Case law

Christensen v. Lawrence F. Quigley Memorial Hospital

656 F. Supp. 14 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 1, 1985

Defendant hired three women in 1981 who allegedly were less qualified than plaintiff. … In addition, the court is not convinced that the pleading standards established by the First Circuit have not been met, albeit barely. In Dewey v.

Morse v. Kraft

466 Mass. 92 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 29, 2013

The plaintiff believes the transfer of assets to the new subtrusts to be in the best interests of the 1982 Trust beneficiaries from a management perspective: each of the Kraft sons is now in his forties, and is well qualified … it termed “[t]he general rule [of trust construction] . . . that the power vested in a trustee to [make distributions] in fee includes the power to create or appoint [trust property in] less than a fee unless the donor clearly

Hall v. Priest

72 Mass. 18 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 1856

The words, “ dying without issue,” unless explained or qualified by other expressions, have acquired a distinct and well understood meaning, by a uniform series of decisions both in this country and in England. … This proviso cuts down the fee, and clearly creates an estate tail in each of his eight children in one ninth of his real estate, with cross remainders over in fee to the brothers and sisters, on the determination of the

Moriarty v. Sullivan

21 Mass. L. Rptr. 254 · Massachusetts Superior Court · May 16, 2006

MHC’s Motion to Dismiss Counts 24-29 of Moriarty’s Complaint The purpose of Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is to “permit prompt resolution of a case where the allegations in the complaint clearly demonstrate that the plaintiffs claim … Here, for the reasons established above, MHC did not owe a duty to Moriarty. See O’Connell, 37 Mass.App.Ct. at 419 .

Union of Concerned Scientists v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 27, 2019

The starting point for analysis is the waiver of sovereign immunity in the APA. … “Under settled principles of sovereign immunity, ‘the United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit, save as it consents to be sued and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction

Jumper Development Group v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transport, Inc.)

108 B.R. 378 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 18, 1989

Balco’s impressive credentials qualified him as an expert witness. He indicated that GZA prepared and modified a Project Operations and Investigation Plan for the Olympia Avenue site and monitored the clean-up. … Judge Mikva, in an dissenting opinion in another circuit case, stated: This definition clearly encompasses more than the everyday meaning of disposal, which is a “discarding or throwing away.”

Kupperstein v. Baker

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 21, 2021

Hoyos, 151 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1998) (“The right to be free from unreasonable seizure (and, by extension, unjustified arrest and detention) is clearly established in the jurisprudence of the Fourteenth Amendment (through … Nevertheless, the Supreme Judicial Court has clearly stated that this language does not constitute a waiver of the Commonwealth’s Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court. Irwin v.

Commonwealth v. Lodge

431 Mass. 461 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 12, 2000

Had Detective Barnicle been qualified based on his experience, it would have been within the judge’s discretion to admit this evidence. See State v. … The motion to suppress lists six grounds, five of which clearly do not address the issue. One ground is that the actions of the police “unlawfully exceeded the bounds of permissible inquiry.”

Great Northern Insurance v. McCollister's Moving & Storage, Inc.

190 F. Supp. 2d 91 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 11, 2001

Orboteeh clearly met the first requirement by making a claim on May 8, 1997. … GNIC seeks to avoid the Carmack Amendment by arguing that McCollister’s May 9, 1997, denial of its claim was nothing more than a qualified disallowance.

S. S. White Dental Manufacturing Co. v. Commonwealth

212 Mass. 35 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 24, 1912

Under this condition of the law, foreign corporations engaged in ordinary trade enjoyed distinct immunities over domestic corporations. Boston Investment Co. v. Boston, 158 Mass. 461 . … These cases seem clearly distinguishable from, the case at bar. They *47 each relate to a railroad corporation which, as said in the opinion in Southern Railway v.

Gent v. Teradyne, Inc.

24 Mass. L. Rptr. 56 · Massachusetts Superior Court · May 8, 2008

His right being a qualified one, he fails if his petition and proof are insufficient to bring his case within the limitations of this common law right. … The Court also relied at least in part, however, on the failure to specify the records sought — a deficiency that is clearly not present here. Gavin, supra, 335 Mass. at 238 .

National Ass'n of Government Employees v. Mulligan

849 F. Supp. 2d 167 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 20, 2012

Where, as here, federal or state prosecutors anticipate bringing related criminal charges against one or more defendants to a civil action, “it is well established” that such parties may intervene to seek a stay of discovery … immunity and the disputed facts which gave rise to the claim.

Cluff v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance

99 Mass. 317 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 1868

The papers were clearly inadmissible upon the principal issue. … As thus qualified, and applied to the case *329 then presented upon the exceptions, this court did affirm the instruction.

Blacksmith Investments, LLC v. Woodford (In Re Woodford)

403 B.R. 177 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 14, 2009

statement that the annuity was ERISA-qualified. … Laws ch. 235, § 34A, 5 he argues that his annuity is ERISA-qualified and further that an ERISA-qualified annuity is not property of the bankruptcy estate.

Beeler v. Downey

387 Mass. 609 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 12, 1982

The first paragraph outlines the screening functions of the tribunal and establishes the standard by which its determination is to be made. … Thus, this question is not a “clearly independent issue raised here for the first time.” Royal Indem. Co. v. Blakely, supra at 88 .

AngioDynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec AG

991 F. Supp. 2d 299 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 18, 2014

In sum, the complaint clearly offers a more than adequate legal and factual basis for piercing the corporate veil. … Their goal, quite clearly, was to prevent Plaintiff from being indemnified and, subsequently, from recovering the resulting New York judgment.

477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE Boston, LLC

477 Mass. 162 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 23, 2017

It may first establish "by a preponderance of the evidence that the [special movant] lacked  11 any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis … As with the similar doctrine of qualified immunity for government officials, the special motion inquiry is "separate from the merits of the underlying action . . . even though a reviewing court must consider the [nonmoving

Green v. City of Lynn

55 F. 516 · U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts · Apr 7, 1893

Hovey was put in evidence, the same being clearly rele vant,: — not as a deposition, but as an admission. … Andrews seem to determine clearly its true nature: On page 57, 122 U. S., and page 1083, 7 Sup. Ct.

Spillane v. Adams

76 Mass. App. Ct. 378 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 2, 2010

We accept a judge’s findings of fact unless they are “clearly erroneous.” Mass.R.Civ.P. 52(a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1402 (1996). … The Spillanes highlight the qualified nature of the title examiner’s report and, as with case no. 7143, point to the case’s lack of conclusive legal application to the case at bar.

Celester v. Rodriguez

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 24, 2023

Against the backdrop of the foregoing cases, the Appeals Court’s decision does not constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. … For this reason, it simply cannot be held that the Appeals Court unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law.