Case law

Lane v. MPG Newspapers

438 Mass. 476 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 16, 2003

Levine, 59 N.Y.2d 8, 17 (1983) (“Plaintiff [mayor and participant in election for office] clearly ... a ‘public of *482 ficial’ ”); Johnston v. … This requirement has been clearly established by the Supreme Court. See Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 299 (1971); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra at 259, 283 & n.23.

George v. Jordan Marsh Company

359 Mass. 244 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 12, 1971

If a consistent pattern cannot yet be clearly discerned in the *253 cases, this but indicates that the law on this subject is in a process of growth.” 3. … In this respect, the law is clearly in a process of growth, the ultimate limits of which cannot as yet be determined.” Prosser, Torts (3d ed.) § 11. 6.

Brunson v. Wall

405 Mass. 446 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 24, 1989

General Laws c. 151B, § 3 (6) and (7), clearly indicate that the Legislature gave the MCAD the authority to adjudicate discrimination claims. 8 See East Chop Tennis Club. v. … Thus, there was no error in the motion judge’s conclusion that the defendants established the necessary element of identity of issues. Almeida v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra at 229.

Darby v. Lelling

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 25, 2022

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials are shielded from civil liability to the extent that “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of … violated was clearly established at the time of the violation.”

Ratner v. OvaScience, Inc.

134 F. Supp. 3d 621 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 28, 2015

To aid the Plaintiffs in adequately pleading the required element of scienter, however, they must establish the requisite strong inference that the Defendants knew the FDA would not grant AUGMENT 361 HCT/P designation. … After all, if FDA guidance from more than a decade *633 earlier clearly answered this question, there would be little reason to hold an advisory committee meeting on the topic.

Jenkins v. The Boston Housing Courts

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 15, 2018

June 15, 2015) (“It is well established [. . .] that leave may be denied if it would reward undue delay or a lack of due diligence.”) (citing Steir v. … Here, the state enjoys immunity; plaintiff’s ADA claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Young v. Patukonis

24 Mass. App. Ct. 907 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 1, 1987

The Castenholz case held that subsection (7) penalties are appropriate even when the tenant remains in possession where a landlord fails to establish a separate account as required by subsection 3 (a) and refuses to return … The judge’s finding that Young’s violation was not wilful is not clearly erroneous, as Young could easily have had the property decontrolled much earlier.

Tracy v. Olson

400 F. Supp. 2d 393 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 30, 2005

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. … As a general statement, a habeas petition is evaluated according to the clearly-established Supreme Court law in effect at the time the petitioner’s conviction became final. Williams v.

Stein v. McDonough

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 16, 2024

. § 206 et seq., and the Massachusetts Act to Establish Pay Equity (“MEPA”) by paying her less than male employees who held “essentially the same job” (id., Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 2). … Thus, Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint sufficiently alleges that she had one or more qualifying disabilities. See Connolly, 659 F.

Middlesex & Boston Street Railway Co. v. Board of Aldermen

371 Mass. 849 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 10, 1977

twenty-three typewritten pages and indicates that he gave the case careful attention, most of which was directed to condition No. 8, his only reference to condition No. 7 was the following language: “Condition seven is clearly … Although the members of the board imposed the invalid condition, there is no finding that they acted “in bad faith, maliciously or corruptly,” and they are therefore immune from liability in damages to the plaintiff for their

Laurenzano v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc. Retirement Income Trust

134 F. Supp. 2d 189 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 27, 2001

In this case, where the Plan is clear, but also clearly illegal, the question is whether each class member reasonably should have known at the moment he joined the Plan that he had a cause of action. … This section provides, in part: (g) Distribution of present value of annuity; written consent; determination of present value (1) A plan may provide that the present value of a qualified joint and survivor annuity or a qualified

Cahaly v. Benistar Property Exchange Trust Co.

68 Mass. App. Ct. 668 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 17, 2007

This tax advantage required the plaintiffs to transfer their sale proceeds to an escrow account, qualified trust, or qualified intermediary pending their purchase of replacement property. … Paley and the plaintiffs were clearly adversarial parties at trial. As the trial judge has noted, Paley’s credibility is properly a matter for the jury to consider.

Shaffer v. Foster-Miller, Inc.

650 F. Supp. 2d 124 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 3, 2009

On this point, the Report and Recommendation is clearly correct. The various arguments offered to attempt to avoid summary judgment on this point are well addressed in the Report and Recommendation. … In July of 2005, after reviewing the claim, Unum, as claims administrator, determined that Plaintiff was not qualified for benefits. (Id. ¶ 15.)

Commonwealth v. Perez

411 Mass. 249 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 20, 1991

We conclude, however, that the error was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. … Under these standards,* * 8 the assumed Edwards error is clearly harmless.

Commonwealth v. MacDonald (No. 1)

368 Mass. 395 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 22, 1975

The defendant now argues that his exclusion from the “hearing at which evidence was taken to determine whether jurors were properly qualified” violated G. … The error was clearly apparent at trial, and could have been cured easily by the judge’s dismissal of the two challenged jurors, as sixteen jurors had been empanelled.

McLaughlin v. Harbor Cruises LLC

880 F. Supp. 2d 179 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 20, 2012

For example, there are a number of cases dealing with whether workers on a dredging barge would qualify for the exemption. … The record establishes that they are expected to be, and are, available to perform the duties of general deckhands when necessary.

Selfridge v. Jama

172 F. Supp. 3d 397 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 24, 2016

Clearly, depositions scheduled to occur on August 1 fall outside these bounds. … This is sufficient to establish a foundation for personal knowledge. c.

Heins v. Ledis

422 Mass. 477 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 18, 1996

The wife, who had one-half of a lung removed due to cancer and suffers from allergies and a low immune system, fell into a major depression. … “The use of the words ‘in lieu of clearly indicates that something other than alimony was intended.” Inker, Alimony and Assignment of Property: The New Statutory Scheme in Massachusetts, 10 Suffolk U.L.

Commonwealth v. Blackington

41 Mass. 352 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 8, 1837

Where an act can only be lawfully done by one qualified in a certain manner, it will not make the act of an unqualified person lawful, that those whose duty it was to confer the qualifica *354 tion have, through mistake or … resorted to and exercised with great caution and deliberation, and it is always to be presumed that a coordinate branch of the government has acted within the limits of its constitutional authority', until the contrary shall clearly

Rimowa Distribution, Inc. v. Travelers Club Luggage, Inc.

217 F. Supp. 3d 400 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 8, 2016

TCL asserts that Rimowa’s trademarks do not qualify under this provision because Rimowa has offered no evidence to establish that its marks are “famous,” and because Dr. … Because the court does not find that the ’403 patent clearly and convincingly establishes the functionality of the asserted marks, the fraudulent procurement claim fails as a matter of law.