Stone - RESTRICTED - ACCEPT NO DOCUMENTS v. Whitt

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

KIEL STONE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:18-CV-962 JD

)

RON WHITT, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Kiel Stone alleges that he was unlawfully stopped by Officer Ron Whitt. He sued Officer

Whitt, plus the Town of New Carlisle, the New Carlisle Police Department, and the Indiana Law

Enforcement Academy, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. All of the defendants

moved to dismiss the amended complaint. The Court grants those motions except as to Mr.

Stone’s claim against Officer Whitt for stopping him in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Kiel Stone alleges that he was driving in New Carlisle, Indiana, in November 2016, when

he was pulled over by Officer Ron Whitt of the New Carlisle Police Department. He alleges that

he was not speeding at the time, and that he had not committed any other traffic infractions or

broken any laws. Officer Whitt approached his car and told Mr. Stone that his vehicle matched

the description of a suspect in a domestic violence incident and that his license plate was

obstructed by a trailer hitch. Mr. Stone alleges that those statements were false. He asserts that

his vehicle was unique and very rare, and that it could not have been reasonably confused with

the vehicle associated with the domestic violence suspect. He further asserts that Officer Whitt

was personally familiar with his vehicle and knew it did not belong to that individual. In

addition, Mr. Stone alleges that the license plate was not obscured by a trailer hitch, which he

argues is corroborated by the dash cam video of the stop.

In November 2018, Mr. Stone filed this suit against Officer Whitt, alleging that Officer

Whitt violated his constitutional rights by pulling him over without justification. Mr. Stone later

filed an amended complaint in which he added three new defendants: the Town of New Carlisle,

the New Carlisle Police Department, and the Indiana Law Enforcement Academy. The

defendants each moved to dismiss, and those motions are now ripe.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court construes the complaint in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts the factual allegations as true, and draws all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143,

1146 (7th Cir. 2010). A complaint must contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That statement must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its

face, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and raise a right to relief above the speculative

level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). However, a plaintiff’s claim need

only be plausible, not probable. Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930,

935 (7th Cir. 2012). Evaluating whether a plaintiff’s claim is sufficiently plausible to survive a

motion to dismiss is “‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense.’” McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th

Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

III. DISCUSSION

Mr. Stone alleges his rights were violated when he was unlawfully stopped without

justification. He seeks to hold four defendants liable for that alleged violation: Officer Whitt, the

New Carlisle Police Department, the Town of New Carlisle, and the Indiana Law Enforcement

Academy. All of them have moved to dismiss the claims, and the Court addresses each defendant

in turn.

First, though, the Court must address the materials properly before it on a motion to

dismiss. In support of his motion, Officer Whitt submitted an affidavit describing his interaction

with Mr. Stone and the reasons he stopped Mr. Stone. He and the town defendants rely on that

affidavit to argue that the stop was justified and that Mr. Stone’s allegations to the contrary are

false. The Court cannot consider such an affidavit at this stage, though. A motion to dismiss tests

the sufficiency of a complaint’s allegations, not their truth. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), (d); Reed v.

Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 548 (7th Cir. 2018). If the Court were to consider this extrinsic evidence,

it would need to convert the motion to a motion for summary judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d),

but that is not warranted. The factual circumstances of the incident need to be explored through

discovery, during which the parties could take depositions and seek the production of documents

or videos pertaining to the incident. The defendants have offered no justification for short-

circuiting that process here, so the Court considers only the allegations in the complaint, not the

evidence submitted by the defendants.

A. Officer Whitt

Mr. Stone first asserts a claim against Officer Whitt, arguing that Officer Whitt violated

his rights when he initiated a traffic stop without justification. In moving to dismiss, Officer

Whitt first argues that no violation occurred because he was justified in stopping Mr. Stone for

having an obscured license plate and because his vehicle matched the description of a vehicle

connected to a person involved in a domestic dispute. This argument, however, relies almost

entirely on accepting as true the statements in his affidavit, instead of the allegations in Mr.

Stone’s complaint. The Court cannot do so at the pleading stage, and Mr. Stone’s allegations

suffice to plead a Fourth Amendment violation. Ms. Stone alleges that his license plate was not

obscured by any trailer hitch, and that the vehicle he was driving was unique and could not have

reasonably been confused for the vehicle described in the police dispatch. The complaint also

alleges that Mr. Stone was not committing any traffic violations at the time. Based on those

allegations, Mr. Stone has adequately pled that he was stopped without reasonable suspicion or

probable cause, which would violate the Fourth Amendment. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S.

393, 396–97 (2014); United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 633 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 2011). Officer

Whitt is entitled to challenge the truth of those allegations at a later stage, but they suffice to

allege an unlawful seizure, so the Court cannot dismiss the claim on that basis.

Officer Whitt also argues that, even if there was a violation, the claim should be

dismissed on qualified immunity. That argument likewise relies on crediting his affidavit over

Mr. Stone’s allegations, though, which the Court cannot do. The argument is also premature. The

Seventh Circuit has stated that “[b]ecause a qualified immunity defense so closely depends ‘on

the facts of the case,’ a ‘complaint is generally not dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified

immunity grounds.’” Reed, 906 F.3d at 548 (quoting Alvarado v. Litscher, 256 F.3d 648, 651

(7th Cir. 2001)). That is true here. Perhaps, for example, the facts will show that Mr. Stone’s

license plate was obscured, or at least that it reasonably appeared to be so to Officer Whitt, as

stated in Officer Whitt’s affidavit. Officer Whitt will also have the ability at later stages to offer

evidence as to what information he received about a vehicle connected to a domestic dispute, and

to argue that the information justified him in stopping Mr. Stone’s vehicle. But as already

discussed, the allegations in Mr. Stone’s complaint are to the contrary. It was clearly established

at the time of the stop that a traffic stop is unlawful if not supported by reasonable suspicion of

criminal activity or probable cause that a traffic violation occurred. Navarette, 572 U.S. at 396–

97; Garcia-Garcia, 633 F.3d at 612. Because the complaint does not supply the details on which

Officer Whitt bases his qualified immunity defense, the Court cannot dismiss the claim on that

ground.

Finally, the Court notes that Mr. Stone’s complaint includes a passing reference to a

violation of his “right to travel” under the Fourteenth Amendment. He alleges only a single

instance in which he was stopped, though, and the lawfulness of that seizure is governed by the

Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the right at issue is Mr. Stone’s Fourth Amendment right to be

free from unreasonable seizures.

B. New Carlisle Police Department

Mr. Stone also named the New Carlisle Police Department as a defendant. In Indiana,

though, a police department has no separate legal existence from its town, so it is not a suable

entity. Sow v. Fortville Police Department, 636 F.3d 293, 300 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Indiana

statutory scheme does not grant municipal police departments the capacity to sue or be sued.”).

The Court therefore grants the motion to dismiss as to the New Carlisle Police Department.

C. Town of New Carlisle

Next, Mr. Stone sued the Town of New Carlisle. He alleges that the Town is responsible

for the unlawful stop because it failed to properly train its officers, leading to an unlawful stop by

Officer Whitt. This claim fails, though, because the complaint does not allege any plausible basis

upon which the Town could be held liable for that violation. Section 1983 does not impose

vicarious liability against municipalities. Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 2007).

“Plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments under § 1983 must [allege] that

‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused their injury.” Connick v. Thompson, 563

U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).

Here, Mr. Stone claims that the Town is liable because of its failure to train its officers,

but his complaint supplies no allegations to make that claim plausible. For a municipality to be

liable under § 1983 for a failure to train, the “failure to train its employees in a relevant respect

must amount to ‘deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the untrained

employees come into contact.’” Id. (quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388

(1989)) (internal alteration omitted). Mr. Stone argues that the Town should have offered

“extended constitutional training,” but he does not say what that training would be or how it

differs from any training the Town already offers. Nor does he allege that any other similar

violations have taken place such that Town officials should be aware of a deficiency in the

training provided to its officers. Instead, he bases his claim on a single violation, plus a

conclusory allegation that the Town failed to train its officers, which falls short of pleading a

plausible claim and putting the Town on notice of what it is alleged to have done wrong.

In addition, Mr. Stone failed to allege that any additional training would have affected the

violation at issue here. He alleges that the effect of any additional training would be that Officer

Whitt would have followed behind him and run his license plate before pulling him over, which

he believes would have notified Officer Whitt that he wasn’t the person involved in the domestic

dispute. Mr. Stone’s claim, though, is based on his allegation that his car was so unique that

Officer Whitt couldn’t have thought it was the car identified in the dispatch anyway. He even

alleges that Officer Whitt knew the vehicle belonged to his family without needing to run the

plates. The “extended” training thus would have had no impact on this alleged violation. Also,

the constitution does not require that kind of additional investigation once an officer has cause to

initiate a seizure. Stokes v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 599 F.3d 617, 624 (7th Cir. 2010)

(“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not require an officer with probable cause to arrest to wait

while pursuing further investigation.”); Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, Ind., 320 F.3d 733,

744 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[O]nce an officer learns sufficient trustworthy information establishing

probable cause, he is entitled to rely on what he knows in pursuing charges or an arrest, and is

under no further duty to investigate.”). The Town thus could not be liable for failing to train its

officers to take that additional, unnecessary step. The Court thus concludes that Mr. Stone has

not alleged a plausible claim against the Town, so the Court grants the motion to dismiss as to

the Town.

D. Indiana Law Enforcement Academy

Finally, Mr. Stone sued the Indiana Law Enforcement Academy, alleging that it is liable

because it fails to properly train its trainees. The Academy moved to dismiss on multiple

grounds. In response, Mr. Stone states that he agrees to dismiss the Academy “for the time

being,” but that its “involvement in this case may not be concluded.” [DE 35]. That appears to be

a request to dismiss the claim without prejudice, but that is not warranted since, as the Academy

argues, it is not subject to suit under § 1983 in the first place. The Court thus dismisses this claim

with prejudice.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a “person” who violates a plaintiff’s

rights, but the Supreme Court has held that states and their agencies do not qualify as “persons”

in this context. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Sebesta v. Davis, 878

F.3d 226, 231 (7th Cir. 2017). To determine if a particular entity is a state agency, “courts look

at: (1) the extent of the entity’s financial autonomy from the state; and (2) the general legal status

of the entity.” Tucker v. Williams, 682 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2012); Kashani v. Purdue Univ., 813

F.2d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 1897). Here, the Academy was built and is operated with funds provided

by the state. Ind. Code § 5-2-1-13. Fee schedules for attendance at the Academy are established

by the law enforcement training board, which is a criminal justice agency of the state. Id. § 5-2-

1-3, -15(f). The Academy is also run by the executive director of the law enforcement training

board, id. § 5-2-1-14, and its facilities are available for use by state and municipal law

enforcement agencies. Id. § 5-2-1-15(a). The Academy is thus a state agency, meaning it cannot

be sued under § 1983, so the claim against it is dismissed with prejudice.1

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS the Indiana Law Enforcement Academy’s motion to dismiss. [DE

13]. The Court also GRANTS the remaining defendants’ motion to dismiss [DE 16], except as to

Mr. Stone’s § 1983 claim against Officer Whitt for violating his rights under the Fourth

Amendment, which remains pending.

Finally, the Court notes that the Court recently entered a filing restriction on Mr. Stone

for the pattern of frivolous and malicious suits he has filed in other cases. Stone v. Glenn, No.

3:19-cv-589 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 6, 2019). That restriction also prevents him from making any filings

in this case, and will be in effect until Mr. Stone pays the fine and any other outstanding fees or

sanctions. Accordingly, if Mr. Stone has not paid those amounts so as to lift the restriction within

a reasonable amount of time, this action may be dismissed for want of prosecution.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: August 9, 2019

/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO

Judge

United States District Court

1 The claim is also barred by the statute of limitations for the reasons explained by the Academy,

but the Court need not further address that additional ground for this holding.