Case law

State v. Rypkema

191 N.J. Super. 388 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Aug 31, 1983

Such an assertion extends the prescriptions espoused in Schmerber *392 well beyond that which was intended, and is clearly without merit. … That is, without some scintilla of evidence that could place the chemical integrity of the blood sample in doubt, [1] proof that such sample was obtained in a hospital and by qualified medical personnel will suffice to establish

Kuller v. Fire Assn. of Philadelphia

124 N.J. Eq. 473 · New Jersey Court of Chancery · Nov 29, 1938

The uncontradicted proof is clearly to the contrary. … In this connection and for that purpose, she testified that, with the exception of the brief occasion on January 8th, 1934, when she conveyed the property to one Moritz Stuhlbach merely for the purpose of enabling him to qualify

Mills v. City of Philadelphia

52 N.J. Super. 52 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Sep 2, 1958

Such does not clearly seem to be the intention of the testatrix. … Both have qualified.

Burke v. Director, Division of Taxation

11 N.J. Tax 29 · New Jersey Tax Court · Feb 22, 1990

Clearly, in this case, the trust at issue is not devoted to exclusively charitable or public purposes. … It is plaintiffs’ burden, N.J.S.A. 54A:9-9(e), to establish that the trust at issue fits clearly within the exemption provision. Board of National Missions v. Neeld, 9 N.J. 349, 353 , 88 A.2d 500 (1952).

Estate of Ehringer v. Director, Division of Taxation

24 N.J. Tax 599 · New Jersey Tax Court · Apr 30, 2009

The record contains no evidence establishing who wrote those notations, when they were written, or what they purport to convey. … Fauver, 167 N.J. 69, 75-78 , 768 A.2d 1055 (2001) (holding that a waiver of governmental immunity must be clearly expressed in a statute).

Baldwin v. Taylor

37 N.J. Eq. 78 · New Jersey Court of Chancery · May 15, 1883

I am aware that the general rule is established in England that where the context is silent, the words referring to the prior death of the legatee, in connection with some collateral event, apply to the happening of the contingency … R. (7 H. of L.) 388. *82 But I am clearly of opinion that the words under consideration were not used by the testator to express an intention to limit the gifts over, but only as a provision as to who should receive them

Brown v. United States

496 F. Supp. 903 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Sep 12, 1980

If the statute of limitations applies, the argument is that consent to suit by waiver of sovereign immunity does not *905 exist, and so there is no subject-matter jurisdiction. … Reference to the 1900 census figures shows that counties so qualifying (in addition to Essex) were Camden, Hudson and Passaic.

In re Registrant J.W.

410 N.J. Super. 125 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Sep 28, 2009

These mandatory time limits, we believe, were established to balance a Registrant’s need for adequate preparation time with the clearly expressed legislative concern in adopting Megan’s Law that members of the public receive … There are facts that, in our view, clearly warrant higher static criteria scoring.

Leach v. Anderl

218 N.J. Super. 18 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 28, 1987

These conceptual gymnastics can be avoided by the analytically sound view that ownership is itself a bundle of rights, privileges, powers and immunities, and that what a conveyor means by either reserving or excepting an … Here, the use appears not only to have been permissive, but it was also clearly non-exclusive.

Il v. Nj Dept. of Human Services

389 N.J. Super. 354 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 25, 2006

The record clearly establishes that I.L.' … However there is a long established principle in law that prevents I.L. from establishing the eligibility necessary to allow Absecon to bill for its services.

In Re Weston

36 N.J. 258 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 18, 1961

They also testified that an optometrist, by education and training, is qualified to perform all the tests. Assuming that all the experts were credible, at best we have here a reasonable difference of opinion. … Clearly the discovery of such departures from the normal would be in the interests of the public welfare. It is not enough to say that other procedures would be more appropriate to that end.

Marsa v. Wernik

86 N.J. 232 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 8, 1981

Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-773 , 93 S.Ct. 2955, 2965 , 37 L.Ed.2d 948, 962-963 (1973), viz: [T]o pass muster under the Establishment Clause the law in question, first, must reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose, second … Finding the readings clearly a religious activity, the Court said “the constitutional prohibition against law respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the business of

In re Ocean County College

204 N.J. Super. 24 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 9, 1985

These subsections clearly apply to the holder of a position in the service of a public employer. … PERC’s rejection of these reasons clearly was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.

L'Hommedieu v. L'Hommedieu

98 N.J. Eq. 554 · New Jersey Court of Chancery · Dec 17, 1925

The executor testified to a conversation with his testator, which clearly showed that the latter was much concerned about the future of his son where dominion over money was involved. … upon the defendant Arthur an absolute right of property in the income of his father's estate, but the effect of the testimony would be to entirely change the testamentary disposition so that the legatee would have only a qualified

Property Owners v. Mayor

264 N.J. Super. 538 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 19, 1993

III We find plaintiffs claim of entitlement to damages and counsel fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 is clearly without merit. … In refusing to provide plaintiffs with customized solid waste collection, they have not been deprived of any "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws...." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; Parratt v.

Guaman v. Velez

421 N.J. Super. 239 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 12, 2011

In 2005, the Legislature adopted The Family Health Care Coverage Act (FHCCA), N.J.S.A. 30:4J-8 to-19, which re-established, reformed, and expanded a prior program to provide subsidized health insurance coverage to qualifying … Thus, the court held that: Congress has established a uniform federal policy for certain federally-funded benefits.

In Re Fortenbach

119 N.J. Super. 124 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 19, 1972

Many persons with arrest records do not even qualify for such a second "trial," since the disclosure of any previous arrests disqualify them pro se and instanter. … Clearly, then, since the statute authorizes, under certain conditions, the expungement of a conviction for "lewdness," a fortiori why not the arrest?

Hawksby v. Depietro

319 N.J. Super. 89 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 9, 1999

. *91 The record does not clearly establish whether the tumor was removed surgically. We are unaware of the prognosis. In January 1995, Hawksby filed a workers’ compensation petition against the New York Times. … In this vein, the language in section 8 immunizing co-employees leaves little room for maneuver.

Haack v. Ranieri

83 N.J. Super. 526 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 20, 1964

never qualified. … The court stated the purpose of R.S. 40:87-9 as follows: "* * * The object and policy of the statute are clearly to guard against actual vacancies in the councilmanic body and a construction is required that will effectuate

Cole National Corp. v. State Board of Examiners of Ophthalmic Dispensers & Ophthalmic Technicians

57 N.J. 227 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 7, 1970

Unless clearly ultra vires on their face, the person attacking them has the burden of proving otherwise. In re Weston, 36 N. J. 358 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U. S. 864 , 83 S. Ct. 1029 , 8 L. … Licensed Dispensers are thereby immunized against competition and enjoy an exclusive control of the market. This is patently not the purpose for which the statute was enacted.