion, does not include any

18 evidence. Even if Shakir’s testimonial allegations are accepted as evidence in opposition

19 to summary judgment, they do not alter the fact that the video demonstrates that Douglas

20 did not kneel down and twist Shakir’s foot, intentionally or otherwise. The officers were

21 trying to persuade Shakir to leave his vehicle, orally and then physically. Shakir concedes

22 he resisted. While Franco held on to Shakir’s t-shirt and tried to pull him from the

1 driver’s side of the minivan, Douglas briefly pulled on the back of Shakir’s right calf,

2 trying to pull him out of the car. That effort was unsuccessful, and Douglas twice

3 deployed his taser. Shakir was nevertheless able to start the vehicle and drive off.

4 Shakir does not address what the two videos do show. Instead, he insists that

5 Douglas’s BWC has “missing footage” that would show what really happened, and

6 argues that Douglas failed to provide the entire video. He contends that he is entitled to

7 summary judgment based on the missing video.

8 These assertions are not enough to create a material question of fact about what

9 happened. The footage the Court reviewed starts before the officers’ interaction with

10 Shakir, shows them calmly but persistently telling him to get out of the car, warning him

11 that he would be tased, Shakir refusing to comply and getting tased, and nevertheless

12 driving away from Douglas and Franco. The better view is Franco’s, but it not possible

13 that Douglas intentionally or unlawfully or excessively twisted Shakir’s foot or broke

14 Shakir’s leg in the footage in evidence. The BWC footage—the only evidence in the

15 record—captures the entirety of Douglas’s interaction with Shakir, and it does not show

16 him twisting Shakir’s foot or doing anything else excessive under the circumstances. Dkt.

17 54.

18 Shakir’s burden on Douglas’s summary judgment motion is to provide evidence

19 which, viewed in the light most favorable to him, would permit a reasonable jury to find

20 in his favor. Shakir has provided no evidence; he has only asserted that Douglas’s

21 evidence is incomplete. The Court disagrees. The BWC footage is the only, and best

22

1 evidence of what happened, and it definitively does not show Douglas intentionally or

2 excessively twisting Shakir’s foot to break his leg.

3 Furthermore, and in any event, the qualified immunity doctrine shields

4 government officials performing discretionary functions “from liability for civil damages

5 insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

6 rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

7 800, 818 (1982). A two-part test resolves claims of qualified immunity

8 by determining whether plaintiffs have alleged facts that “make out a violation of a

9 constitutional right,” and if so, whether the “right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the

10 time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)

11 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001)).

12 Qualified immunity protects officials “who act in ways they reasonably believe to

13 be lawful.” Garcia v. County of Merced, 639 F.3d 1206, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011)

14 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)). The reasonableness inquiry

15 is objective, evaluating whether an official’s actions are “objectively reasonable” in light

16 of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent

17 or motivation. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)).

18 Even if an official’s decision is constitutionally deficient, qualified immunity

19 shields her from suit if her misapprehension about the law applicable to the

20 circumstances was reasonable. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). As

21 a privilege from suit, not merely from liability, qualified immunity “gives ample room for

22

1 mistaken judgments” and protects “all but the plainly incompetent.” Hunter v. Bryant,

2 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986)).

3 For a constitutional right to be clearly established, a Court must define the right at

4 issue with specificity, and not at a high level of generality. Gordon v. County of Orange,

5 6 F.4th 961, 968 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing City of Escondido v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 42

6 (2019)). The Court’s goal is to “define the contours of the right allegedly violated in a

7 way that expresses what is really being litigated.” Id. at 969 (citation omitted). Qualified

8 immunity is not meant to be analyzed in terms of a “general constitutional guarantee,”

9 but rather the application of constitutional principles “in a particular context.” Id.

10 (internal citations omitted). Ultimately, “the prior precedent must be ‘controlling’—from

11 the Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court—or otherwise be embraced by a ‘consensus’ of

12 courts outside the relevant jurisdiction.” Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Wesby, 538

13 U.S. 48, 63 (2019)).

14 The plaintiff bears the burden of proof that the right allegedly violated was clearly

15 established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Id.; see also Romero v. Kitsap County,

16 931 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1991). However, because resolving whether the asserted federal

17 right was clearly established presents a pure question of law, the Court draws on its ‘‘full

18 knowledge’’ of relevant precedent rather than restricting its review to cases identified by

19 the plaintiff. Gordon, 6 F.4th at 969 (citing Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994)).

20 Shakir has not provided any authority for the proposition that a reasonable officer

21 in Douglas’s position would have known that his conduct was unconstitutional. The video

22 does not show “plain incompetence”; it shows that Shakir was actively resisting arrest

1 and the officers reasonably trying to pull him from his vehicle, and to keep him away

2 from the knife in that vehicle. On this evidence, Douglas is entitled to qualified immunity

3 as a matter of law.

4 Douglas’s summary judgment motion, Dkt. 46, is GRANTED, and Shakir’s §

5 1983 claim against him is DISMISSED with prejudice. Shakir’s motion for summary

6 judgment, Dkt. 57, is DENIED.

7 The Clerk shall enter a JUDGMENT and close the case.

8 IT IS SO ORDERED.

9 Dated this 12th day of May, 2026.

A

10

11

BENJAMIN H. SETTLE

12

United States District Judge

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22