James Mathewson v. Charles J. Most, psy.D.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0043-24

JAMES MATHEWSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CHARLES J. MOST, PSY.D.,

Defendant-Respondent.

_________________________

Submitted October 30, 2025 – Decided January 16, 2026

Before Judges Bishop-Thompson and Puglisi.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-1176-23.

Resnick Law Firm, LLC, attorneys for appellant

(Steven M. Resnick and Catherine A. Manino, on the

briefs).

Farkas & Donohue, LLC, attorneys for respondent

(Beth A. Hardy, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff James Mathewson appeals from the July 25, 2024 Law Division

order granting summary judgment to defendant Charles J. Most, Psy.D., and

dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. We affirm.

I.

During the pendency of their divorce, plaintiff and his now former spouse,

Jessica Mathewson (collectively, the divorcing parties), were engaged in a

custody dispute in which Jessica1 requested the Family Part judge interview their

two children. The judge denied the application based on the children's young

age and other issues not relevant here but expressed concerns about deciding

custody and parenting time without the benefit of a qualified expert's opinion on

the children's best interests. On November 9, 2020, the judge ordered:

In lieu of child interviews, the [divorcing] parties shall

retain a joint custody and parenting time expert to opine

on the best interest[s] of the children and provide said

report within [forty-five] to [sixty] days of this order.

The [divorcing] parties shall share the cost of this

evaluation and report [fifty-fifty].

The accompanying statement of reasons reiterated:

The motion record makes clear that [the divorcing]

parties have completely different views of their

relationship and the needs of their children. It is for

1

Because plaintiff and his ex-wife Jessica Mathewson share a common

surname, this memo refers to her as Jessica. No disrespect is intended.

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this reason that the court is persuaded that an expert

report is necessary to assist the court in determining the

best interest[s] of the children. Accordingly, the court

orders the [divorcing] parties to retain a joint expert and

to equally divide all costs.

Ultimately, the divorcing parties consented to retaining defendant to

"prepare a preliminary assessment addressing primarily the mental health and

best interest[s] of the minor children relative to the issue of parenting time."

They executed a retainer agreement stating defendant would "conduct

interviews, psychological testing, review of documents, home/office visits as

needed, collateral interviews as needed and any other services that are required

to form an opinion" and would follow the standards set forth by the American

Psychological Association and the New Jersey Psychological Association. The

agreement also confirmed defendant had no prior contact with the divorcing

parties and noted an understanding "that the [divorcing] parties may or may not

agree in part or in total with [defendant]'s opinions."

Pursuant to the agreement, defendant produced his report on February 15,

2021. We need not recite in detail defendant's findings and recommendations,

as they are not relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Suffice it to say , the

report detailed an unflattering picture of plaintiff's relationship with the

children. It recommended Jessica be designated as the parent of primary

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residence but urged the divorcing parties to "work toward a [fifty-fifty]

coparenting agreement." The report also defined several steps plaintiff should

take to reconcile his relationship with the children and achieve equal parenting

time.

Although defendant was not deposed, the divorcing parties relied on his

report in resolving their custody and parenting time dispute. Plaintiff asked

defendant for a copy of his file underpinning the report but did not receive it

until after the divorce was finalized.

On June 19, 2023, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging defendant

misreported data, misrepresented key facts from his

data-gathering process, failed to report data, failed to

review [Jessica]'s medical and psychological records,

misanaly[z]ed certain parties' mental health and/or

suppressed relevant information pertaining to same,

and failed to either recognize or acknowledge that the

children were being unduly influenced against . . .

[p]laintiff.

Plaintiff claimed he discovered defendant "relies on expert work from

[Jessica]'s attorneys for a significant portion of his income," and alleged

defendant's

knowing and willful preparation of the defective report,

and his subsequent refusal to produce the file

underpinning it, indicate that he placed greater weight

on protecting and maintaining his lucrative financial

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4

relationship with [Jessica]'s attorneys than producing

an accurate and reliable best interest[s r]eport.

Count one, alleging malpractice, claimed defendant owed a duty to

plaintiff to prepare an accurate and reliable report but negligently produced a

defective report on which plaintiff relied. Count two, alleging fraud, claimed

defendant held himself out to be a neutral party and knowingly failed to advise

plaintiff "that a substantial portion of his practice was and is derived from his

professional relationship with [Jessica]'s attorneys." Both counts contended

defendant's actions harmed plaintiff's relationship with his children.

Defendant moved for summary judgment based on judicial immunity and

litigation privilege. Plaintiff opposed the motion, contending defendant was not

a court-appointed expert but instead a joint expert retained by the divorcing

parties, and therefore was not entitled to judicial immunity. Although not pled

in the complaint, plaintiff also alleged defendant exceeded the scope of his

retainer by treating the children, which was not shielded by any privilege or

immunity.

After considering argument, the motion judge issued a July 25, 2024 order

accompanied by a comprehensive written opinion. As a threshold matter, the

judge determined as a matter of law defendant was a court-appointed expert.

Citing the motion practice that resulted in defendant's retention, along with the

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court's oral and written reasons for entering the November 9, 2020 order, the

motion judge concluded defendant was a "court-appointed psychological expert

whose function and role was to serve the court and assist it in assessing the

children's best interests. [Defendant] performed that function, notwithstanding

that [Jessica]'s attorney selected him, [plaintiff] consented to the selection, and

[the divorcing] parties . . . agreed to pay [defendant]'s fee."

Because defendant was a court-appointed expert, the motion judge found

he was entitled to judicial immunity from the malpractice claims pursuant to

P.T. v. Richard Hall Community Mental Health Care Center (P.T. I), 364 N.J.

Super. 546 (Law Div. 2000), aff'd o.b., 364 N.J. Super. 460 (App. Div. 2003).

The judge also dismissed plaintiff's fraud claim because: (1) it alleged equitable

fraud but sought legal damages; (2) defendant had no duty to disclose details of

his relationship with the law firm that recommended him; (3) defendant owed a

duty to the court, not the divorcing parties; and (4) the misrepresentation claim

was simply a recasting of his negligence claim. Relying on P.T. v. Richard Hall

Community Mental Health Care Center (P.T. II), 364 N.J. Super. 561 (Law Div.

2002) aff'd o.b., 364 N.J. Super. 460 (App. Div. 2003), the motion judge held

defendant did not owe a duty to plaintiff, but rather to the children and the court.

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Thus, plaintiff's unpled claim that defendant "exceeded the scope of his

appointment" also failed.

II.

We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary

judgment, applying the same standard used by the trial court. Samolyk v.

Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022) (citing Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc.,

237 N.J. 501, 511 (2019)). A motion for summary judgment must be granted "if

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or

order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c).

The court must decide whether "there is [a] genuine issue as to any

material fact" when the evidence is "viewed in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party." Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 405-

06 (2014) (first quoting R. 4:46-2(c); and then quoting Brill v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)). "To decide whether a genuine issue

of material fact exists, the trial court must 'draw[] all legitimate inferences from

the facts in favor of the non-moving party.'" Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J.

449, 472 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev,

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225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016)). "The court's function is not 'to weigh the evidence

and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine

issue for trial.'" Rios v. Meda Pharm., Inc., 247 N.J. 1, 13 (2021) (quoting Brill,

142 N.J. at 540).

"If there is no genuine issue of material fact, we must then 'decide whether

the trial court correctly interpreted the law.'" DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig.

Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting

Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 486, 494 (App. Div. 2007)). On

de novo review, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal

consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special

deference." Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) (alteration

in original) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140

N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

On appeal, plaintiff asks us to reverse the order because: (1) discovery

was not complete; (2) the summary judgment motion was a "motion to dismiss

in disguise" and should have been denied on that standard; (3) the motion judge

interpreted and enhanced defendant's retention in the matrimonial matter; (4) the

judge found respondent did not owe a duty to plaintiff; (5) the decision

contravenes Rule 5:3-3 and N.J.R.E. 702; (6) defendant is not entitled to the

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litigation privilege; and (7) the fraud claim was sufficiently pled and even if it

were not, the dismissal should have been without prejudice. We are not

persuaded by these contentions and, given the motion judge's thorough and

cogent analysis, our de novo review need not be extensive.

We are unconvinced the motion judge erred by determining, as a matter

of law, whether defendant was a court-appointed expert pursuant to Rule 5:3-

3(a) and (b). A party's entitlement to immunity is a legal issue that may be

resolved on a summary judgment motion. Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162

N.J. 375, 387 (2000). Plaintiff's arguments, which mirror those advanced by the

plaintiff in P.T. I, fail for the same reasons articulated by then Judge Hoens:

[I]t is clear that the motion is ripe for adjudication at

this time. The theory of the summary judgment motion

is that [the defendant] enjoys absolute immunity, a

theory which is based upon her status as a court-

appointed expert and therefore, in essence, is one which

can be decided without regard for the precise facts of

what she did or did not do in that capacity. The theory

of absolute immunity can be addressed without regard

to the specifics of her engagement for it rests on the

theory, urged upon the court by her counsel, that her

appointment carried with it the protection ordinarily

conferred on judges and others acting in a quasi-judicial

capacity. Regardless of whether or not the court

accepts this argument, the motion itself is based solely

on two uncontested facts, namely, that she was

appointed by court order to conduct an evaluation and

render a report and recommendations and that she in

fact thereafter did so pursuant to that order. Thus, the

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motion is not premature and plaintiffs' argument in this

regard is unpersuasive.

[364 N.J. Super. at 550-51.]

We are also unpersuaded the dismissal was premature based on

incomplete discovery because "discovery need not be undertaken or completed

if it will patently not change the outcome." Minoia v. Kushner, 365 N.J. Super.

304, 307 (App. Div. 2004). Here, no amount of discovery would have altered

the fact that defendant was a court-appointed expert,2 and plaintiff's contentions

to the contrary lack any support in law or fact.

Plaintiff also raises several issues regarding the motion judge's separate

reasons for dismissal of his fraud claim. These contentions lack sufficient merit

to warrant discussion in a written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). The entirety

of plaintiff's complaint, no matter how interpreted or redrafted, arose from

defendant's role as a court-appointed expert and was therefore subject to

dismissal based on judicial immunity.

Affirmed.

2

Rule 5:3-3(d) provides "[e]xperts appointed hereunder may be selected by the

mutual agreement of the parties or independently by the court" and Rule 5:3-

3(i) provides "the court may direct who shall pay" for the expert. Thus, the

divorcing parties' mutual agreement to engage defendant, and their obligation to

pay for his services, did not alter the nature of his appointment.

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