Case law

Marini v. Ireland

56 N.J. 130 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 18, 1970

Exceptions to the broad immunity inevitably developed.” The guidelines employed to construe contracts have been modernly applied to the construction of leases. 3 Thompson *142 on Real Property 377 (1959). … It could be argued that every such ease qualifies for removal to the Superior Court.

TEEL v. ELIASEN

District Court, D. New Jersey · Jul 9, 2019

Qualified Immunity The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officers from civil liability under Section 1983 “so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly … At the second step, courts “decide whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of [the] defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id.

Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.

121 N.J. 69 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 26, 1990

That Act provides that states may not establish or continue “a requirement applicable to such substance * * * unless such requirement is identical to the warning established pursuant to the Act.” … Section 3a(2) also modifies the method of analyzing “obvious danger” as established in Campos v.

Leah Coleman v. Sonia Martinez (084489) (Camden County & Statewide)

Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 15, 2021

Martinez filed a motion for summary judgment based on the following assertions: she was immune from liability under N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16; the harm to Coleman was unforeseeable as a matter of law; Coleman failed to establish … “Had the Legislature intended to confer immunity” on licensed social workers, it would have stated so, Murray v.

New Amsterdam v. National Newark

117 N.J. Eq. 264 · New Jersey Court of Chancery · Dec 5, 1934

On the contrary, it is established that they and each of them acted in utmost good faith. … The bank it is submitted should not be liable unless some officer or employe had actual knowledge of the depositor's misconduct or knowledge of facts so clearly indicating such misconduct as to show that the bank was guilty

Caminiti v. Board of Trustees

431 N.J. Super. 1 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 30, 2013

After hearing from appellant and expert witnesses from both sides, the ALJ concluded that appellant qualified for accidental disability because, as a reasonable sheriffs officer in 2000, he could have suffered a qualifying … The Court found that “prolonged exposure” clearly failed to meet the traumatic event requirement as that term had been defined for purposes of accidental disability pensions. Id. at 51 , 942 A.2d 782 .

Wasserman v. Tannenbaum

23 N.J. Super. 599 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 11, 1952

It is the established rule in all jurisdictions that this statute must be strictly construed. … Laws (Tent.) §§ 431, 432, although there is authority that, because of the remedial character of these statutes, the rights of the beneficiaries will not be allowed to fail for the want of a trustee qualified to bring the

M.G. Sheridan Avenue Family Limited Partnership v. Oceanside Contracting

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Oct 16, 2024

immunity. … Nelson had qualified immunity. See Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 113 (2014). Therefore, those issues are deemed abandoned on appeal. Shangzhen Huang, 461 N.J.

Hopper v. Stack

69 N.J.L. 562 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Sep 19, 1903

inimical to secrecy than is the open and avowed partisan co-operation that has hitherto constituted the voter’s credential. • Apart, ■ however, from these considerations, the matter, as an incident of police regulation, is clearly … protect worshippers- at camp-meetings could not have been enacted without a determination of the fact of the existence of such associations, the objects of those so associated and the further fact that such objects included immunity

Financial Services, L.L.C. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment

326 N.J. Super. 265 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 7, 1999

He also testified the proposed use did not qualify as a conditional use and, therefore, a special reasons variance was required. … That standard has generally been defined in relation to the purposes of zoning, see N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2, and our decisions have emphasized the promotion of the general welfare as the zoning purpose that most clearly amplifies

Crippen v. Central Jersey Concrete Pipe Co.

176 N.J. 397 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 22, 2003

We reaffirmed that "in order for an employer's act to lose the cloak of immunity under N.J.S.A. 34:15-8," both the conduct and context prongs, established in Millison , must be proved. Id. at 617, 790 A. 2d 884 . … We have emphasized that an employer's mere knowledge that the workplace is dangerous does not qualify as an intentional wrong.

James Mathewson v. Charles J. Most, psy.D.

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 16, 2026

Defendant moved for summary judgment based on judicial immunity and litigation privilege. … On de novo review, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Rowe v.

State v. Teare

129 N.J. Super. 562 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 28, 1974

Defense counsel was informed both by telephone and by letter that the test ampule of defendant had been destroyed in accordance with the routine established by the State Police. … Clearly, an important avenue of cross-examination on the test would be closed to defendant.

Perth Amboy Dry Dock Co. v. Crawford

103 N.J.L. 440 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 31, 1927

Bennett had qualified as an expert. … Our examination of this case has satisfied us that the trial court grasped most intelligently the issues presented, ruled clearly and concisely upon the admission and rejection of testimony, and fairly and concretely presented

Nusbaum v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc.

171 F. Supp. 2d 377 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Oct 26, 2001

Clearly, an employer is in the best position to monitor and verify that an employee meets this basic qualification mandate. … Under that framework, a plaintiff must be able to establish that s/he (1) has a “disability,” (2) is a “qualified individual,” and (3) has suffered an adverse employment action because of a disability.

State v. Moore

207 N.J. Super. 561 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 13, 1985

Adams has already been subjected to one trial with a death qualified jury. … Adams has the right to be free from being required to sit through a new trial, and the presentation of all the evidence before a new death qualified jury.

Pacifico v. Pacifico

190 N.J. 258 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 18, 2007

Ginger filed a cross-motion to buy out James’ interest for one-half of the $167,000 value that had been established by a broker’s market analysis in 1996. … Clearly, the burden of establishing immunity from distribution of a particular marital asset or portion of an asset rests upon the spouse who asserts it. Landwehr v.

Carlo v. the Okonite-Callender Cable Co.

3 N.J. 253 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 5, 1949

Some statutes of this nature have created penalties for violation of the standards so established. The effect of such statutes is clearly set forth in Evers v. Davis, 86 N. J. … It is well established, however, that statutes are to be construed with reference to the common law and that a statute which is claimed to impose a duty or establish a right which was not recognized by the common law will

Pollo v. Hospital Service Plan

220 N.J. Super. 243 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Oct 5, 1987

We are guided in considering the question before us by well-established principles governing the construction of exclusionary clauses in contracts of insurance. See Hunt v. … Clearly, however, the tort remedy and the compensation remedy cannot be simultaneously available.

Eaton v. Grau

368 N.J. Super. 215 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 8, 2004

"[T]o establish the right to such relief, it must be shown that enforcement of the order or judgment would be unjust, oppressive or inequitable." Id. … Clearly, the financial misfortune of defendant, of which plaintiff was aware at the time the PSA was executed, was not the type of willful, purposeful conduct contemplated by this provision.