Hall v. Baltimore Police Department

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

ANTHONY HALL, *

Plaintiff, *

v. * Civil Action No. RDB-24-1137

BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT, *

DONALD LICATO, FRANK BARLOW,

and THE ESTATE OF JOHN BARRICK, *

Defendants. *

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This civil rights case arises from the investigation, conviction, and subsequent

imprisonment of Plaintiff Anthony Hall (“Plaintiff” or “Hall”), who served more than

twenty-five years in state prison and six years on parole after being convicted in Circuit Court

for Baltimore City of second-degree murder. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 2–3.)1 After years of Hall

maintaining his innocence, that court, in March of 2023, granted his Petition for Writ of Actual

Innocence. (Id. ¶¶ 13–15.) In April 2023, the State of Maryland dismissed the criminal case

against him. (Id. ¶ 16.) Hall now brings this action against Defendants Baltimore Police

Department (“BPD”) and three former BPD employees—Donald Licato, Frank Barlow, and

the Estate of John Barrick2 (collectively, the “Officer Defendants)—alleging various violations

1 For clarity, this Memorandum Opinion cites to the ECF generated page number, rather than the page number

at the bottom of the parties’ various submissions, unless otherwise indicated. Likewise, this Memorandum

Opinion cites to the ECF generated document number, rather than the exhibit number provided by the parties’

various submissions.

2 Plaintiff’s Complaint names the “Estate of John Barrick” as a Defendant, as John Barrick passed away on

November 4, 2023. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 2 n.1.)

of his constitutional rights and state law. (Id. ¶¶ 171–222.) Hall claims that BPD and the

Officer Defendants’ illegal actions led to his wrongful conviction and subsequent

incarceration. (Id.)

Instantly before the Court is the Defendants’ Joint Motion to Bifurcate and Stay

Discovery (ECF No. 28), which is fully briefed (ECF Nos. 36; 43) and remains pending on

the Court’s docket.3 The parties’ submissions have been reviewed and no hearing is necessary.

Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). This Court has on several occasions noted that cases that contain

claims of wrongful conviction and subsequent incarceration are appropriate candidates for

bifurcation. Indeed, this Court has previously ruled that bifurcation is appropriate in such

cases.4 For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Joint Motion to Bifurcate and Stay Discovery

(ECF No. 28) is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

At approximately 10:30 PM on July 13, 1991, Gerard Dorsey was fatally shot and killed

on the 600 block of North Brice Street in Baltimore, Maryland. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 36.)

Now-deceased Baltimore Police Department Sergeant John Barrick was the lead homicide

3 Also pending is (1) Defendant Baltimore Police Department’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint

Against “Estate of John Barrick” (ECF No. 34), which was later withdrawn, (ECF No. 68); and (2) the Parties’

Joint Motion for Leave of Court to Conduct BPD’s Corporate Designee Deposition After Discovery Deadline

(ECF No. 97). By separate Order, the Court (1) INSTRUCTS the Clerk of Court to update the docket to

reflect that Defendant Baltimore Police Department’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint Against “Estate

of John Barrick” (ECF No. 34) is WITHDRAWN; and (2) GRANTS the Parties’ Joint Motion for Leave of

Court to Conduct BPD’s Corporate Designee Deposition After Discovery Deadline (ECF No. 97).

4 Shipley v. Disney, No. SAG-21-3173 (D. Md. Dec. 12, 2022), ECF No. 65; Washington v. Balt. Police Dep’t, No.

SAG-19-2473, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198596, at *3–6 (D. Md. Oct. 26, 2020); Burgess v. Balt. Police Dep’t, No.

RDB-15-0834, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37470, at *3–4 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2016); but see Johnson v. Balt. Police Dep’t,

500 F. Supp. 3d 454, 460 (D. Md. 2020) (denying without prejudice the defendants’ motion to bifurcate in

wrongful conviction case, explaining that “given the posture of the case,” the court could not yet determine

whether bifurcation of trial was warranted).

detective and supervisor on the case, with Detectives Donald Licato and Frank Barlow actively

investigating the case, “participating in almost every witness interview and report.” (Id. ¶ 37.)

On September 26, 1991, Plaintiff Anthony Hall—born September 20, 1962—was

charged for Dorsey’s murder and the use of a handgun to commit a felony. (Id. ¶¶ 32, 91.)

On April 29, 1992, Hall went to trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. (Id. ¶ 102.)

During the two-day trial, the jury heard from only four witnesses, all called by the prosecution.

(Id. ¶¶ 102–17.) BPD Officer Bruce Button testified that he discovered Dorsey’s body around

10:40 PM on Brice Street. (Id. ¶ 108.) Sergeant Barrick falsely testified that there were only

two “eyewitnesses” to the shooting: Gerald Patterson and Nancy Hill, omitting that Patterson

was not actually an eyewitness, that Hill could not actually identify the perpetrators, and that

several other eyewitnesses described the perpetrators in a manner that excluded Plaintiff

Anthony Hall or were evidence of his innocence. (Id. ¶¶ 109–11.) Finally, the jury heard from

Patterson and Hill—the only two non-police witnesses to testify—whom Sergeant Barrick

falsely testified were the only “eyewitnesses” to the shooting, and whose false testimony was

coerced through threats and intimidation. (Id. ¶¶ 112–17.) Specifically, Patterson was

threatened with incarceration for an unrelated criminal charge if he did not state that he heard

shots and saw Hall run by him with a gun, despite the fact that Patterson was not in the area

when the murder occurred and had stated as much to law enforcement. (Id. ¶¶ 112–14.)

Similarly, BPD threatened to take away Hill’s children if she did not testify that on the evening

of the murder around 10:30 PM, she was walking near the crime scene with her children when

Dorsey ran past them, knocking down her daughter and being pursued by two men into an

alley, one of whom was carrying a gun and whom Hill claimed to recognize as Hall. (Id.

¶¶ 115–17.) Because no physical evidence or apparent motive linked Hall to the crime, the

prosecutor’s case rested solely on the witnesses’ false and coerced testimony. (Id. ¶ 107.) On

April 30, 1992, after less than five hours of trial time over two days, Hall was convicted of the

second-degree murder of Dorsey, as well as use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.

(Id. ¶¶ 12, 118.)

In the decades following his conviction, Hall maintained his innocence and filed

numerous pro se petitions seeking to overturn his conviction. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 120–22.) Eventually,

Hall wrote to the Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project (“MAIP”), who began investigating his

conviction and obtained, through public record requests, documents containing sweeping

exculpatory and impeachment evidence that had been withheld. (Id. ¶¶ 123–33.)

On June 11, 2021, Hall filed a Petition for Writ of Actual Innocence, which was

subsequently amended on February 15, 2023, based on the aforementioned exculpatory and

impeachment evidence that had been withheld from him before, during, and after his trial.

(Id. ¶ 134.) On March 8, 2023, Judge Charles J. Peters of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City

conducted an evidentiary hearing on Hall’s Petition. (Id. ¶¶ 135–37.) Ultimately, on

March 15, 2023, Judge Peters granted Hall’s Petition for Writ of Actual Innocence, vacating

his convictions and ordering a new trial. (Id. ¶ 138.) On April 18, 2023, the State of Maryland

dismissed the case against Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 143.)

On June 30, 2023, Hall filed a petition with the State of Maryland Office of

Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) pursuant to the Walter Lomax Act,5 seeking compensation

5 The Walter Lomax Act enables compensation for those who have received a pardon for wrongful conviction

or who can prove to an administrative law judge that they were wrongfully convicted for a felony. MD. CODE

ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 10-501, 10-502.

for the more than twenty-five years he served in prison as a result of his wrongful conviction.

(Id. ¶¶ 17, 144.) Following an evidentiary hearing on that petition during which Hill and

several others testified, the OAH Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) ruled in Hall’s favor. (Id.

¶¶ 145–49.) The ALJ stated: “There is no evidence tying the [Mr. Hall] to the murder of Mr.

Dorsey and it was only through manipulating the witnesses and hiding the evidence that the

City obtained a conviction in the first place.” (Id. ¶ 149.)

On April 18, 2024, Hall initiated the instant action against BPD and the Officer

Defendants. (ECF No. 1.) Counts I, II, III,6 IV, V, and VI are filed under 42 U.S.C § 1983,

and Counts VII, VIII, and IX assert claims under Maryland law. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 178–222.)

More specifically, Counts I, II, III, and IV allege violations of Hall’s right to due process under

the Fourteenth Amendment, arising out of the Officer Defendants’—that is, Detectives Licato

and Barlow and now-deceased Sergeant Barrick—fabrication of evidence against Hall (“Count

I”) (id. ¶¶ 178–81); failure to adequately investigate and disclose exculpatory and impeachment

evidence7 (“Count II”) (id. ¶¶ 182–85); malicious prosecution (“Count III”) (id. ¶¶ 186–90);

and failure to intervene (“Count IV”) (id. ¶¶ 191–94). Count V alleges violation of Hall’s right

6 The Complaint mislabels Count III as “Count IIII.” (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 186–90.) For clarity, the Court refers

to this count as Count III.

7 Count II, as well as Counts III, IV, and V, focus on alleged Brady violations. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.

83 (1963), the Supreme Court held that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused

upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective

of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87. A Brady violation occurs when a defendant can

show that the evidence at issue (1) was favorable to the defendant, (2) material to the defense, and (3) the

prosecution had the evidence but failed to disclose it. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794–95 (1972); United States

v. Young, 916 F.3d 368, 383 (4th Cir. 2019). Brady extends to law enforcement officers; they have a duty to

provide the prosecution with any material evidence that is favorable to a defendant. See Barbee v. Warden, Md.

Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842, 846–47 (4th Cir. 1964). Brady imposes this duty on any officer who has knowledge

of the exculpatory or impeachment evidence. See Owens v. Balt. City State’s Atty’s Off., 767 F.3d 379, 397–98 (4th

Cir. 2014). However, police officers “commit a constitutional violation only when they suppress exculpatory

evidence in bad faith.” Gilliam v. Sealey, 932 F.3d 216, 238 (4th Cir. 2019).

to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, against Sergeant Barrick for supervisory

liability (“Count V”) (id. ¶¶ 195–200). Count VI alleges a Monell claim8 against the BPD,

pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment (“Count VI”) (id. ¶¶ 201–07). Counts VII and VIII

allege state law claims of malicious prosecution (“Count VII”) (id. ¶¶ 208–15) and internal

inflictions of emotional distress (“Count VIII”) (id. ¶¶ 216–18) against the Officer Defendants.

Lastly, Count IX alleges indemnification against BPD (“Count IX”) (id. ¶¶ 219–22).

Defendants filed Answers to the Complaint (ECF Nos. 13 (Answer of BPD); 16 (Answer of

Licato); 17 (Answer of Barlow); 80 (Answer of Estate of John Barrick)). This motion, which

seeks to bifurcate for trial the Monell claim against BPD raised in Count VI and further stay

discovery as to that claim, followed shortly thereafter. (ECF No. 28.) Plaintiff responded in

opposition to the motion (ECF No. 36), and Defendants replied (ECF No. 43). Defendants’

Joint Motion to Bifurcate and Stay Discovery (ECF No. 28) is ripe for review.

ANALYSIS

Defendants ask this Court to bifurcate Hall’s § 1983 Monell claim raised in Count VI

against BPD. (ECF No. 28-1.) Defendants contend doing so will further judicial expediency

and economy (id. at 4–7; see also ECF No. 43 at 5–8); and will protect all Defendants against

the risk of prejudice (ECF No. 28-1 at 7–9; see also ECF No. 43 at 9–10). Defendants also

request that discovery related to Hall’s Monell claim be stayed pending resolution of the

8 In what is commonly referred as to a Monell claim, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 permits a plaintiff to bring a claim directly

against a municipality if it causes a deprivation of a constitutional right through an official policy or custom.

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Accordingly, “a viable § 1983 Monell claim consists of two

components: (1) the municipality had an unconstitutional policy or custom; and (2) the unconstitutional policy

or custom caused a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Saltz v. City of Frederick, 538 F. Supp. 3d

510, 554 (D. Md. 2021) (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Kirby v. City of Elizabeth

City, 388 F.3d 440, 451 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1187 (2006); Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th

Cir. 2003)).

remaining § 1983 claims raised in Counts I, II, III, and IV against the Officer Defendants and

in Count V against Sergeant Barrick. (ECF No. 28-1 at 9–10.)

Hall opposes Defendants’ request for bifurcation and stay, advancing several

arguments in opposition to the Defendants’ motion. (ECF No. 36.) First, Hall argues that

the Defendants’ motion should be denied because: BPD could be found liable even if the

Officer Defendants are not. (Id. at 13–15.) Second, Hall argues that Defendants’ motion

overlooks the overlapping nature of the evidence Hall would use to prove the Officer

Defendants’ liability and his Monell claim. (Id. at 16–18.) Third, Hall argues that the

Defendants’ claim that bifurcation would further judicial expediency and economy is

unsupported and premature. (Id. at 19–22.) Fourth, Hall argues that unique circumstances

presented here, such as the prior judicial findings of misconduct and the fact that BPD has

not agreed to indemnify the Officer Defendants in this matter, counsel against bifurcation.

(Id. at 22–25.) Fifth, Hall contends that he would be prejudiced by bifurcation, (id. at 25–26),

and characterizes the Defendants’ fear that they would suffer prejudice if bifurcation were

denied as “speculative.” (Id. at 26–28.) With respect to the stay, Hall argues that Defendants

“have not overcome the strong presumption against a stay of discovery,” and even if the Court

bifurcates the Monell claim, that the Court should still deny the request to stay discovery to

allow “trial #2 [to] be scheduled immediately after trial #1 concludes.” (Id. at 28–29.)

In reply, Defendants reiterate that bifurcation will further judicial expediency and

economy (ECF No. 43 at 5–8); and will protect all Defendants against the risk of prejudice (id.

at 9–10). They further contend that Plantiff’s arguments that Monell liability is not contingent

upon a finding of individual officer liability and the facts and post-conviction history counsel

against bifurcation are “incorrect legal conclusions” and/or “irrelevant.” (Id. at 2–5, 9.) Lastly,

Defendants contend that it is not premature to order bifurcation. (Id. at 8.)

As further explained below, the Court finds that bifurcation of the Monell claim against

BPD is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) due to “convenience,” “to avoid prejudice to

the Defendants” without prejudicing Hall, and “to expedite and economize” this litigation.

Similarly, a related stay of discovery on the Monell claim against BPD is appropriate under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 26.

In relevant part, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides that: “For convenience,

to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one

or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 42(b). As Judge Hollander of this Court observed in Saltz v. City of Frederick, 538 F.

Supp. 3d 510 (D. Md. 2021), “Rule 42(b) is disjunctive, meaning ‘[o]nly one of these criteria

need be met to justify bifurcation.’” Id. at 561 (citing Saxion v. Titan-C-Mfg., 86 F.3d. 553 556

(6th Cir. 1996)). Trial courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to bifurcate claims for

trial, and the exercise of that discretion will be set aside only if clearly abused. Dixon v. CSX

Transp., Inc., 990 F.2d 1440, 1443 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 915 (1993).

In the instant case, the majority of Plaintiff’s claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, also

known as the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Pursuant to Section 1983, a plaintiff may file suit

against any person who, acting under color of state law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of

the United States. See, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377 (2012); Owens v. Balt. City State’s Atty’s

Off., 767 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2014). However, § 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive

rights,’ but provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v.

Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see

also Safar v. Tingle, 859 F.3d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 2017).

Simply stated, § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under

the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526

U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting

under color of state law deprived him of a constitutional right or a right conferred by a law of

the United States. Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 (4th Cir. 2009);

Safar, 859 F.3d at 245 (“The first step in any such claim is to pinpoint the specific right that

has been infringed.”). “The statutory color-of-law prerequisite is synonymous with the more

familiar state-action requirement—and the analysis for each is identical.” Philips v. Pitt Cnty.

Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).

In what is commonly referred as to a Monell claim, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 permits a plaintiff

to bring a claim directly against a municipality if it causes a deprivation of a constitutional right

through an official policy or custom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). In

Monell, the Supreme Court determined that local governmental bodies may be liable under

§ 1983 based on the unconstitutional actions of individual defendants, but only if those

defendants were executing an official policy or custom of the local government that resulted

in a violation of the plaintiff’s rights. Id. at 690–91. But liability attaches “only where the

municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378, 384 (1989).

To state a § 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must “adequately plead and

prove the existence of an official policy or custom that is fairly attributable to the municipality

and that proximately caused the deprivation of their rights.” Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d

333, 338 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that

“it is by now well settled that a municipality is only liable under section 1983 if it causes such

a deprivation through an official policy or custom”). A plaintiff may allege four types of

policies, customs, or practices for which a municipality may be held liable: “(1) through an

express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of a person

with final policymaking authority; (3) through an omission, such as a failure to properly train

officers, that manifest[s] deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens; or (4) through a

practice that is so persistent and widespread as to constitute a custom or usage with the force

of law.” Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Carter, 164 F.3d at 217).

With that context, the Court returns to the issue chiefly before it. While the

determination of whether bifurcation is appropriate is fact specific, Dawson v. Prince George’s

Cnty., 896 F. Supp. 537, 539 (D. Md. 1995), judges in this Court have observed that “[c]ases

that contain Monell claims ‘are good candidates for bifurcation.’” Johnson v. Balt. Police Dep’t,

500 F. Supp. 3d 454, 460 (D. Md. 2020) (citation omitted). “Judges in this district have

repeatedly ruled that bifurcation ‘is appropriate and often desirable’ in cases involving both

§ 1983 claims against individual police officers and Monell claims.” Saltz, 538 F. Supp. 3d at

561.

“Generally, a plaintiff’s § 1983 claims ‘hinge on his ability to show that [individual

defendants] violated his constitutional rights.’” Haughie v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No.

ELH-18-3963, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40770, at *41 (D. Md. Mar. 9, 2020) (quoting Baker v.

Dist. of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). Nevertheless, courts have recognized

“narrow circumstances in which ‘a finding of no liability on the part of the individual municipal

actors can co-exist with a finding of liability on the part of the municipality.’” Johnson, 500 F.

Supp. 3d at 463 (citing Int’l Ground Transp. v. Mayor & City Council of Ocean City, 475 F.3d 214,

219 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[A] situation may arise in which a finding of no liability on the part of

the individual municipal actors can coexist with a finding of liability on the part of the

municipality.”)). “But, in such cases, municipal liability under Monell is limited to situations in

which ‘such a finding would not create an inconsistent verdict’ as to the individual defendants.”

Haughie, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40770, at *43 (quoting Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604

F.3d 293, 305 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in Thomas)). “One such situation is when the individual

defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.”9 Id.; see also Int’l Ground Transp., 475 F.3d at 219

(“[B]ecause municipalities are not entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense, a finding of

a constitutional violation is conclusive as to their liability. Thus, a jury could find that a

constitutional violation has occurred but that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity.”).

Indeed, each of the Defendants raised qualified immunity in their respective answer.

(See ECF Nos. 13, 16, 17, 80.) Nevertheless, while BPD’s Monell liability may or may not

depend on the Officer Defendants’ liability, the Court need not reach any such conclusion,

9 Other such situations include “where the combined actions of multiple officials or employees may give rise

to a constitutional violation, supporting municipal liability, but where no one individual’s actions are sufficient

to establish personal liability for the violation,” Speer v. City of Wynne, 276 F.3d 980, 986 (8th Cir. 2002); and

where “the injuries complained of are not solely attributable to the actions of named individual defendants,”

Barrett v. Orange Cnty. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, 194 F.3d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1999). While Plaintiff cites both of these

cases in their opposition, (ECF No. 36 at 13, 15), neither of these two situations are present in the instant case.

because, quite simply, that is not determinative of the Court’s analysis as to whether to

bifurcate Count VI and stay the related discovery. Haughie, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40770, at

*41–48. As Judge Hollander aptly noted in Tserkis v. Balt. Cnty., No. ELH-19-202, 2019 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 173369 (D. Md. Oct. 4, 2019)

The key question is whether the [Officer Defendants] committed constitutional

violations, not whether they can be held liable for them. [Plaintiff] will have a

viable Monell claim against the [municipality], despite the [Officer Defendants]

being found not liable, if the fact-finder concludes that the [Officer Defendants]

violated [Plaintiff’s] constitutional rights, and that those rights were not clearly

established, such that the [Officer Defendants] are entitled to qualified

immunity. On the other hand, if the fact-finder concludes that the [Officer

Defendants] are not liable under § 1983 on the ground that they did not violate

[Plaintiff’s] constitutional rights, then [the] Monell claim would founder [sic] as

a matter of law. In either circumstance, the question of whether any police

officer committed a constitutional violation is central to [the Monell] claim[.]

Id. at *20. Thus, while BPD’s liability may co-exist with the Officer Defendants’ non-liability,

the question of whether Detectives Licato and Barlow and Sergeant Barrick committed a

constitutional violation is central to Hall’s claim against BPD.

Furthermore, the rationale for bifurcation of Monell claims in § 1983 actions is not just

that those claims generally, or often, hinge on individual defendant liability for constitutional

violations. Bifurcation also works to “spare the parties from expending valuable resources in

discovery, because resolution of the claims as to the individual defendants may obviate the

need to litigate the Monell claim.” Johnson, 500 F. Supp. 3d at 460. Bifurcation also “prevent[s]

the potential prejudice to individual defendants that might result from the introduction of

inflammatory evidence concerning the municipality’s policies, practices, or customs.” Id.

In the Court’s view, bifurcation is appropriate for the reasons argued by Defendants.

While the Court understands Plaintiff’s resistance to this conclusion, the simple fact is that

bifurcation of the Monell claim will further judicial expediency and economy, and will protect

all Defendants against the risk of prejudice, without resulting in substantial prejudice to the

Plaintiff.

First, it would save time and resources, and promote judicial economy, to defer

consideration of the Monell claim until after a determination of the liability of the Officer

Defendants. It is possible that, if Hall succeeds on his § 1983 claims against the Officer

Defendants, BPD might consider a resolution of the Monell claim, without the need for a trial,

which would spare the parties and the Court of the burdens and challenges of litigating the

Monell claim. While Plaintiff resists this conclusion by characterizing Defendants’ request as

“unsupported” and “premature,”10 (ECF No. 36 at 19–22) and by emphasizing the

overlapping nature of the evidence he would use to prove the Officer Defendants’ liability and

his Monell claim (id. at 16–18), the Court is persuaded that bifurcation of the Monell claim and

a related stay of discovery is undoubtedly more efficient than the alternative.

Relatedly, the scope of discovery involved in Plaintiff’s Monell claim will be far broader

than Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the Officer Defendants. That is because Monell liability,

by its nature, turns on evidence concerning victims other than Plaintiff and alleged offenders

other than the Officer Defendants. Haughie, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40770, at *49. Thus,

Defendants’ contention that “it is certain that the discovery in this case regarding the § 1983

Monell claim will be an enormous and lengthy task” (ECF No. 28-1 at 10) is well-taken.

10 The Court notes that the discovery deadline in this case is April 4, 2025. (ECF No. 92.) While Plaintiff’s

argument that Defendants’ request for bifurcation was “premature” may have been more persuasive back when

the issue was being briefed, such argument does not seem to be reasonable or in accordance with the facts at

this late stage in the litigation.

In addition, while evidence of any prior instances of fabrications of evidence, of failures

to adequately investigate and disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence, of malicious

prosecution, and of failure to intervene may be admissible against BPD with respect to the

Monell claim, such evidence is likely inadmissible against the Officer Defendants.11 As Judge

Hollander explained in Haughie, “[s]uch evidence is also potentially inflammatory in regard to

the individual defendants, and it would be difficult for the jury to compartmentalize such

evidence.” 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40770, at *49. While Plaintiff characterizes any prejudice

feared by Defendants as “speculative” and further suggests that any prejudice could be cured

by motions in limine and cautionary jury instructions, (ECF No. 36 at 26–28), the Court is

unpersuaded.

Plaintiff insists that he will be prejudiced by bifurcation, arguing that bifurcation would

further delay final disposition of this matter and deny him access to proof of his Brady claim

against the Officer Defendants. (ECF No. 26 at 25–26.) Plaintiff’s insistence that bifurcation

would further delay final disposition resulting in prejudice to Hall is unpersuasive, as such

prejudice—if any—is greatly outweighed by the risk of prejudice posed to the Defendants.

With respect to Plaintiff’s argument that bifurcation would deny him access to proof of his

Brady claim against the Officer Defendants, Plaintiff remains free to endeavor to obtain

discovery of BPD routine police conduct at the relevant time to prove his Brady claims against

the Officer Defendants. Bifurcation will not deprive him of “discovery regarding any

11 Of course, because bad faith can be inferred based on gross deviations from routine police conduct with

respect to Plaintiff’s Brady claims against the Officer Defendants, Johnson, 500 F. Supp. at 462 (citing Mellen v.

Winn, 900 F.3d 1085, 1104 (9th Cir. 2018); Jimenez v. City of Chicago, 732 F.3d 710, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2013)),

Plaintiff remains free to endeavor to obtain discovery of BPD routine conduct at the relevant time to prove his

Brady claims against the Officer Defendants.

nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense,” related to his claims

against the Officer Defendants, and that is “proportional to the needs of the case.” See FED.

R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).

Lastly, the Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that unique circumstances of

this case—namely, prior judicial findings of misconduct and the fact that BPD has not agreed

to indemnify the Officer Defendants—counsel against bifurcation. (ECF No. 36 at 22–25.)

While Hall’s case is quite remarkable, it does not follow that bifurcation is inappropriate. With

respect to Hall’s indemnification argument, the risk that “Hall could potentially have to

proceed all the way through trial against the Officer Defendants just to have to start over

against BPD”—as frustrating as that possibility may be—does not influence the Court’s

conclusion that bifurcation furthers judicial expediency and economy, and protects all

Defendants against the risk of prejudice, without resulting in substantial prejudice to the

Plaintiff.

The Court turns to consider the requested stay. As with the decision to bifurcate,

decisions about the appropriate timing and sequence of discovery lie within the discretion of

the trial court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (allowing discovery rules, including those pertaining to

scheduling, to be modified “by court order”). Again, Plaintiff insists that Defendants “have

not overcome the strong presumption against a stay of discovery,” and even if the Court

bifurcates the Monell claim, that the Court should still deny the request to stay discovery to

allow “trial #2 [to] be scheduled immediately after trial #1 concludes.” (ECF No. 36 at 28–

29.) In brief, in light of the bifurcation, a stay of discovery relating to the Monell claims is also

appropriate. Accordingly, Defendants’ Joint Motion to Bifurcate and Stay Discovery (ECF

No. 28) is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Joint Motion to Bifurcate and Stay

Discovery (ECF No. 28) is GRANTED.

A separate Order follows.

Date: March 26, 2025 /s/

Richard D. Bennett

United States Senior District Judge