Rovin v. State

Valerie Rovin v. State of Maryland, No. 19, September Term, 2023, Opinion by Booth, J.

MARYLAND COMMON LAW CLAIMS OF FALSE ARREST, FALSE

IMPRISONMENT, AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, AND ASSOCIATED

CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS ARISING UNDER ARTICLES 26 AND 24 OF THE

MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS.

Petitioner was arrested pursuant to a warrant for violating the juror intimidation statute,

Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law Article § 9-305 (2021 Repl. Vol.). At the conclusion of

Petitioner’s bench trial, the circuit court acquitted her based upon its interpretation of the

statute. Petitioner brought a civil suit against a sheriff’s deputy, alleging that by filing an

application for statement of charges, and causing her arrest pursuant to a warrant, he was

civilly liable under the common law torts of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious

prosecution, and that he violated her rights under Articles 24, 26, and 40 of the Maryland

Declaration of Rights. The deputy filed the application for statement of charges after

consulting with the State’s Attorney’s Office and relying on the determination by that

office that Petitioner’s conduct violated the statute.

The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the circuit court did not err in entering summary

judgment in favor of the State on the common law claims of malicious prosecution, false

arrest, and false imprisonment, and on the claims alleging violations of Article 24 and

Article 26 arising from the same conduct, under circumstances in which the deputy arrested

the plaintiff pursuant to a warrant that was issued by a neutral judicial officer.

When an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant, probable cause is predetermined by a judicial

officer. The issuance of a warrant by a neutral issuing judge or judicial officer creates a

strong presumption that it was objectively reasonable for police officers to believe that

there was probable cause, and a plaintiff who argues that a warrant was issued on a lack of

probable cause faces a heavy burden. See Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535

(2012). Although a warrant is not an absolute shield, civil liability will arise only in

circumstances in which “it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have

concluded that a warrant should issue.” Id. at 547. In order to overcome the presumption

of objective reasonableness that attaches to a warrant, the plaintiff must demonstrate that:

(1) the judicial officer issuing the warrant was misled by an affidavit that the affiant knew

was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2)

the judicial officer wholly abandoned his or her judicial role; (3) the warrant was based on

an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence

entirely unreasonable; or (4) when the warrant is so facially deficient that the executing

officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. The application of these principles is

based upon the “sound presumption” that the judicial officer is more qualified than the law

enforcement officer to make a probable cause determination.

In addition to the strong presumption of probable cause that attaches to a warrant, when an

officer obtains and follows legal advice from a prosecutor when applying for a statement

of charges after presenting a full and fair disclosure of everything that was presented to the

officer, there is “further support for the conclusion that an officer could reasonably have

believed that the scope of the warrant was supported by probable cause.” See

Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 553.

Applying the above principles, the Supreme Court of Maryland held that the circuit court

did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of the State on counts alleging false

arrest (Count I), false imprisonment (Count II), malicious prosecution (Count III), and

violations of Article 26 (Count VI) and Article 24 (Count IV) (as that count pertains to

conduct alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution). Petitioner

was arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral judicial officer after the deputy who

obtained the warrant sought legal advice from the State’s Attorney’s Office. As a matter

of law, Petitioner cannot overcome the strong presumption of probable cause that attached

to the warrant in the circumstances presented. The Court determined that the application

for statement of charges was based upon an objectively reasonable interpretation of the

juror intimidation statute, and thus probable cause and legal justification existed for

Petitioner’s arrest and imprisonment.

MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS — ARTICLE 40. The Supreme Court

held that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the State

on Petitioner’s claim that her arrest and imprisonment violated her free speech rights under

Article 40 (Count V) and Article 24 (as it related to the free speech claim). Based upon its

examination of the application for statement of charges that was presented to the neutral

judicial officer, the Supreme Court held that the judicial officer had probable cause to

believe that Petitioner’s speech constituted a “true threat” and fell outside the protections

of Article 40. The Court held that the presence of probable cause defeated any Article 40

claim arising from Petitioner’s arrest and imprisonment.

MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS — ARTICLE 24 — CHALLENGE TO

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JUROR INTIMIDATION STATUTE. The Supreme

Court of Maryland held that the circuit court did not err in entering summary judgment in

favor of the State on Petitioner’s Article 24 (Count IV) claim to the extent that she alleged

that Maryland’s juror intimidation statute, Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law Article § 9-305

(2021 Repl. Vol.), is unconstitutionally vague.

Circuit Court for Wicomico County

Case No.: C-22-CV-17-000326

Argued: February 6, 2024

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 19

September Term, 2023

VALERIE ROVIN

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Fader, C.J.,

Watts,

*Hotten,

Booth,

Biran,

Gould,

Eaves,

JJ.

Opinion by Booth, J.

Watts, J., dissents.

Filed: August 15, 2024

*Hotten, J., now a Senior Justice, participated in

Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal

the hearing and conference of this case while an

Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State active member of this Court. After being

recalled pursuant to Maryland Constitution,

Government Article) this document is authentic.

2025.02.25 Article IV, § 3A, she also participated in the

14:26:44 -05'00' decision and adoption of this opinion.

Gregory Hilton, Clerk

This is the second appearance of this case before this Court. In this instance, we are

asked to determine whether the State may be subject to civil liability for an arrest under

circumstances in which, after interviewing a victim, a deputy obtained legal advice from

the State’s Attorney’s Office that there was probable cause to believe that an individual

had committed a statutory criminal offense, a judicial officer found probable cause to issue

a warrant, and thereafter a trial judge acquitted the individual of the charge based upon the

trial judge’s interpretation of the statute in question.

The issues presented in this case arise in the context of Petitioner, Valerie Rovin’s,

arrest and prosecution for violating the juror intimidation statute, Md. Code Ann., Criminal

Law Article (“CR”) § 9-305 (2021 Repl. Vol.). Ms. Rovin, upset by a jury’s verdict

rendered against her daughter in a criminal trial, went to the jury foreperson’s workplace

on the same day to confront him about the verdict. According to the foreperson, Ms. Rovin

yelled at him, acted in an aggressive and threatening manner, and told him, among other

things, that she was going to have an individual from Nicaragua “take care of him.” The

foreperson immediately reported this exchange to the Sheriff’s Office. The deputy sheriff

who investigated the matter consulted with prosecutors in the State’s Attorney’s Office,

who advised the deputy that Ms. Rovin’s conduct violated the juror intimidation statute.

Thereafter, the deputy applied for a statement of charges. A District Court Commissioner

determined that there was probable cause to issue a warrant for Ms. Rovin’s arrest.

At the close of the State’s case at Ms. Rovin’s bench trial, her counsel moved for a

judgment of acquittal, arguing that her conduct did not constitute juror intimidation under

the statute because Ms. Rovin’s daughter’s criminal trial had concluded, and thus the

foreperson was no longer serving on a jury and his service had concluded. The State

disagreed with Ms. Rovin’s narrow interpretation of the statute and argued that the

foreperson’s jury service was for the period of his summons, and that as a result of Ms.

Rovin’s actions, the foreperson was dismissed from his jury service early. The circuit court

determined that although Ms. Rovin’s actions were “very improper” and may have been

evidence of juror “retaliation,” her actions did not fit within the conduct prohibited by the

juror intimidation statute, and it therefore entered a judgment of acquittal.

Ms. Rovin then filed a civil suit against, among others, the State’s Attorney and

Assistant State’s Attorney who advised the deputy and subsequently prosecuted her, and

the deputy who applied for the charges and sought a warrant for her arrest. She asserted

that the defendants, through their conduct in causing her arrest and prosecution,

committed common law torts and violated her rights under various articles of the

Maryland Declaration of Rights. After the circuit court entered judgment in favor of the

defendants and the matter was appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland, this Court

granted certiorari to determine, among other things, whether absolute immunity barred

the claims.

With respect to the claims against the prosecutors, we held that the circuit court was

correct in entering summary judgment in their favor because they were entitled to absolute

immunity. State v. Rovin, 472 Md. 317 (2021). We determined that the immunity extended

not only to the prosecutors’ decision to prosecute, but also to their conduct in advising the

deputy prior to the filing of the application for statement of charges. Id. at 355–56.

Although we held that the State could not be civilly liable for the actions of the prosecutors

2

(and after declining to extend prosecutorial immunity to the deputy’s conduct), for the

reasons discussed more fully herein, we declined to decide whether the State could be

civilly liable for the deputy’s conduct in applying for charges and obtaining an arrest

warrant under these circumstances. We remanded the case to the circuit court. On remand,

the circuit court entered summary judgment in the State’s favor, ruling that “neither the

[deputy nor the sheriff] can be civilly liable for [Ms. Rovin’s] arrest pursuant to a warrant

based upon a judicial officer’s determination that probable cause existed for said arrest

even though that determination was later held by a trial court to be based upon an error of

law.” After the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment in the State’s favor,

Ms. Rovin filed a petition for writ of certiorari. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm

the judgment of the Appellate Court.

I

Background

A. The Criminal Case Against Ms. Rovin’s Daughter

The proceedings in this case arose after Ms. Rovin’s daughter was convicted of

driving under the influence of alcohol and related traffic offenses in the Circuit Court for

Wicomico County in June 2015. 1 Ms. Rovin’s daughter received a sentence that included

jail time. Ms. Rovin attended a portion of her daughter’s trial. On the same day the jury

1

State v. Bailey, No. 22-K-15-000171 (Md. Cir. Ct. Wicomico County, June 16,

2015).

3

convicted Ms. Rovin’s daughter, Ms. Rovin located the jury foreperson at his workplace

and confronted him about the verdict.

According to Ms. Rovin’s complaint, she had met the foreperson approximately one

year prior to the trial. They discussed the fact that they had the same last name, as well as

the possibility that they shared a common relative, Bill Rovin, who had moved to

Nicaragua. Ms. Rovin indicated, however, that to her knowledge, she and the foreperson

were not related. The complaint also alleges that the foreperson and one of Ms. Rovin’s

daughters were Facebook friends. 2

After Ms. Rovin left the foreperson’s workplace, he reported the incident to the

Wicomico County Sheriff’s Office. Deputy Sheriff Matthew Cook responded to the call.

Ms. Rovin disputes what was said during her conversation with the foreperson. She does

not, however, appear to dispute what the foreperson told the deputy. The foreperson

reported that Ms. Rovin behaved erratically and aggressively, caused a commotion, and

appeared to be outraged by the foreperson’s decision to convict Ms. Rovin’s daughter. The

foreperson told Deputy Cook that Ms. Rovin invaded his personal space to the point that

he felt very “uncomfortable and threatened.” The foreperson also stated that Ms. Rovin

told him that she would have “Bill Rovin” “take care of him[.]” The foreperson did not

know Bill Rovin, and when he asked who Bill Rovin was, Ms. Rovin told him that Bill

2

Ms. Rovin’s daughter who was convicted of the DUI and related traffic offenses

was not the same daughter with whom Mr. Rovin was Facebook friends. Ms. Rovin does

not suggest that the foreperson knew Ms. Rovin’s daughter who was convicted.

4

Rovin worked in Nicaragua and had people who could “take care of” him. The foreperson

interpreted this as a threat and alerted the police.

B. The Criminal Case Against Ms. Rovin

Officers of the Wicomico County Sheriff’s Office consulted with the Wicomico

County State’s Attorney’s Office and were advised that Ms. Rovin’s conduct constituted

juror intimidation under CR § 9-305 and that she should be charged accordingly. Under

that statute, “[a] person may not, by threat, force, or corrupt means, try to influence,

intimidate, or impede a juror, a witness, or an officer of a court of the State or of the

United States in the performance of the person’s official duties.” CR § 9-305(a).

Around the same time, the foreperson applied for a peace order against Ms. Rovin

and gave sworn testimony in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Wicomico County.

He stated that he was a member of a jury that convicted Ms. Rovin’s daughter and that Ms.

Rovin came to his workplace and threatened to harm to him. Specifically, he testified that

Ms. Rovin threatened that she would have “somebody come in from out of town” to harm

him and that “she told [him] she was going to contact somebody who was going to send

people . . . to take care of [him] . . . people from Nicaragua where Bill Rovin lives.” The

judge explained to the foreperson that he was unable to obtain a peace order because the

statutory requirements were not satisfied. 3 The foreperson testified that the State’s

Attorney’s Office had advised him to apply for the peace order. The judge informed the

3

Md. Code Ann., Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”) § 3-1503 (1984,

2021 Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp.) identifies the grounds for which a peace order may be

obtained.

5

foreperson that “there’s a statute, it’s a criminal offense to intimidate a juror[,]” and “if

[Ms. Rovin] has done what you say she has done, that may very well be a criminal offense.”

After that hearing, Deputy Cook applied for a statement of charges against Ms.

Rovin. Among other things, the application recited the information provided by the

foreperson. It also stated that the Wicomico County Sheriff’s Office had consulted with

the State’s Attorney’s Office, and that office “believed” that this was a case of juror

intimidation under CR § 9-305(a) “and should be charged accordingly.” The application

further stated that the foreperson “was assigned as a [j]uror for the [Circuit Court for]

Wicomico County for the month of June 2015 and had to be discharged from further duty

as a result of this incident.”

A District Court Commissioner agreed that there was probable cause that Ms. Rovin

violated CR § 9-305 and, consequently, issued a warrant for her arrest. Ms. Rovin was

arrested on June 18, 2015. She was held for one day, after which she was placed under

house arrest. In July 2015, the State’s Attorney’s Office filed a criminal information

charging Ms. Rovin with intimidating a juror in violation of CR § 9-305(a) and second-

degree assault. Thereafter, Ms. Rovin remained on house arrest for approximately four

months until her trial commenced.

Ms. Rovin was tried in a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County. The

record in this case includes only very limited portions of the transcript of her criminal trial. 4

4

Specifically, the record includes two pages of the foreperson’s testimony,

counsels’ legal arguments on the defense’s motion for acquittal at the end of the State’s

case, and the court’s ruling on the motion. The transcript reflects that the State called

6

The foreperson testified that Ms. Rovin came to his workplace “in an extreme state of

agitation[,]” started yelling at him, and asked him how he could “put another Rovin in

jail[.]” The foreperson testified that the building included a preschool program and that

there were “probably over 100 kids in the building at that time, so [he] wanted to escort

her away” from the public area and asked her to come to his office. After being escorted

into the foreperson’s office (which had a double glass door, making the area visible to the

public), the foreperson testified that Ms. Rovin “continued yelling” at him “for putting her

daughter in jail[.]” According to the foreperson, the yelling continued, and Ms. Rovin told

him that “Bill Rovin . . . in Nicaragua” would take care of him. The foreperson testified

that after Ms. Rovin left his office, he googled Bill Rovin “and saw that he had business

dealings in Nicaragua” and, therefore “knew in [his] mind[,] it was a valid threat.”

At the close of the State’s case, Ms. Rovin moved for an acquittal, arguing that, on

both the evidence presented at trial and the law, she did not commit either offense with

which she was charged. Pertaining to the second-degree assault charge, Ms. Rovin’s

counsel argued that the evidence failed to prove that any threat Ms. Rovin made against

the foreperson rose to the level of an imminent battery. Specifically, Ms. Rovin’s counsel

argued that although his client was “yelling,” “being rude,” and that her conduct was

“distasteful,” such conduct did not put the foreperson in fear of imminent offensive

physical contact or harm. With respect to Ms. Rovin’s statement that “Bill Rovin from

Nicaragua” would “send someone to take care of” the foreperson, defense counsel argued

several witnesses, including Deputy Cook. However, those portions of the transcript are

not part of this record.

7

that having someone “come from Nicaragua and take care of him” “is the antithesis of

immediate and imminent.”

As for the juror intimidation charge, Ms. Rovin’s counsel argued that the court

should interpret the statute very narrowly, focusing on the fact that the trial had concluded

when Ms. Rovin confronted the foreperson at his workplace and, therefore, her conduct

could not have influenced an ongoing proceeding. Ms. Rovin’s counsel argued:

What [the juror intimidation] statute says is a person may not by threat, force

or corrupt means try to influence, intimidate or impede a juror in the

performance of the person’s official duties. . . . [Here,] they had already

found [Ms. Rovin’s daughter] guilty. There was not a pending judicial

proceeding, no pending trial. [The foreperson] had already completed his

official duty . . . and there is no way that she could have influenced that

verdict, which was over.

* * *

She had to attempt to influence a juror in the performance of his official

duties. She did not have that intent because she couldn’t have any influence

on his official duties. Just because [a circuit court judge] decided that he

should not serve on any future juries does not mean that my client was trying

to cause that result. She went there to criticize him for finding her daughter

guilty, and according to [the foreperson] to threaten that somebody else

would come and do harm. But she wasn’t trying to [affect] the outcome of

the trial[.]

* * *

[A]t best you could consider her conduct [as] a threat of retaliation against

[the foreperson] for a prior verdict. . . . She was just voicing her opinion,

granted in a way she shouldn’t have, everybody knows that. But it did not

amount to a crime. I think she understands better than anybody she shouldn’t

have done this, but the bottom line is she didn’t commit a crime[.]

The State disagreed with Ms. Rovin’s counsel’s “extremely narrow reading” of the

juror intimidation statute, which limited a juror’s “official duties” to “simply sitting on a

single jury.” The State pointed out that sworn jurors are “under the [c]ourt’s subpoena for

30 days[,]” and that as a result of Ms. Rovin’s conduct, the foreperson was dismissed from

8

his official duties as a sworn juror on June 17—prior to the expiration of his juror service

on June 30.

The court questioned how Ms. Rovin was “trying to get this particular juror to take

any action[.]” The court observed that Ms. Rovin’s conduct was “not proper,” and

“shouldn’t have been done,” but expressed its view that her conduct did not appear to

violate the statute. The prosecutor disagreed, stating:

[B]y intending to intimidate him, which she certainly did, to stalk out, find

the [foreperson’s] name . . . go there and make that threat, I think she

absolutely intended to intimidate him. The natural and probable consequence

. . . was that he was unable to serve the rest of the month, he couldn’t possibly

be a fair juror for the rest of the month. Whether she intended that result, the

State argues, is irrelevant; it’s whether she intended to intimidate him. If she

intended to intimidate him[,] she is responsible for the natural and probable

consequences of her actions.

In response to the court’s question as to whether Ms. Rovin intended to intimidate

the foreperson in connection with his official duties as a juror, the prosecutor noted that

under the testimony presented to the court, “[a] juror’s official duties extend 30 days.” The

prosecutor further explained that the State’s interpretation of the statute required the court

to determine whether “a reasonable juror who . . . had this occur could perform, could be

reasonably expected to be fair and impartial, which is [a juror’s] official duties for the rest

of the month.”

After considering these arguments, the trial court agreed with Ms. Rovin’s counsel’s

characterization of the evidence—that Ms. Rovin merely sought to “retaliate” against the

foreperson for the prior verdict, rather than attempting to convince him to take some action

to affect the verdict. The court stated that “the evidence here is of a retaliation for

9

something that was already done, which is improper, but not in violation of [CR § 9-305].”

The court then granted Ms. Rovin’s motion, stating:

Well, I think this is a very difficult case. I think [Ms. Rovin’s] actions were

very improper.

* * *

As far as the violation of [CR § 9-305], I think this should be a violation of

the law to intimidate or threaten a juror for something they have already done,

but that’s not what this statute does. It’s to prevent somebody from impeding

an ongoing judicial process, to [a]ffect the outcome of the case, or something

of that nature. It’s not to retaliate for something that a juror has done in the

past.

* * *

I think the actions that have been testified to as to the Defendant if they are

true are wrong and should not have been performed, but I don’t think they

violate [CR §] 9-305, and the Court’s going to grant the Defendant’s motion.

As to the second-degree assault charge, the court acquitted Ms. Rovin because “the threat

of doing something to somebody at some time in the future is not by legal definition an

assault.”

C. Ms. Rovin’s Civil Case Against the State

1. Rovin v. State – Part I

Following her acquittal, Ms. Rovin sued the State, the prosecutors, and law

enforcement officers 5 who were involved in her criminal charges and prosecution, alleging,

among other things, that the defendants’ conduct in causing her arrest and prosecution gave

rise to civil liability under various common law torts, and violated her rights under Article

5

In addition to the State, Ms. Rovin named the following individuals as defendants:

Wicomico County State’s Attorney Matthew Maciarello, Assistant State’s Attorney

Richard Brueckner, Sheriff Michael Lewis, Deputy Sheriff Matthew Cook, the Wicomico

County State’s Attorney’s Office, and the Wicomico County Sheriff’s Office.

10

24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Specifically, the initial complaint alleged seven

counts: false arrest (Count I), false imprisonment (Count II), malicious prosecution (Count

III), violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count IV), false light

invasion of privacy (Count V), defamation (Count VI), and intentional infliction of

emotional distress (Count VII).

The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court

granted. The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed in an unreported opinion, holding

that summary judgment was not appropriate because, among other things, Ms. Rovin’s

claims against some of the individual defendants required a showing of malice or gross

negligence to proceed, pursuant to State personnel immunity under the Maryland Tort

Claims Act (“MTCA”), and Ms. Rovin may have needed discovery to prove those

elements. 6 Rovin v. State, No. 233, Sept. Term, 2018, 2020 WL 3265119, at *9 (Md. Ct.

Spec. App. June 17, 2020).

We granted certiorari and reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court in part.

State v. Rovin, 472 Md. 317 (2021) (“Rovin I”).

6

The Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), Md. Code Ann., State Government

Article (“SG”) § 12-101 et seq. (1984, 2021 Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp), provides statutory

immunity for “State personnel” from suit for any tortious act or omission committed, so

long as the individual was acting within the scope of his or her public duties without malice

or gross negligence. See SG § 12-105; CJ § 5-522(b). The MTCA identifies the various

individuals who qualify as “State personnel,” including sheriffs and deputy sheriffs. SG

§ 12-101(a)(6). The Act provides a concomitant waiver of State immunity, subject to

certain monetary and other limitations, where the Act provides State personnel immunity.

Under this framework, the State may be liable (up to a certain amount) when State

personnel immunity applies but retains its immunity when State personnel may be liable in

their individual capacities because they acted with malice or gross negligence, or because

they acted outside the scope of their public duties. See SG § 12-104; CJ § 5-522.

11

Aside from the false light invasion of privacy and defamation counts, which were

not before us, 7 we held that summary judgment was proper on the claims filed against the

individual defendants. Concerning the claims against the State’s Attorney and Assistant

State’s Attorney, we held that the circuit court was correct in granting summary judgment

in their favor because they were entitled to prosecutorial immunity—an absolute

immunity—and, therefore, the State could not be held civilly liable for their actions in this

case. Rovin I, 472 Md. at 349. We also held that the prosecutors were entitled to

prosecutorial immunity not only for prosecuting Ms. Rovin, but also for their conduct in

advising Deputy Cook to institute charges against her. 8 Id. at 355. Specifically, we

explained that “prosecutorial immunity applies where a prosecutor advises a law

enforcement officer to file with a judicial officer an application for a statement of charges

as this is an act related to the decision of whether to prosecute and an act closely associated

with the prosecutor’s role in the judicial process.” Id. at 355–56.

As for the claims against the law enforcement officers, Deputy Cook argued that we

should extend prosecutorial immunity to his acts because he relied on the advice given by

7

After Ms. Rovin’s arrest, law enforcement officers made statements about Ms.

Rovin’s arrest and her conduct. These statements relate to Ms. Rovin’s counts for false

light invasion of privacy and defamation. In Rovin I, the State did not raise in its petition

for writ of certiorari that portion of the Appellate Court’s judgment reversing the trial

court’s grant of summary judgment on Ms. Rovin’s counts of false light invasion of privacy

and defamation. This Court’s reversal of the Appellate Court’s judgment did not extend to

those counts. State v. Rovin, 472 Md. 317, 331, 334 (2021) (“Rovin I”).

8

Moreover, we made clear that, although Ms. Rovin also included both the

Wicomico County State’s Attorney’s Office and the Wicomico County Sheriff’s Office as

defendants in her complaint, neither office was “a legal entity subject to suit[.]” Rovin I,

472 Md. at 329 n.3; see also id. at 339 n.9.

12

the prosecutors, namely, that there was probable cause to believe that Ms. Rovin violated

the juror intimidation statute. We did not accept Deputy Cook’s invitation to extend

prosecutorial immunity to law enforcement officers who consult with prosecutors, id. at

356, observing that we had “never made any form of absolute immunity generally

applicable to actions by law enforcement officers, and we decline[d] to do so [t]here[,]” id.

at 362.

Although we declined to extend absolute immunity to the law enforcement officers’

conduct, we held that they were entitled to State personnel immunity under the MTCA. Id.

at 330–31. Based upon her pleadings, we observed that Ms. Rovin did not allege that any

of the individual defendants “acted with the malice or gross negligence required to defeat

State personnel immunity.” Id. at 363.

In the last eight pages of our opinion, we discussed an issue of first impression raised

by the State—“whether liability can attach to an officer who makes an arrest based on a

reasonable, good faith belief that the conduct in question was criminal after conferring with

prosecutors and obtaining a warrant from a District Court Commissioner.” Id. at 365. In

arguing that it should not be civilly liable in this case, the State relied on the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014), in which the

Court held that there is no violation of the Fourth Amendment when a law enforcement

officer initiates a traffic stop on reasonable suspicion that is based on an objectively

reasonable mistake of law. We discussed the State’s contentions pertaining to Heien. We

also noted that in the context of common law claims for malicious prosecution, the probable

cause necessary to defeat such a claim typically exists when a layperson relies upon the

13

advice of an attorney, including a prosecutor, that the conduct constitutes a crime, even if

that advice is mistaken. Id. at 367–73 nn.15–16 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts

§ 662 (Existence of Probable Cause) (1977), Restatement (Third) of Torts § 22 (Probable

Cause to Initiate Criminal Proceedings)).

After discussing these principles, we declined to apply them because they were

raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 373. Instead, we returned “the case to the circuit

court for a determination as to whether Heien is applicable to the circumstances of this

case.” Id. Having determined that the officers were “not entitled to absolute judicial or

prosecutorial immunity[,]” we remanded the case to the circuit court, stating that “all of

the claims in the complaint against the State based on the alleged actions of the officers

remain[.]” Id. at 374. In a concurring opinion, Judge McDonald stated that, although he

had “no problem with a disposition that sen[t] the case back to the circuit court,” he

believed that the Court could address the legal issue of whether the State could be liable

for an “asserted error of law” without remanding the case to the circuit court. Id. at 375

(McDonald, J., concurring). In his view, it was not the deputy’s role to second-guess the

prosecutors’ legal advice to file the warrant application or the District Court

Commissioner’s decision to issue the warrant, and he would have affirmed the grant of

summary judgment in favor of the State on that basis. 9

9

Judge McDonald observed that these claims “turn[ed] on whether the deputy

sheriff who arrested Ms. Rovin was at fault for executing the arrest warrant based on an

error of law.” Rovin I, 472 Md. at 375 (McDonald, J., concurring). Judge McDonald

summarized his conclusion regarding the asserted error of law in this case, stating:

14

2. Rovin v. State – Part II

After the case was remanded, Ms. Rovin amended her complaint. 10 She did not

modify her allegations with respect to gross negligence or malice, but she did add additional

counts against the State (the sole remaining defendant) 11 thus alleging eight counts in total:

false arrest (Count I), false imprisonment (Count II), malicious prosecution (Count III), and

claims under Articles 24, 40, and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Counts IV, V,

The asserted error of law relates to the breadth of the juror intimidation

statute ([CR] § 9-305) at the time that the warrant was issued and executed.

Several lawyers and judicial officers—the District Court judge in the peace

order hearing, the prosecutors in the State’s Attorney’s Office, the District

Court Commissioner—each opined that the facts alleged by the victim fell

within the juror intimidation statute. Only the trial judge at Ms. Rovin’s

criminal trial reached a different conclusion. The basis for the trial judge’s

conclusion was that the victim of the alleged intimidation had concluded his

service at the trial of Ms. Rovin’s daughter, even though (as alleged in the

statement of charges) he remained an active member of the jury pool at the

time of the incident. That legal conclusion was a questionable interpretation

of § 9-305, as the circuit court below indicated, and was never reviewed by

an appellate court because, of course, the State cannot appeal an acquittal.

Even if one were to conclude that the trial judge in Ms. Rovin’s criminal case

was correct as to the breadth of § 9-305, it was not the role of the deputy

sheriff to foresee the future and overrule the legal judgments of the State’s

Attorney who authorized the prosecution and arrest and the judicial officer

who ordered the arrest by issuing the warrant.

Id. at 375–76 (footnote omitted).

10

Ms. Rovin’s amended complaint is now the operative complaint.

11

The new counts in Ms. Rovin’s complaint were counts V and VI, alleging

violations of Article 40 and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, respectively.

Separately, Ms. Rovin omitted her original count of intentional infliction of emotional

distress.

15

and VI respectively), 12 false light invasion of privacy (Count VII), and defamation (Count

VIII). The State filed an answer with respect to the false light invasion of privacy and

defamation counts and a second motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment on the

remaining counts. In its motion, the State presented briefing not only on Heien, but also on

whether law enforcement officers could be civilly liable for an arrest pursuant to a warrant

based upon a judicial officer’s probable cause determination. The State cited cases from this

Court discussing the application of these principles in the context of false imprisonment,

false arrest, and malicious prosecution claims.

The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, reasoning that

Heien’s mistake of law framework applied. The court ruled that “neither the [deputy nor

the sheriff] can be civilly liable for Plaintiff’s arrest pursuant to a warrant based on a

judicial officer’s determination that probable cause existed for said arrest even though that

determination was later held by a trial court judge to be based on an error of law.”

Subsequently, Ms. Rovin moved to certify that order as a final judgment under Maryland

Rule 2-602(b), 13 and to stay her remaining claims for false light invasion of privacy and

12

Although Ms. Rovin’s state constitutional protections mirror protections that she

would have under the Federal Constitution, she has not alleged any federal violations.

Recovery for federal violations arise under statute—42 U.S.C. § 1983—“whereas the

redress for State violations is through a common law action for damages.” DiPino v. Davis,

354 Md. 18, 50 (1999). “Unlike in a § 1983 action and unlike in an action for some

common law torts, neither the local government official nor a local governmental entity

has available any governmental immunity in an action based on rights protected by the

State Constitution.” Id. at 51 (citations omitted).

Maryland Rule 2-602(b)(1) provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f the court expressly

13

determines in a written order that there is no just reason for delay, it may direct in the order

16

defamation. In so doing, she asserted that she would suffer financial hardship if she were

forced to proceed on those counts before an appellate court considered the “mistake of law”

argument. The circuit court granted her motion and certified its order as an appealable

final judgment. 14 Thereafter, Ms. Rovin noted an appeal.

The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the decision of the circuit court. Rovin

v. State, No. 198, Sept. Term, 2022, 2023 WL 4855950 (Md. App. Ct. July 31, 2023).

The Appellate Court concluded “that like the Fourth Amendment, Article 26 tolerates an

officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of law.” Id. at *17. The court next concluded

that there was “probable cause to arrest Ms. Rovin, based upon an objectively reasonable

interpretation of the juror intimidation statute[,]” because “threatening a juror shortly

after a verdict could serve part of a larger effort to undermine the verdict and secure a

new trial, by causing the juror to carry out future duties while intimidated, influenced, or

impeded by the threat.” Id. at *21 (footnote omitted). As for Ms. Rovin’s claims under

Articles 24 and 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights that the juror intimidation

statute was unconstitutional, the court held that the statute was not void for vagueness,

either facially or as applied to her conduct. Id. at *24–26. The court also determined that

Ms. Rovin’s free speech rights were not violated. Finally, the Appellate Court affirmed

the entry of a final judgment . . . as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or

parties[.]”

14

In its certification order, the circuit court stated, in part, that the “remaining

defamation and false light counts in Counts VII and VIII of the Amended Complaint are

separate and independent from Counts I-VI” that were resolved by the court’s summary

judgment order, and “that certifying the [summary judgment order] for appeal is the most

judicially expeditious path forward.”

17

the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the State on Ms. Rovin’s claims

for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, because the arrest

“warrant provided legal justification for Ms. Rovin’s arrest and imprisonment” and

because the “officers’ construction of Section 9-305(a) was objectively reasonable.” Id.

at *26–27.

Ms. Rovin filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which this Court granted to consider

whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the State on Ms.

Rovin’s claims alleging violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and common law

torts in connection with her arrest. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment

of the Appellate Court.

II

Standard of Review

We review the decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Gambrill v. Bd. of

Ed. of Dorchester County, 481 Md. 274, 297 (2022). “We review the record in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party and construe any reasonable inferences which may

be drawn from the facts against the movant.” Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and [] the [moving] party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Md. Rule 2-

501(a). “If no material facts are in dispute, we determine whether the trial judge’s ruling

was legally correct. Ordinarily, we may affirm the trial court only on the grounds upon

which the trial court relied in granting summary judgment.” Gambrill, 481 Md. at 297

18

(quoting Newell v. Runnels, 407 Md. 578, 608 (2009) (internal quotations omitted)).

“Nonetheless, we may affirm summary judgment on a different ground if the trial court

would have no discretion as to the particular issue.” Wireless One, Inc. v. Mayor & City

Council of Baltimore, 465 Md. 588, 614 n.6 (2019) (quoting Young Elec. Contractors, Inc.

v. Dustin Constr., Inc., 459 Md. 356, 383 (2018)) (cleaned up).

In this case, we are asked to decide several questions of law. Specifically, we must

determine whether the State may be civilly liable under constitutional and common law

claims arising from the plaintiff’s arrest pursuant to a warrant that was obtained in good

faith and based upon legal advice of the prosecutors, and after a judicial officer determined

there was probable cause for the arrest, where the plaintiff was later acquitted of the

criminal charge based upon the trial judge’s interpretation of the statute in question. We

must also determine whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on Ms.

Rovin’s claim that her arrest and imprisonment violated her free speech rights. Finally, we

must determine whether the juror intimidation statute is unconstitutionally vague. We

undertake a de novo review in each instance.

III

Parties’ Contentions

Ms. Rovin’s claims all arise out of the same conduct—her arrest pursuant to a

warrant for violating the juror intimidation statute where she was later acquitted of the

charge based upon the trial judge’s interpretation of the statute. Ms. Rovin contends that

the State is liable under the common law torts of false arrest, false imprisonment, and

19

malicious prosecution for this conduct. Specifically, Ms. Rovin asserts that because the

trial judge determined that her actions did not violate the juror intimidation statute, which

resulted in an acquittal, there necessarily could not have been probable cause to arrest,

detain, or prosecute her. In particular, she alleges that “based upon the facts contained in

the arrest warrant,” it was “objectively unreasonable to believe that [she] had committed a

crime.” Accordingly, she asserts that she was arrested “without legal justification,”

“without probable cause,” and pursuant to a “facially invalid warrant.” She further

contends that after her arrest, and prior to her prosecution, it should have become “clear

and obvious” that her arrest was not supported by probable cause or legal justification, and

she should “have been immediately freed from that imprisonment.”

In addition to her common law claims, Ms. Rovin asserts that the law enforcement

officers violated her rights under the due process and search and seizure provisions of

Articles 24 15 and 26 16 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, respectively. Article 24

protects substantive and procedural due process rights and is the State analogue to the due

process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

State v. Dett, 391 Md. 81, 92 n.3 (2008). Article 26, like the Fourth Amendment of the

15

Article 24 states: “That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of

his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or

deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of

the land.”

16

Article 26 states: “That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected

places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants

to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing

the place, or the person in special, are illegal, and ought not to be granted.”

20

United States Constitution, 17 protects a person’s right to be free from unreasonable

searches and seizures.

Ms. Rovin also argues that even if the officers had probable cause to arrest her for

violating the juror intimidation statute, her Article 24 rights were nonetheless violated

because she was arrested, imprisoned, and prosecuted pursuant to a “statute that is vague

and invalid, unconstitutional, and void-for-vagueness[.]” She further asserts that her

Article 40 18 free speech rights were violated because, among other things, she was arrested

and imprisoned for engaging in protected speech.

The State maintains that there was both probable cause and legal justification to

arrest Ms. Rovin, which defeats Ms. Rovin’s claims as a matter of law. The State points

out that the probable cause determination in this case was made by a neutral magistrate

after the deputy obtained legal advice from the State’s Attorney’s Office. Under these

circumstances, the State argues that it was objectively reasonable for the deputy to rely

upon the warrant in making the arrest. In addition to the probable cause that attached to

the warrant, the State also notes that under the Restatement of Torts, as well as our case

17

The Fourth Amendment states: “The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not

be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or

affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things

to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.

18

Article 40 states: “That the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably preserved;

that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish his sentiments

on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.”

21

law, a deputy’s good faith reliance on legal advice provides a basis for probable cause in

the context of malicious prosecution claims.

As a matter of first impression, the State argues that this Court should hold that the

State is not liable when a law enforcement officer applies for charges and obtains a warrant

based on a reasonable, good faith mistake of law. Although this Court has never addressed

whether an individual’s Article 26 rights are violated where an officer makes an arrest

based upon an objectively reasonable mistake of law, the State points out that in Heien v.

North Carolina, 574 U.S. 84 (2014)—in the context of reasonable suspicion necessary for

a lawful traffic stop—the United States Supreme Court determined that there was no

violation of the Fourth Amendment in such an instance. The State asserts that this Court

should apply the same principles to Ms. Rovin’s civil claims.

We decline the State’s invitation to import the United States Supreme Court’s Heien

analysis here for a simple reason. That case involved an officer’s reasonable suspicion to

stop a vehicle based upon the officer’s objectively reasonable belief that a motor vehicle

law had been violated. In other words, Heien applied a constitutional framework to an

officer’s determination of reasonable suspicion in the field without the benefit of a warrant

issued by a neutral judicial officer. In contrast, this case involves a probable cause

determination by a judicial officer in connection with the issuance of an arrest warrant.

Of course, in either instance, the Fourth Amendment mandates that the search or seizure

be objectively reasonable. We determine that consideration of the claims presented here

should be analyzed under this Court’s and the United States Supreme Court’s framework

for determining probable cause, and in particular, probable cause to arrest when a warrant

22

is issued. See DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18 (1999); Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70 (1995);

Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535 (2012); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897

(1984). 19

19

Given our decision not to consider the application of Heien in this case, the

Dissent argues that we should simply reverse the circuit court’s ruling and “not decide the

matter on a ground other than the one that the circuit court did and for which we remanded

the case in” Rovin I. Dissent Op. at 1. We disagree with the Dissent’s narrow focus on

Heien for several reasons.

When the parties initially briefed this matter to this Court in Rovin I, the State

specifically asked us to consider whether law enforcement officers could be civilly liable

for an arrest that was made on an objectively reasonable belief that the conduct was

criminal after conferring with prosecutors and obtaining a warrant from a neutral judicial

officer. Notwithstanding that the issue was before us, we remanded all the claims related

to the deputy because the State mentioned Heien in its briefing before us for the first time.

Rovin I, 472 Md. at 374. As noted, one member of the Court saw no reason to remand and

would have determined that the warrant provided probable cause. Id. at 374 (McDonald,

J., concurring).

On remand, Ms. Rovin amended her complaint, adding two new constitutional

claims—violations of Article 26 and Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In

response, the State filed a new motion for summary judgment. In addition to arguing that

the circuit court should apply Heien, the State once again argued and briefed whether the

deputy could be liable based upon the probable cause determination made by the neutral

judicial officer. Based upon the briefing and arguments, the circuit court ruled that Heien

applied. The circuit court also ruled that law enforcement cannot be “civilly liable for [Ms.

Rovin’s] arrest pursuant to a warrant based on a judicial officer’s determination that

probable cause existed for said arrest even though that determination was later held by a

trial court judge to be based on an error of law.” In other words, the circuit court expressly

ruled that the warrant provided probable cause for Ms. Rovin’s arrest.

Whether probable cause existed pursuant to the warrant has been a central focus in

the briefs and oral arguments of the parties from the State’s initial motion for summary

judgment continuing through the briefing to this Court in this second appeal. Moreover,

we granted certiorari on questions extending beyond the application of Heien, including

Ms. Rovin’s request that we determine “whether the warrant issued for” her “arrest was

invalid based on the contents of the warrant, which show no crime was committed.” In her

opening brief, Ms. Rovin argued that the circuit court’s “warrant-related analysis [was]

23

It is therefore unnecessary for us to consider whether we adopt the Supreme Court’s

Heien analysis when considering an Article 26 claim. 20 We shall save that question for

another day. 21

[in]correct[,]” and that the “circuit court was also wrong in concluding that the warrant

acted as an absolute shield against liability[.]” Ms. Rovin has squarely placed before us

the issues of whether there was probable cause for her arrest and the validity of the warrant.

There is no reason for this Court to limit its consideration of this case simply to whether

Heien applies.

20

Although Heien concerned a mistake of law in the context of reasonable suspicion

necessary for a lawful traffic stop, we observe that the Supreme Court relied heavily upon

its probable cause jurisprudence in holding that the Fourth Amendment tolerates

objectively reasonable mistakes of law. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 62–64

(2014) (discussing United States v. Riddle, 9 U.S. (Cranch) 311 (1809) and Michigan v.

DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979)).

We further observe that courts routinely conclude that the Supreme Court’s analysis

in Heien applies to probable cause determinations. See, e.g., Mahone v. Georgia, No. 20-

14752, 2022 WL 2388426, at *3 (11th Cir. July 1, 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 435

(2022) (determining that there was no Fourth Amendment violation in the context of a civil

suit filed against the state where an officer made a reasonable mistake of law by

erroneously believing that the plaintiff committed a home invasion under an interpretation

of a statute); United States v. Stevenson, 43 F.4th 641, 645 (6th Cir. 2022) (observing that

“officers may make certain reasonable mistakes [of law] and still have probable cause”);

United States v. Diaz, 854 F.3d 197, 203–05 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that an objectively

reasonable mistake of law supported probable cause); Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399, 408

(4th Cir. 2015) (stating that “officers may have probable cause to arrest based on reasonable

mistakes of law” (internal quotations omitted)); May v. Pritchett, No. 22-10147, 2022 WL

16753599, at *5 (11th Cir. Nov. 8, 2022) (stating that “probable cause or reasonable

suspicion can rest on objectively reasonable mistakes of fact or law” (footnote and citation

omitted)). We simply conclude here that we can consider Ms. Rovin’s claims within the

existing framework of the probable cause jurisprudence of this Court and the United States

Supreme Court. As such, we need not decide whether Heien applies to claims arising under

Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

21

Given that we have determined that Ms. Rovin’s claims for false arrest, false

imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, as well as her state constitutional claims arising

from the same conduct, may be resolved without considering whether to adopt Heien, we

abrogate the Appellate Court’s determination that Heien governs this analysis.

24

IV

Discussion

At the outset, we mention some key analytical principles that govern our

consideration of the issues presented in this case. First, although in certain contexts the

contours of state constitutional rights are not precisely the same as federal constitutional

rights, in the context of the allegations presented here, we have consistently construed the

state constitutional rights in pari materia with the comparable rights under the Federal

Constitution. 22

Second, the facts upon which Ms. Rovin relies to support her common law claims

and constitutional claims arising under Article 26 and Article 24 (as they pertain to false

arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution) are the same. In cases in which the

plaintiff alleges common law and constitutional claims arising from the same conduct—

here, an unlawful arrest and imprisonment—we consider the claims together. See State v.

22

See DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18 (2006) (analyzing civil common law claims for

malicious prosecution and state constitutional claims alleging violations of Articles 24, 26,

and 40 in pari materia with their federal constitutional analogues); see also King v. State,

434 Md. 472, 483 (2013) (stating that “[a]lthough we have asserted that Article 26 may have

a meaning independent of the Fourth Amendment,” to date, we have not held “that it provides

greater protection against state searches than its federal kin”); Padilla v. State, 180 Md. App.

210, 226 (2008) (observing that “the cases are legion in which Maryland courts have

construed Article 26 in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment”) (collecting cases); Irma

S. Raker, Fourth Amendment and Independent State Grounds, 77 Miss. L.J. 401, 403 (2007)

(“With respect to Article 26, Maryland has not resolved Fourth Amendment issues on

independent state grounds and continues to interpret Article 26 in pari materia with the

United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.”); Kirsch v. Prince

George’s County, 331 Md. 89 (1993) (construing the due process and equal protection rights

embodied in Article 24 in pari materia with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Jakanna

Woodworks, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 344 Md. 584 (1997) (explaining that the freedoms

protected by Article 40 are co-extensive with those protected by the First Amendment).

25

Dett, 391 Md. 81, 92 (2006) (analyzing the plaintiff’s Article 24 claim and the common

law false imprisonment claim together because there was no separate, independent

argument with respect to the constitutional provision); Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 202

(2000) (concluding that, for purposes of summary judgment, defendants did not have legal

authority to arrest the plaintiff, and on that basis alone, summary judgment was improperly

granted on the plaintiff’s Article 24 claims); see also Roshchin v. State, 219 Md. App. 169,

181 (2014), rev’d on other grounds, 446 Md. 128 (2016) (explaining that “because it is

clear” that the plaintiff’s Article 24 claim was “based on an alleged arrest without proper

justification,” the court applied “the same standard in assessing this claim as is applicable

to an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution” (citing

Dett, 391 Md. at 92)).

Third, as our case law makes clear, when considering whether a plaintiff has set

forth a common law claim for false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution,

the test as to whether probable cause and legal justification exist in a particular case is

judged by principles applicable to the law of arrest. Ashton, 339 Md. at 120; Great Atl. &

Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 655 (1970).

A. Common Law Elements

Although Ms. Rovin has alleged separate claims for false arrest and false

imprisonment, the elements “are identical.” Heron v. Strader, 361 Md. 258, 264 (2000).

They are: (1) a deprivation of the liberty of another; (2) without consent; and (3) without

legal justification. Id.; see also Ashton, 339 Md. at 119. Here, like the vast majority of false

26

arrest cases, our focus is on the last element—whether the deprivation was without legal

justification.

The necessary elements for a malicious prosecution claim are: (1) a criminal

proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff; (2) termination of

the proceeding in favor of the accused; (3) absence of probable cause for the proceeding; and

(4) “malice,” meaning that the primary purpose in instituting the proceeding was something

other than bringing an offender to justice. Heron, 361 Md. at 264.

Our focus here is on two elements—probable cause for purposes of the malicious

prosecution claim, and legal justification for purposes of the false arrest and false

imprisonment claims. In many contexts, the element of “legal justification” for establishing

false arrest and false imprisonment is different from the “probable cause” element for

malicious prosecution. See Ashton, 339 Md. at 119–121. 23 However, within the context of

23

We discussed the concept of “legal justification” in the context of false

imprisonment in Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70 (1995). That case involved warrantless

arrests of minors for violating a local curfew ordinance that this Court later held to be

facially unconstitutional. Id. at 90. After declaring the ordinance unconstitutional, we

discussed, among other things, the arresting officers’ liability for Maryland common law

and constitutional torts based on false imprisonment. Id. While examining liability in tort

for warrantless arrests, we discussed the distinction between arrests made pursuant to

warrants and warrantless arrests. Id. at 120. Specifically, we observed that “the test

whether legal justification exist[s] in a particular case has been judged by the principles

applicable to the law of arrest.” Id. (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md.

643, 655 (1970)). We discussed how we applied these principles in our case law and

pointed out that just as a law enforcement officer’s authority to arrest is different for each

type of arrest, so too is the liability for any civil action that may follow from the arrest. Id.

First, we observed that a police officer has legal justification—and is therefore not civilly

liable—where the officer makes an arrest pursuant to a warrant that “appears on its face to

be legal” “even if, unbeknownst to the arresting police officer, the warrant is in fact

improper.” Id. (citing Brewer v. Mele, 267 Md. 437, 440 (1972), Lewin v. Uzuber, 65 Md.

27

the claims presented by Ms. Rovin here—which are governed by the principles applicable

to the law of arrest involving an arrest warrant and based upon the objectively reasonable

standard governing the officer’s reliance on said warrant—the elements of legal justification

and probable cause overlap. Therefore, to prevail on the common law claims that have

been asserted in this case and on the state constitutional claims alleging the same conduct,

Ms. Rovin must establish a lack of probable cause. In other words, the presence of

probable cause defeats these claims as a matter of law.

B. Probable Cause Principles Generally

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable to the

states by the Fourteenth Amendment, protects against “unreasonable” searches and

seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment is not a “guarantee against all

searches and seizures, but only against unreasonable searches and seizures.” United States

v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) (emphasis in original). It is an oft-cited proposition

that the “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” Riley v.

California, 573 U.S. 373, 381–82 (2014) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,

403 (2006)). As we noted, Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides the

same protections as the Fourth Amendment.

341, 348 (1886), Campbell v. Webb, 11 Md. 471, 482 (1857)). Second, we noted that a

police officer also “has legal justification to make a warrantless arrest where he has

probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed, and that the arrestee

perpetrated the offense.” Id. “[W]ith respect to both of these types of arrest,” we stated

that “legal justification to arrest may depend, in part, upon the arresting officer’s good faith

and reasonable belief in his authority to arrest.” Id.

28

To satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and Article 26, probable

cause is required for both warrantless arrests and arrests pursuant to a warrant. 24 “Probable

cause” is a term of art in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and is defined as “a ‘practical,

nontechnical conception’ that deals with ‘the factual and practical considerations of

everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’” Stevenson

v. State, 455 Md. 709, 722 (2017) (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003));

see also Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384, 403 (1988) (explaining that probable cause is a

“non-technical conception of a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, requiring less evidence

for such belief than would justify conviction but more evidence than that which would

arouse a mere suspicion”). Thus, “‘the quanta of proof’ appropriate in ordinary judicial

proceedings are inapplicable to the decision to issue a warrant. Finely tuned standards such

as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal

trials, have no place in the magistrate’s decision.” Id. at 722 (quoting Pringle, 540 U.S. at

371) (cleaned up). Probable cause is “a fluid concept[,]” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,

232 (1983), “incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it

deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Pringle, 540

U.S. at 371. The standard represents “a necessary accommodation between the individual’s

right to liberty and the State’s duty to control crime.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112

(1975).

24

Although this case involves an arrest pursuant to a warrant, it is well established

that with probable cause to believe a person has committed a felony or is committing a

felony or misdemeanor in the presence of police, police may constitutionally arrest that

person without a warrant. See Pacheco v. State, 465 Md. 311, 322 (2019).

29

Probable cause to arrest under federal and state constitutional law is determined

based upon an objective standard. Davis v. DiPino, 121 Md. App. 28, 51 (1988) (citing

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979), Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 494 (1984)).

Under this objective standard, probable cause to arrest exists where “the facts and

circumstances within the officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonably

trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution

in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.”

Elliot v. State, 417 Md. 413, 431 (2010) (quoting Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 501

(2007)) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

When an arrest involves a warrant, the probable cause analysis (as well as the legal

justification analysis for purposes of false arrest and false imprisonment), requires the

application of different principles. We therefore turn to the manner in which probable

cause is determined in the context of an arrest pursuant to a warrant.

C. Arrest Warrants and the “Strong Presumption” of Probable Cause

A warrant must be issued “upon probable cause,” which must be supported by “Oath

or affirmation,” see U.S. Const. amend IV; Md. Decl. R. Art. 26, and issued by a “neutral

and detached magistrate[,]” see Johnston v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). See

Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(h) (6th ed. 2020) (stating that “[u]nder the

Fourth Amendment, a warrant may only issue upon probable cause, which in the case of

an arrest warrant means probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and

also probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested committed it”). Notably, “[i]t

30

is for the issuing magistrate rather than the complainant to determine whether this

probable cause exists[.]” Id. (emphasis added).

When considering whether a warrant may issue based upon probable cause, “[t]he

task of the issuing judge [or judicial officer] is to reach a practical and common-sense

decision, given all of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, as to whether there exists

a fair probability” that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be

arrested. Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 667 (2006) (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238–

39). In the suppression context, a reviewing court applies a highly deferential standard of

review. Id. at 668. Under that standard, the “duty of a reviewing court is to ensure that the

issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Id.

(cleaned up). In doing so, a reviewing court ordinarily confines its “consideration of

probable cause solely to the information provided in the warrant and its accompanying

application documents.” Id. at 669. The reviewing court does not consider “evidence that

seeks to supplement or controvert the truth of the grounds advanced in the affidavit.” Id.

This principle is known as the “four corners rule.” Id. One exception to this rule is where

“testimony or other proof is proffered by a defendant that the police officer who sought the

warrant provided deliberately false material evidence to support the warrant or held a

reckless disregard for the truth.” Id. (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171–72

(1978)).

The Supreme Court of the United States has explained the deference due to an

issuing judge’s probable cause determination:

31

Because a search warrant provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral

magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than

the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer engaged in the often

competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime, we have expressed a strong

preference for warrants and declared that in a doubtful or marginal case a

search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall.

Reasonable minds frequently may differ on the question whether a particular

affidavit establishes probable cause, and we have thus concluded that the

preference for warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according great

deference to a magistrate’s determination.

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913–14 (1984) (cleaned up). Accordingly, “[i]n the

ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s probable-cause

determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. Once

the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the police[ officer] can do in seeking to

comply with the law. Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own,

cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.” Id. at 921

(cleaned up).

As the Supreme Court has held, “[w]here the alleged Fourth Amendment violation

involves a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has

issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable

manner or,” as we have sometimes put it, “in ‘objective good faith.’” Messerschmidt v.

Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922–23). Nonetheless,

under Supreme Court precedent, “the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant

authorizing the allegedly unconstitutional search or seizure does not end the inquiry into

objective reasonableness.” Id. at 547. In other words, the warrant is not an absolute shield

32

against civil liability. That said, the threshold for determining whether one of the narrow

exceptions below applies is a “high one.” Id.

In the context of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, 25 the Supreme

Court has outlined four circumstances under which police will be unable to reasonably rely

on a warrant that is later determined to have been improperly issued:

(1) when the judicial officer issuing the warrant was misled by an affidavit

that “the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for

his reckless disregard of the truth;” (2) when the magistrate “wholly

abandoned his judicial role;” (3) when “a warrant [is] based on an affidavit

so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its

existence entirely unreasonable;” or (4) when the warrant is facially deficient

(e.g., failing to particularize the place to be searched).

Minor v. State, 334 Md. 707, 712 (1994) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923) (internal

quotations omitted) (alteration in original). 26

25

Maryland does not have an independent exclusionary rule for physical evidence.

Instead, we recognize and routinely apply the good-faith exception that was enunciated by

the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). See e.g.,

Richardson v. State, 481 Md. 423, 468–69 (2022); Whittington v. State, 474 Md. 1, 37 (2021);

Stevenson v. State, 455 Md. 709 (2017); Patterson v. State, 401 Md. 76 (2007); Greenstreet

v. State, 392 Md. 652 (2006); Agurs v. State, 415 Md. 62, 77–78 (2010); Minor v. State, 334

Md. 707 (1994).

26

In Leon, the Supreme Court “held that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply

to evidence obtained under a search warrant that has later been found to be deficient, so

long as the law enforcement officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the

warrant.” Minor, 334 Md. at 712 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 913). The “exclusionary rule

is designed to deter police misconduct, rather than to punish the errors of neutral

magistrates.” Id. at 713. The holding in Leon “is also based upon the ‘great deference’

that is afforded search warrants issued by neutral magistrates.” Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S.

at 914). “Consequently, when police officers have acted in good faith pursuant to a search

warrant that is later invalidated, excluding evidence would ‘only rarely’ serve the purposes

of the exclusionary rule.” Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 926).

33

While the Supreme Court has regularly discussed and considered the Leon

exceptions in the context of criminal suppression hearings, it has also applied them in other

contexts, including whether a police officer is able to rely upon the probable cause

determination that attached to a warrant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims in which the

supporting affidavit failed to establish probable cause. See Messerschmidt v. Millender,

565 U.S. 535 (2012); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986). For purposes of determining

whether probable cause and legal justification exist under our common law and

constitutional claims, we do the same here. 27

We first pause to clarify one point. The right of recovery for federal constitutional

violations by state officials arises from statute—42 U.S.C. § 1983—and involves the

consideration of government immunity. By contrast, “the redress for State [constitutional]

violations is through a common law action for damages.” 28 DiPino, 354 Md. at 50. As

27

The Dissent criticizes our discussion of Messerschmidt because it was not cited

by the parties. Dissent Op. at 8. To be sure, the parties’ focus was on Heien, which is

understandable given our discussion of Heien in Rovin I. That said, we determine that it is

prudent to rely upon settled precedent of the United States Supreme Court, which holds

that a strong presumption of probable cause attaches to a warrant in contexts similar to Ms.

Rovin’s common law and constitutional claims. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Heien

and Messerschmidt is rooted in objective reasonableness—the touchstone of the Fourth

Amendment—a principle upon which this Court regularly relies when considering

probable cause. There is no reason for us to withhold consideration of this precedent in

the context of this case.

28

We have previously recognized such a common law cause of action for damages

“where an individual is deprived of his liberty or property interests in violation of Articles

24 and 26[.]” Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Center, 300 Md. 520, 537–38 (1984). In

doing so, we emphasized that we did “not suggest that a violation of every state

constitutional right gives rise to a common law action for damages.” Id.; see also DiPino,

354 Md. at 50 n.7 (“We do not mean in any way to suggest that an action for damages lies

34

such, Ms. Rovin’s constitutional claims for damages for her false imprisonment, malicious

prosecution, and false imprisonment can be vindicated by a common law tort action. Under

the State Constitution, governmental officials do not have qualified immunity when a

violation is established. Although “[p]roof that [an] official acted in [an] objectively

reasonable” manner that would exempt the official from liability under Section 1983 is not

relevant to whether an official has immunity for state constitutional claims, it is relevant to

“whether the official committed a violation” in the first instance. Id. at 51. In other words,

if the plaintiff’s arrest and imprisonment were supported by probable cause and were

therefore objectively reasonable, there is no violation of the common law torts or of state

constitutional rights in the first instance. Stated another way, we apply the same principles

of “objective reasonableness” underlying the application of a Section 1983 qualified

immunity determination when considering whether a plaintiff’s arrest was objectively

reasonable, which would defeat the common law claims and constitutional claims arising

from the same conduct as a matter of law. Accordingly, we turn to the Supreme Court’s

articulation of these principles and its jurisprudence relating to civil cases alleging

violations of the Fourth Amendment involving warrants.

In Malley, the Supreme Court held that “the same standard of objective

reasonableness that [it] applied in the context of a suppression hearing in Leon . . . defines

the qualified immunity accorded an officer whose request for a warrant allegedly caused

an unconstitutional arrest.” 475 U.S. at 344 (footnote omitted). The Court explained that

for the violation of all provisions of the Constitution or Declaration of Rights; it may or

may not[.]” (emphasis omitted)).

35

the relevant question is whether a “reasonably well-trained officer” “would have known

that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for

the warrant.” Id. at 345 (footnote omitted).

In Messerschmidt, the Supreme Court expounded upon the principles expressed in

Malley in the context of a civil suit under Section 1983 filed by occupants of a residence

against deputy sheriffs and a county sheriff’s department, alleging that they were subjected

to an unreasonable search because the warrant authorizing the search of their home was

not supported by probable cause. 565 U.S. at 546. In that case, a deputy undertook an

investigation into a woman’s assault by her boyfriend, during which the woman advised

that the boyfriend had ties to a gang. Id. at 540–42. The deputy sought two warrants: one

for the boyfriend’s arrest and one to search his home. Id. at 541. The search warrant sought

to seize items related to gang activities and weapons. Id. Prior to submitting the warrant

applications to a neutral magistrate for approval, the deputy had them reviewed by his

supervisor as well as a deputy district attorney. Id. at 543.

The occupants filed suit against, among others, the sheriff’s department and the

deputy, alleging that the search warrant was unconstitutionally overbroad and seeking

damages. Id. at 544. After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the

validity of the search warrant, the district court found that the warrant was invalid because

it was overbroad in two respects: (1) it authorized a search for weapons in excess of the

specific weapon that was allegedly used in a crime; and (2) it sought evidence related to

gang-related materials, when there was no evidence that the crime was gang-related. Id.

The district court determined that the third Leon exception applied and rejected the officers’

36

claim that they were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. After the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity, the

Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the judgment. Id. at 556.

The Court considered the plaintiffs’ claim that the officers were not entitled to

qualified immunity because the warrant satisfied the third Leon exception—that the

warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render

official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable—which “allow[s] suit when ‘it is

obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should

issue.’” Id. at 547 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 341). The threshold for establishing “this

narrow exception” “is a high one” because, “[i]n the ordinary case, an officer cannot be

expected to question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination” because “[i]t is the

magistrate’s responsibility to determine whether the officer’s allegations establish probable

cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth

Amendment.” Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 921; Malley, 475 U.S. at 346 n.9 (“It is a

sound presumption that the magistrate is more qualified than the police officer to make a

probable cause determination, and it goes without saying that where a magistrate acts

mistakenly in issuing a warrant but within the range of professional competence of a

magistrate, the officer who requested the warrant cannot be held liable.” (internal

quotations and citation omitted))).

The Court disagreed that the plaintiffs had satisfied the high threshold to overcome

the presumption of probable cause that was established by the neutral magistrate’s warrant.

Id. at 548–49. The Court determined that it was not “entirely unreasonable” for an officer

37

to believe, “in the particular circumstances of [the] case,” that there was probable cause to

search for firearms beyond the particular weapon allegedly used in the crime and that

evidence regarding gang affiliation would be helpful for prosecuting the plaintiff in the

attack on his girlfriend. Id. at 548–50.

In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court observed that the appellate court

“gave no weight” to the fact that the officers had the warrant reviewed and approved by

their superiors, a deputy district attorney, and a neutral magistrate. Id. at 553–54. The

Court observed that “the officers thus ‘took every step that could reasonably be expected

of them.’” Id. at 554 (quoting Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989 (1984)). The

Court reasoned that, “[i]n light of the foregoing, it cannot be said that no officer of

reasonable competence would have requested the warrant,” and “[i]ndeed, a contrary

conclusion would mean not only that [the officers] were plainly incompetent, but that their

supervisor, the deputy district attorney, and the Magistrate were as well.” Id. (internal

quotations and citations omitted).

The Court concluded by stating:

The question in this case is not whether the Magistrate erred in believing that

there was sufficient probable cause to support the scope of the warrant he

issued. It is instead whether the Magistrate so obviously erred that any

reasonable officer would have recognized the error. The occasions on which

this standard will be met may be rare, but so too are the circumstances in

which it will be appropriate to impose personal liability on a lay officer in

the face of judicial approval of his actions. Even if the warrant in this case

were invalid, it was not so obviously lacking in probable cause that officers

can be considered “plainly incompetent” for concluding otherwise.

Id. at 556 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 341).

38

D. A Summary of the Probable Cause Framework that Applies to Common

Law Claims Alleging False Arrest, False Imprisonment, and Malicious

Prosecution Arising from a Warrant

We summarize the principles that apply to a common law tort claim seeking redress

for false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution arising from an officer’s

arrest pursuant to a warrant. When an arrest is pursuant to a warrant, probable cause is

predetermined by a judicial officer. The issuance of a warrant by a neutral issuing judge or

judicial officer creates a strong presumption that it was objectively reasonable for officers

to believe that there was probable cause, and a plaintiff who argues that a warrant was

issued on a lack of probable cause faces a heavy burden. See Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at

546; see also Horton v. Portsmouth Police Dep’t, 22 A.3d 1115, 1124 (R.I. 2011) (Rhode

Island Supreme Court applying these principles in the context of common law claims for

malicious prosecution and probable cause to arrest).

Of course, the warrant is not an absolute shield, and civil liability will arise in

circumstances in which “it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have

concluded that a warrant should issue.” Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 547 (quoting Malley,

475 U.S. at 341). In order to overcome the presumption of objective reasonableness that

attaches to a warrant, the plaintiff must demonstrate that one or more of the Leon exceptions

apply, namely that: (1) the judicial officer issuing the warrant was misled by an affidavit

that the “affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless

disregard of the truth”; (2) the judicial officer “wholly abandoned his” or her “judicial

role”; (3) the “warrant [was] based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause

as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”; or (4) the warrant is so

39

facially deficient that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. Leon,

468 U.S. at 923; see also Malley, 475 U.S. at 344–45; Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 547–48.

The application of these principles is based upon the “sound presumption that” the judicial

officer “is more qualified than the police officer to make a probable cause determination,

and it goes without saying that where a [judicial officer] acts mistakenly in issuing a

warrant but within the range of professional competence of [a judicial officer], the officer

who requested the warrant cannot be held liable.” Malley, 475 U.S. at 346 n.9 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

E. Another Probable Cause Presumption—Arising from the Prosecutor’s

Legal Advice

In addition to the strong presumption of probable cause that attaches to a warrant,

we also point out a separate basis from which an officer can reasonably believe that a

warrant is supported by probable cause. That is, when an officer obtains and follows legal

advice from a prosecutor when applying for a statement of charges after presenting a full

and fair disclosure of everything that was presented to the officer, there is “further support

for the conclusion that an officer could reasonably have believed that the scope of the

warrant was supported by probable cause.” 29 Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 553.

29

The Dissent mischaracterizes the separate basis for probable cause that arises from

an officer obtaining and relying upon a prosecutor’s legal advice as being “akin to a grant

of absolute immunity[.]” Dissent Op. at 11 n.6. We disagree. An officer who obtains and

relies upon legal advice simply has a separate basis upon which the officer can reasonably

believe that a warrant is supported by probable cause.

Indeed, our adoption of the probable cause principles outlined in Messerschmidt in

the context of law enforcement’s reliance on the prosecutor’s advice offers less protection

40

With these principles in mind, we turn to Ms. Rovin’s allegations.

F. Ms. Rovin’s Claims as Alleged in Her Amended Complaint

As we already noted, Ms. Rovin asserts that the State is liable under the common

law torts of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and attendant

constitutional claims, for the deputy’s conduct in obtaining a warrant resulting in her arrest

for violating the juror intimidation statute because under her interpretation of the juror

intimidation statute—which was accepted by the trial judge—her conduct did not violate

the statute as a matter of law. Although she acknowledges in her complaint that the deputy

consulted with the State’s Attorney’s Office prior to filing the charge, and that the warrant

was issued by a District Court Commissioner, she nonetheless asserts that there was no

legal justification or probable cause to arrest her because her actions did not amount to a

crime “as a matter of law.” She further asserts that “based on the facts contained in the

than the Restatement (Second) of Torts in the malicious prosecution context, which

provides:

The advice of an attorney at law admitted to practice and practicing in the

state in which the proceedings are brought, whom the client has no reason to

believe to have a personal interest in obtaining a conviction, is conclusive of

the existence of probable cause for initiating criminal proceedings in reliance

upon the advice if it is:

(a) sought in good faith, and

(b) given after a full disclosure of the facts within the accuser’s knowledge

and information.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 666(1) (Effect of Advice of Counsel) (1977) (emphasis

added); see also Rovin I, 472 Md. at 368 n.15; Gladding Chevrolet, Inc. v. Fowler, 264

Md. 499, 509 (1972); Kennedy v. Crouch, 191 Md. 580, 587 (1948).

41

warrant affidavit and alleged against her[,]” it was “objectively unreasonable to believe

that” she had committed a crime. Additionally, Ms. Rovin asserts that the warrant was

“facially invalid.” We address these contentions below.

First, the issuance of the warrant by the neutral District Court Commissioner

“creates a presumption that it was objectively reasonable for the officer[] to believe that

there was probable cause, and a plaintiff who argues that a warrant was issued on less than

probable cause faces a heavy burden.” Horton, 22 A.3d at 1124; see Messerschmidt, 565

U.S. at 553.

Second, the deputy sought and relied upon the advice of the State’s Attorney’s

Office in making the application for statement of charges. Such action “provides further

support for the conclusion that an officer could reasonably have believed that the scope of

the warrant was supported by probable cause.” Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 553. “In light

of the foregoing, it cannot be said that no officer of reasonable competence would have

requested the warrant[,]” and “[i]ndeed, a contrary conclusion would mean not only that”

Deputy Cook was “plainly incompetent, but that” the State’s Attorney’s Office and the

District Court Commissioner “were as well.” Id. at 554. In this case, Deputy Cook took

“every step that could reasonably be expected of” him. Id. Stated another way, it “was not

the role of the deputy sheriff to foresee the future and overrule the legal judgments of the

State’s Attorney who authorized the prosecution and arrest and the judicial officer who

42

ordered the arrest by issuing the warrant.” Rovin I, 472 Md. at 375–76 (McDonald, J.,

concurring). 30

Ms. Rovin points out that a warrant “is not an absolute shield” to civil liability and

that she can overcome the strong presumption of probable cause attendant to a validly

executed search warrant in this case. She recites several of the Leon factors in her

complaint. As an initial matter, we note that she has not alleged the first one. Specifically,

as we observed in Rovin I, “Ms. Rovin has not alleged that [Deputy Cook] made material

omissions or misstatements of fact in the arrest warrant application[.]” 472 Md. at 366.

Although she disagrees with the foreperson’s account of the events, she does not allege

that Deputy Cook falsely recounted those events in the application for charges as they were

reported to him by the foreperson, and for good reason. Comparing the Deputy’s recitation

of the facts in the application for statement of charges with the foreperson’s testimony

under oath that he provided at the peace order hearing on the same day, they are consistent,

if not identical. In other words, the undisputed evidence is that Deputy Cook recounted

the facts in the application for statement of charges as the foreperson had recounted them

to him.

However, Ms. Rovin asserts that the warrant in this case fits within several other

Leon exceptions—namely, that the warrant was based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia

30

In the parties’ first trip to our Court, we held that the State is not liable in tort for

the prosecutor’s conduct in advising the deputy to file an application for charges based

upon the prosecutor’s advice. Rovin I, 472 Md. at 355–56. It would be incongruous to

hold the State civilly liable for the deputy’s conduct in relying upon the prosecutor’s advice

to file an application for charges.

43

of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable” and that

the warrant was “facially deficient.” She also argues that the District Court Commissioner

“wholly abandoned his judicial role by rubber stamping a warrant application obviously

lacking in probable cause.”

Where there is no genuine dispute as to the material facts, the question whether

those facts do or do not amount to probable cause is one of law for the court. Palmer Ford,

Inc. v. Wood, 298 Md. 484, 509–11 (1984) (explaining that where the material facts on

which the defendants relied in initiating prosecution were not in dispute, whether those

facts established probable cause was a question of law for the court). To determine whether

Ms. Rovin has satisfied the “high burden” of overcoming the strong presumption of

probable cause that attached to the warrant, we turn to the application for statement of

charges that was presented to the District Court Commissioner, which asserted the

following under oath:

• The victim of the crime had been the foreperson serving on a jury in which Ms.

Rovin’s daughter was convicted of a crime. The presiding judge sentenced Ms.

Rovin’s daughter to jail time.

• Apparently during the trial, Ms. Rovin became disorderly and had to be escorted out

of the court room.

• After the trial concluded, Ms. Rovin called the foreperson’s workplace and became

verbally aggressive with the receptionist.

• At approximately 5:30 p.m. on the same day, Ms. Rovin visited the foreperson’s

workplace.

• Ms. Rovin became verbally assaultive with the foreperson, and the foreperson

escorted Ms. Rovin to his office so patrons would not see the commotion.

44

• Ms. Rovin complained to the foreperson that he “sent her daughter to jail.” Due to

her “erratic and aggressive behavior,” the foreperson told Ms. Rovin that she had to

leave and began escorting her out of the building. According to the foreperson, Ms.

Rovin “would get close to him, invading his personal space and to the point where

he felt very uncomfortable and threatened.”

• Prior to leaving, Ms. Rovin “threatened” the foreperson by telling him that “Bill

Rovin” would “take care of him.” The foreperson had no idea who Bill Rovin was.

When the foreperson denied having any knowledge of this individual, Ms. Rovin

claimed that Bill Rovin “worked in Nicaragua” and has people that will “take care

of him.” The foreperson felt this statement “was an indirect death threat.”

• The Deputy attempted to contact Ms. Rovin at the number from which she initially

called in order to warn her not to continue her tactics and to verbally ban her from

the foreperson’s place of work. Ms. Rovin did not answer. The deputy left a

message. As of the time of the application of charges, Ms. Rovin had not returned

the call.

• The Deputy contacted members of the State’s Attorney’s Office by email as well as

through telephone communications. The Deputy spoke with an investigator with

the State’s Attorney’s Office who had been in communication with the State’s

Attorney as well as the Assistant State’s Attorney (who had handled Ms. Rovin’s

daughter’s trial). That Office “believed that this was a case of” “jury intimidation

and should be charged accordingly.”

• At the time when Ms. Rovin “threatened and intimidated” the foreperson, he was

still a member of the Wicomico County jury pool. He was assigned as a juror for

the circuit court for the month of June 2015. As a result of this incident, he was

discharged from further duty for the month.

The application for statement of charges is based upon the State’s Attorney’s

Office’s interpretation of the juror intimidation statute. Under this interpretation, the

foreperson was a juror for the month of June. He had to be excused from jury service after

Ms. Rovin went to his place of business and “threatened and intimidated him.” We observe

that the State’s Attorney’s Office did not waver from this interpretation—from the advice

45

initially given to Deputy Cook when he applied for the statement of charges through and

up until the Assistant State’s Attorney’s arguments to the judge at Ms. Rovin’s trial.

Ms. Rovin asserts that the above application for statement of charges did not set

forth a crime as a “matter of law” because the foreperson “was not a member of the jury at

the time of her visit[]” to the foreperson’s workplace. Under Ms. Rovin’s interpretation of

the statute, because the foreperson was no longer a member of the jury who convicted her

daughter, she could not have interfered with his “official duties” by influencing a jury

verdict or an ongoing trial.

At bottom, all of Ms. Rovin’s assertions flow from one premise, namely that the

State’s Attorney’s Office’s legal interpretation of the juror intimidation statute—which is

described above in the application for statement of charges submitted under oath by Deputy

Cook and upon which Ms. Rovin was subsequently arrested and tried—was so obviously

incorrect that “no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant

should issue.” Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 547.

We disagree. We determine that the State’s Attorney’s Office’s interpretation of

the juror intimidation statute—which formed the basis of the statement of charges, and

upon which Ms. Rovin was arrested—was an objectively reasonable, if not the correct,

interpretation. We explain our reasoning as follows.

46

G. The Interpretation of the Juror Intimidation Statute Set Forth in the

Application for Statement of Charges, Which Was Consistent with the

State’s Attorney’s Argument at Trial, Was Objectively Reasonable

Under CR § 9-305(a), “[a] person may not, by threat, force, or corrupt means, try to

influence, intimidate, or impede a juror, a witness, or an officer of a court of the State or

of the United States in the performance of the person’s official duties.”

This Court has never interpreted the juror intimidation statute with respect to the

meaning of the word “juror” or the scope of the juror’s “official duties.” Moreover,

although this Court has interpreted the meaning of the statute, as well as prior versions of

it, within the context of witness intimidation and obstruction of justice, see, e.g., State v.

Wilson, 471 Md. 136 (2020), State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129 (1996), Romans v. State, 178

Md. 588 (1940), we have not had an occasion to interpret its scope and meaning within the

context of juror intimidation.

In undertaking this analysis, we turn to our traditional canons of statutory

interpretation to examine the statute in question. Our ultimate objective “is to extract and

effectuate the actual intent of the Legislature in enacting the statute.” Goshen Run

Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Cisneros, 467 Md. 74, 107 (2020) (quotations omitted). “This

process begins with an examination of the plain language of the statute.” Id. at 107–08. “If

the language of the statute is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent

purpose, our inquiry as to legislative intent” ordinarily ends “and we apply the statute as

written without resort to other rules of construction.” Hoang v. Lowery, 469 Md. 95, 119

(2020) (quotations omitted). We do not, however, analyze statutory language in a vacuum.

Id. Rather, we view the statutory language “in the context of the statutory scheme to which

47

it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute.”

Id. (quotations omitted). “Where the language of the statute is ambiguous and may be subject

to more than one interpretation,” “we look to the statute’s legislative history, case law,

purpose, structure, and overarching statutory scheme in aid of searching for the intention of

the Legislature.” Koste v. Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 26 (2013) (citations omitted).

1. The Juror Intimidation Statute

The juror intimidation statute was first enacted in 1853. 31 From its initial enactment

until 2002, the language of the statute changed very little, and prohibited not only juror and

witness intimidation, but also various forms of obstruction of justice. Compare Acts of

1853, ch. 450 § 2, with Md. Code, Art. 27, § 26 (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.). 32

31

The following statute was enacted by Chapter 450, § 2 of the Acts of 1853:

That if any person or persons shall corruptly, or by threats or force, endeavor

to influence, intimidate or impede any juror, witness or officer in any court

of this State, in the discharge of his duty, or shall corruptly, or by threats or

force, obstruct or impede, or endeavor to obstruct or impede the due

administration of justice therein, every person or persons so offending shall

be liable to be prosecuted therefor by indictment, and shall on conviction

thereof be punished by fine, not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by

imprisonment not exceeding three months, or both, according to the nature

and aggravation of the offence.

32

Prior to its recodification in 2002, the statute stated:

If any person by corrupt means or by threats or force endeavors to influence,

intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, or court officer of any court of this

State in the discharge of his duty, or by corrupt means or by threats or force

obstructs, impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede the due administration

of justice therein, he is liable to be prosecuted[.]

Art. 27, § 26 (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.).

48

In 2002, as part of the code recodification process, the General Assembly recodified

former Article 27 into a newly created Criminal Law Article. 33 The General Assembly

separated the witness and juror intimidation provisions from the obstruction of justice

provisions, creating two separate statutory offenses. 34 The former provisions of Article 27

that addressed witness and juror intimidation were codified as CR § 9-305(a). The

Revisor’s Note for CR (2002) § 9-305 stated, in pertinent part, that “[t]his section is new

language derived without substantive change from former Art. 27, § 26, as it referred to

intimidating or corrupting a juror.”

The statute has two prongs relevant to our analysis. First, a violation must involve

an attempt to “influence, intimidate, or impede” a juror “in the performance of the [juror’s]

official duties.” Second, the attempt must be by “threat, force, or corrupt means[.]”

Ms. Rovin asserts that the prosecutor’s interpretation of the juror intimidation

statute was incorrect—and therefore unreasonable—because the foreperson was no longer

a “juror” within the meaning of the statute once the jury rendered the verdict. She also

contends that her interaction with the foreperson could not have constituted an attempt to

influence, intimidate, or impede the “performance of [his] official duties,” because those

duties ended once the jury returned its verdict in her daughter’s trial.

33

See 2002 Md. Laws 197 (Vol. I, Ch. 26, H.B. 11).

34

The provisions of former Article 27, § 26 that addressed obstruction of justice

were recodified in CR § 9-306(a), which states that “[a] person may not, by threat, force,

or corrupt means, obstruct, impede, or try to obstruct or impede the administration of justice

in a court of the State.” The Revisor’s Note for CR (2002) § 9-306 stated, in pertinent part,

that “[t]his section is new language derived without substantive change from former Art.

27 § 26, as it related to obstructing justice.”

49

At Ms. Rovin’s trial, the prosecutor disagreed with Ms. Rovin’s narrow

interpretation of the statute. The State’s Attorney’s Office’s interpretation, as outlined in

the application for charges, and as argued to the trial judge, was that the foreperson was a

“juror” for the duration of his term on the jury panel, and that his “official duties” extended

for the period of his jury summons. Under that interpretation, the attempt to threaten or

intimidate a juror is not limited to a particular trial but extends to the juror’s official duties

for the duration of the juror’s summons.

Examining the plain language of the statute, it does not define “juror,” nor does it

specify a juror’s “official duties.” One interpretation—the one advanced by Ms. Rovin—

is that “juror” means a member of a sworn jury seated on a particular trial and that a juror’s

duties conclude upon the entry of a verdict. Another interpretation—the one asserted by

the State’s Attorney’s Office—is that “juror” means an individual summoned for jury

service, and that a juror’s “official duties” are coextensive with the period of the juror’s

summons. Under these competing interpretations, the scope of a juror’s “official duties”

is dependent upon whether the term “juror” means a sworn juror, or a member of the jury

pool or panel that is subject to the summons for a particular duration.

Common usage of the term “juror” supports both interpretations. Black’s Law

Dictionary defines “juror” both narrowly—“[a] member of a jury”—and broadly—“a

person serving on a jury panel.” Juror, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The term

“panel” similarly includes both an expansive and a narrow definition. “Panel” is defined

as both “[a] list of persons summoned as potential jurors;” with a cross-reference to the

term “venire,” and as “[a] group of persons selected to serve on a jury[.]” Panel, Black’s

50

Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The term “jury panel” simply cross-references the term

“venire.” Jury Panel, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). “Venire” is defined as “[a]

panel of persons selected for jury duty and from among whom the jurors are to be chosen.”

Venire, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Indeed, this Court sometimes refers to

members of a jury venire simply as “jurors.” See, e.g., Wright v. State, 411 Md. 503, 512–

14 (2009). Because the term “juror” is susceptible to more than one reasonable

interpretation, we determine that it is ambiguous. In an effort to ascertain the Legislature’s

intent, we turn to the overarching statutory scheme for jury selection and service in

Maryland.

2. Jury Selection in Maryland—The Overarching Statutory Scheme

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the

Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantee a defendant charged with qualifying crimes the

right to a fair and impartial jury—a right that is sometimes traced to the Magna Carta.

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151–52 (1968). A civil litigant’s right to a jury trial

is guaranteed by Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Legislature has

implemented these constitutional directives through statutory provisions governing the

way juries are to be selected.

a. The Current Jury Selection Statute

In 1969, Maryland adopted a uniform and comprehensive statute governing jury

selection. 35 These statutory provisions are currently set forth in Title 8 of the Courts and

35

See 1969 Md. Laws, ch. 408.

51

Judicial Proceedings Article (sometimes hereinafter referred to as the “jury selection

statute”). Md. Code Ann., Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”) § 8-101, et seq.

(1984, 2021 Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp.). The jury selection statute states that every adult

citizen in the State has not only an “opportunity for jury service,” but a corresponding “duty

to serve” when summoned for service. Id. § 8-102. The limited grounds of disqualification

from jury service are set forth in CJ § 8-103.

Each circuit court is required to have “a written plan for jury selection and service

in accordance with the requirements of [the] title.” Id. § 8-201. The statute establishes

certain required provisions that each jury plan must include, such as intervals for the

creation of a prospective jury pool and a qualified jury pool, see CJ § 8-207, a method by

which summonses for jury service are to be served, see id. § 8-208, juror qualification

forms, see id. § 8-212, provisions for the disqualification, excusal, exemption, or

rescheduling of jury service by a prospective or qualified juror for specified reasons

permitted under the statute, see id. § 8-215, and frequency of service, see id. § 8-216. “A

person who is summoned for jury service” “may not fail to complete jury service as

directed.” Id. § 8-505(a). An individual who fails to comply with a jury summons and

fails to show good cause is subject to a fine not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not

exceeding 90 days, or both. Id. § 8-505(c).

52

The jury selection statute does not define “juror” but does include definitions of

“[p]rospective juror” 36 and “[q]ualified juror,” 37 and uses terms such as “sworn juror” and

“grand juror.” Although the current jury selection statute does not use the word “juror” in

isolation without an adjective that provides additional parameters, we observe that, in at

least one instance, the Legislature uses the term “jury” to broadly refer to the jury panel or

venire. Specifically, CJ § 8-104 states that “[e]ach jury for a county shall be selected at

random from a fair cross section of the adult citizens of this State who reside in the county.”

(Emphasis added). In this instance, the term “jury” is synonymous with the venire, i.e., the

prospective jurors from which a grand jury or particular trial jury are to be chosen. 38

In our review of the statutory history of the jury selection statute, we observe that

the adjectives that are used to describe jurors in their various stages of jury service—such

as “qualified” or “prospective” jurors—did not appear until 2006. 39 It is therefore useful

to examine the historical context of the General Assembly’s usage of the word “juror” and

36

A “[p]rospective juror” “means an individual whose name is selected from a

source pool but who has not yet been screened for disqualification, excusal, or exemption.”

CJ § 8-101(d).

37

A “[q]ualified juror” “means an individual who, after selection as a prospective

juror, is not disqualified, excused, or exempted.” CJ § 8-101(e); see also id. § 8-309.

38

As we mentioned, this Court also occasionally uses the word “juror” to refer to

members of a jury venire. See Wright v. State, 411 Md. 503, 512, 514 (2009); cf. Kidder

v. State, 475 Md. 113, 124 n.1 (2021) (explaining that “[t]erms such as ‘jury pool,’ ‘jury

panel,’ ‘venire,’ ‘prospective juror,’ and ‘qualified juror’ are sometimes used

interchangeably in certain contexts to mean the same group or individuals and are

sometimes used in other contexts to mean different subsets of groups or individuals”).

39

See 2006 Md. Laws, ch. 372.

53

consider the context of a juror’s “duties” as those terms were used prior to the introduction

of the current terminology.

b. Jury Selection in Maryland – Some Statutory History

Prior to the mid-1960s, Maryland, like most court systems, used a “keyman” system

in selecting jurors. 40 Under this system, the clerk of the court and the county jury

commissioner were responsible for selecting potential jurors. Although there were

variations in the jury selection statutes (for example, changes that permitted women to

serve on juries), the overall process remained unchanged for over a century. Compare Acts

of 1867, ch. 329, with Md. Code Ann., Art. 51 (1957, 1968 Repl. Vol.). Given that this

case arose in Wicomico County, we will focus our discussion and analysis on the statutory

provisions governing jury selection in that county as set forth in Article 51 of the Maryland

Code prior to its repeal in 1973. 41

In the first judicial circuit, the clerk of the county commissioners, or the county

council (as the case may be), furnished a list of “taxable inhabitants or residents” of the

county to the judges of the circuit. Article 51, § 6. From this list, prior to the beginning of

40

For a more detailed discussion of the “keyman system,” see Richard Seltzer, John

M. Copacino, & Diana Roberto Donahoe, Fair Cross-Section Challenges in Maryland: An

Analysis and Proposal, 25 U. Balt. L. Rev. 127 (1996). Baltimore City’s keyman system

in the 1920s is described by Clarence N. Callendar, The Selection of Jurors: A Comparative

Study of the Methods of Selection and the Personnel of Juries in Philadelphia and Other

Cities, at 71–72 (1924) (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pennsylvania). See also United States

v. Cohen, 275 F. Supp. 724, 729–30 (D. Md. 1967) (Judge Frank A. Kauffman describing

the federal keyman system).

41

As part of the State’s code revision process, Article 51 was repealed in 1973 and

recodified as Title 8 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. See 1973 Md. Laws,

ch. 2, § 2.

54

each court term, the judges of each circuit selected a jury panel for the court’s term. 42 The

statute provided for the selection of jurors by a ballot system. Id. § 10A(a). 43 The names

from the list were printed on individual ballots and placed into a jury box. Id. A clerk or

deputy would then withdraw ballots “as the judges shall determine appropriate until the

number of jurors deemed necessary by the judges, for the ensuing term of court, has been

drawn[.]” Id. (emphasis added). The individuals identified by ballot were recorded by the

clerk in the order drawn, and thereafter, the judges ordered “a venire facias directed to the

sheriff,” “commanding him to summon as jurors to attend at the next ensuing term of said

court, the several persons whose names shall be drawn as aforesaid[.]” Id. (emphasis

added).

Of the “jurors drawn and summoned,” the court would then appoint a grand jury

and its foreperson, and the “remaining names . . . constitute[d] the petit jury or juries for

said term of the court[.]” Id. § 12A. Over the term, the court had the discretion to “excuse

any one or more of those selected as petit jurors” and to rebuild the panel by drawing names

42

The names selected for the panel were to be “fairly and impartially selected,”

“with special reference to the intelligence, sobriety and integrity of such person and without

the least reference to political opinion[.]” Art. 51, § 10.

43

The statute gave the courts in the first judicial circuit the option of utilizing either

the “ballot system” or the “marble or ball system” “as may be most convenient and

satisfactory to the judge or judges drawing a jury.” Art. 51, § 10A(b). Under the marble

or ball system, each name on the list was assigned a number that corresponded to a number

on a marble or ball that was placed in a jury box. Id. The marble and ballot system were

the same insofar as the clerk or designated individual would withdraw either a ballot or a

marble out of the jury box, and the names withdrawn from the box would constitute the

jury panel or venire for that particular court term. Because the process was the same under

either system, for ease of discussion, we shall focus on the ballot system.

55

from the jury box. Id. § 15. Additionally, if any “panel or petit jurors” served “for a

reasonable period of time,” the judge had the authority to “excuse said panel from further

service and draw from the jury box” another “panel which shall serve until excused by the

court, or until the beginning of the next jury term.” Id.

When the “jurors for any term of the court” had “been drawn” and the business of

the term had proceeded such that their daily services or attendance were no longer

necessary, the statute provided that “said juries shall not be finally discharged” but instead,

they were “excused from further service” until they were needed again. Id. § 28 (emphasis

added). The court had “the power and authority to recall the grand or petit jurors” “at any

time” in the judge’s discretion “within [the] jury term, and until the beginning of the next

succeeding jury term” of the court. 44 Id. Furthermore, the court had the “full power and

44

Article 51, § 28 provided in pertinent part:

Whenever the jurors for any term of court in the counties of this State have

been drawn . . . and the business of said term has so far proceeded that the

daily services and attendance of either the grand jury or the petit jury, or both

. . . shall no longer be no longer necessary, said juries shall not be finally

discharged, but shall be excused from further service for the time being until

said jury or juries are reconvened for intermediate sessions . . . for the balance

of said jury term[.] . . . The court, or a judge thereof, shall have the power

and authority to recall the grand or petit jurors, or both, in special session at

any time in his discretion within said jury term, and until the beginning of the

next succeeding jury term of said court, for indictments or trials, or both, as

the case may be.

* * *

In the event the work in any county awaiting the grand or petit juries, or both,

is sufficient to justify assembling both or either in the judgment of the court,

the court shall so inform the clerk of the circuit court for said county and said

56

authority to coerce the attendance of jurors drawn and summoned” and to punish jurors

“by fine or imprisonment or both,” as well as to find them in contempt for disregarding the

summons. Id. § 16.

As the above discussion reflects, in prior versions of the jury selection statute, the

Legislature used the term “juror” to refer to individuals whose names were drawn from the

jury box and selected for jury service for the court’s term. Moreover, the juror’s “duties”

were not limited to simply sitting on a particular trial. Instead, they were not “discharged”

from performing their duties until the conclusion of the term. They could be recalled “at

any time” and were subject to the court’s summons until the conclusion of the term. Given

the broad use of the term “juror” and the general description of the juror’s duties as being

co-extensive with the court’s term, we conclude that a reasonable interpretation of the juror

intimidation statute is that it was intended to apply to members of the jury panel for the

particular court term, and to cover all of the juror’s duties—and was not limited to service

on a particular trial.

3. This Court’s Case Law Discussing Witness Intimidation and

Obstruction of Justice Does Not Compel a Narrow Interpretation of

the Juror Intimidation Statute

As noted above, this Court has not had an occasion to interpret the meaning of

“juror” and a juror’s “official duties” within the context of the juror intimidation statute.

Ms. Rovin asserts that, to the extent the statute is ambiguous, this Court’s decisions in

clerk shall notify said jurors by mail at least five days before the day upon

which their attendance shall be needed in intermediate session.

(Emphasis added).

57

Romans v. State, 178 Md. 588 (1940) and State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129 (1996) support

her narrow interpretation. For the following reasons, we disagree.

As discussed above, prior to the General Assembly’s 2002 code recodification of

Article 27, the former version of the statute contained two prongs. The first prong involved

witness and juror intimidation. The second prong embraced various forms of obstruction

of justice. In Romans and Pagano, we discussed the scope of the “obstruction of justice”

prong.

In Romans, the defendants were charged with obstruction of justice and witness

intimidation for allegedly attempting to get a witness to leave Baltimore City during the

trial in which the witness was to testify. 178 Md. at 591–93. We held that the conduct

violated both prongs of the statute. We stated:

The statute is in aid and definition of a class of those criminal acts which are

known to the common law as obstructions of justice. The words of the statute

are general and embrace in comprehensive terms various forms of

obstruction. Thus[,] the particular acts are not specified but, whatever they

may be, if the acts be corrupt, or be threats or force, used in an attempt to

influence, intimidate, or impede any juror, witness or officer in any court of

the State in the discharge of his duty, there is an obstruction of justice.

Id. at 592 (emphasis added).

In Pagano, we were asked to determine “whether lying to a police officer during an

investigation and before the initiation of judicial proceedings and instructing others to do

the same constitutes an obstruction of justice” under the second prong of Article 27, § 26.

341 Md. at 131. We determined that it did not because the conduct occurred prior to the

initiation of any judicial proceeding. Id. at 135. The State argued that the second prong of

the statute—i.e., conduct affecting the “administration of justice”—should be construed

58

broadly to include police investigations before the initiation of any judicial proceeding. Id.

at 135–36. We examined the legislative history and concluded that “the [L]egislature

originally intended the terms ‘administration of justice’ in § 26 to require a nexus to the

court system and did not intend for those terms to refer generally to the legal system.” Id.

at 135. We observed that in other cases, we determined that, “[i]rrespective of the identity

of the immediate victim, the ultimate victim is inevitably the court.” Id. at 137 (quoting

Pennington v. State, 308 Md. 727, 735 (1987)). In conclusion, we held “that the term

‘therein’ in the second prong of § 26 refer[red] to ‘any court of this State’” and therefore

the statute prohibited “only actions aimed at obstructing or impeding a judicial

proceeding.” Id. at 139.

Ms. Rovin argues that these cases support a narrow interpretation of the juror

intimidation statute. In support thereof, she seizes on the term “in any court of this State”

in Romans, 178 Md. at 591, and the language in Pagano requiring that acts constituting

witness intimidation be associated with a “pending judicial proceeding[,]” Pagano, 341

Md. at 135. We disagree that these cases support Ms. Rovin’s narrow interpretation.

First, Pagano and Romans involved attempting to obstruct a witness in connection

with a witness’s “official duties”—not conduct against a juror in connection with the

juror’s “official duties.” A witness’s official duties in connection with giving testimony in

a particular judicial proceeding are different from a juror’s official duties in connection

59

with a jury summons requiring attendance during the period of the summons. 45 Second,

the broad interpretation of “juror” that was advanced by the prosecutors at Ms. Rovin’s

trial was consistent with the language in these cases. Unlike the conduct in Pagano, the

conduct for which Ms. Rovin was charged had a “nexus to the courts.” 341 Md. at 135.

Indeed, where a victim is no longer able to remain an active member of the jury pool after

the incident, “the ultimate victim is inevitably the court.” Id. at 137 (quoting Pennington,

307 Md. at 735). The prosecutor’s interpretation of the juror intimidation statute—in which

“juror” means a member of the jury panel and the juror’s “official duties” are coextensive

with the juror’s duties for the period of the summons—is not an interpretation divorced

from the “court system” or the juror’s duties in connection with the court’s judicial

proceedings. Nothing in these cases supports the very narrow interpretation espoused here

by Ms. Rovin, particularly in light of the historically broad use of the term “juror” under

the jury selection statute.

Finally, we note that another case—Lee v. State, 65 Md. App. 587 (1985)—provides

some support for the broader statutory interpretation that the prosecutor relied upon at Ms.

45

Notably, the statute prohibits a person from trying to “influence, intimidate, or

impede” the “official duties” of three distinct categories of persons: a “juror,” a “witness,”

and an “officer of a court[.]” CR § 9-305(a). Each class of individuals has distinct and

independent duties in connection with the court system, and some may be broader than

others. A witness’s official duties may be limited to a particular trial or testimony before

a grand jury; a member of a jury panel’s official duties (such as the duty to appear in court

for the duration of the summons when called for service) can extend throughout the period

that the juror is subject to the court’s summons; and an “officer of [the] court[’s]” official

duties may be even broader still, depending upon the type of officer and the extent of their

duties. In other words, the scope of the duties is contextual to the individual who is the

subject of the prohibited conduct.

60

Rovin’s criminal trial. In that case, the defendant was convicted of obstruction of justice

after he intimidated a witness. The witness had been the victim of an assault by the

defendant and was scheduled to testify against the defendant in the criminal proceeding.

As the witness was leaving court after appearing pursuant to a summons, the defendant

confronted the witness, asked him why he had initiated charges against him and pointed a

gun at him. After the defendant was convicted of witness intimidation, on appeal, the

defendant argued that the State had not established that he was trying to “influence,

intimidate, or impede” the witness in the discharge of his duty, and “at most,” reflected a

continuation of a mutual disagreement that had led to the initial assault charge. Id. at 589.

The Appellate Court disagreed. Writing for the court, the Honorable Robert M. Bell

explained that, because “no direct or express evidence of” the defendant’s “intent to

influence, intimidate, or impede” the witness appeared on the record, the court would “look

to the circumstances surrounding the incident and the natural and inevitable consequences

of the action.” Id. at 592 (emphasis added). Considering the evidence through this lens,

the court observed that the witness had attended the hearing, and the defendant assaulted

the witness as he was returning home from the hearing only after the defendant inquired

about the case. Id. at 594. In other words, the conviction was upheld notwithstanding that

the intimidation occurred after the witness left the hearing.

4. Conclusions with Respect to the Prosecutor’s Statutory Interpretation

Based upon the overall statutory scheme related to jury selection in Maryland, we

determine that the prosecutor’s interpretation of the juror intimidation statute was an

objectively reasonable one. As noted above, the juror intimidation statute does not define

61

“juror” or specify a juror’s “official duties.” The statute has been in effect without

substantive change since 1853. The dictionary definition of the word “juror” includes both

a broad and a narrow definition, and therefore supports both interpretations. Turning to

the overall statutory scheme for selecting juries in Maryland, the current jury selection

statute does not use the word “juror” without adjectives such as “qualified,” “prospective,”

or “sworn.” However, in at least one instance, the Legislature uses the word “jury” to

expansively mean the jury venire. See CJ § 8-104.

Looking at prior versions of the jury selection statute, we observe that the

Legislature historically used the term “jurors” in a broad sense to refer to individuals whose

names had been drawn from the jury box to serve as “jurors for any term of the court[,]”

and the term was not used to refer to jurors who were serving in a particular trial. When

the jurors were not needed for daily services or attendance in court, their services were not

“finally discharged,” but they were excused until their services were needed again.

Construing the terms “juror” and the juror’s “official duties” as used in the juror

intimidation statute within the context of the jury selection statutes in Maryland in effect

during the same time period, we conclude that an objectively reasonable interpretation is

that “juror[,]” as used in the juror intimidation statute, means an individual serving on a

jury panel for the duration of the juror’s summons and that the “official duties” of the juror

extend beyond the juror’s participation on a particular trial. 46

46

Even if we concluded that a more reasonable interpretation of “juror” was that it

referred to a sworn jury and that the juror’s “official duties” concluded upon the jury’s

discharge in a particular trial, like our colleagues on the Appellate Court, we conclude that

62

In a robust argument at the conclusion of the State’s case, the prosecutor presented

his statutory interpretation to the trial judge. The prosecutor disagreed with Ms. Rovin’s

counsel’s “extremely narrow reading” of the juror intimidation statute, which limited a

juror’s “official duties” to “simply sitting on a single jury.” The prosecutor pointed out

that in Wicomico County, jurors are “under the [c]ourt’s subpoena for 30 days[,]” and that

a reasonable interpretation of these terms could include a time-period over which the court

had revisory power over the verdict. We agree with the Appellate Court that, after a

verdict, and during the time-period over which a court may exercise its revisory power, it

is possible that a juror might be required to testify. While it is a rare occurrence, it can

happen, nonetheless.

Under Maryland Rule 5-606, commonly referred to as the “no impeachment rule,”

after a verdict has been rendered and accepted and the jury discharged, jurors are prohibited

from giving certain testimony pertaining to jury deliberations and the influencing effect of

anything on the juror’s ability to deliberate and on a juror’s mental processes during

deliberations. This prohibition, however, typically does not extend to jurors’ conduct

during trial outside of deliberations. If, for example, the court or parties learned that a juror

engaged in misconduct or had improper contact during the trial, it could cast doubt on

whether the verdict was just and proper and require a hearing in which the juror gives

testimony. See, e.g., Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 301 (2003) (in a case involving

improper contacts between a detective and a juror during trial, in which both individuals

were required to testify after the verdict, we observed that “some . . . juror contacts with

third parties and/or misconduct can reach a level of being presumptively prejudicial to a

defendant, thus placing the burden of showing harmlessness on the State”); see also

Johnson v. State, 423 Md. 137, 149 (2011) (explaining that in certain circumstances, “the

juror misconduct is such that prejudice to the defendant must be presumed. In those

situations, a mistrial (or the post-trial remedy of a new trial) is the proper remedy unless

the State overcomes the presumption of prejudice”); cf. Barnes v. Joyner, 751 F.3d 229,

242 (4th Cir. 2014) (an evidentiary hearing is required “when the defendant presents a

credible allegation of communications or contact between a third party and a juror

concerning the matter pending before the jury”).

63

as a result of Ms. Rovin’s conduct, the foreperson was dismissed from his official duties

as a sworn juror on June 17—prior to the expiration of his jury service on June 30. 47

The prosecutor argued that Ms. Rovin intended to intimidate the foreperson by

finding out his name, going to his workplace, and making a threat. He further asserted that

47

Ms. Rovin cites CJ § 8-310(c)(2) to argue that the foreperson, “by law, was also

no longer a member of the jury pool after actively serving on a jury[]” and that the

foreperson “could not have been called to serve on a second jury for a three-year period.”

CJ § 8-310(c)(2) states:

Except as needed to complete service in a particular case or as otherwise

provided in a jury plan, an individual may not be required, in any 3-year

period, to serve or attend court for jury service more than once.

(Emphasis added). As an initial matter, Ms. Rovin fails to cite another applicable statute—

CJ § 8-216—which permits a county, in its jury plan, to modify the frequency with which

individuals may be summoned for jury service to one year. The Wicomico County Jury

plan has made such a modification.

Putting aside Ms. Rovin’s reliance on the incorrect statute, we further observe that

neither statute defines “jury service.” Ms. Rovin narrowly interprets “jury service” to

mean serving as a sworn juror on a particular trial. We disagree with Ms. Rovin’s

interpretation. Read in the context of Title 8 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings

Article, as we outlined above, “jury service” means an individual’s service on a jury

panel. See, e.g., CJ § 8-401(c) (“A summons sent to an individual with a juror

qualification form shall instruct the individual to report for jury service unless a jury

commissioner instructs otherwise.” (emphasis added)); CJ § 8-208 (“Each jury plan shall

set the method by which summonses for jury service are to be served.” (emphasis added)).

In Wicomico County, the foreperson remained subject to a summons for “jury service”

for the month of June. See Maryland Courts, Juror Information-Frequently Asked

Questions, available at https://perma.cc/SX6N-VJYN (stating that “jurors may serve on

multiple trials as [they] are on call for the whole month”). Sitting as a juror on a single

trial jury did not extinguish the foreperson’s summons, and he was required to report for

jury duty in Wicomico County for the month of June.

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the “natural and probable consequence” of her actions 48 was that the foreperson was unable

to serve as a juror for the remainder of the month. According to the prosecutor, it was

irrelevant whether Ms. Rovin intended that result—rather, what was relevant was that she

“intended to intimidate him.” According to the State, “[i]f she intended to intimidate him[,]

she is responsible for the natural and probable consequences of her actions.” The

prosecutor explained that the State’s interpretation of the statute required the court to

determine whether “a reasonable juror who . . . had this occur could perform, could be

reasonably expected to be fair and impartial, which is [a juror’s] official duties for the rest

of the month.”

Although the trial judge accepted the narrow statutory interpretation advanced by

Ms. Rovin at her criminal trial, he found it to be a “very difficult case[,]” and noted that

Ms. Rovin’s actions were “very improper.” He ultimately concluded that the statute was

not intended to apply to retaliatory conduct. Given the acquittal, his interpretation was not

subject to further judicial review. 49

48

Based upon the prosecutor’s arguments, he appears to have relied upon the

“natural and inevitable consequences” language from Lee v. State, 65 Md. App. 587, 592

(1985), discussed supra.

49

Although there was no opportunity for further judicial review of the trial judge’s

interpretation, it was the subject of legislative action. In the very next legislative session,

the General Assembly enacted legislation to expand the witness retaliation statute, CR § 9-

303(a)(2) to criminalize threats against a juror for participation in a “pending or completed

case.” See 2016 Md. Laws ch. 532, 533. The prosecutor in Ms. Rovin’s criminal trial

testified in favor of the bill. As part of his testimony, the prosecutor explained the 30-day

duration of jury duty in Wicomico County. He noted that the foreperson had served on

two trials during that month, and “likely [would] have serve[d] on two or three more”

65

In conclusion, we hold that the State’s Attorney’s Office’s interpretation of the juror

intimidation statute—which formed the basis of the application for statement of charges

upon which the District Court Commissioner made a probable cause determination, and

for which Ms. Rovin was tried and ultimately acquitted—was objectively reasonable. 50

Accordingly, Ms. Rovin cannot overcome the strong presumption of probable cause that

attached to the warrant by establishing that “it [was] obvious that no reasonably competent

officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue,” Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at

547. 51

As such, in entering summary judgment in favor of the State on Ms. Rovin’s

common law claims of false imprisonment, false arrest, and malicious prosecution, as well

as her Article 26 and Article 24 claims arising from the same conduct, the circuit court

during his month of service, had the court not excused him from further jury duties because

of his encounter with Ms. Rovin.

Given our holding that the interpretation of the juror intimidation statute contained

50

in the application for charges upon which the warrant was issued was objectively

reasonable, we also reject Ms. Rovin’s conclusory assertions that the judicial officer

“wholly abandoned his judicial role” or that the warrant was “facially deficient.”

We note that the “objectively reasonable” standard is a higher burden than the one

51

that a law enforcement officer must satisfy to gain the benefit of the protection of an arrest

warrant that attaches when a neutral magistrate issues the warrant. As we discussed above,

for that protection to be removed, a plaintiff must demonstrate that one or more of the Leon

exceptions apply. As such, we are not suggesting that a law enforcement officer would be

held to the level of legal interpretive analysis outlined here to validate his or her reliance

on an arrest warrant. Rather, our analysis is to demonstrate that the warrant was not “based

on an affidavit so lacking in probable cause as to render official belief in its existence

entirely unreasonable” because the interpretation of the statute that formed the basis of the

application for statement of charges satisfied an even higher standard—it was objectively

reasonable.

66

correctly ruled that the State is not civilly liable for Ms. Rovin’s “arrest pursuant to a

warrant based on a judicial officer’s determination that probable cause existed for said

arrest” even though a trial judge acquitted Ms. Rovin based upon that trial judge’s

interpretation of the statute. Because probable cause and legal justification existed for Ms.

Rovin’s arrest and imprisonment, these claims fail as a matter of law.

H. Ms. Rovin’s Article 40 Claim

We turn next to Ms. Rovin’s Article 40 claim. Ms. Rovin argues that even if the

prosecutors’ interpretation of the juror intimidation statute was objectively reasonable such

that there was probable cause for her arrest, it cannot defeat her free speech claim under

Article 40. The substance of Ms. Rovin’s free speech claim is set forth in a single

paragraph of her amended complaint, in which she states that: “[b]y taking and depriving

[her] of her liberty against her will, and by arresting, imprisoning, and prosecuting[52] [her]

based on protected speech, Defendants violated the rights guaranteed” by Article 40. Ms.

Rovin appears to be making an “as applied” challenge—contending that she was arrested

and imprisoned for engaging in protected speech.

We disagree with Ms. Rovin that her Article 40 claim falls outside the probable

cause framework that applies when an arrest is pursuant to a warrant. In other words, just

as law enforcement was entitled to rely upon the judicial officer’s probable cause

determination that the foreperson was a “juror” and that Ms. Rovin’s conduct interfered

Obviously, the law enforcement officers who investigated the allegations against

52

Ms. Rovin are not responsible for the State’s Attorney’s Office’s decision to prosecute Ms.

Rovin.

67

with his “official duties” under the juror intimidation statute, law enforcement was

similarly entitled to rely upon the probable cause determination that Ms. Rovin made a

“threat,” and therefore, her statements to the foreperson did not constitute protected speech.

1. The True Threat Doctrine

As discussed above, the juror intimidation statute prohibits a person from, among

other things, making threats against a juror. CR § 9-305. Because the statute may

criminalize a form of speech, we must interpret the statute “with the commands of the First

Amendment clearly in mind[,]” so that “[w]hat is a threat must be distinguished from what

is constitutionally protected speech.” Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969). A

statutory “prohibition on true threats” is constitutionally permissible regardless of whether

the speaker intends to carry out the threat because, in addition to protecting people “from

the possibility that the threatened violence will occur[,]” such a law “protect[s] individuals

from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear engenders[.]” Virginia v. Black,

538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (second alteration in original) (internal quotations and quotation

marks omitted).

“True threats are ‘serious expression[s]’ conveying that a speaker means to ‘commit

an act of unlawful violence.’” Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 74 (2023) (alteration

in original) (quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 359). We have interpreted the statutory term

“threat” consistent with the constitutional parameters to limit its scope to communications

that convey a serious expression of intent to inflict physical harm. See Hammonds v. State,

436 Md. 22, 41 (2013) (identifying the plain meaning of “threat” as “a communicated intent

to inflict harm[,]” Threat, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), and “[a]n expression of

68

an intention to inflict something harmful[,]” Threat, Webster’s II New College Dictionary

(3d ed. 2005) (alteration in original)); see also Abbott v. State, 190 Md. App. 595, 619

(2010) (in discussing the “true threat” doctrine, defining a threat “as an expression of ‘a

determination or intent to injure presently or in the future[,]’[53] . . . which is distinct from

‘words as mere political argument, talk or jest.’” (citations omitted)).

In analyzing whether a statement is a “true threat” and therefore outside the

protections of the First Amendment in the context of a criminal prosecution, “[t]he State

must show that the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his

communications would be viewed as threatening violence.” Counterman, 600 U.S. at 69.

53

Ms. Rovin cites Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262 n.5 (1941) for the

proposition that to avoid constitutional protection, there must be reasonable grounds to

believe that the danger occasioned by the threat is imminent. Ms. Rovin’s reliance on

Bridges is misplaced. That case involved the application of the “clear and present danger”

category of unprotected speech. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 261–63 (1941). The

United States Supreme Court subsequently confirmed that the clear and present danger

category is separate and distinct from the true threat category, and that “restriction under

the [former] category is most difficult to sustain[.]” United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709,

717–18 (2012). Though they may have similarities, see Counterman, 600 U.S. at 97

(Sotomayor, J., concurring), they are not one and the same. Ms. Rovin cites Baltimore

Radio Show v. State, in which this Court quoted language from Bridges reflecting that the

harm must be imminent. 193 Md. 300, 326 (1949). Like Bridges, however, Baltimore

Radio Show concerned the clear and present danger test and did not involve a threat of

violence. Id. That case is also inapposite for the same reason as Bridges.

We further observe that the Appellate Court’s articulation of a true threat—a

determination or intent to injure presently or in the future—is consistent with the true threat

standard utilized by other courts. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411, 424 (2d

Cir. 2013) (rejecting the argument that a true threat must be imminent); United States v.

Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that a true threat expresses “a

determination or intent to injure presently or in the future”); Connecticut v. Pelella, 170

A.3d 647, 653-54 (Conn. 2017) (holding that imminence is not required for a statement to

be a true threat); Harrell v. Georgia, 778 S.E.2d 196, 200 (Ga. 2015) (stating that the

“threatened violence need not be imminent”).

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However, “[w]hether the speaker is aware of, and intends to convey, the threatening aspect

of the message is not part of what makes a statement a threat[.]” Id. at 74 (citing Elonis v.

United States, 575 U.S. 723, 733 (2015)). “The existence of a threat depends not on the

mental state of the [speaker], but on what the statement conveys to the person on the other

end.” Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). This is because “[w]hen the statement

is understood as a true threat, all the harms that have long made threats unprotected

naturally follow.” Id.

The determination as to whether speech is a true threat must include a consideration

of its context. See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708; Abbott, 190 Md. App. at 620 (observing that

“[w]hether a particular communication constitutes a true threat depends on both its

language and its context”). “[T]he context in which the words were” communicated, “the

specificity of the threat,” and the “reaction of a reasonable recipient familiar with the

context” in which the words were spoken are “factors which must be considered” in

determining whether the communication was a “true threat.” Abbott, 190 Md. App. at 620

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Roberts, 915 F.2d 889, 890–

91 (4th Cir. 1990)).

2. The Judicial Officer Had Probable Cause to Believe that Ms. Rovin’s

Statement was a True Threat

Examining the application for statement of charges, we determine that the judicial

officer had probable cause to believe that Ms. Rovin’s statement to the foreperson did not

implicate any protected speech. Once again, we note that Ms. Rovin has not alleged that

Deputy Cook make material omissions or misstatements of fact in the arrest warrant

70

application. Although she disagrees with the foreperson’s account of the events, she does

not allege that Deputy Cook falsely recounted those events in the application for charges

as those events were reported to him by the foreperson.

According to the application for statement of charges, the foreperson reported that

Ms. Rovin invaded his personal space “to the point where he felt uncomfortable and

threatened.” Prior to leaving, she “threatened” the foreperson by telling him that “Bill

Rovin” would “take care of him.” Ms. Rovin claimed that Bill Rovin “worked in

Nicaragua” and had people that will “take care of him.” The foreperson felt this statement

“was an indirect death threat.”

It was certainly objectively reasonable for the neutral judicial officer who issued the

warrant to determine that Ms. Rovin’s statements as conveyed by the foreperson

constituted a “threat,” i.e., an expression of a determination or intent to injure presently or

in the future, particularly in light of both the language and the context in which the

statement was made. Ms. Rovin went to the foreperson’s workplace on the same day as

her daughter’s trial, acted in a loud and threatening manner, and invaded his personal space.

The foreperson found Ms. Rovin’s statement that “Bill Rovin” would take care of him to

be sufficiently threatening and alarming that he contacted the State’s Attorney’s Office and

applied for a peace order. In other words, it was objectively reasonable for a judicial officer

to find probable cause that Ms. Rovin consciously disregarded a substantial risk that her

communication would be viewed as threatening violence, and that the foreperson

reasonably understood the statement to be a true threat.

71

Based upon our examination of the application for statement of charges, we hold

that in issuing the warrant, the judicial officer had probable cause to believe that Ms. Rovin

made a true threat that was outside the protections of Article 40. Law enforcement was

entitled to rely upon the probable cause determination in making the arrest.

I. Ms. Rovin’s Article 24 Void-For-Vagueness Claim

Finally, Ms. Rovin also asserts that her rights under Article 24 were violated

regardless of whether there was probable cause for her arrest because she was arrested

pursuant to an unconstitutionally vague statute. She contends that if the juror intimidation

statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it must be void for

vagueness.

In determining whether a statute is constitutional, we start with a presumption that

the statute is valid. Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 611 (2001) (citations omitted). To

assess whether a statute is void for vagueness, we consider whether it: (1) “fails to give

ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes,” or (2) is “so standardless that it

invites arbitrary enforcement.” Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015); see

also Galloway, 365 Md. at 615. “The standard for determining whether a statute provides

fair notice is whether persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the

statute’s meaning.” Galloway, 365 Md. at 615 (cleaned up). “A statute is not vague under

the fair notice principle if the meaning ‘of the words in controversy can be fairly

ascertained by reference to judicial determinations, the common law, dictionaries, treatises

or even the words themselves, if they possess a common and generally accepted meaning.’”

Id. (quoting Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 125 (1978)); see also Eanes v. State, 318 Md.

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436, 461 (1990) (“[W]e . . . apply normal meanings to words of common

understanding[.]”). When interpreting criminal penal statutes, we have construed them

through the lens of a reasonable person standard. Galloway, 365 Md. at 634. Moreover,

“‘the vagueness doctrine does not require absolute precision or perfection.’” McCree v.

State, 441 Md. 4, 20 (2014) (quoting Galloway, 365 Md. at 634). A statute “‘does not

become unconstitutionally vague merely because it may not be perfectly clear at the

margins.’” Galloway, 365 Md. at 634 (quoting Williams v. State, 329 Md. 1, 11 (1992)).

Ms. Rovin does not suggest that the words used in the juror intimidation statute are

too complicated or difficult as to escape ordinary meaning. Indeed, she contends quite the

opposite—that it was, or should have been, clear beyond a reasonable doubt that she did

not violate the statute, and therefore, she should not have been arrested, imprisoned, or

prosecuted for allegedly doing so. Nor does she set forth any genuine argument that the

statute is “so standardless such that it invites arbitrary enforcement.” 54 Instead, in her view,

any statute that is susceptible to more than one objectively reasonable interpretation is per

54

In discussing the arbitrary enforcement prong, we have explained:

a criminal statute is [not] void merely because it allows for the exercise of

some discretion on the part of law enforcement and judicial officials. It is

only where a statute is so broad as to be susceptible to irrational and selective

patterns of enforcement that it will be held unconstitutional under this second

arm of the vagueness principle.

Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 122 (1978) (citation omitted). The juror intimidation statute

is not “so broad as to be susceptible to irrational and selective patterns of enforcement[

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