Case law

Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Director, Division of Taxation

28 N.J. Tax 197 · New Jersey Tax Court · Oct 29, 2014

Clearly, the Legislature required something more than a valid non-tax business purpose and economic substance be demonstrated in order to qualify for the exception. … It is clearly not referenced as the determinative factor.

State v. Skillman

76 N.J.L. 464 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 8, 1908

In England this rule is ■established and liberalized by an act of parliament. 28 Viet., e. 18. … If such copies were offered as substantive proof of the original document they would be clearly inadmissible.

SEIDLE v. NEPTUNE TOWNSHIP

District Court, D. New Jersey · Oct 31, 2019

If none exists. the Court may consider “a ‘robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority’ in the Court of Appeals [that] could clearly establish a right for purposes of qualified immunity.” Jd. … Although “it is true that qualified immunity should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of the litigation, at the motion to dismiss stage, ‘qualified immunity will be found only when the immunity is established

ORTIZ v. CUMBERLAND COUNTY FREEHOLDERS

District Court, D. New Jersey · Aug 28, 2025

Mendibles Is Entitled to Qualified Immunity for the Slap 1. … Legal standard “Qualified immunity protects [government officials] who make wrong but reasonable judgment calls absent clearly established law.” Urda v.

<font color="red">DO NOT FILE IN THIS CASE</font> TRANSFERRED TO TRENTON - NEW CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-cv-13943

District Court, D. New Jersey · Jun 3, 2022

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” … “The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis asks whether the right in question was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the violation.”

Tp. of Dover v. Bd. of Adj. of Tp. of Dover

158 N.J. Super. 401 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 10, 1978

It is the governing body's ultimate responsibility to establish, by the adoption of its zoning ordinances and amendments thereto, the essential land use character of the municipality. … That is to say, if a zoning ordinance amendment applicable only to a given parcel of land would fall as spot zoning because of the parcel's size, location and character, it might be that the parcel would then qualify for

Hodgson v. Board of Ed., Parsippany-Troy Hills

344 F. Supp. 79 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Jun 14, 1972

Wirtz, and are clearly put before this Court by the cases at bar. While the Supreme Court left the narrow Eleventh Amendment issue open, we are not without guideposts generally. … While establishing that, absent waiver or consent, an action brought by employees under 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b) is barred by the sovereign immunity afforded by the Eleventh Amendment, the Court observed ( 452 F.2d at 826 ): An

HIGGENBOTHAM v. THE CITY OF TRENTON

District Court, D. New Jersey · Feb 11, 2021

rights, and (2) that the constitutional right that was violated was clearly established. … Thus, Officer Gonzalez has not satisfied the first step of the qualified immunity analysis, on this motion.

ALTAGRACIA v. VIOLA

District Court, D. New Jersey · Dec 5, 2022

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials who perform discretionary functions ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional … entitled to qualified immunity at this time.

In Re Ownership of Renewable Energy Certificates

389 N.J. Super. 481 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 10, 2007

("EDECA"), which established the framework for restructuring the electric power industry. … Appellants next argue that the BPU's decision violates PURPA by discriminating against renewable energy Qualified Facilities in favor of cogeneration Qualified Facilities.

Hudson United Bank v. House of Supreme, Inc.

149 N.J. Super. 153 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 30, 1977

Special deposits are immune from set-off by a bank because the right of set-off arises only when there is a mutuality of relationship between the customer and the bank. … In most jurisdictions the general-special deposit distinction as it relates to a bank's right of set-off is a well established rule of law.

Trauma Nurses, Inc. v. Board of Review

242 N.J. Super. 135 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 20, 1990

Prior to entering contracts with TNI, nurses are screened to insure that they are appropriately qualified. … In sum, the undisputed evidence clearly established the statutory requisites of N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(i)(6)(A), (B) and (C). The determination of the Board is accordingly reversed.

West Milford Tp. v. Garfield Recreation Comm.

194 N.J. Super. 148 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 20, 1983

N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.68 clearly established the procedure for implementing the Green Acres tax exemption by providing: The tax exemption established by this act shall be granted or revoked pursuant to the provisions of [ N.J.S.A … It clearly appears as such that the certification by DEP is merely advisory and not a final determination of tax exemption.

Jari Almonte v. Township of Union

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 18, 2024

paramedic who acted negligently is entitled to qualified immunity, if he acted with subjective good faith or in a reasonably objective manner. … Plaintiffs argue that we should interpret the qualified immunity for advanced life support paramedics under N.J.S.A. 26:2K-14 more narrowly than we interpreted the Tort Claims Act immunity in Frields and Murray.

Hyland v. Simmons

152 N.J. Super. 569 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Aug 26, 1977

The above authorities establish clearly that the instant cause of action is independent from any past criminal proceeding against defendant, regardless of its outcome. … It is well established that since this is a purely equitable action, [2] the general statute of limitations is not applicable. Colton v. Depew, 60 N.J. Eq. 454, 458-459 (E. & A. 1900).

Romeo v. Romeo

84 N.J. 289 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 16, 1980

We conclude that N.J.S.A. 37:2-5 does not establish a substantive rule of law on the capacity of spouses to contract with one another. Our analysis must therefore focus on the common law rule. … demise * * While acknowledging the obligation of a lower court “to anticipate the winds of change as well as probable future expression of a higher court,” the court properly refused to deviate from the “clearly pronounced

State v. Mazur

158 N.J. Super. 89 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 29, 1978

Swidler was not in a condition to be aborted in no way negates their clearly manifested intent to commit a criminal act. … The judge added that he knew from "the prior trial" that no immunity was granted to Cohn with respect to potential welfare fraud charges.

Sudler v. Environ. Disposal Corp.

219 N.J. Super. 52 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 15, 1987

The two Antitrust Act claims are also barred by statutory immunity. In Zoneraich v. Overlook Hosp., 212 N.J. Super. 83, 93 (App. … The immunity protection therefore covers Hills as well as EDC. Sudler's remaining points are clearly without merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). The decision of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners is affirmed.

New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. Bayshore Regional Sewerage Authority

340 N.J. Super. 166 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 8, 2001

Therefore, the Commissioner did not err by failing to recognize that Bayshore is immune from the WPCA and DEP regulation. This argument is without merit. … Bayshore clearly falls within the purview of the WPCA because it is both a “municipal treatment works” and a “local agency.” N.J.S.A. 58:10A-3. Moreover, as a NJDEPS permit holder, Bay-shore is subject to the WPCA.

State v. Vinegra

73 N.J. 484 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 30, 1977

Ed. 819 (1896), the Court clearly indicated that transactional immunity was constitutionally required. … Brown and Hale, however, involved statutes that were clearly sufficient to supplant the privilege against self-incrimination, as they provided full immunity from prosecution ‘for or on account of any transaction, matter or