Case law

Commonwealth v. Lodge

431 Mass. 461 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 12, 2000

Had Detective Barnicle been qualified based on his experience, it would have been within the judge’s discretion to admit this evidence. See State v. … The motion to suppress lists six grounds, five of which clearly do not address the issue. One ground is that the actions of the police “unlawfully exceeded the bounds of permissible inquiry.”

McIntyre v. White (In Re McIntyre)

328 B.R. 356 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 22, 2005

In the instant case, Debtor seeks a determination of whether the current debt he owes continues to qualify as non-dis-chargeable alimony or whether because of Mrs. McIntyre’s death, it has assumed a new character. … While these two cases give effect to the plain language of the statute, their holdings produce a result clearly at odds with Congress’s avowed intent.

Hicks v. MassDOT

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 5, 2021

This court subsequently granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to procced in forma pauperis, but ordered Plaintiff to “clearly set[] out his claims” and “identify the alleged misconduct that constitutes the discrimination … Moreover, even if Plaintiff could bring an employment discrimination claim under Title II, Plaintiff still could not overcome the sovereign immunity problem. In Tennessee v.

Comfort Ex Rel. Neumyer v. Lynn School Committee

283 F. Supp. 2d 328 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 5, 2003

See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 182 , 107 S.Ct. 1053 (finding significant the fact that a racial classification prefers only qualified applicants of one race for hiring or promotion, and that the impact on qualified applicants … The evidence clearly establishes a risk of reversion to segregation, but of a de facto nature.

Commonwealth v. Zavala

52 Mass. App. Ct. 770 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Oct 10, 2001

Here, the evidence was clearly insufficient as matter of law as to the identity of the defendant being the person previously arrested for narcotic offenses. … In any event, Diaz was a qualified expert and the defendant does not argue otherwise.

Reardon v. United States

731 F. Supp. 558 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 6, 1990

The First Circuit has clearly recognized that this provision “merely waives sovereign immunity, but does not authorize a suit unless there are jurisdictional grounds independent of the statute.” Remis v. … The federal lien, however, clearly is not "an action” to recover response costs.

AngioDynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec AG

991 F. Supp. 2d 299 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 18, 2014

In sum, the complaint clearly offers a more than adequate legal and factual basis for piercing the corporate veil. … Their goal, quite clearly, was to prevent Plaintiff from being indemnified and, subsequently, from recovering the resulting New York judgment.

Green v. City of Lynn

55 F. 516 · U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts · Apr 7, 1893

Hovey was put in evidence, the same being clearly rele vant,: — not as a deposition, but as an admission. … Andrews seem to determine clearly its true nature: On page 57, 122 U. S., and page 1083, 7 Sup. Ct.

Beeler v. Downey

387 Mass. 609 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 12, 1982

The first paragraph outlines the screening functions of the tribunal and establishes the standard by which its determination is to be made. … Thus, this question is not a “clearly independent issue raised here for the first time.” Royal Indem. Co. v. Blakely, supra at 88 .

Fraco Products, Ltd. v. Bostonian Masonry Corp.

84 Mass. App. Ct. 296 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Sep 26, 2013

injuries could be attributed both to the manufacturer of a product used by the plaintiff’s employer in the construction process and to the negligence of the employer in the use of the product — for which the employer was immune … Even if Fraco were to establish that its only liability related to the installation of the equipment, and that its employees were “borrowed servants” of Bostonian when participating in the installation of Machine No. 10,

Glovsky v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc.

469 Mass. 752 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 10, 2014

Glovsky’s complaint alleges that he felt “intimidated” by this delivery of Roche Bros.’ policy and “threatened by the inherent consequences he understood could result if he acted against such a clearly stated prohibition. … Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910 (1979) (distinguishing “modest retail establishment”).

Gumley v. Gumley

59 Mass. App. Dec. 139 · Massachusetts District Court, Appellate Division · Dec 1, 1976

In May of 1971, the defendant bought the house in which he presently resides in Deerfield, Massachusetts, and established residence there immediately. … Among the various methods prescribed by the act for the service of process in proceedings against non-residents, it is provided that such service might be made by a duly qualified attorney, barrister or equivalent in such

Mediplex of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Shalala

39 F. Supp. 2d 88 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 19, 1999

. *91 A.The Programs Medicare is a federally-administered program that provides funding for a range of medical services directed to qualifying elderly or disabled people. … To qualify for funding from either program, a facility must be certified periodically based on on-site surveys as meeting a series of health and safety requirements.

In re Angelo

480 B.R. 70 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 27, 2012

Robinson contends that the Award qualifies because it is in the nature support. Angelo contends that no part of the Award is support. … For these reasons, the second requirement for judicial estoppel is established.

Luna v. COM. OF MASSACHUSETTS

224 F. Supp. 2d 302 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 26, 2002

decision will also be contrary to th[e] Court’s clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e] Court and nevertheless arrives at a … “Unreasonable Application of’ Standard The Supreme Court in Williams held that a state court decision would involve an ‘unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it “identifies the correct

Commonwealth v. Smith

92 Mass. 448 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 15, 1865

The franchise to be a corporation clearly cannot be fi'ansferred by any corporate body, of its own will. Such a franchise is not, in its own nature, transmissible. … Having once established its road, if that and its franchise of managing, using and taking tolls or fares upon the same are alienated, its whole power to perform its most important functions is at an end.

Daigle v. De Gregorio Construction Corp.

3 Mass. L. Rptr. 571 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 4, 1995

Plaintiff failed to establish how much overtime he worked per week and the court will not speculate as to this fact. … Clearly, the current version of the prevailing wage law, G.L.c. 149, §27, affects liability as it would subject a defendant to significantly increased damages: indeed, the statute creates a new substantive cause of action

81 Spooner Road, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Brookline

461 Mass. 692 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 20, 2012

The judge stated that it was unclear from the record whether George’s property satisfied the 300-feet requirement, but, in any event, it was irrelevant whether he qualified as a party in interest. … L. c. 40A to establish standing to challenge a zoning decision. See Cohen v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Plymouth, 35 Mass. App.

Fernandes v. UNION BOOKBINDING CO. IONICS, INC.

400 Mass. 27 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 14, 1987

Without question, Union qualifies as a sophisticated maker of the spacers which it manufactured for Ionics. … He established that the “clutch . . . *32 worked very well” and “functioned properly” when he put sufficient compressed air into the system.

Schmid v. National Bank of Greece, S.A.

622 F. Supp. 704 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 14, 1985

Abraham is not immune from tort liability simply because he was acting as an officer of F.B.A.C. when he withdraw the funds. LaClair v. Silberline Mfg. Co., Inc. 379 Mass. 21 , 393 N.E.2d 867 (1979). … Clearly, it was Schmid’s understanding that he would give the release to Abraham, Spiliakos and F.B.A.C. only if he would get $100,000 from Ala Fadili.