Case law

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Apex Oil Co.

113 F. Supp. 3d 807 · District Court, D. Maryland · Oct 20, 2015

Att’y Gen. 69, at 1 (1992) (describing § 4-419 as establishing “immunity from liability ... [for] a responder who renders care, assistance, or advice in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent a discharge of oil”). … Chevron's additional argument that the statutes under which it brings claims establish a duty of care is meritless.

Coppage v. Resolute Insur. Co.

264 Md. 261 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jan 18, 1972

Resolute, a small but well established company, incorporated in Rhode Island, had its headquarters in Hartford, Connecticut. 2 Resolute was qualified to do business in the District of Columbia and every state except New York … Reliance on § 273 is clearly inapposite here, since the provision deals with the cession of risks, and not the acceptance of risks, which was National Motors’ role.

Goldberg v. Miller

371 Md. 591 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Nov 8, 2002

As a qualified “legal process,” therefore, the Supplemental Order satisfies the first prong of 5 C.F.R. § 581.307 . … The record below does not describe clearly the exact nature of Robert Miller’s federal retirement income. Goldberg, in his brief, refers to the federal income as a "federal retirement annuity." Petitioner’s Brief at 5.

McKnight v. Malone

District Court, D. Maryland · Mar 17, 2025

In any event, “qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person … To overcome an official’s qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the

Jno. McCall Coal Co. v. United States

248 F. Supp. 253 · District Court, D. Maryland · Dec 27, 1965

Plaintiff did not qualify as a “regular dealer” within the meaning of § 1(a) of the Act, 41 U.S.C.A. § 35 (a), *255 because it did not have any storage yards or other facilities in which it stocked and from which it sold … As to both interpretations which plaintiff’s contentions question, the interpretations followed by the Secretary of Labor, act* ing through the administrator, are reasonable, if not clearly correct.

Wood v. Toyota Motor Corp.

134 Md. App. 512 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Oct 5, 2000

As such, the plaintiff, to support her theories, must assert or establish that, one, a defect existed. … Leshner was not qualified to express the proffered opinion. B. The “Factual Basis” Issue Mr.

Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States

63 F. Supp. 629 · District Court, D. Maryland · Nov 23, 1945

It is true, of course, that the United States is immune from suit unless Congress has otherwise clearly provided. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 , 60 S.Ct. 659 , 84 L.Ed. 888 ; United States v. … There is a further complication that confronts the plaintiff in this case, in that the payment it made was in consequence of a compromise of litigation; and there are no other facts appearing to qualify or further explain

Queen Anne's County Ass'n for Handicapped Citizens, Inc. v. Ringgold

75 Md. App. 535 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jun 10, 1988

The guidelines established by the State for living units such as this residence, followed by the Defendant, were admitted as Defendant’s Exhibit 5. … Jones 1939)): “An estate in fee simple determinable, sometimes referred to as a base or a qualified fee, is created by any limitation which, in an otherwise effective conveyance of land, creates an estate in fee simple and

Adeyemi v. State of MD

District Court, D. Maryland · May 5, 2021

Moreover, “denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability” may qualify as “discrimination against a qualified individual on the basis of disability … Dep’t of Public Safety and Correctional Services, 926 F.3d 97 (4th Cir. 2019), stating, id. at 100: “The Supreme Court ‘has drawn on principles of sovereign immunity to construe the Amendment to establish that an unconsenting

State v. Sheldon

332 Md. 45 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Aug 27, 1993

These cases clearly establish that the burning of a cross or other religious symbols is “speech” in the contemplation of the First Amendment. Indeed, the State concedes as much. … The legislative history of the cross burning statute, as well as the very definition of content-neutrality, clearly establish that the statute is content-based.

Burch v. Snider

461 F. Supp. 598 · District Court, D. Maryland · Dec 4, 1978

In any event, using the analysis in Singleton , the Attorney .General does not qualify to assert Mr. Baylin’s rights. … The Novotny court rejected the argument that the defendants were immune merely because their actions were “taken in the course of their duties” as officers and directors. Id. at 1257 .

Turner v. Bouchard

202 Md. App. 428 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Dec 2, 2011

Likewise, the circuit court’s holding that the disputed area did not qualify for the so-called “woodlands exception” was a factual determination, and shall be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. II. … Alternatively, Turner argues that lot 17 qualifies for the “woodlands exception,” which is recognized in Maryland and would result in a presumption that Bouchard’s use of the disputed area was permissive. A.

Hall v. Baltimore Police Department

District Court, D. Maryland · Mar 26, 2025

“One such situation is when the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.”9 Id.; see also Int’l Ground Transp., 475 F.3d at 219 (“[B]ecause municipalities are not entitled to assert a qualified immunity … established, such that the [Officer Defendants] are entitled to qualified immunity.

Raney v. County Commissioners

170 Md. 183 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Feb 20, 1936

Since there is but one paper qualified to publish the notices, and as the notices are required by law to be published in a newspaper, the effect of the statute is to create a privilege, special in the sense that no one but … But when the democratic nature of that government, and the care and foresight exercised, in the formulation of that instrument, to safeguard the citizen in the enjoyment of privileges and immunities which were regarded as

Estep v. Mackey

52 Md. 592 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Nov 14, 1879

The intent, however, must clearly appear from the language used in the various parts of the will; and unless the intent is clearly and certainly different from that which the technical language he has used may import, we … The absence of such language to qualify that expression, so that we can limit it, without doubt as to what the testator meant, compels us to give these words in this will their technical signification.

Podberesky v. Kirwan

764 F. Supp. 364 · District Court, D. Maryland · May 15, 1991

The causation element is also clearly satisfied in this case. … However, assuming that § 1981 covers scholarship benefits (and assuming that § 1981 extends to states) [3] , Podberesky has failed to establish that defendants have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Fkonimos v. Ribicoff

208 F. Supp. 492 · District Court, D. Maryland · Mar 2, 1962

The court feels it unnecessary to review in any detail the findings which are set forth quite clearly in the Hearing Examiner’s report. … There is a record under the 9th position, Immigration Records, which would fix the applicant’s date of birth at a time which would not qualify her even now to receive benefits; even under that she would not be 62 years of

Ensminger v. Towson University

District Court, D. Maryland · Feb 5, 2024

On November 18, 2019, OIIE denied Plaintiff’s appeal for the purported reason that Plaintiff did not clearly label his appeal. Id. … “Once service has been contested, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the validity of service pursuant to Rule 4.” Id.

Savage v. State

455 Md. 138 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Aug 4, 2017

Garmoe was not qualified to render any relevant diagnoses, such as a traumatic brain injury, his qualifications as a board-certified *147 neuropsychologist were not in dispute, and the Circuit Court indeed qualified him as … Where the unrefuted evidence presented at the Frye-Reed hearing established that Dr.

Martell v. Sparrows Point Scrap Processing, LLC

214 F. Supp. 2d 527 · District Court, D. Maryland · Aug 12, 2002

The law is well-settled that to establish a violation of the ADA in this failure-to-hire case, Martell must show (1) that he had a disability; (2) that he was qualified for the job of crane operator; and (3) that his disability … The word ‘substantial’ thus clearly precludes impairments that interfere in only a minor way with the performance of manual tasks from qualifying as disabilities.”).