Case law

Maryland Attorney General Opinion 99OAG088

Maryland Attorney General Reports · Aug 20, 2014

We emphasize, in this context, that the applicants must indeed be qualified. … Jan. 12, 1998) (aspirational documents and policy to recruit broadest possible applicant pool and hire the most qualified did not establish a “tendency to discriminate”).

Smith v. State

63 Md. App. 311 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · May 20, 1985

Therefore, this man, I will now rule, is not immune in the legal sense of the Court in the term of art used, but the charges cannot be reinstituted against him under the Megrogan case. … However, I want him to clearly understand, Mr. Kenkel, that has to do with this case, this indictment. ...

Moosavi v. State

118 Md. App. 683 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jan 7, 1998

He seemed to believe that the Chevy Chase Bank was located in Frederick but was clearly unsure. … An issue does not qualify for appellate consideration simply because of its close association with other issues that are properly before the Court. In DeGroft v.

SUPERVISOR OF ASSESSMENTS OF MONTGOMERY CTY. v. Asbury Methodist Home, Inc.

72 Md. App. 352 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Sep 2, 1987

CONCLUSION Asbury’s provision of apartment housing facilities with a life-care commitment, relieving the fear of exhausted life’s savings, is clearly a charitable use of property. … McRory, who qualified as an expert on housing in Montgomery County, opined that Asbury was a unique and ingenious way of providing housing for the elderly.

Jacques v. First National Bank

62 Md. App. 54 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jun 28, 1985

They were first told that the maximum loan for which they qualified was $74,000, an amount Mr. Jacques indicated he would accept [1] and subsequently, that the amount was $41,400. … When the Jacques tendered, and the bank accepted, the mortgage loan application, a business relationship was established. [6] Acceptance of the application for processing clearly indicated the bank's willingness to "deal"

Consolidated Gas Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore

105 Md. 43 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Feb 13, 1907

In the opinion referred to the Court considered the question at length (p. 487 to 493), and explained very clearly and satisfactorily the difference which exists between a body of men proceeding under a law of that kind, … From this statement it cannot be doubted that they are generally qualified as experts upon the subject of inquiry in this case.

Rendelman v. State

73 Md. App. 329 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Mar 30, 1988

The three judge panel was without jurisdiction to render a decision following the termination of the thirty day period established by statute. V. … The right of appeal from the order of a sentence review panel is clearly not within the contemplation of Courts Art. § 12-301.

Maryland Clay Co. v. Goodnow

95 Md. 330 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Feb 15, 1902

This testimony was absolutely uncontradicted, and if it does not establish negligence in the construction of the trestle, I am at a loss to understand how it could be established by any testimony. … though there .may be subordinate and - independent causes in operation, must be looked to in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties concerned. * * * * And no wrongdoer ought to be allowed to apportion or qualify

Downs v. Reighard

265 Md. 344 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Apr 12, 1972

He had testified as an expert witness in regard to value of real estate in the Circuit Courts for Baltimore County and Harford County and is a qualified appraiser for the State Roads Commission. … We do not find that the findings of fact of the trial court, sitting without a jury, were clearly erroneous, Maryland Rule 886, nor, in our opinion, were his conclusions in error.

109OAG32

Maryland Attorney General Reports · May 10, 2024

See COMAR 09.24.01.06C-E (establishing ethical limits on CPAs’ other services). … A CPA who merely asks the client these questions and notes the answers would clearly not be practicing law.

Riley v. TECHNICAL AND MANAGEMENT SERVICES CORP.

872 F. Supp. 1454 · District Court, D. Maryland · Jan 11, 1995

She emphasizes that she was more qualified for the position. Carros Dec. at ¶¶ 20-22. However, unlike Carros, Mr. … Therefore, Riley has not established a prima facie case of gender discrimination. Assuming arguendo that she has established a prima facie case, she still cannot avoid summary judgment.

Cossio v. Life Ins. Co. of North America

240 F. Supp. 2d 388 · District Court, D. Maryland · Nov 25, 2002

In this letter, Defendant listed its reasons for terminating Plaintiffs benefits and concluded that the evidence in Plaintiffs file did not establish a disability from “any occupation.” … Thereafter, the employee is covered under the policy only if she is disabled from any occupation for which she may become qualified based on education, training, and experience.

Abner v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.

180 Md. App. 685 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jul 3, 2008

The subcontractor appealed, arguing that § 12-303(1) was applicable, in that the right of possession is ultimately determined if a mechanic’s lien is *692 established and the property is sold at foreclosure. … Clearly, [the subcontractor] has no present right to possession and whether any such right may ultimately exist is purely speculative.

Gruber v. Unum Life Insurance Co. of America

195 F. Supp. 2d 711 · District Court, D. Maryland · Mar 11, 2002

In so finding, courts cite the “firmly established federal policy favoring exhaustion of administrative remedies in ERISA cases.” Alfarone v. … Plaintiffs case does not rise to this standard, and is clearly distinguishable from a recent decision by one of our sister courts finding that futility existed.

Sullivan v. Easco Corp.

662 F. Supp. 1396 · District Court, D. Maryland · Jun 16, 1987

Paper #37, Siske, Freeman, Haber, Klein & Schewe, Non-Qualified Executive Compensation Considerations For Executives of the Acquired Company, Practicing Law Institute Series on Non-Qualified Executive Compensation (J. … Clearly, Sullivan has satisfied his burden of documentation with respect to attorney’s fees.

Logan v. Dietz

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Aug 2, 2023

Clearly, RP § 11B-116 itself only authorizes a “homeowners association”—not individual unit owners—to amend a governing document with 60% approval. … As we have discussed, for Dietz and the other homeowners to rely on § 11B-116 of the Act, there had to be a qualifying homeowners association, which in turn required a qualifying declaration.

Shallow Run Ltd. Partnership v. State Highway Administration

113 Md. App. 156 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Dec 27, 1996

Gray, The Law of Torts § 27.2, at 136 (2d ed.1986) (if the source of a landowner’s immunity is that he is not charged with knowledge of a trespasser’s presence, then the same immunity should be applied to the holder of an … It established the then present location of the easement and reserved to the State the right to reasonable modification, i.e., relocation.

Payne v. Payne

136 Md. 551 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jun 17, 1920

The will was duly executed and attested, and on the testator’s death was duly probated, and the executor appears to have qualified and entered upon the administration of the estate. … On the other hand it is equally well established that every intendment is to be made against holding a man to be intestate who sits down to dispose of the rest and residue of his; property.

Manuel v. State

85 Md. App. 1 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Nov 14, 1990

The wiretaps and the staged heroin transaction clearly establish the connection between and the roles of the appellants in the drug ring. … This evidence was clearly sufficient to support Ohakwe’s conviction for conspiracy to distribute heroin.

Antwerpen v. Baltimore County

163 Md. App. 194 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jul 7, 2005

Not only does the use designated in Section 233.2 not utilize either the words “new” or “used,” but the uses described in Sections 233.2 and 236.4 above are clearly different. … Even if the special exception was never “declared” invalid, it was never a final valid special exception, which would qualify respondent to begin to vest rights in a zoning approval.