"Our review of the district court's grant for summary judgment is de novo"
How later courts described this case
- "Our review of the district court's grant for summary judgment is de novo"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-608
23-P-911
I.L.
vs.
ELIZABETH S. TEMIN & others1 (and a companion case2).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
In these paired appeals, the pro se plaintiff argues that
judges of the Suffolk and Middlesex Superior Courts improperly
dismissed his complaints against the defendants, who are medical
providers, and the hospitals that employ them. While the
procedural histories giving rise to the controversies before us
are complicated, the matters are factually straightforward. On
May 9, 2019, the plaintiff presented himself to the
Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) emergency room department
on the advice of his psychiatrist, to obtain a voluntary
psychiatric evaluation. After examining him, medical providers
1Wendy L. Macias Konstantopoulos, James Luccarelli, Gerald
O. Duffy, David Fredrick, Adriana M. K. Reguera, Lauren
Fitzgerald Oshea, and "John/Jane Does."
2 I.L. vs. McLean Hospital & others.
at MGH caused the plaintiff to be involuntarily committed
according to the procedure set forth in G. L. c. 123, § 12 (a),
due to an "unknown degree of risk of unintentional harm to self
and impending homelessness." While at MGH, the plaintiff
attempted to elope and was physically restrained by the
hospital's security staff, placed in four-point restraints,3 and
administered medication to address his agitated behavior.
As a result of the examination's findings, the plaintiff
was transferred to McLean Hospital (McLean) on the following
day, for a period not to exceed three days pursuant to G. L.
c. 123, §§ 12 (a) and (b). McLean applied to extend the
plaintiff's commitment on the same day pursuant to §§ 7 and 8 of
G. L. c. 123. That application was denied following a hearing,
and the plaintiff was ultimately discharged from McLean on May
16, 2019.4,5
3 Four-point restraint is a method of restraint that
involves the immobilization of a patient's limbs independently
of one another. See Williams v. Burton, 943 F.2d 1572, 1578
(11th Cir. 1991) (Pittman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 505
U.S. 1208 (1992) (describing "four-point, spread-eagle
restraint").
4 As we discuss infra, this hearing and the subsequent
discharge were timely. See Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. C.R.,
484 Mass. 472, 481 (2020).
5 The plaintiff was only held at MGH for the duration of the
initial examination pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 12 (a). See
Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., supra at 482. The remainder of his
commitment occurred at McLean.
2
Almost two years following his discharge from McLean, on
May 10, 2021, the plaintiff filed a complaint in Middlesex
Superior Court against MGH and McLean, accusing them of
"kidnapping & unlawful confinement." McLean filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6),
365 Mass. 754 (1974), which was allowed on September 28, 2021.
MGH also filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied, but later
it filed a motion for summary judgment that was allowed, on June
23, 2023.6 The same judge granted both the dismissal as to
McLean and the entry of judgment for MGH after concluding that
the defendants were immune from civil liability pursuant to
G. L. c. 123, § 22.7
Separately, on April 20, 2022, the plaintiff filed a
complaint in Suffolk Superior Court against medical providers
employed by MGH, alleging "statutory non-compliant unlawful
confinement," "lack of consent," "negligence/medical
malpractice, "intentional infliction of emotional distress," and
"misdiagnosis/failure to examine." A different judge dismissed
6 The plaintiff amended his complaint on February 21, 2022,
to allege false imprisonment and unlawful confinement against
MGH and McLean, even though McLean had already been dismissed as
a defendant by that point in the proceedings. A judge later
clarified that the plaintiff was only permitted to amend the
complaint with respect to MGH.
7 The plaintiff's appeal from the judgment of dismissal and
from the summary judgment was docketed as 23-P-911.
3
that complaint on a motion by the defendants, concluding
similarly that the defendants were immune from civil liability
under G. L. c. 123, § 22.8 We affirm the dismissals of both
complaints and the summary judgment in favor of MGH.
Discussion. "General Laws c. 123, § 12, governs the
emergency restraint, evaluation, care, and hospitalization of
persons posing a risk of serious harm due to mental illness."
Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. C.R., 484 Mass. 472, 477 (2020).
"A physician . . . who, after examining a person, has
reason to believe that failure to hospitalize such person
would create a likelihood of serious harm by reason of
mental illness may restrain or authorize the restraint of
such person . . . at a public facility or at a private
facility authorized for such purposes by the [Department of
Mental Health]."
G. L. c. 123, § 12 (a). The ensuing hospitalization of a person
so restrained may last for three days. See Massachusetts Gen.
Hosp., supra at 480. See also G. L. c. 123, § 12 (a) ("A
physician . . . may . . . apply for the hospitalization of such
person for a 3-day period").
"The statute further provides that '[a] person shall be
discharged at the end of the three day period unless the
superintendent applies for a commitment under the provisions of
[G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8,] or the person remains on a voluntary
basis.'" Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 484 Mass. at 480, quoting
8 The plaintiff's appeal from this judgment of dismissal was
docketed as 23-P-608.
4
G. L. c. 123, § 12 (d). "If the superintendent of a facility
moves for commitment of the patient before the end of the three-
day time period, a court generally has five days to commence a
hearing." Id. at 481, citing G. L. c. 123, § 7 (c). "The
statutory scheme does not allow recovery by persons
involuntarily restrained or committed." Newton-Wellesley Hosp.
v. Magrini, 451 Mass. 777, 781 n. 9 (2008), citing G. L. c. 123,
§ 22.
With respect to emergency hearings, the version of G. L.
c. 123, § 12 (b), in effect at the pertinent time provided that
"Any person admitted under the provisions of this
subsection, who has reason to believe that such admission
is the result of an abuse or misuse of the provisions of
this subsection, may request, or request through counsel an
emergency hearing in the district court in whose
jurisdiction the facility is located, and unless a delay is
requested by the person or through counsel, the district
court shall hold such hearing on the day the request is
filed with the court or not later than the next business
day."9
Such an emergency hearing cannot be used to challenge "the
substance of the designated physician's actual 'determin[ation]
that failure to hospitalize such person would create a
likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental illness.'"
Newton-Wellesley Hosp., 451 Mass. at 784 n. 13 (2008), quoting
G. L. c. 123, § 12 (b).
9 The statute was rewritten by St. 2020, c. 260, § 43, which
became effective January 1, 2021, but the revisions did not
change the substance of G. L. c. 123, § 12 (b).
5
"We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo,
accepting as true the facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint
as well as any favorable inferences that reasonably can be drawn
from them" (citation omitted). Braley v. Bates, 100 Mass. App.
Ct. 259, 260 (2021). "To survive a motion to dismiss, the
pleading stage requires factual allegations plausibly suggesting
(not merely consistent with) an entitlement to relief"
(quotations and citation omitted). Id. at 261.
"We review a decision to grant summary judgment de novo."
Bank of N.Y. v. Bailey, 460 Mass. 327, 331 (2011). "The
standard of review of a grant of summary judgment is whether,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."10
Id., quoting Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass.
117, 120 (1991).
10The plaintiff relies on Ahern v. O'Donnell, 109 F.3d 809,
819 (1st Cir. 1997), to argue that we should review for error of
law. His reliance on this authority is inapposite, however,
because the portion of the decision to which he refers deals
with the principle of qualified immunity for law enforcement
officers. The court in Ahern reviewed a grant of summary
judgment de novo. See id. at 815 ("Our review of the district
court's grant for summary judgment is de novo").
6
The plaintiff raises two principal arguments in his brief
before this court.11 First, he contends that the defendants are
not entitled to immunity under G. L. c. 123, § 22, because G. L.
c. 123, § 12 (a), requires that an individual be examined prior
to being subjected to involuntary commitment, and he was not
examined before being committed by the defendants. Accordingly,
he contends, the defendants should not have been granted summary
judgment pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 22. Although the plaintiff
is, at times, unclear in his argumentation, we believe that he
considers this alleged failure of the defendants to examine him
to abrogate the immunity of all defendants in both cases.
The argument fails on its face, however, as the plaintiff
himself repeatedly conceded -- in his complaints and before this
court -- that he was in fact examined by the MGH defendants.12
Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
11Although the plaintiff's two appeals have been docketed
separately, he submitted an identical brief in each case.
12The plaintiff's references to his examinations by the MGH
defendants are numerous. It suffices to say that in his
complaint before the Suffolk Superior Court, the plaintiff
claimed that the MGH defendants "took part in the initial psych
evaluation," "examined [the plaintiff] and was surprised that he
came in for a psychiatric evaluation," and "met with [the
plaintiff] and provided an evaluation." In his original
complaint before the Middlesex Superior Court, he claimed that
the "second doctor evaluated me & said I was free to go." In
his brief before this court, quoting his amended complaint
before the Middlesex Superior Court, he wrote "first doctor at
MGH examined [the plaintiff]."
7
plaintiff, it remains undisputed that the MGH defendants did, in
fact, examine the plaintiff in accord with G. L. c. 123,
§ 12 (a). Therefore, immunity under G. L. c. 123, § 22, on
these grounds applies.
Second, the plaintiff argues that McLean is not immune
under G. L. c. 123, § 22, because it failed to accommodate his
demand for an emergency hearing as required by G. L. c. 123,
§ 12 (b). The plaintiff asserts that he began requesting an
emergency hearing after arriving at McLean. This argument fails
as well, as the plaintiff appears to conflate an emergency
hearing available under G. L. c. 123, § 12 (b), with the hearing
available to challenge involuntary commitments provided by G. L.
c. 123, § 7. See Newton-Wellesley Hosp., 451 Mass. at 784 n.
13. Section 7 requires that the hearing which permits a
plaintiff to challenge "the designated physician's actual
determin[ation] that failure to hospitalize such person would
create a likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental illness"
must occur within five days (citation omitted). Id.13 McLean
We are unpersuaded by the plaintiff's contention that he
13
sought to challenge his commitment on grounds that justified an
emergency hearing. The plaintiff argues that the doctors who
examined him did not find that he should be hospitalized and
that his commitment therefore qualified as an "abuse or misuse"
of G. L. c. 123, § 12. G. L. c. 123, § 12 (b). However, an
assertion that the patient is, in fact, mentally well is
precisely the type of claim that may not be argued at an
emergency hearing under G. L. c. 123, § 12 (b). See Newton-
Wellesley Hosp., supra.
8
moved for the extended commitment of the plaintiff pursuant to
G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8, on May 10, 2019, and the plaintiff's
hearing occurred on May 16, 2019.14 As "intermediate Saturdays,
Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the
computation," Mass. R. Civ. P. 6 (a), 365 Mass. 747 (1974), the
plaintiff's hearing was timely.15 See Massachusetts Gen. Hosp.,
484 Mass. at 481.
Judgments affirmed.
By the Court (Milkey, Henry &
Desmond, JJ.16),
Assistant Clerk
Entered: April 8, 2024.
14General Laws c. 123, § 12 (a), permits an authorized
facility to hold a patient for up to three days before applying
to extend the commitment under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8. Here,
McLean applied for the extension on May 10, 2019, the same day
the patient arrived at its facility.
15The plaintiff further "preserves his right to challenge
[Supreme Judicial Court] Rule 9A on constitutional grounds," and
provides fourteen arguments supporting his claim that such a
rule is violative of due process. We decline to consider these
arguments as, notwithstanding the plaintiff's general references
to constitutional rights, they are unsupported by legal citation
and do not rise to the level of appellate argument. See Mass.
R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).
We further note that the plaintiff concedes that this court does
not have the jurisdiction to review his challenge to the
requirements of Supreme Judicial Court rules.
16 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
9