Nichols v. Wallace

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JEFFREY NICHOLS,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 3:22-CV-703-SJF

WADE A WALLACE,

Defendant.

OPINION and ORDER

Plaintiff Jeffrey Nichols filed this case on August 29, 2022, after Defendant

Officer Wade Wallace pulled him over for traffic violations on January 13, 2021. Plaintiff

brings claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, contending that, during the traffic stop,

Officer Wallace violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant conducted the

traffic stop without reasonable suspicion and that, as a result, Plaintiff was unlawfully

detained for about 25 minutes. Plaintiff also contends that Defendant’s actions were

racially motivated.

Defendant has moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims, which

Plaintiff has opposed.1 The Court issues the following opinion and order based on the

1 Under this Court’s local rules, a party moving for summary judgment must separately file (1) a motion;

(2) a supporting brief; (3) a statement of material facts with numbered paragraphs for each material fact

the moving party contends is undisputed which includes (A) a short statement of each fact; and (B) a

citation to evidence supporting each fact. N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(a). A party opposing summary judgment

must separately file: (1) a response brief and (2) a Response to Statement of Material Facts that (A)

restates verbatim the Statement of Facts, (B) a correspondingly numbered response immediately

following each paragraph of the Statement of Facts, (C) a citation to evidence supporting each dispute of

parties’ consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). [See DE 7, DE 21]. For the reasons below,

Defendant’s Motion is granted.

I. FACTS

On January 13, 2021, Plaintiff was driving westbound on Interstate 94 near mile

marker 43 in Michigan City, Indiana. [DE 16 at 1, ¶ 1]. Defendant, on duty for the

LaPorte County Sheriff’s Interdiction Traffic Enforcement Unit that day, was parked in

the median of the interstate in his marked police vehicle. [Id.] Defendant began to

follow Plaintiff after observing that Plaintiff appeared to be traveling at a speed greater

than the speed limit of 70 miles per hour and after observing that Plaintiff merged

“quickly” from the far inside lane to the center lane “without signaling 300 feet prior to

changing lanes.” [Id. at 1, ¶ 1–2]. Then, after pacing his vehicle with Plaintiff’s,

Defendant’s “speedometer and [dash-mounted] radar” reflected a speed of 77 miles per

hour. [Id. ¶ 3]. Defendant again observed “Plaintiff merge to the far outside lane of

travel” without signaling for 300 feet. [Id. at 2, ¶ 4]. Defendant then pulled Plaintiff

over. [Id. ¶ 5].

Plaintiff disputes that he was speeding or that he made unsafe lane changes.

Plaintiff maintains that his cruise control was “set at 70 miles per hour.” [DE 17-1 at 2, ¶

fact, and (D) additional facts in a section titled Additional Material Facts with numbered paragraphs

continuing the sequential numbing of the Statement of Material Facts for each additional material fact the

opposing party contends is undisputed which includes both (i) a short statement of each fact, and (ii) a

citation to evidence supporting each fact. N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b). Plaintiff’s response fails to meet these

requirements because he did not individually file a response brief and a Response to Statement of Facts.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s Statement of Genuine Disputes section does not restate verbatim the Statement of

Material Facts, use corresponding numbers, or cite evidence for each fact. In the interest of ruling on the

merits of the arguments, the Court will consider the entirety of Plaintiff’s response despite its deficiencies.

See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962).

6]. Plaintiff also contends that Defendant followed him for about 3 to 5 miles before

activating his lights to pull Plaintiff over. [DE 17 at 3–4, ¶ 3]. Plaintiff explains that he

noticed when Defendant began to follow him, and so after a mile or two, Plaintiff

reduced his speed to 65 miles per hour. [Id. at 3–4, ¶ 3]. As to the lane changes, Plaintiff

insists that he used his turn signals for both lane changes and that he waited at least 4

seconds before changing lanes. Plaintiff maintains that, because he was driving at 70

miles per hour, he drove at least 410 feet before changing lanes. [Id. at 3, ¶ 2]. Plaintiff

states that he even asked Defendant to provide a recording that showed that he had

been speeding or had failed to signal during the lane changes, but that Defendant

declined to do so. [Id. at 4, ¶ 3].

Generally, traffic stops take between ten and twenty minutes to complete. [DE

15-1 at 3, ¶ 18]. Defendant alleges that the traffic stop was conducted through normal

procedures and took about ten minutes, beginning at 1:43 p.m. and concluding at 1:53

p.m. [DE 16 at 2, ¶ 5, 6]. This duration was listed on the warning issued to Plaintiff. [DE

17]. Defendant states that throughout the traffic stop, “public safety precautions were

followed to address the inherent concerns surrounding traffic stops on interstate

highways as well as the COVID-19 global pandemic.” [Id. at 2, ¶ 7]. At the time of the

incident here, Defendant “routinely disinfected” his patrol vehicle and kept it “well-

stocked with face masks which were made available to anyone who wanted one due to

the COVID-19 pandemic.” [DE 15-1 at 3, ¶ 16]. Defendant provides that it is common

practice for him to invite people to sit in his patrol vehicle during traffic stops. [Id. at 3,

¶ 13; DE 18 at 4]. Accordingly, Defendant maintains that he invited Plaintiff to sit in the

front seat of his patrol vehicle while he conducted the traffic stop. [DE 15-1 at 3, ¶13].

According to Defendant, Plaintiff did not “articulate or make any indication that

he was uncomfortable sitting in the unlocked patrol [vehicle] or engaging in general

conversation” nor did Plaintiff assert his Fifth Amendment rights during the stop. [DE

16 at 2, ¶ 8; DE 15-1 at 3, ¶ 19]. But Plaintiff alleges that he understood Defendant’s

invitation to sit in the patrol vehicle as an “order” to do so. [DE 17 at 5, ¶ 5]. Plaintiff

insists that he “was fearful” that if he questioned Defendant’s authority, that this

“might provoke an angry, forceful or harmful response” from Defendant. [DE 17-1 at 3,

¶ 17]. Plaintiff thus insists that he felt that he “had no choice but to get out of the van

and sit in his patrol vehicle.” [Id.]. Still, Plaintiff does not contend that he asked whether

it was an order, nor did he tell Defendant that he was uncomfortable. [DE 17 at 5, ¶ 5].

Plaintiff disputes that the traffic stop lasted only ten minutes, maintaining that

his recollection is that it lasted around twenty-five minutes. [Id. at 5–6, ¶ 7]. Plaintiff

insists that the times (1:43 p.m. and 1:53 p.m.) listed on the warning reflect only the

times that Defendant called dispatch, not the actual duration of the traffic stop. [Id. at 6,

¶ 7]. Plaintiff alleges that when Defendant approached his vehicle, Defendant requested

his driver’s license and registration, which Plaintiff promptly produced. [DE 17-1 at 3, ¶

15]. Plaintiff contends that once Defendant had Plaintiff’s driver’s license and vehicle

rental agreement, Defendant needed nothing else to complete the stop. [DE 17 at 5, ¶ 7].

Plaintiff also contends that Defendant knew that Plaintiff was African

American—as Plaintiff’s windows are not tinted—and that Defendant did not offer a

“race neutral reason” for having Plaintiff sit in the patrol vehicle. [Id. at 5, ¶ 6; DE 17 at

9]. According to Plaintiff, sitting in the patrol vehicle also increased his fear that “he

would contract [COVID-19] and prolong the stop.” [Id. at 5, ¶ 6]. But Defendant

maintains that at the time of the traffic stop, he was not “familiar with [] Plaintiff or his

vehicle, nor was he able to ascertain” Plaintiff’s race until after he approached his

vehicle. [DE 16 at 2, ¶ 12].

Defendant issued Plaintiff a warning for speeding and failing to properly use

turn signals. [DE 16 at 2, ¶ 11]. With only a warning issued, Plaintiff did not pay any

fees. [Id.].

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the “pleadings, the discovery and

disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). A “material” fact is one

identified by the substantive law as affecting the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, (1986). A “genuine issue” exists regarding a material fact

when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

[nonmoving party].” Id. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the

suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”

Id. To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must review

the record, construing all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and

drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Heft v. Moore, 351 F.3d 278, 282

(7th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the court’s role “is not to sift through the evidence,

pondering the nuances and inconsistencies, and decide whom to believe. The court has

one task and one task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is

a material dispute that requires a trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920

(7th Cir. 1994). Indeed, the court is not “obligated to research and construct legal

arguments for parties, especially when they are represented by counsel.” Nelson v.

Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 2011).

To overcome a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party cannot rest

on the allegations or denials contained in his pleadings. Rather, the nonmoving party

must present sufficient evidence to show the existence of each element of his case on

which he will bear the burden at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23; Modrowski v. Pigatto,

712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013). When a factual record, taken as a whole, could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for

trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986). In other words, “[s]ummary judgment is not a dress rehearsal or practice

run; it is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what

evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events.”

Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted);

see also Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010).

B. Discussion

Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, contending that

Defendant’s actions violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Defendant maintains that summary judgment

should be granted on all claims because (1) there was no violation of Plaintiff’s rights

and, (2) even if there was a violation, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.2

To begin, Plaintiff admits that, in “the absence of clear authority, Defendant

appears to be entitled to immunity on Plaintiff’s claim that [Defendant’s] questioning

violated [Plaintiff’s] 5th Amendment rights.” [DE 17 at 8]. Accordingly, with no

substantive response from Plaintiff, the Court can only find that Defendant is entitled to

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim.

The Court now considers Defendant’s motion as to Plaintiff’s Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment claims.

1. Violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s actions violated his Fourth Amendment right

not to be pulled over without reasonable suspicion and not to have the traffic stop be

unreasonably prolonged. He also contends that Defendant discriminated against him

based on his race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendant argues that he

2 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has experienced no concrete injury traceable to Defendant’s conduct

because he was only issued a warning, not a ticket, and thus lacks standing. [DE 15, 3–5]. But Defendant

cites no authority to support this assertion, instead devoting most of his Memorandum in Support of

Summary Judgment discussing other arguments. Accordingly, this Court deems this argument waived.

See United States v. Beavers, 756 F.3d 1044, 1059 (7th Cir. 2014). “Perfunctory, undeveloped arguments

without discussion or citation to pertinent legal authority are waived.”

is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff fails to properly raise a § 1983 claim,

that Defendant did have reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop, and that he did

not notice Plaintiff’s race before approaching his vehicle and thus could not have had a

discriminatory intent.

Section 1983 vindicates “rights, privileges or immunities that are guaranteed by

the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute.” Narducci v. Moore, 572 F.3d 313, 318–19 (7th

Cir. 2009). “To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements[:]

he must allege violation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United

States, and he must show a person acting under color of law committed the alleged

deprivation.” Sims v. Marnocha, 159 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1136–37 (N.D. Ind. 2001) (citing

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988)). First, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff “cannot provide

any evidence” to support his claim that Defendant’s conduct during the traffic stop

“deprived Plaintiff of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or

laws of the United States.” [DE 15 at 2]. Second, though Defendant concedes that he was

acting under color of law, he maintains that Plaintiff has not shown “a direct causal link

between a municipal custom or policy” and the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights.

[DE 15 at 2–3]. The Court considers Defendant’s second argument first.

Defendant relies on City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)3, to support

his contention that Plaintiff must show a direct causal link between a municipal custom

or policy and the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s rights. Canton considered whether “a

3 Canton was abrogated in part on other grounds unrelated to this case by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825

(1994).

municipality can ever be liable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for constitutional violations

resulting from its failure to train municipal employees.” Id. at 380. The Court explained

that “a municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself

causes the constitutional violation at issue.” Id. at 385 (internal citation omitted). As such,

“‘[i]t is only when the 'execution of the government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the

injury’ that the municipality may be held liable under § 1983.” Id. (citing Springfield v.

Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 267 (1987)). Canton thus established t the first inquiry into an

allegation of municipal liability must be “whether there is a direct causal link between a

municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id.

But here, Plaintiff is not suing the police department that Defendant is employed

by, nor is Plaintiff suing Defendant in his official capacity. Plaintiff is suing Defendant

in his individual capacity. And when a state actor, a “person” within the meaning of

Section 1983, is sued in his or her personal or individual capacity, “it is enough to show

that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal

right.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166

(1985)). Thus, Plaintiff need not allege a “direct causal link between a municipal custom

or policy” and his alleged Constitutional deprivations to bring his claims against

Defendant. [DE 15 at 2].

With Defendant’s second argument unpersuasive, the Court now returns

Defendant’s first argument: that Plaintiff fails to present evidence showing that

Defendant violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Court addresses

each claim in turn.

a. Fourth Amendment

Defendant maintains that he is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment claim because the undisputed evidence shows that Defendant had

reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop against Plaintiff and that the stop was not

unreasonably prolonged.

i. Reasonable Suspicion

Defendant alleges that the undisputed evidence shows that he observed Plaintiff

commit three traffic violations before initiating the traffic stop: exceeding the speed

limit of 70 mph and changing lanes without proper use of a turn signal twice in

violation of Ind. Code § 9-21-8-25.4 Plaintiff disputes this by maintaining that he was

driving the speed limit while using cruise control and by maintaining that he used his

turn signal correctly during both lane changes.

The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”

U.S. Const, Amend. 4. “Whenever police stop a vehicle, the stop must meet the [Fourth]

Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.” United States v. Lewis, 920 F.3d 483, 489 (7th

Cir. 2019) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)). “Traffic stops are brief,

like Terry stops, so they require only reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation—not

probable cause.” Abbas v. City of Hobart, Indiana, No. 2:21-CV-150-GSL-APR, 2024 WL

4 “On January 13, 2021, prior to the statute’s repeal [Repealed by P.L. 118-2022, SEC.23], Ind. Code § 9-21-

8-25 read as follows: ‘Sec. 25. A signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously during

not less than the last two hundred (200) feet traveled by a vehicle before turning or changing lanes. A

vehicle traveling in a speed zone of at least fifty (50) miles per hour shall give a signal continuously for

not less than the last three hundred (300) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning or changing lanes.’”

[DE 15 at 4 n.2].

3508640, at *3 (N.D. Ind. July 22, 2024) (internal citations omitted). Thus, “[i]f an officer

reasonably thinks he sees a driver commit a traffic violation, that is sufficient grounds

to pull him over without offending the Constitution.” Lewis, 920 F.3d at 489 (citing

United States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 2005)). Moreover, “[w]hether the

driver actually committed a traffic infraction is irrelevant for [Fourth] Amendment

purposes so long as there was an objective basis for a reasonable belief he did.” Id.

(citing United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 2000)).

Defendant relies on United States v. Lewis to show that Plaintiff’s traffic stop was

reasonable. In Lewis, an officer was watching traffic when he observed Lewis driving

closely behind another vehicle. Id. at 486. The officer began following Lewis to see if he

could confirm the distance. Id. The officer “calculated the time-distance[]” by activating

a “stopwatch…to record the time between the truck’s rear passing a milepost” and the

front of Lewis’s car passing the same milepost. Id. at 486. “He clocked this at 1.2

seconds, meaning Lewis followed 1.2 seconds behind the truck according to this

calculation. Lewis stayed close behind the truck for about 45 seconds despite the lack of

traffic immediately behind him.” Id. The officer activated his emergency lights and

pulled Lewis over. Id. During the stop the officer found heroin in Lewis’ vehicle, and

Lewis was then charged with possession of heroin with intent to distribute. Id. Lewis

later moved the suppress the heroin, contending that the stop was unlawful, but his

motion was denied. Id. On appeal, the court affirmed, finding that the officer “had more

than ample grounds to pull Lewis over.” Id. at 489. The court explained that the officer’s

initial observation that Lewis was driving behind the truck in front of him too closely

“alone probably satisfied the Constitution.” Id. The court also explained that whether

“Lewis actually followed [the truck] by 1.2 seconds exactly is irrelevant for purposes of

the [4th] Amendment. It is enough that this calculation supported a reasonable belief

Lewis was breaking the law.” Id. Thus, the court in Lewis determined that the traffic

stop initiated by the officer did not violate Lewis’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id. A

radar gun reading likewise has been found to support such a reasonable belief. See

United States v. Baker, 78 F.3d 1241, 1244 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding than a officer’s reading

that “clocked [the defendant’s car] going 77 miles per hour in a 65 mile per hour zone”

gave the officer probable cause to initiate a traffic stop); see also Retzlaff v. City of

Cumberland, No. 09-CV-692-SLC, 2010 WL 1780338, at *6 (W.D. Wis. May 3, 2010)

(finding that there was probable cause for a traffic stop after the officer used a visual

estimation and dash-mounted radar of the plaintiff’s speed).

Like the officer in Lewis, Defendant observed what he believed were traffic

violations and acted to confirm his observations. Defendant first observed Plaintiff

violating the posted speed limit of 70 miles per hour and began traveling behind

Plaintiff, pacing his patrol vehicle with Plaintiff’s car. [DE 16 at 1, ¶ 3]. After doing so,

both Defendant’s “speedometer and [dash-mounted] radar” showed that Plaintiff was

driving at 77 miles per hour. [DE 16 at 1, ¶ 3]. These facts suggest that Defendant had

not only reasonable suspicion, but also probable cause to initiate a traffic stop.

Still, Plaintiff insists that he had cruise control set to the speed limit of 70 mph

and could not have been speeding. [DE 17 at 3, ¶ 1]. But the use of cruise control has

routinely been considered insufficient. See Retzlaff, No. 09-CV-692-SLC, 2010 WL

1780338, at *6 (citing Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 165 (5th Cir. 2009) (“despite [a]

plaintiff's protests that she was driving within the speed limit, the ‘[u]ncontradicted

testimony that [an officer's] radar gun indicated that [plaintiff] was speeding’ is

normally enough to establish probable cause.’”).5 Without more, Plaintiff’s assertion

that he was using cruise control set to the speed limit of 70 mph does not create a

material dispute of fact that can overcome Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

See Fells v. Adams, No. 11 C 47, 2012 WL 2872118, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2012) (a defense

that plaintiff used cruise control was not enough to overcome defendant’s argument

that his radar-gun detected plaintiff traveling below the speed limit when defendant

also saw plaintiff violate lane usage.)

What’s more, Defendant also observed Plaintiff improperly use his turn signal

twice, providing another ground to pull him over. In Abbas v. City of Hobart, the

plaintiff, Devonte Abbas, was driving between 5 and 10 miles below the speed limit

when Officer Kissee, employed by the City of Hobart, began to follow him. Abbas, 2024

WL 3508640, at *1. Abbas ended up driving past his intended destination and pulled

into an apartment complex to turn around. Id. After turning around, Abbas turned into

his intended destination. But when making this turn, Officer Kisee observed Abbas

activate his left turn signal, and then his right turn signal, all less than 200 feet of

making the turn. Officer Kissee then pulled him over. Id. Officer Kissee explained that

5 Probable cause is no longer required for a traffic stop. An officer must only have reasonable suspicion

that a minor traffic offense has been committed. A traffic violation need not be committed, but only that

the officer has an objective basis for a reasonable belief that the law was broken. Lewis, 920 F.3d at 489

(citing Cashman, 216 F.3d at 587).

he assessed the distance by using his “reasonable judgment as to what 200 feet is” and

that he has “walked out 200 feet just to get an idea” of what the distance looks like. Id.

at 3. But, like Plaintiff does here, Abbas insisted that he “‘signaled to turn…more than

200 feet prior to the turn and at no time…did [he] turn [his] left turn signal on.’” Id. at 3.

Despite this dispute, the court in Abbas found that “[e]ven taking this statement as true,

all it would establish is that [p]laintiff complied with the turn signal statute at the time,

which is not the key inquiry…[T]he key inquiry is whether there was an objective basis

for [the officer’s] reasonable belief.” Id. at 3-4. (citing United States v. Simon, 937 F.3d

820, 829 (7th Cir. 2019)). The court in Abbas thus found that there was “not enough

evidence in the record for a reasonable jury to decide that the initial stop was

unconstitutional.” Id.

Similarly, here, Defendant observed Plaintiff’s improper turn signal usage. At the

time of the incident giving rise to this case Indiana law required for a turn signal to be

used for at least 300 feet when traveling 50 mph or above. Defendant asserts that he saw

Plaintiff “merge quickly” from the far inside lane to the middle lane “without signaling

300 feet prior to changing lanes.” [DE 16 at 1, ¶ 2]. Defendant also asserts that while

pacing with Plaintiff’s vehicle, Defendant observed Plaintiff “merge to the far outside

lane of travel…again, without signaling his intention to change lanes for 300 feet prior

to changing lanes.” [Id. at 2, ¶ 4]. As Abbas shows, such an observation provides an

objective basis for Defendant to reasonably suspect that a traffic violation has been

committed. Thus, Plaintiff’s assertion that he properly used his turn signal is not

enough evidence for a jury to decide that the traffic stop was unconstitutional.

Based on these facts, the Court can only find that Defendant had reasonable

suspicion to initiate a traffic stop against Plaintiff.

ii. Length of Stop

The Court’s analysis does not end there, however, as Plaintiff also contends that

Defendant violated his Fourth Amendment rights by unreasonably prolonging the

traffic stop.

[A] police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which

the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable

seizures. A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation,

therefore ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably

required to complete [the] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.

Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350 (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). “A seizure

for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation. ‘[A] relatively brief

encounter,’ a routine traffic stop is ‘more analogous to a so-called “Terry stop” . . . than

to a formal arrest.’” Id. at 354 (citing Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998)). “Like

a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is

determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted

the stop[.]” Id. (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407). There is no “‘rule of thumb that relies on

the number of minutes any given stop lasts.’” United States v. Cole, 21 F.4th 421, 433 (7th

Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Gholston, 1 F.4th 492, 496 [] (7th Cir. 2021)). The

tolerable duration is also determined by “related safety concerns.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at

354. “Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or

reasonably should have been—completed.” Id. But “[a]s part of making these ordinary

inquiries, no one disputes that an officer may ask questions unrelated to the stop, and

even conduct a dog sniff, if doing so does not prolong the traffic stop.” Cole, 21 F.4th at

429. Still, not all inquiries will qualify as ordinary inquiries: “measure[s] aimed at

detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing’ do not pass muster.’” Id. at 440

(Hamilton, J., dissenting) (quotations deleted) (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355).

Plaintiff contends that even a six-minute delay can be unreasonable under the 4th

Amendment, citing United States v. Cole, 994 F.3d 844 (7th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted,

opinion vacated, 849 F. App'x 598 (7th Cir. 2021), and on reh'g en banc, 21 F.4th 421 (7th

Cir. 2021). But Plaintiff fails to mention that this decision was vacated. [DE 17 at 8].

Rather, the court’s subsequent decision in Cole supports Defendant’s argument that the

traffic stop was not unreasonably prolonged. There, an officer pulled over the

defendant for following another car too closely. 21 F.4th at 424. “During the brief

roadside detention…the trooper questioned Cole about his license, registration, and

travel plans.” Id. The type of questions asked by the officer included why Cole had an

Arizona license but a California registration and who he worked for. Id. at 432. “Cole’s

answers struck the trooper as evasive, inconsistent, and improbable.” Id. at 424. This led

the officer to have many follow-up questions and caused him to suspect Cole of

“trafficking drugs.” Id. Because the traffic stop was initiated on the interstate, the officer

asked Cole to drive to a nearby gas station where he could issue Cole a warning. Id. at

427. This was requested within 9 minutes of the beginning of the stop. Id. Then, at the

gas station, the officer called a K9 unit, and who found large quantities of drugs in

Cole’s vehicle. Id. On appeal, the court considered whether the officer “unlawfully

prolonged the traffic stop by inquiring about Cole’s itinerary.” Id. at 428. The court

acknowledged that “‘[a]n officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification

for the traffic stop…do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful

seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.’”

Id. at 429 (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009)). Still, the court could not

determine whether the officer’s questioning prolonged the stop because the record was

undeveloped on that point. Id.. The court instead determined whether the officer’s

travel plan and itinerary questions “fell within the mission of the stop, such that they

could not have prolonged it in the first place.” Id. at 429. On this point, the court found

that the officer’s questioning did fall within the scope of the mission of the traffic stop

and thus there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 433, 435.

Whether the traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged is similarly undeveloped in

the record of this case. Plaintiff does little more than offer conclusory statements in

support of his claim. Plaintiff states that the “stop and the time in the patrol [vehicle]

was approximately 25 minutes” but produces no other evidence to support this. [DE 17

at 5–6, ¶ 7]. In contrast, Defendant includes a copy of a Calls For Service View Call

Report, which shows the time that Defendant called for dispatch and when it was

cleared. [DE 15-2]. Plaintiff argues that the Calls for Service View Call Report merely

reflects the time that Defendant “called dispatch” and not “the actual duration of the

stop.” [DE 17 at 5–6, ¶ 7]. But Plaintiff does not assert that Defendant did not call for

dispatch at the beginning of the traffic stop which could have offered some support for

Plaintiff’s claim that the traffic stop was longer than 10 minutes. What’s more, Plaintiff

does not allege that any questions of Defendant were unnecessary or unrelated to the

scope of the traffic stop. In fact, Plaintiff also states that once he was in Defendant’s

patrol vehicle that Plaintiff himself asked Defendant questions. [DE 17-1 at 4, ¶ 18].

Plaintiff also contends that the stop was unreasonably prolonged by claiming

that there was no reason for him to sit inside the patrol vehicle because Defendant

needed nothing other than his “driver’s license and vehicle rental agreement” to

complete the traffic stop. [DE 17 at 5–6, ¶ 7]. But this does not support Plaintiff’s

argument because it is customary for police officers to invite people whom they have

initiated a traffic stop against to sit in their patrol vehicle while they issue citations.6

Moreover, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff did not vocalize any “objection or concern”

to sitting in the patrol and instead “sat in the patrol [vehicle] and…engaged in general

conversation about [his] travels.” [DE 15 at 7–8]. Plaintiff does not dispute this. Even if

the entire duration of the traffic stop was longer than 10 minutes and lasted about 25

minutes, Plaintiff does not show that the traffic stop lasted longer than what was

reasonably necessary for Defendant to issue a warning. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350. As

made clear above in Cole, general conversation is permissible during a traffic stop even

if such conversation is unrelated to the traffic stop. Cole, 21 F.4th at 429. Such

conversation does not deem a traffic stop to be unreasonably prolonged. Thus, even

with the facts being construed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff fails to meet

6 An officer offering or requesting that a person whom they are conducting a traffic stop against sit in

their patrol vehicle during the traffic stop is common practice. See United States v. Curiel, No. 3:24-CR-

00022-CCB-SJF, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183608, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 8, 2024).

his burden of showing that there is a genuine dispute of material fact relating to the

duration of the traffic stop. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

In sum, the undisputed material facts show that there was reasonable suspicion

for the traffic stop and that the traffic stop was not unreasonably prolonged.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment claims is granted.

b. Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiff contends that Defendant discriminated against him because Defendant

pulled him over due to his race. In contrast, Defendant argues that he “did not utilize

impermissible classification when determining to stop or briefly detain the

Plaintiff…[and he] had no familiarity whatsoever with [] Plaintiff…prior to the traffic

incident.” [DE 15 at 10].

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection clause prohibits and provides a

basis for objection to the selective enforcement of the law on considerations such as

race. Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 635 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Whren v. United

States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)). “To show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,

plaintiff[] must prove that the defendant[‘s] actions had a discriminatory effect and

were motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” Id. at 635–36. “To prove discriminatory

effect, the plaintiff[] [is] required to show that [he is a] member[] of a protected class,

that [he is] otherwise similarly situated to members of the unprotected class, and that

plaintiff[] [was] treated differently from members of the unprotected class.” Id. at 636.

Put another way, a plaintiff must show that a defendant “selected or reaffirmed a

particular course of action at least in part ‘because of’…its adverse effects upon an

identifiable group.” Conley v. United States, 5 F.4th 781, 789 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987)).

Plaintiff states that when Defendant approached his vehicle, he did not offer a

“race neutral reason” for asking Plaintiff to sit in his patrol vehicle, which violates the

Fourteenth Amendment. [DE 17 at 5, ¶ 6]. Thus, Plaintiff seems to suggest that there

was a violation of his fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection right based on the

assertion that the traffic stop was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. [DE 1 at 3, ¶

9]. Such a claim must fail when a plaintiff fails to show that a defendant’s actions had

either a discriminatory effect or a discriminatory purpose. Chavez, 251 F.3d at 635–36.

Jones v. City of Elkhart is instructive. 737 F.3d 1107, 1109 (7th Cir. 2013). In Jones,

the plaintiff was driving from Elkhart, Indiana, to South Bend, Indiana around 2:00 a.m.

when he was stopped by Elkhart police officers for speeding. During the traffic stop, the

officers suspected that Jones may have been under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Id.

The officers had Jones use a portable breath test device which determined that his blood

alcohol content was 0.096%. Id. Jones then did a “walk and turn test” but could not keep

his balance steady and was swaying back and forth. Id. at 1109–1110. As a result, Jones

was arrested, among other reasons, for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Id.

at 1110. Jones subsequently filed suit, alleging, among other things, that the traffic stop

lacked probable cause and was based on racial animus. Id. The court first found that

there was probable cause for the stop. Id. The court also acknowledged that Jones’

“equal protection claim hinge[s] . . . in part, on the fact that his traffic stop and arrest

occurred without any probable cause.” Id. at 1116-17. With probable cause found, and

no other “mention of racial profiling or injury to rights governed by the Equal

Protection Clause,” the court considered Jones’ equal protection claim waived. Id. at

1113.

As in Jones, here, the traffic stop here was reasonable. Moreover, Plaintiff does

not argue that Defendant’s initiation of or conduct during the traffic stop produced an

effect of racial discrimination, nor does he argue that Defendant acted to discriminate

against Plaintiff based on race. Instead, Plaintiff merely states that “[i]t is well

established that racially discriminatory enforcement motivated by a discriminatory

intent violates the 14th Amendment” and that Defendant knew that Plaintiff was

African American when he initiated the stop. [DE 17 at 9]. But to overcome a motion for

summary judgment, Plaintiff cannot rest on the allegations or denials contained in his

pleadings. Rather, he must present sufficient evidence to show the existence of a

Fourteenth Amendment violation. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23. Because Plaintiff does not

point to any evidence of discrimination outside of his own conclusory statements, the

disagreement about when Defendant noticed Plaintiff’s race is not material.

Thus, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment claim.

2. Qualified Immunity

Defendant also contends that summary judgment is warranted because he is

entitled to qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government

officials from liability for civil damages when their conduct does not violate a “clearly

established” constitutional or statutory right. McAllister v. Price, 615 F.3d 877, 881 (7th

Cir. 2010). Once a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff carries

the burden of defeating it. Kiddy-Brown v. Blagojevich, 408 F.3d 346, 359 (7th Cir. 2005).

Evaluating this defense requires that the court make two inquiries: (1) whether the

facts—which the court views in the light most favorable to Plaintiff—show a violation

of a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was “clearly

established” at the time of the alleged violation. Williams v. Chicago, 733 F.3d 749, 758

(7th Cir. 2013). “If either inquiry is answered in the negative, the defendant official is

entitled to summary judgment.” Gibbs v. Lomas, 755 F.3d 529, 537 (7th Cir. 2014)

(emphasis in original).

As discussed above, the facts here do not show that Defendant violated

Plaintiff’s rights. With the first inquiry answered in the negative, Defendant is entitled

to summary judgment. Id.

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. [DE

14]. As the Court has ruled on the motion without the need for oral argument,

Defendant’s motions for a hearing [DE 20, DE 22] are DENIED as moot. See N.D. Ind.

L.R. 56-1(g). The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate this case.

SO ORDERED this 24th day of January, 2025.

s/Scott J. Frankel

Scott J. Frankel

United States Magistrate Judge