Case law

Clark v. Benton, LLC

189 A.3d 761 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 17, 2018

DISCUSSION [¶ 8] Benton, LLC, contends that the Act's definition of "employer" is ambiguous and does not resolve the issue of whether it may qualify for immunity as an employer pursuant to 39-A M.R.S. § 104. 39-A M.R.S. § … Even if all of the above facts were undisputed, Benton, LLC, cannot establish its claim to immunity under any applicable doctrine.

Mitchell O/B/O X.M. v. Dakota Cnty. Soc. Servs.

357 F. Supp. 3d 891 · District Court, D. Maine · Jan 28, 2019

Malice is not present if a defendant's conduct (1) objectively was legally reasonable, (2) was performed in good faith, or (3) did not violate a "clearly established" right. Gleason v. Metro. … Because the malice exception to official immunity requires an intentional commission of an act, the amended complaint's allegations of negligence do not qualify for this exception.

Scott Paper Co. v. Ceilcote Co.

103 F.R.D. 591 · District Court, D. Maine · Nov 27, 1984

resistable claim is not sufficient to immunize an investigative report developed in the ordinary course of business. f Some recent cases have suggested the need for objective facts establishing an identifiable resolve to … The purpose of these references was clearly to alert the recipient of the demands made by Plaintiff or of the likelihood that Plaintiff would initiate litigation.

Wilson v. Lyons

270 F. Supp. 2d 73 · District Court, D. Maine · Jul 9, 2003

In the alternative, they assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity under the circumstances. … The doctrine of qualified immunity provides that “government officials performing discretionary functions[ ] generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

Chauncey W. Clark v. Benton, LLC

2018 ME 99 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 17, 2018

DISCUSSION [¶8] Benton, LLC, contends that the Act’s definition of “employer” is ambiguous and does not resolve the issue of whether it may qualify for immunity as an employer pursuant … Even if all of the above facts were undisputed, Benton, LLC, cannot establish its claim to immunity under any applicable doctrine.

PLOURDE v. MASON

District Court, D. Maine · Oct 4, 2024

immunity. … Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“[Q]ualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

Pouliot v. Town of Fairfield

226 F. Supp. 2d 233 · District Court, D. Maine · Sep 4, 2002

In determining whether qualified immunity applies, three factors must be determined: (1) “whether the plaintiffs allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation”; (2) “whether the right was clearly established … This prong requires determining whether the right asserted was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation.

Scott v. Androscoggin County Jail

866 A.2d 88 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Nov 29, 2004

Thus, to recover pursuant to the ADA or the MHRA, Scott must establish that (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was excluded from participating in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services … Because we determine that Scott has not established an actionable claim for liability, we do not reach the issue of whether Scott’s claims may be barred by sovereign immunity. [¶ 24] In the absence of an immunity bar, federal

Cote v. Town of Millinocket

901 F. Supp. 2d 200 · District Court, D. Maine · Sep 28, 2012

Qualified Immunity “Qualified immunity shields state officials from civil damage liability under section 1983, insofar as their conduct does not violate ‘clearly established’ rights of which ‘a reasonable person would have … Qualified Immunity “Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, police officers are protected from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

Pattangall v. Mooers

113 Me. 412 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 6, 1915

Whatever may have been the nature of the editorial it was clearly incompetent as evidence on the question of the plaintiff’s general reputation. Nor was it admissible to rebut malice. 2. … And we think the jury must have clearly understood that if they did not find that the words were spoken of the plaintiff in respect to his professional conduct, then he could not recover.

Winston v. Maine Technical College System

631 A.2d 70 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Sep 1, 1993

Contrary to plaintiffs contention, Conrath is shielded by qualified immunity from personal liability for his discretionary acts, including the termination of plaintiffs employment. See Anderson v. … Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 , 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). That is not the case here.

Morgan v. Kooistra

941 A.2d 447 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Feb 5, 2008

Kooistra and Walsh argue that: (1) they each are entitled to discretionary function immunity pursuant to the Maine Tort Claims Act (the MTCA), 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1)(C) (2007); (2) they each qualify for intentional act immunity … Co., 2001 ME 8, ¶ 6 , 764 A.2d 258, 263 (holding that the “immunity” exception to the final judgment rule applies when the basis for the motion for summary judgment is complete or qualified immunity). See also, Webb v.

Bradbury v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC

58 A.3d 1054 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Nov 29, 2012

However, because the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure establish that affidavits are not pleadings, the defective affidavits executed by Jeffrey Stephan do not qualify for the protection of that privilege. See M.R. Civ. … The privilege does not immunize a party from liability simply because a statement is made in the context of a judicial proceeding. See Vahlsing Christina Corp. v.

Scott v. Central Maine Power Co.

709 F. Supp. 1176 · District Court, D. Maine · Mar 13, 1989

Thus, the Court broadened the scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity established in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 , 96 S.Ct. 984 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). … In light of the holding that none of Scott's federal claims can survive the absolute immunity defense, the court does not consider whether any of Bradford’s actions may be subject to qualified immunity. 12 .

Neal L. Weinstein v. Old Orchard Beach Family Dentistry, LLC

271 A.3d 758 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Mar 8, 2022

Me. 1993), her statements to the Maine Board of Overseers of the Bar, the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers, and the USPS are entitled to only qualified immunity, see Truman, 2001 ME 182, ¶ 15, 788 A.2d 168. … Furthermore, because I believe that Narowetz’s statements made to the Maine Board of Overseers of the Bar, the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers, and the USPS were entitled only to qualified immunity, Counts 1, 3, 4

Cohen v. Bowdoin

288 A.2d 106 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Mar 2, 1972

We present those portions of the complaint which most clearly state its fundamental import. “1. … The absolute immunity recognized by Richards v. Ellis, Me., 233 A.2d 37 (1967) and Rodway v.

Berthiaume v. Caron

973 F. Supp. 29 · District Court, D. Maine · Jul 10, 1997

Qualified Immunity If Defendants’ conduct is immunized at all, it results from the qualified good faith immunity available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . … Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity for their discretionary acts as long as their conduct does not “violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

Nancy J. McCandless v. John Ramsey

211 A.3d 1157 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 11, 2019

P. 12(a)(2) (“A qualified justice may participate in a decision even though not present at oral argument.”). 2 [¶2] Nancy J. … the summary judgment record to determine whether there is no genuine issue of material fact and the Ramseys have established the applicability of the immunity provision as a matter of law, see M.R.

Child v. Central Maine Medical Center

575 A.2d 318 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jun 8, 1990

In considering the merits of the hospital’s charitable immunity defense, we reaffirmed our requirement that “in order to qualify for charitable immunity, an institution must, inter alia, derive its funds ‘mainly from public … We therefore conclude that CMMC has failed to meet its burden of establishing that it is entitled to charitable immunity.

Cummings v. Libby

176 F. Supp. 2d 26 · District Court, D. Maine · Dec 20, 2001

I did not instruct the juty on qualified immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151 , 2158, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), held that qualified immunity is a separate inquiry from the unreasonable force inquiry. … Although a judge ordinarily deals with qualified immunity in the early stages of a case, it is uncertain in the First Circuit what role the jury has if the issue stays in the case until trial. See, e.g., Tatro v.