Case law

Sullivan v. State

836 N.E.2d 1031 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 10, 2005

sentence for class A felony child molesting and, indeed, may not qualify as a significant aggravating cireumstance at all. … J.S. and A.S. also were clearly listed in the presentence report as Sullivan's children. .

James K. Chenoweth v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 9, 2015

[18] Because the victim was four-years old when she was molested, Chenoweth’s victim qualified as a protected person, and therefore, the videotape of her forensic interview was admissible at trial if: … The victim’s unavailability for medical reasons was established by Dr.

State Ex Rel. Indiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Miller

770 N.E.2d 328 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 26, 2002

Compliance with the new rules established by the Board will avoid unlicensed practice of law. … We agree that the first challenge clearly involved questions of law.

Nesbit v. Hert

91 F. 123 · District Court, D. Indiana · Dec 28, 1898

term not less than the minimum time prescribed by the statutes of this state, as a punishment for such offense, and not more than the maximum time prescribed by such statutes therefor, subject to the rules and regulations established … made to appear that the petitioner has been denied, by the judgment of the highest court of the state, some right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the constitution or laws of the United States.

Trent v. Hunt

39 F. Supp. 373 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jun 12, 1941

Boykin, supra, and said further: “No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. … ‘No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts.

Izaak Walton League of America v. Lake County Property Tax Assessment Board of Appeals

881 N.E.2d 737 · Indiana Tax Court · Mar 4, 2008

will reverse a final determination of the Indiana Board only if it is: (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity … As a result, IWL asserts that it was clearly entitled to the exemption provided for in Indiana Code § 6-l.l-10-16(c)(3): 1) it was a nonprofit entity established for the purpose of retaining and preserving land and water

Clarian Health Partners, Inc. v. Wagler

925 N.E.2d 388 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 31, 2010

Summary judgment is available only if Clarian can clearly show unequivocal expert medical testimony about causation. … There is currently no clearly applicable Indiana law showing if, how, or when, nurses can testify as experts. Appellant's Appendix at 20 (footnote omitted).

Strack v. Holcomb

District Court, N.D. Indiana · Sep 11, 2020

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless “(1) the plaintiffs adequately alleged facts that, if true, would constitute a violation of a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the right was ‘clearly … established’ at the time of the alleged violation, such that a reasonable public official would have known his conduct was unlawful.”

City of Indianapolis v. Clint's Wrecker Service, Inc.

440 N.E.2d 737 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 19, 1982

The Ordinance clearly defines the prohibited behavior as approaching an accident for solicitation purposes. … For example, Ind.Code 9-4-l-25(c) clearly withholds the privileges from emergency vehicles returning from a fire alarm.

BOWLING v. CANTRELL

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jul 14, 2020

Qualified Immunity Mr. Cantrell, Mr. Bills, and Ms. Dudley argue that certain claims against them should be dismissed because they are entitled to qualified immunity. … "Because a qualified immunity defense so closely depends 'on the facts of the case,' a 'complaint is generally not dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity grounds.'" Reed v.

Comfax Corp. v. North American Van Lines, Inc.

638 N.E.2d 476 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 11, 1994

NAVL later established a wholly-owned subsidiary called Relocation Management Systems ("RMS"), which marketed a software package. … Comfax and Kuker contend that as a qualified attorney, Lundy's legal opinion as to an ultimate issue in the case is admissible. See Willsey v.

KD EX REL. KD v. Chambers

951 N.E.2d 855 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 13, 2011

McCoy, Ph.D., on the grounds that he was not properly qualified as an expert. … We will reverse only if the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court. Id. II.

Serrano v. State

266 Ind. 126 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 31, 1977

State, (1972) 259 Ind. 166 , 285 N.E.2d 279 , ‘clearly establish the principle that absent some form of waiver or stipulation by the parties the results of polygraph examinations administered to witnesses or parties are not … The defendant does not challenge the establishment of the corpus delicti.

Reynaldo Amaro-Perez v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 19, 2019

years, with the first two years to be executed in the Cass County Jail and the third year suspended to probation, with the possibility for the second executed year to be served on community corrections if he qualified … An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record

Long, Mayor v. Kinney

210 Ind. 192 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 20, 1936

It qualifies and limits that which preceded. Board of Commissioners v. Millikan (1934), 207 Ind. 142 , 190 *197 N. E. 185; City of Gary v. Gary, etc., Cemetery Assn. (1917), 186 Ind. 446 , 116 N. E. 741 ; Murray v. … The resolution of the common council of the city of Peru, adopted September 1, 1933, set out in the appellees’ complaint and established by the proof given at the trial, clearly shows that the city of Peru did have a board

Bowen v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division

173 Ind. App. 166 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 25, 1977

. *168 DECISION CONCLUSION — Bowen qualified for benefits under the terms of the Statute. … This was clearly a conscious extra benefit conveyed by the Legislature. Federal legislation does not go so far. See IC 1971, 22-4-15-2 and 3 (e) ; 26 U.S.C. § 3304 .

Stone - RESTRICTED - ACCEPT NO DOCUMENTS v. Whitt

District Court, N.D. Indiana · Aug 9, 2019

The Seventh Circuit has stated that “[b]ecause a qualified immunity defense so closely depends ‘on the facts of the case,’ a ‘complaint is generally not dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity grounds.’” … It was clearly established at the time of the stop that a traffic stop is unlawful if not supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause that a traffic violation occurred.

Bailor v. Salvation Army

854 F. Supp. 1341 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Jun 10, 1994

To the contrary, the alleged acts or omissions of Jackson were clearly work related and arose out of his employment as a matter of law. 11 Accordingly, Jackson is immune from common-law liability by virtue of Indiana’s Worker … Thus, the Salvation Army was clearly an independent contractor, and therefore under 28 U.S.C. § 2671 the United States is immune from liability for any negligent acts allegedly committed by them. 24 Accordingly, Count V of

Jeff Lane v. Menard, Inc.

Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 26, 2024

The Defendants argued that they were statutorily immune from suit because they had probable cause to detain Lane. … The Act clearly and unambiguously applies when the merchant or its agent has probable cause to believe that a theft “is occurring,” referring to something that is presently occurring, or “has occurred,” referring to something

Chamberlain v. Parks

692 N.E.2d 1380 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 6, 1998

In considering a constitutional challenge to a statute, we presume that the statute is valid, and place the burden upon the party challenging it to clearly overcome the presumption by a contrary showing. Boehm v. … We therefore conclude that the Wrongful Death Act does not violate the Indiana Privileges and Immunities Clause under Article I, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution. III.