Case law

Rayl v. General Motors Corp.

121 Ind. App. 608 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 5, 1951

Williston, upon whom the appellants strongly rely, limits or qualifies the above rule with these words: “In some cases, however, stress is laid on the fact that inspection would have revealed the defect. … We think the evidence shows without contradiction that the appellee inspected and accepted the merchandise in controversy but clearly these facts constitute no bar to the present suit unless the appellee failed to give the

Keith v. Mendus

661 N.E.2d 26 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 12, 1996

However, we need not determine the admissibility of these state *37 ments because sufficient other evidence establishes an issue of material fact. … In any case we need not address today whether a non-supervisory employee acting within the scope of his employment is immune from tort liability for interfering with another employee’s contractual relationship.

Keifer v. State

204 Ind. 454 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 23, 1933

It appears that upon direct examination the witness, a physician and surgeon, after qualifying as an expert upon the subject of the reaction of the muscles at the time of the death of a person as a result of gun shot wounds … was assumed as established and the witness was asked what preliminary facts, in his opinion as an expert, must have existed to establish the fact assumed.

Todd George v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 19, 2019

In challenging the admission of this testimony, George asserts that the State failed to establish that Morris, the forensic nurse who treated L.G., qualified as an expert witness. … And only one characteristic is necessary to qualify an individual as an expert.

Nave v. Flack

90 Ind. 205 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 15, 1883

It is contended that the word “accident” qualifies the instruction and makes it correctly express the law. We do not think so. … Knowledge is always an important matter for consideration, but it does not always establish contributory negligence.

Tinder v. Tinder

131 Ind. 381 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 21, 1892

The restrictive words in the deed before us are unquestionably clearer and stronger than was the qualifying word “ present ” in the deed construed in the case to which we have referred. … This was clearly not only the intention of the grantor, but it is the obvious meaning of the language.” In the case of Tharp v. Yarbrough, 79 Ga. 382 ( 11 Am. St.

GREATER HAMMOND COMMUNITY SERV., INC. v. Mutka

735 N.E.2d 780 · Indiana Supreme Court · Sep 21, 2000

GHCS points to certain facts it believes qualify it for treatment as a governmental entity under this test. We examine these under the standard on appeal for summary judgment. … In World Productions, the Court of Appeals was called upon to decide whether the Capital Improvement Board was a governmental entity immune from claims for punitive damages.

Powers v. State

696 N.E.2d 865 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 8, 1998

To establish sudden heat, the defendant must show “sufficient provocation to engender ... passion.” Johnson v. State, 518 N.E.2d 1073, 1077 (Ind.1988). … Kyran’s crying did not constitute the provocation necessary to qualify defendant’s actions as “sudden heat.” See Patterson v.

City of Louisville v. Babb

7 F. Supp. 658 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jun 7, 1934

The language used in the enacting clause of such statute is clearly a declaration and in no way affects the purpose for which the legislation was enacted. … Kentucky, supra: “Clearly, the tax was not a tax on the interstate business carried on over or by means of the bridge, because the bridge company did not transact such business.

Wachowski v. Beke

756 N.E.2d 990 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 11, 2001

. § 31-19-9-15 3 is not jurisdictional, and *997 the trial court should have concluded that his irrevocable implied consent was inequitable because his behavior clearly evinced an intent to establish parental rights. … Specifically, I.C. § 31-19-9-15 clearly states that a putative father forgoes his right to establish paternity of the child if he fails to file his paternity action within thirty days of receiving notice of the potential

Menges v. Depuy Motech, Inc.

61 F. Supp. 2d 817 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Jun 11, 1999

McKenzie’s credentials qualified him as an expert his opinion is unreliable. … To establish a product defect in this case, Menges offers the testimony of Dr. Alexander, Ph.D. 8 Dr.

Billingsley v. State

960 N.E.2d 882 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 30, 2012

She asserts, however, that the State produced insufficient evidence at trial to establish judgment under one of the predicate offenses. … Trotter’s certified BMV record, which showed that Trotter’s license had been suspended, but did not show that Trotter had received a previous driving while suspended conviction,” and that here, by contrast, the BMV Record “clearly

Sager v. Moltz

80 Ind. App. 122 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 7, 1923

The instrument was duly admitted to probate by the Porter Circuit Court on January 15, 1920, and appellee Peirce, executor, duly qualified as such. … From these authorities it clearly appears that, unless there was such a waiver upon the part of the one who stands in the place of the decedent, the admission of such testimony was error. But in Morris v.

SPENCER v. WEISNER

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Feb 9, 2022

Qualified Immunity The defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. … "Qualified immunity is a doctrine that protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

Rogers v. Rogers

876 N.E.2d 1121 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 20, 2007

At some point, A.R.R. was diagnosed with immune deficiency, and she struggled with constant sickness in her younger years. … Because the trial court is charged with determining the credibility of the witnesses, the findings or judgment will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Id.

City of Terre Haute v. Simpson

746 N.E.2d 359 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 30, 2001

II, Was Lisa emancipated at the time of her death such that she did not qualify as Simpson's "child" within the meaning of the Act? III. … There is no explicit requirement under the act that the deceased be "unemancipated" at common law to qualify as a "child." The City points to the case of Wallace v.

Indiana University Health Southern Indiana Physicians, Inc. v. Charlene Noel

114 N.E.3d 479 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 7, 2018

The rule, however, sets forth criteria for establishing preferred venue under ten separate subsections. … [25] I.C. § 23-0.5-4-12 clearly conflicts with T.R. 75(A)(4) as the rule has been interpreted by our Supreme Court.9 As set forth above, in American Family, the Court was concerned with the meaning of

Keener School Township v. Eudaly

93 Ind. App. 627 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 31, 1931

Hart now is and since January 1, 1927, has been the elected, qualified and acting township trustee of Keener Township, Jasper County, and that Morgan L. … This action is clearly an action for breach of contract.

United States Cement Co. v. Cooper

172 Ind. 599 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 28, 1909

If the general purpose of the legislation clearly appears from a study of all the parts, that purpose cannot be defeated or limited by the doctrine we are considering. Webber v. … The term “all” qualifies each class or genus of things here specified, and we necessarily must imply that nothing remains of either class ejnsdem generis for the general words of the phrase to embrace.

Taurean Jones v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 9, 2016

And I think that clearly that is not in his best interest nor in the best interest of the State of Indiana. … Olive was just as qualified to render an opinion regarding Jones’s competency. We infer that the trial court chose to credit Dr. Olive’s opinion over Dr.