<font color="red">DO NOT FILE IN THIS CASE</font> TRANSFERRED TO TRENTON - NEW CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-cv-13943

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

___________________________________

SHAFT JONES, :

:

Plaintiff, : Civ. No. 18-13943 (RBK) (AMD)

:

v. :

:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., : OPINION

:

Defendants. :

____________________________________:

ROBERT B. KUGLER, U.S.D.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Shaft Jones (“Plaintiff” or “Jones”), was formerly incarcerated at F.C.I. Fort

Dix in Fort Dix, New Jersey. He is proceeding pro se with an amended civil rights complaint.

(See Dkt. No. 9). On March 16, 2020, this Court screened the amended complaint and proceeded

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims and related state law claims against

Defendants White, Dillon, Decker, Harris and Esposito. (See Dkt. Nos. 11 & 12). Presently

pending before this Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to

state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, for

summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). Additionally, Defendants

have filed a motion to seal certain records. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion to seal

is granted and their motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for summary judgment, is denied

without prejudice.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts giving rise to Plaintiff’s amended complaint were previously stated by this

Court in its screening opinion as follows:

Plaintiff names the following as Defendants: (1) the United States

of America; (2) David Ortiz; (3) Unknown Assistant Warden; (4)

Officer White; (5) Lt. Decker; (6) Officer Dillon; (7) Officer

Harris; (8) S. Malloy; (9) R. Gilyard; (10) Unknown Health

Services Administrator; (11) J. Wilks; (12) Ravi Sood; (13) Steven

Esposito; (14) FCI Fort Dix Medical Director; (15) R. Newbury;

(16) Unknown X-ray Technician; (17) Mr. Byrd; (18) Regional

Director for FCI Fort Dix; (19) Hugh Hurwitz; (20) Mark Inch;

(21) Mr. Kane; (22) Ms. Flowers; (23) Nicoletta Turner-Foster;

(24) Unknown Nurse; and (25) Mr. Donepudi.

This case arises from Plaintiff’s medical treatment while

incarcerated at FCI Fort Dix. According to the Complaint, in the

evening of February 19, 2017, Plaintiff reported to Defendant

Harris that he was experiencing distressing symptoms, and

Defendant Harris advised him to lay down and rest, and if the

situation worsened, to let him know. After Defendant Harris

completed his rounds, Plaintiff stated that his condition did not

improve, and Defendant Harris notified additional officers of the

situation.

Defendants Decker and White arrived, and it appeared to them that

Plaintiff was experiencing “Bell’s Palsy” of the face, and that if

that were the case, the condition would improve with rest, and that

they would make a sick call in the morning. Plaintiff advised the

officers that he may have been suffering from something more

serious and requested to see medical immediately, because he was

experiencing numbness, tingling, and pain on the left side of his

body, as well as abnormal gait and speech. Defendant White stated

that no one was available at medical, and if the condition

worsened, they would take him to medical in the morning.

The next morning, on February 20, 2017, Plaintiff’s condition

worsened, and he notified an officer who contacted medical. The

officer reported that Plaintiff had been complaining all night of

“numbness, on his left side, loss of equilibrium, problems with

speech and concentration,” and “appeared to be physically

unbalanced.” (ECF No. 9, at 15).

A healthcare provider, Defendant Esposito, then examined

Plaintiff. The Complaint alleges that Defendant Esposito’s notes

portray a different version of events, but according to Plaintiff, he

presented the symptoms above to Defendant Esposito. Thereafter,

Defendant Esposito suggested that Plaintiff purchase ibuprofen, lay

down and rest, and that he would order certain tests in the future.

On his walk back from the infirmary, Defendant Dillon observed

Plaintiff, and the two had a dispute over Plaintiff’s condition, and

whether Plaintiff was “faking” it. Approximately three days later,

on February 23, 2017, staff found Plaintiff face down on the floor,

unresponsive, and rushed him to a hospital.

Staff at the hospital determined that Plaintiff had suffered multiple

strokes, which left him paralyzed, unable to speak coherently,

unable to focus, with loss of feeling, impaired memory, and

abnormal gait. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff’s symptoms

during the prior three or four days, were clearly stroke warning

signs.

After his hospitalization, medical professionals recommended that

Plaintiff receive certain follow-up treatments. Plaintiff complains

that Defendants did not provide him with those treatments, but,

with the exception of Defendant Esposito, he makes no specific

allegations as to any other Defendant regarding the follow-up

treatments. Plaintiff also alleges that he filed a number of

grievances regarding the above events, but that several of the

Defendants improperly rejected or otherwise impeded his

grievances.

Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint on or about September 26,

2019 and signed his notice of tort claim the day before, on

September 25, 2019. Plaintiff now raises Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference claims, First Amendment right to petition

claims, and Fifth Amendment due process claims against the

Defendants under Bivens, as well as claims against the United

States under the FTCA. The Complaint names all of the individual

Defendants both in their official and individual capacities.

(Dkt. No. 11 at 1-3). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and physical therapy as relief in his

amended complaint. (See Dkt. No. 9 at 26).

On March 16, 2020, this Court screened Plaintiff’s amended complaint. (See Dkt. No. 11

& 12). The only claims permitted to proceed past screening were Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

and related state law claims against Defendants White, Dillon, Decker, Harris and Esposito.

On September 8, 2021, prior to filing an answer or any discovery taking place,

Defendants filed the pending motion to dismiss or in the alternative motion for summary

judgment. Defendants make three arguments in their motion. First, they argue Plaintiff failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies. Second, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims against the

medical and non-medical Defendants should be dismissed or, alternatively, that they should be

granted summary judgment because they were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious

medical needs. Finally, Defendants assert they are entitled to qualified immunity because their

actions did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendants’ motion. Thereafter, this Court issued

notice pursuant to Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2018) that it intended to resolve

any factual disputes based on Defendants’ affirmative defense of Plaintiff’s purported failure to

exhaust administrative remedies. (See Dkt. No. 40). Defendants filed a response to the Paladino

notice. (See Dkt. No. 42). Plaintiff did not.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss an action for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When evaluating a motion to dismiss, “courts

accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff

may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)

(quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). In other words, a

complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009);

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

A court conducts a three-part analysis to make this determination. See Santiago v.

Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the court must “tak[e] note of the

elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Second, the

court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 131 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680). Finally, “where

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id. Additionally, it is

worth noting that “courts generally consider only the allegations contained in the complaint,

exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record.” See Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v.

White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law” and a dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude the Court from

granting a motion for summary judgment. See id.

A party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing the basis for its

motion and must demonstrate that there is an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “A party asserting that a fact [is not]

genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the

record, including depositions, documents ..., affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including

those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other

materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). After the moving party adequately supports its motion,

the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits,

or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotation

marks omitted). To withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the

nonmoving party must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict the moving

party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. “[I]f the non-movant's evidence is merely ‘colorable’ or is

‘not significantly probative,’ the court may grant summary judgment.” Messa v. Omaha Prop. &

Cas. Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528 (D.N.J. 2000) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50).

“If reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence,” however, summary judgment

is not appropriate. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Defendants’ first argument is that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The

Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) states: “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to

prison conditions under the section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as

are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is a mandatory prerequisite

before a plaintiff files a civil rights action regarding prison conditions. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548

U.S. 81, 85 (2006) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). “The PLRA's

exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general

circumstances or particular episodes[.]” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (citation

omitted). A prisoner must exhaust administrative remedies even when the relief sought, such as

monetary damages, cannot be granted by the administrative process. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at

85 (citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 734).

To determine whether a prisoner has exhausted his administrative remedies, the Court

looks to the administration's, in this case the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), applicable

grievance procedure and rules. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (stating that the

procedural rules for exhausting administrative remedies are defined by the prison grievance

process itself and that “[c]ompliance with the prison grievance procedures ... is all that is

required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust”). The BOP's Administrative Remedy Program is a

multi-tier process that allows “an inmate to seek formal review of an issue relating to any aspect

of his/her own confinement.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.10. The inmate first must attempt to informally

resolve his issue with the institutional staff. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). If informal resolution

fails or is waived, the inmate then may submit a formal Administrative Remedy Request on the

appropriate BP–9 form within twenty calendar days following the date for which the basis for the

request occurred. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a). If the inmate is unsatisfied with the warden's

response to his Administrative Remedy Request, he may submit an appeal on the BP–10 form to

the appropriate Regional Director within twenty calendar days of the date the warden signed the

response. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). An inmate who is not satisfied with the Regional Director's

response may appeal to the General Counsel on the appropriate BP–11 form within thirty

calendar days of the date the Regional Director signed the response. See id. An inmate's appeal to

the General Counsel is the final administrative appeal. See id.

The BOP's Administrative Remedy Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 et seq. and its Program

Statement 1330.13, available at http:// www.bop.gov/policy/progstate/1330_18.pdf (last visited

May 24, 2022), do not provide meaningful guidance as to the level of specificity required in an

administrative remedy request except to note that “[t]he inmate shall place a single complaint or

a reasonable number of closely related issues on the [administrative remedy] form.” 28 C.F.R. §

542.14(c)(2). The Third Circuit has not addressed the issue of the level of specificity required,

however, it has noted that “[t]he primary purpose of a grievance is to alert prison officials to a

problem.” Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 2007). This language has led this and

other courts to adopt a standard “that a grievance suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of

the wrong for which redress is sought.” See Olivares v. United States, No. 07–3476, 2010 WL

5251429, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec.16, 2010) (citing Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir.2009)

(quoting Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir.2002))); see also Perez v. Turner, No. 11–

6833, 2013 WL 3216147, at *7 (D.N.J. June 25, 2013); Nestor v. Dir. Ne. Region Bureau of

Prisons, No. 11–4683, 2012 WL 6691791, at *8 (D.N.J. Dec.20, 2012). This Court sees no

reason to reject this methodology.

Plaintiff initially filed a BP-8 informal resolution form on or around March 3, 2017. (See

Dkt. No. 9-1 at 3). On March 8, 2017, the BOP rejected Plaintiff’s BP-8 form stating as follows:

This is in response to your BP-8, dated March 3, 2017, in which

you allege on February 19, 20, 23, 2017, you were denied

emergency medical treatment from the staff of FCI Fort Dix as a

result of this, you allege you passed out and had multiple strokes.

After reviewing your medical record, there is no medical

documentation indicating you reported to health Services or

complained to Medical Staff of any medical complaint on February

19, 2017. The following day on February 20, 2017, you were seen

and evaluated by the Duty PA for your complaints of pain to your

legs and feet which you stated have been present for the past

several months.

On February 23, 2017, you were evaluated by the Paramedic and

transferred to the local hospital to be evaluated for changes in your

mental status which you were admitted for syncopal episode, later

while hospitalized was diagnosed with embolic stroke.

In review of your medical record, there is no evidence that indicate

that you were denied emergency Medical.

(Dkt. No. 9-1 at 5). Plaintiff then filed a BP-9 grievance on March 10, 2017, which stated as

follows:

In respectful appeal to the findings of the Unit Team to which it

stated that after reviewing my medical record that there was no

medical documentation indicating that I reported to health services

or complained to medical staff on February 19, 2017. This avers

that this administrative has responded falsely and has now falsified

government documents in order to not accept responsibility for

failure to provide medical care, which in turn caused this movant

to have multiple strokes. This movant is requesting that this

administrative allow for an outside agency to investigate the

patterns and practices of this medical department, and/or allow this

movant to bring a civil claim against this institution and its staff for

deliberate and callous indifference on the part of the official. [S]ee

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S. Ct. 3408 (1981).

Furthermore, this movant is requesting that this administration

remove AHSA J. Wilk from his position over the Medical

Department for violating § 3420.09(34) Falsification – under the

Standards of Employee Conduct. This behavior needs a severe

consequence given to each employee who violates the program

statement in order to deter other employees from conducting the

same behavior.

(Dkt. No. 9-1 at 6). On March 16, 2017, the BOP told Plaintiff his BP-9 form needed more

specific information (such as his case number) so that his appeal could be considered.1 (See Dkt.

No. 34-10 at 2). The BOP stated Plaintiff could resubmit his BP-9 form within five days. (See

id.).

Defendants state that Plaintiff resubmitted his BP-9 form on March 24, 2017. The BOP

rejected that BP-9 form as untimely because it was not filed within five days of its March 16,

1 Defendants state that the BOP’s rejection occurred on March 15 or 16, 2017. The rejection

notice has a typed date of March 15, 2017. However, the 5 on the 15th date is crossed out and

replaced with a handwritten 6. Accordingly, for purposes of this opinion, this Court will use

March 16, 2017 as the date of the BOP’s rejection as Defendants have not come forward with

anything concrete that Plaintiff received this notice on March 15th as opposed to March 16th.

2017 rejection notice. Defendants note, “Plaintiff continued to attempt to refile on all levels, but

BOP staff never accepted the grievance due to the untimeliness of the initial re-filed grievance.”

(Dkt. No. 34-1 at 22).

According to Defendants, because Plaintiff did not comply with its directive to refile his

BP-9 form within five days, this Court should determine that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies. Nevertheless, Plaintiff attached to his amended complaint a signed

letter from BOP Counselor S. Malloy dated April 20, 2017 in which she states the following:

Inmate Jones, Shaft Reg. No. 04688-027, BP-9 was rejected I do

recall seeing the rejection notice between the dates of March 15 or

16; I do not recall the exact date. I attempted to have the IM wait

for his Counselor to handle the situation. I called Unit Manager

Gilyard to see if the 5 days to resubmit were business days, she

replied “No it’s not[.]” Jones decided to resubmit the BP-9[.] I

immediately placed it into the UM mailbox. It was not untimely.

(Dkt. No. 9-1 at 10).

Assuming for purposes of this opinion only that Defendants may be entitled to relief on

their lack of exhaustion argument under either a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard, or a

Rule 56 motion for summary judgment standard, dismissal or judgment in Defendants’ favor is

not warranted at this time. There remain clear issues presented in the pleadings and relevant

materials under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard and clear material issues of fact under the Rule 56

standard outstanding. Most notably, Counselor Malloy states in her letter that Plaintiff’s

resubmission was timely. As this letter was attached as an exhibit to the amended complaint, this

letter certainly does not entitle Defendants to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint applying a motion to

dismiss standard.

Nevertheless, Defendants alternatively assert they are entitled to summary judgment.

Based on this record though, summary judgment based on a failure to exhaust is also not

appropriate at this time. Indeed, again assuming without deciding for purposes of this opinion

only that Defendants would be entitled to relief because Plaintiff’s amended BP-9 was untimely,

Counselor Malloy’s letter indicates there remain material issues of fact outstanding of when

Plaintiff resubmitted his BP-9 form. Discovery, such as an affidavit or testimony from Malloy,

will presumably help resolve this outstanding factual issue. Accordingly, applying either a

motion to dismiss or summary judgment standard, this Court will not grant Defendants’ motion

on its failure to exhaust administrative remedies at this time.

B. Merits/Qualified Immunity

Defendants next assert their motion should be granted because they were not deliberately

indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs and/or because they are entitled to qualified

immunity. For the following reasons, both arguments are premature based on the specific

circumstances of this case.

For the delay or denial of medical care to rise to a violation of the

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment, a prisoner must demonstrate “(1) that defendants were

deliberately indifferent to [his] medical needs and (2) that those

needs were serious.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir.

1999). Deliberate indifference requires proof that the official

“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or

safety.” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582

(3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837

(1994)). We have found deliberate indifference where a prison

official: “(1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but

intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical

treatment based on a nonmedical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner

from receiving needed or recommended treatment.” Rouse, 182

F.3d at 197. Deference is given to prison medical authorities in the

diagnosis and treatment of patients, and courts “disavow any

attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular

course of treatment ... (which) remains a question of sound

professional judgment.” Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce,

612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Bowring v. Godwin, 551

F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977)). Allegations of negligent treatment or

medical malpractice do not trigger constitutional protections.

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976).

Pierce v. Pitkins, 520 F. App’x 64, 66 (3d Cir. 2013). Deliberate indifference can also be found

“where the prison official persists in a course of treatment in the face of resultant pain and risk of

permanent injury.” See McCluskey v. Vincent, 505 F. App’x 199, 202 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). “A medical need is serious if it ‘has been diagnosed by a

physician as requiring treatment,’ or if it ‘is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize

the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” See Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 236 (3d Cir.

2012) (quoting Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Monmouth

Cnty. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987))).

Defendants rely on prison records as well as Plaintiff’s medical records in their motion

which were not attached to the amended complaint. Thus, their arguments cannot be considered

as part of a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, summary judgment is the proper standard to apply to

Defendants’ merit based argument.

Defendants assert they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has failed to

show material issues of fact regarding whether they were deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical needs. (See Dkt. No. 34-1 at 24-32). Because Defendants filed their motion relying on

numerous documents prior to any discovery, this Court finds Plaintiff should at least be afforded

the right to discovery in this case before ruling on the merits of Defendants motion for summary

judgment. See, e.g., Costlow v. United States, 552 F.2d 560, 564 (3d Cir. 1977) (citation omitted)

(“[W]here the facts are in possession of the moving party a continuance of a motion for summary

judgment for purposes of discovery should be granted almost as a matter of course.”); see also

See Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 568 (3d Cir. 2015) (“If discovery is incomplete, a district

court is rarely justified in granting summary judgment[.]”); Scholar Intelligent Sols., Inc. v. N.J.

Eye Center, P.A., No. 13–0642, 2013 WL 2455959, at *2 (D.N.J. June 5, 2013) (summary

judgment motion filed before discovery deemed premature).

Next, Defendants assert they are entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff has

failed to allege a deprivation of his constitutional rights. “Qualified immunity shields

government officials from civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or

constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Taylor v.

Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 825 (2015) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The first prong

of the analysis “asks whether the facts, [t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting

the injury, ... show the officer's conduct violated a [federal] right [.]” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S.

650, 655–56 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations and omissions in

original). “The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis asks whether the right in

question was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the violation.” Id. at 656 (internal citation and

quotation marks omitted).

Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity under the first prong of the

qualified immunity analysis, namely that Plaintiff has failed to show that their actions violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Defendants rely on evidence outside of Plaintiff’s amended

complaint including medical and prison records to support their argument. Thus, this Court

analyzes this portion of Defendants’ motion also under the summary judgment standard.

For similar reasons as discussed regarding Defendants’ arguments on the merits of

Plaintiff’s claims, in this case, and under these particular circumstances, this Court finds

Defendants’ argument on qualified immunity is also premature. See, e.g., Lasane v. Campos, No.

17-6316, 2019 WL 959703, at *6 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2019) (citing Newland v. Reehorst, 328 F.

App'x 788, 791 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009); Coles v. Carlini, No. 10-6132, 2012 WL 1079446, at *9

(D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2012)) (“Because any inquiry into qualified immunity is necessarily a fact-

intensive inquiry, the Court declines to grant the Motion at this early stage, prior to discovery, on

grounds of qualified immunity.”). Defendants may of course re-raise their merits and/or qualified

immunity arguments after Plaintiff is given an opportunity for discovery.

V. CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion to seal is granted. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, or in the

alternative for summary judgment, is denied without prejudice. An appropriate order will be

entered.

DATED: June 3, 2022 s/ Robert B. Kugler

ROBERT B. KUGLER

United States District Judge