Case law

Galloway v. Hadley

881 N.E.2d 667 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 22, 2008

[Wjhile the plaintiff does claim some economic loss from not being on the approved list that loss is not qualifiable [sic] and cannot be judged. … The second criterion is whether plaintiff has established a likelihood of success at trial.

Sampson v. Orkin Exterminating Co.

124 F.R.D. 631 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Feb 24, 1989

The plaintiffs introduced evidence that Wanda was suffering from chlordane poisoning, that the poisoning affected her immune system, and that the damage to her immune system may lead to cancer. … First, Orkin has failed to establish that either Mr. Wickland or Mr. Block agreed to accept personal responsibility for the expert witness fees.

Asia Marshall v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 22, 2017

To qualify as an excited utterance, a statement must have been made after a startling event has occurred, while under the stress or excitement caused by the event, and it must relate to the event. Young v. … See Fowler, 829 N.E.2d at 464 (noting an excited utterance is not necessarily immune from attack under the Confrontation Clause, but also noting that “when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial,

Anderson Ex Rel. Anderson v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n

699 F. Supp. 719 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 26, 1988

To qualify as a nominee such person shall be from the class of school from which the selection is to be made in that particular year. … This was clearly expressed by Commissioner Cato and the Executive Committee members during testimony before this Court. Finally, the Court regrets the result.

Vollmar Ex Rel. Vollmar v. Rupright

517 N.E.2d 1240 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 19, 1988

To allow Bradley to enjoy the benefits of a reduction in attorneys' fees without incurring any of the cost of the pursuit of such a reduction clearly would be inequitable. … While in this case Bradley holds the dual role of beneficiary and personal representative, this does not mean that funds destined for Bradley as a beneficiary are immune from payment of fees incurred by Bradley as personal

Indiana Department of Public Welfare v. Anderson

171 Ind. App. 375 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 2, 1976

court finds such finding, decision or determination of such agency is: (1) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law; or (2) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity … We have held, swpra, that the evidence already before the Department establishes as a matter of law that Anderson is entitled to benefits.

United States v. Duke

263 F. Supp. 828 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Feb 9, 1967

The Jury Commissioner and Clerk who are the only persons entrusted with the statutory duty of obtaining jurors must not establish or invite the establishment of one or more standards or qualifications other than those standards … As of the time of the rendering of this decision, the evidence before the Court shows clearly that the present system is well within all of the Constitutional and statutory requirements.

Finnegan v. Tetzloff

District Court, N.D. Indiana · May 9, 2025

However, this is clearly not the case as Indiana law empowers trial courts to initiate contempt proceedings, to make contempt findings, and to issue punishment. Ind. Code § 34-47-3-5; Knowles v. … Finnegan asserts a claim against Jennifer Tetzloff, who he alleges is a court administrator who served as the court reporter at the contempt proceeding but was not qualified to do so.

Amoco Production Co. v. Laird

622 N.E.2d 912 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 21, 1993

Thus, Laird reasons, Amoco failed to establish that the information was not “readily ascertainable by other proper means,” a requisite statutory element for trade secret protection. … Thus, the overlay of an economically infeasible standard upon the UTSA’s readily ascertainable standard is clearly inconsistent with the definitional elements of “trade secret” contained in the model statute endorsed in to

GRIFFIN v. CARTER

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Feb 25, 2025

"A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from suit unless he [or she] violated a clearly established constitutional right." Dockery v. … that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct."

Highhouse v. Midwest Orthopedic Institute, P.C.

782 N.E.2d 1006 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 4, 2003

A 401(k) plan as established by Employer with eligibility commencing July 1, 1997. (d) Health Insurance. ... (e) Life insurance.... (Appellant's Appendix pp. 16-18). … Therefore, the trial court erred by not granting Highhouse partial summary judgment on his claim that the Agreement's bonus payments qualified as a "wage" under the Wage Payment Statute.

Hape v. State

903 N.E.2d 977 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 31, 2009

During trial, the State established Trooper Gadberry's heightened degree of knowledge about methamphetamine. … State, 637 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind.1994) (officer qualified as expert on blood spatters); Burnett v. State, 815 N.E.2d 201, 204-06 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (officer qualified as expert on fingerprint examination), reh'g de-mied.

United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.

399 F. Supp. 480 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · May 29, 1975

Plaintiffs contend that the only terminals which would qualify as “designated terminals” for this crew would be Stevens, Kentucky, and Peru, Indiana. … Clearly, the term “designated terminal” means more than any place with suitable facilities chosen by management.

Senco Products, Inc. v. Riley

434 N.E.2d 561 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 22, 1982

To demonstrate abuse of discretion, defendant must demonstrate that the ruling was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. McFarlan v. … Riley carried his burden of establishing proximate cause. The evidence was sufficient to establish that Riley was injured by a staple coming from the Senco gun he was using.

Economation, Inc. v. Automated Conveyor Systems, Inc.

694 F. Supp. 553 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 1, 1988

ACS did no more than hire qualified individuals to sell conveyor systems. … That motivation is clearly recognized as a legitimate reason for defendant’s conduct.

Board of Directors of the Bass Lake Conservancy District v. Brewer

818 N.E.2d 952 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 7, 2004

Because the typical definition of a duplex is a "two-family dwelling," say the Brewers, their residence does not qualify as such. Appellant's App. p. 118. … The Bass Lake Board's Contentions The Bass Lake Board argues that the trial court's judgment may not stand because the evidence clearly established that the Brewers owned a "multiplex" within the meaning of the ordinance.

Neidefer v. Chastain

71 Ind. 363 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 15, 1880

Birt, 4 Ind. 566 , this answer was clearly bad, if for no other reason than that it failed to show the article to be valueless. … Murray , if given effect, would break down the long and well established rule, that, if a party gets all he knowingly contracts for, he will not be allowed to plead that he got no consideration. Baker v.

In the Matter of the Guardianship of Shirla Gonzalez Xitumul: Miguel Hernandez Jeronimo

Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 20, 2019

under the scheme established by federal immigration law.” 114 N.E.3d at 859. … Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-GU-948 | November 20, 2019 Page 12 of 17  never clearly articulated that purpose to the court.

Bova v. Roig

604 N.E.2d 1 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 7, 1992

Bova asserts that two separate and distinct occurrences of malpractice were established, and therefore, the verdict was within the limit of the Act. … Where the intent is clearly expressed by the language of the legislation, we may not construe the statute to mean something other than what it plainly states on its face. Id.

Bass v. Salyer

923 N.E.2d 961 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 17, 2010

Accordingly, the trial court's judgment on this issue is clearly erroneous: 2. … Stated differently, they constitute property rights of a qualified or restricted nature. Id. Ctr. Townhouse Corp. v. City of Mishawaka, 882 N.E.2d 762, 767-68 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied.