Case law

Bennett v. Harford County

485 Md. 461 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Aug 30, 2023

To be qualified to serve as a Council member, a candidate must “have been a resident and a qualified voter of the County for at least two years immediately preceding election or appointment,” and (other than the Council … Before his removal can be compelled by mandamus his constitutional or statutory disqualification should be clearly apparent.

Espina v. Prince George's County

215 Md. App. 611 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Dec 20, 2013

Applications “of tradi *642 tional or well-established immunities from suit” do not violate Article 19. Id. … Moreover, in Dackman , if a qualified offer was rejected, the landlord had full immunity, including immunity against future claims by an injured child once she reaches majority, leaving a lead paint poisoned child with no

Tavakoli-Nouri v. State

139 Md. App. 716 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Aug 30, 2001

Qualified Immunity Appellant also complains that the trial court erred in holding that individual troopers could not be held liable be *734 cause they had qualified immunity. … See Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 12-105 of the State Government Article (“SG”) (“state personnel” have the qualified immunity established in Md.Code (1974, 1998 Rep.

Benford v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.

502 F. Supp. 1148 · District Court, D. Maryland · Nov 14, 1980

The Butz Court utilized the definition of qualified immunity that the Court applied to state officials in Scheuer . … In his dissenting opinion in McSurley , Judge Wilkey clearly assumed that absent the absolute protection of the Speech or Debate Clause the legislative defendants would have access to qualified official immunity.

Rice v. Dunn

81 Md. App. 510 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Feb 2, 1990

, alternatively, qualified immunity. … “Conspiracy to predetermine the outcome of a judicial proceeding, while clearly improper, does not pierce the immunity extended to judges____ As long as the judge’s ultimate acts are judicial actions taken within the court

Pathways Psychosocial v. Town of Leonardtown

133 F. Supp. 2d 772 · District Court, D. Maryland · Mar 29, 2001

Qualified Immunity Under this doctrine, public officials are not liable under federal law for civil damages to the extent that their conduct does not contravene “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which … The officials are “entitled to summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity if they can establish that reasonable officials could have believed that their actions were lawful in light of both clearly established law

Withers v. Levine

449 F. Supp. 473 · District Court, D. Maryland · Apr 21, 1978

Testimony by hearing officer Tilley established clearly that the MHC adjustment team did not have the medical evidence when it concluded that Redd had engaged only in a perverted practice, not an assault. … Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 , 94 S.Ct. 1683,1692 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), officers of the executive branch of government were held to have a qualified immunity to § 1983 damages “dependent upon the scope of discretion and

Gonzalez v. Cecil County, Maryland

221 F. Supp. 2d 611 · District Court, D. Maryland · Jun 4, 2002

In the alternative, the Nurse Defendants assert that they are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. … Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials performing discretionary functions are not liable for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

Bowling v. Brown

57 Md. App. 248 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jan 11, 1984

That the individual Town Council members do not have qualified immunity for discretionary acts performed without malice; and IV. … Qualified Immunity Defendants also cite James v.

Robinson v. Board of County Commissioners

262 Md. 342 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jun 2, 1971

Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 151 Md. 11 (1926), and that when they are within the scope of their law enforcement function they are clearly acting in a discretionary capacity. Eliason, supra. … Watkins, supra, we said: *348 “It has been felt that a qualified privilege is sufficient, so that immunity is conditioned upon the absence of malice (unlike the situation where there is absolute privilege) and also upon action

Smith-Berch, Inc. v. Baltimore County, Md.

68 F. Supp. 2d 602 · District Court, D. Maryland · Aug 9, 1999

and Permits Department Director Jablon are entitled to qualified immunity. … immunity under the ADA, Defendants contend that as of 1997, it was not clearly established law either that WMI had standing to sue under Title II or that Title II applied to local zoning decisions.

Paoli v. Lally

636 F. Supp. 1252 · District Court, D. Maryland · May 23, 1986

Qualified Immunity As an alternative basis for summary judgment, Goodlander contends that he is entitled to a qualified good faith immunity defense. See Harris v. … court granted judgment for defendants on the basis of a qualified immunity defense.

Martin v. Mendoza

230 F. Supp. 2d 665 · District Court, D. Maryland · Nov 12, 2002

established right of plaintiff secured by the Fourth Amendment; (2) even if Mendoza committed one or more errors of constitutional magnitude, nevertheless, he is entitled to the benefit of the qualified immunity defense … West, 237 F.3d 356 (4th Cir.2001)(same; affirming denial of summary judgment sought on the ground of qualified immunity; genuine dispute of material fact present); Henderson v.

Brewer v. Mele

267 Md. 437 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Dec 20, 1972

Dep *445 uty Sheriff Mele would qualify for governmental immunity here, barring only the question of his possible malice. As Judge McWilliams said for this Court in Robinson v. … If it be some affirmative showing of ill will, improper motivation, or evil purpose, 5 the undisputed facts might well reveal its total absence prior to trial and permit the assertion of the qualified immunity.

Schreyer v. Chaplain

416 Md. 94 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Oct 6, 2010

Accordingly, it was not convinced that the petitioner qualified for immunity pursuant to § 5-639. … To establish that link, the petitioner cites Ashton v.

Montgomery County Public Schools v. Donlon

233 Md. App. 646 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Aug 30, 2017

The court also found it “deeply troubling” that MCPS could qualify as a State entity for Eleventh Amendment immunity purposes, but not for WBL purposes. … Having established that SPP § 5-301 states clearly that the WBL applies only to State employees in the executive branch (and applicants), we continue our statutory analysis by examining SPP § 5-307, an election of procedures

Carroll v. City of Westminster

52 F. Supp. 2d 546 · District Court, D. Maryland · Mar 22, 1999

Nonetheless 33 , the Court has undertaken the qualified immunity analysis. … Therefore, Defendants did not violate a eleariy established right and would be entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs § 1983 claims. B.

Benford v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.

98 F.R.D. 42 · District Court, D. Maryland · May 2, 1983

This Court left open the possibility that a qualified immunity defense might be raised at trial. Id. On June 24, 1982, the United States Supreme Court decided Harlow v. … Because the issue of qualified immunity is very much alive, and may be reasserted by these defendants at trial, the authority they actually possessed is a highly relevant issue.

Rovin v. State

488 Md. 144 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Aug 15, 2024

Under the State Constitution, governmental officials do not have qualified immunity when a violation is established. … legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.”

Rucker v. Harford County

316 Md. 275 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jun 6, 1989

In his remarks, Attorney General Sachs first dealt with public official immunity as follows (emphasis added): “[U]nder State law, it is only ‘public officials,’ not ‘public employes,’ who enjoy a qualified immunity as the … S.B. 585 would also abolish the arbitrary distinction between State ‘officials’ (who now have qualified immunity) and State ‘employees’ (who don’t).