Case law

Creighton v. Hoppis

99 Ind. 369 · Indiana Supreme Court · Sep 27, 1884

It was said by Professor Greenleaf: “ But no reason is perceived why every declaration accompanying the act of possession, whether in disparagement of the claimant’s title, or otherwise qualifying his possession, if made … Punderson were clearly evidence, namely, to show in what character, or with what intent, she entered, and held possession of the premises in dispute.”

Orange County Assessor v. Stout

996 N.E.2d 871 · Indiana Tax Court · Oct 2, 2013

The State has asked, recommended [to] the counties if it is wooded ground that the [property owner] provide a forest management plan and/or a timber harvesting plan for it to qualify as agricultural property. … Areas containing a large manicured yard over and above the accepted one acre homesite would qualify for the [residential] excess” classification.

Patterson v. Dykes

804 N.E.2d 849 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 12, 2004

Clearly, the effect of a Pardon is retroactive; thus, from August 14, 2003, forward, Patterson is eligible to run for an elected office, because he no longer has a felony conviction in his criminal history. … Our supreme court explained this provision as follows: When the elective term ends and no qualified person has been elected and qualified to take over the duties of the office, the person holding the office at the end of

Goins v. Lott

435 N.E.2d 1002 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 26, 1982

However, the facts in Yellow Cab clearly indicated paternity and therefore the decedent was under a legal obligation to support the child. See also Copple v. … If a child seeking benefits through this category proved only acknowledgement he would not qualify. If a child proved only paternity he would not qualify.

Steven R. Perry v. State of Indiana

13 N.E.3d 909 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 22, 2014

An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” … App. 2009) (holding that distinguishing between a person on pretrial detention and post-sentence home detention does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution or the Equal Privileges and Immunities

Marion County Treasurer v. Blue Lustre Products, Inc.

214 B.R. 188 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Oct 16, 1997

DISCUSSION STANDARDS OF REVIEW We review the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard. … Therefore, the tax liability was clearly within the meaning of the “assessed before the commencement of the case” provision of section 507(a)(8)(B).

Ray v. State

679 N.E.2d 1364 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 28, 1997

Similar to the constitutions of a majority of states, the Indiana Constitution makes all offenses bailable, with the qualified exception of capital crimes. … Although the prosecutor originally moved for an increase in the original $20,000 bond, the trial court’s order that he be held without bail pending trial clearly constituted a revocation of bail.

Jones v. Marion County Small Claims Court

701 F. Supp. 1414 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Dec 6, 1988

Action based on state case law, even if based solely on state common law, would qualify as “custom or usage of a state” for purposes of § 1983. … His pension from General Motors is paid from a trust qualified under the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 1001 , et seq.). 26.

Nichols v. Wallace

District Court, N.D. Indiana · Jan 24, 2025

Qualified Immunity Defendant also contends that summary judgment is warranted because he is entitled to qualified immunity. … The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages when their conduct does not violate a “clearly established” constitutional or statutory right. McAllister v.

Hebron-Vision, LLC v. Porter County Assessor

Indiana Tax Court · Oct 28, 2019

Finally, Hebron-Vision maintains that the Indiana Board erred in concluding that it did not establish it qualified for a charitable purposes exemption during the years at issue because the totality of the evidence established … Clearly[, Hebron-Vision] is using shrewd business skills in selecting tenants.

Randles v. Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund

860 N.E.2d 1212 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 6, 2007

Ballard is an expert qualified to give an opinion as to whether her patient was dead or alive. See Evid. … As a result, Seandre had a dependent when she died and did not qualify as a child under the CWDS. The trial court’s finding that Randies’s individual claim under the CWDS failed is not clearly erroneous. II.

Marriage of Dowden v. Allman

696 N.E.2d 456 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 30, 1998

In other words, we will not reverse the trial court unless the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. … We have held that for the pension to qualify as “property” under section (b)(2), “it is not important that the funds are eligible for immediate withdrawal.

Brown v. Poulos

78 Ind. Dec. 869 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 29, 1980

Clearly the Doney court considered the phrase in question as synonymous with agent. See also: Provident Trust Co. v. Darrough (1906), 168 Ind. 29 , 78 N.E. 1030 ; Day v. West (1978), Ind.App., 373 N.E.2d 935 . … There is nothing in the statute at hand to indicate that the Legislature intended to alter well-settled rules of agency by requiring that the agency be established by some written instrument.

Fisher v. State

259 Ind. 633 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 8, 1973

The evidence at the trial clearly established that Herman Fitzgerald died of gunshot wounds. … Immediately after the term was used the court specifically qualified its use by adding the words “calculated to take or destroy life” which clearly indicates to the jury the correct law of intent for this charge.

Epperly v. E. & P. Brake Bonding, Inc.

169 Ind. App. 224 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 24, 1976

. & P. on August 11, 1971, and qualified as such on August 17, 1971. Pfau, as Receiver, retained all of the corporate employees, including Epperly and Pucillo. … Other evidence established that Epperly had made arrangements for the formation of United during his tenure with E. & P.

Schacke v. State

164 Ind. App. 153 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 8, 1975

the evidence does not *155 show that the place involved was a “building or structure” and thus he could not be found guilty of burglary in the second degree. 1 The evidence on this point is rather confusing, but it does clearly … This, we believe, is sufficient to qualify the place as a “structure”.

Clem v. United States

601 F. Supp. 835 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Jan 29, 1985

. § 1346 (b), 2671 et seq., constitutes a limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 , 96 S.Ct. 948, 953 , 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976); United States v. … In the case presently before the court, the evidence clearly establishes that the Clems were swimming in Lake Michigan in an area adjacent to Mt. Baldy beach at the time of the incident.

Hiland v. Hiland

467 N.E.2d 1253 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 29, 1984

establish that he provided more for the support of such child during the calendar year than the parent not having custody. … To qualify for tax exemptions under subsection B, the noneus-todial parent must pay at least twelve hundred dollars ($1200.00) per year per child; this is sufficient only if the custodial parent failed to show that he provided

Lane v. State

521 N.E.2d 947 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 22, 1988

This Court found the evidence sufficient to establish Lane's identity as the robber. … Lane's allegation of ineffective assistance is clearly an attempt to cireum-vent Rule PC 1, section 8, in order to present evidence on issues that had been waived.

Natalie Medley v. Bruce Lemmon, Julie Stout, Pam Ferguson, Stacey Milner, Sherry White, L.A. Vannatta, Mike Pavese, Virginia McCullough

994 N.E.2d 1177 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 17, 2013

Although Article 1, Section 23 does explicitly refer to acts of the General Assembly, our supreme court has clearly held that this provision governs “not only state statutes, but also the enactments and actions of county … She does, however, allege that the second offense for touching another inmate in the restroom was not sexual in nature, but that it was construed that way by prison staff so that it would qualify as a “sex offense” under