Case law

Pomeroy v. United States

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 27, 2018

The Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (“FSHCAA”) establishes a sovereign immunity waiver, setting suits against the United States under the FTCA as the exclusive remedy “for damage for personal injury, including … In Mendez, the First Circuit held that the FSHCAA did not establish immunity for an individual doctor who allegedly engaged in acts of race and sex discrimination in the peer review process, explaining that the statute

Commonwealth v. Stephens

25 Mass. App. Ct. 117 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Dec 2, 1987

In order to establish the specific intent required by that statute, it is not necessary to prove that the defendant had a particular evil or wicked purpose. United States v. … ten years, or both.” 3 “ Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

Burns v. Sullivan

473 F. Supp. 626 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 29, 1979

Cohen’s testimony establishes for purposes of this motion that in addition to the terms of the consent decree in the Kantor case, Mr. … Whether or not the requirements of Mass,' Gen.Laws ch. 31 § 15C were satisfied by the words “better qualified” is a question of state law without federal significance.

I.L. v. ELIZABETH S. TEMIN & Others (And a Companion Case).

Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 8, 2024

His reliance on this authority is inapposite, however, because the portion of the decision to which he refers deals with the principle of qualified immunity for law enforcement officers. … Therefore, immunity under G. L. c. 123, § 22, on these grounds applies. Second, the plaintiff argues that McLean is not immune under G.

McDonough

457 Mass. 512 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 11, 2010

Goguen, supra at 682 (establishing method for appellate review of orders made pursuant to G. L. c. 209A). … Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 339 (2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008) (findings of fact “should be stated clearly, concisely and unequivocally, and be worded so that they are not susceptible of more than one interpretation”).

Clermont v. Monster Worldwide, Inc.

102 F. Supp. 3d 353 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 6, 2015

Applying the foregoing interpretation to the undisputed facts set forth in Plaintiffs complaint establishes that Defendant violated the statute, subject to any defenses. … Both Dixon and Somers establish firmly that the statute requires timely payments clearly denoted as payments for the wages at issue in order to qualify as payments under the statute.

Skyhook Wireless, Inc. v. Google Inc.

86 Mass. App. Ct. 611 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 6, 2014

It is undisputed that Skyhook has established the first two elements of each claim. … (1979).17 As previously 17 Section 773 of the Restatement deals with one of several "special situations" in which application of enumerated factors for determining whether interference is improper have produced "clearly

Wolk v. Teich

23 Mass. App. Dec. 5 · Massachusetts District Court, Appellate Division · Dec 20, 1961

Denied. 1 find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, by reason of the fact that he was ready, able and willing, and eminently qualified to complete the work, called for in his contract, but was prevented from doing so … The trial judge, by his “Findings of Fact”, clearly established the right of the plaintiff to sue either on the special contract or on the account annexed. Searls v. Doring, 275 Mass. 403 , 407 and Beaudoin v.

Bishop Ex Rel. Bishop v. Cermenaro

355 F. Supp. 1269 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 19, 1973

. § 1983 to redress the deprivation under color of state law of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States. … The preamble to the code recites that: The primary objective for the establishment of these guidelines is the safety and welfare of the students.

Grant v. John Hancock Mutual, Life Insurance

183 F. Supp. 2d 344 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 8, 2002

To hold otherwise would render meaningless the Act’s grant of immunity for intentional torts. … Grant’s scenarios are clearly not the "rare” type of "peculiar power of coercion” anticipated by Massachusetts courts. 10 .

Geoffrey, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue

453 Mass. 17 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 8, 2009

L. c. 63, § 39, “every foreign corporation, exercising its charter, or qualified to do business or actually doing business in the commonwealth, or owning or using any part or all of its capital, plant or any other property … The Legislature has stated that the purpose of § 39 is to require foreign corporations to pay “for the enjoyment under the protection of the laws of the commonwealth, of the powers, rights, privileges and immunities derived

Arraj v. United States

95 F. Supp. 3d 150 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 30, 2015

The FTCA waives sovereign immunity for certain negligence claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b)(1). … does not establish the critical element of causation.

Riffelmacher v. Board of Police Commissioners

27 Mass. App. Ct. 159 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 24, 1989

L. c. 151B, § 9. “1) Was the plaintiff . . . qualified for the position she sought? … If the reason given was a pretext, the plaintiff need not disprove it in her case, that is, establish that she was not an introvert. See Trustees of Forbes Library v.

Sturdy Memorial Foundation, Inc. v. Board of Assessors

60 Mass. App. Ct. 573 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 4, 2004

The Foundation claimed it was entitled to abatement because the property qualified for the charitable tax exemption under G. … Clearly, the payment of the bonuses represented a distribution of income to Sturdy’s physician employees that would otherwise have inured to Sturdy.

Ramos v. Board of Selectmen

16 Mass. App. Ct. 308 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jul 5, 1983

The trial judge interpreted the emphasized language in this quotation from the Gildea case as establishing an “exception to the immunity principles set down in the Gildea” case, if it is shown that harm was caused to Ramos … [of counts II and III] which very clearly and explicitly set forth a claim for breach of contract against the [t]own.”

Lobel v. Woodland Golf Club of Auburndale

260 F. Supp. 3d 127 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 31, 2017

Club members do not- need to directly control every detail of operations in' order for the club to qualify as a private establishment. (8) Whether the Club Advertises for Members Establishments that “advertise and solicit … However, Title Ill's protections do not apply to such entities if they qualify under the law's exemption for “private clubs or establishments.” § 12187. .

In the Matter of the Estate of Galatis

88 Mass. App. Ct. 273 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Sep 9, 2015

Assessing Galatis’s mental state when the will was signed on February 9 against the backdrop of the medical records was made particularly challenging by the fact that no testimony or other evidence established at what time … During the signing, Skopas asked Galatis to write his signature more clearly, to which Galatis responded, “Leave me alone.” After the signing, according to Skopas, Galatis asked him, “I did everything right, right?”

Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co.

216 Mass. 486 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 26, 1914

It was established about 1866, and the plaintiffs’ estates were occupied at approximately the same time by one of the defendant’s predecessors in title. … They will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Willets v. Langhaar, 212 Mass. 573 , and cases cited at 576. Stewart v. Hanreddy, 212 Mass. 340 .

Hamdi Halal Market LLC v. United States

947 F. Supp. 2d 159 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 30, 2013

Hasbro, Inc., 314 F.3d 289, 295-96 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding a typed name at the end of an email qualifies as a signature). … Hamdi has established no actual prejudice occasioned by the agency’s use of a typed name.

Rogers v. Attorney General

347 Mass. 126 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 4, 1964

Although a donor may clearly manifest a desire to have the trust serve as a memorial, the doctrine of cy pres may still apply. … The use of the word “request” as to the latter suggests that the trust should not fail for want of applicants who could not qualify be *134 cause they drank or smoked.