Case law

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  • Mahoney v. Carus Chemical Co., Inc.

    102 N.J. 564 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 21, 1986

    II In establishing the fireman’s rule in New Jersey, this Court expressly considered the relationship between the conduct responsible for causing a fire and the fireman’s right to recover for injuries sustained in fighting … The dissenting opinion does not generally endorse an exemption from the fireman's rule for willful and wanton misconduct but asserts that such an exemption clearly applies when the misconduct occurs after the officer has

    Superseded by statute, as recognized in Ruiz v. MeroCited 52 timesPublished
  • Mastice v. Interstate Industrial Corp.

    270 N.J. Super. 350 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 8, 1994

    Establishing tort liability is an inherently uncertain process. See Eger v. E.I. Du Pont DeNemours Co., supra, 110 N.J. at 143 , 539 A.2d 1213 . … Establishing damages in a wrongful death action of a minor is an equally uncertain process. See Simmel v. New Jersey Coop Co., 28 N.J. 1, 14 , 143 A.2d 521 (1958); Botta v.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • State v. Gora

    148 N.J. Super. 582 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 24, 1977

    B Defendant argues that the State failed to establish that Oliveri's tape recorder was capable of taping the conversations, that the recordings were authentic and correct, and that no changes, additions or deletions had been … The trial judge, in effect, held that the immunity granted by this statute was not self-executing. We disagree. In State v.

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Karczewski v. Nowicki

    188 N.J. Super. 355 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 24, 1982

    N.J.S.A. 59:8-8, which establishes a notice requirement, is part of the Tort Claims Act which, according to N.J.S.A. 59:14-4, took effect on July 1, 1972. … The subject of the liability and immunity of public employees is the exclusive province of *361 N.J.S.A. 59:3-1 through N.J.S.A. 59:3-14.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Pinkowski v. Township of Montclair

    299 N.J. Super. 557 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 7, 1997

    Thus, the Pinkowskis argue, the judge erred in according Montclair immunity. … In addition, “not every impairment of value establishes a taking.” Washington Market Enterprises v. Trenton, supra, 68 N.J. at 116 , 343 A.2d 408 .

    Cited 34 timesPublished
  • Board of Education v. Eckert

    361 N.J. Super. 238 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 17, 2003

    immune from the imposition of rollback taxes once a change in use has occurred.”), aff'd, 5 N.J. … Therefore despite the parties' dispute over the extent of disruption caused by the Board’s excavations, the soil sampling clearly would have been disruptive to the farming operation described by Habiak.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Christmas v. City of Newark

    216 N.J. Super. 393 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 2, 1987

    Dept., 55 N.J. 534 (1970) which all but eliminated sovereign immunity in actions brought against the State and other public entities. … Clearly, the Stewart court's holding unambiguously states that commercial property owners, not the municipality, owe a duty to pedestrians to maintain sidewalks which abut their property. See also Mirza v.

    Questioned by Roman v. City of Plainfield, 388 N.J. Super. 527 (2006)Cited 16 timesPublished
  • SEXTON v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

    District Court, D. New Jersey · Dec 22, 2023

    “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable … the asserted constitutional right is clearly established.”

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Ricciardi v. Weber

    350 N.J. Super. 453 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 2, 2002

    Once this qualified privilege has been established, the burden then shifts to the plaintiffs to overcome the privilege by demonstrating that the statements were published with actual malice, i.e., either with knowledge that … This means that a slander plaintiff may establish a cause of action not only without proving special damages but without proving any form of actual damage to reputation.

    Abrogated on other grounds by Salzano v. North Jersey Media Group Inc., 201 N.J. 500 (2010)Cited 12 timesPublished
  • SANCHEZ v. ELIZABETH BOARD OF EDUCATION

    District Court, D. New Jersey · Mar 19, 2024

    Troiano is entitled to qualified immunity under the second prong of the analysis because he did not violate any clearly established right. … immunity under the second prong of the analysis because they did not violate any clearly established right.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Salzano v. North Jersey Media Group Inc.

    201 N.J. 500 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 11, 2010

    Our courts have alternatively characterized the fair-report privilege as absolute, qualified, and a hybrid of the two. … Although the truth or falsity of the information reported on may later be established, it is not the focus of the fair-report privilege.

    Cited 31 timesPublished
  • Thomason v. Norman E. Lehrer, P.C.

    183 F.R.D. 161 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Oct 27, 1998

    Indeed, Rule 8(a) of the *168 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure clearly describes what must be contained in “Claims for Relief.” 4 Accordingly, I find that the counterclaims asserted by Lehrer against Thomason qualify for … Since Baglini, by its terms, is limited to claims for abuse of process, it is clearly inapposite to Thomason's remaining state law claims.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Monarch Entertainment Bureau, Inc. v. New Jersey Highway Authority

    715 F. Supp. 1290 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Jun 27, 1989

    The Authority is established as a “body corporate and politic, with corporate succession.” N.J.S.A. sec. 27:12B-4 (West Supp.1988). … The Court ruled that this provision clearly satisfied the clear articulation requirement because they made anticompetitive restraints “foreseeable.” ... the statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anticompetitive

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • State v. Mellick

    25 N.J.L. 563 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 15, 1856

    enacts, that the town shall be entitled "to its just proportion of the- ’ school fund of the state, to be applied by the common coun cij in.the.manner prescribed by law. . , v At the time this charter was granted, thé act to establish … Minton, Ib. 529, that the provisions of a special charter will not be repealed or modified'by a general act, unless it clearly appears that *565 such was.the intention of the legislature.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • State v. City of Elizabeth

    56 N.J.L. 71 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 15, 1893

    This statute is one -which, so far as this ease is concerned,, clearly regulates the internal affairs of the city of Elizabeth. … The conditions imposed are not even similar. ' One class of race-courses may be established without regard to conditions at all; another class can only be established by submitting to the imposition of a condition which may

    Cited 17 timesPublished
  • Gunson v. James

    364 F. Supp. 2d 455 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Jan 12, 2005

    The LTCSA directed the OPM to contract with qualified carriers and establish a program whereby federal employees and annuitants, current and retired members of the uniformed services, and their qualified relatives “may obtain … At the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff satisfies this threshold “where the conduct alleged ... clearly state[s] a non-frivolous, prima facie case” and “the already established evidence indicates more than and ‘extremely

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • MOSLEY

    District Court, D. New Jersey · Mar 31, 2026

    was not clearly established. … Defendant Carpo and Defendant DeFeo contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's Excessive Force claim because Plaintiff's rights were not clearly established at the time of the incident; and

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Vacirca v. Consolidated Rail Corp.

    192 N.J. Super. 412 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 7, 1983

    they are clearly employees of the railroad which pays their salaries and can fire them at will. … The immunity granted by that section applies to all phases of the licensing function. Malloy v. State, 76 N.J. 515, 520 (1978).

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Bernice Pisack v. B & C Towing, Inc. Eptisam Pellegrino v. Nick's Towing Service, Inc. Christopher Walker v. All Points Automotive & Towing, Inc. (081492) (Bergen & Middlesex Counties & Statewide)

    Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 16, 2020

    Now, the 2018 amendatory language qualifies that provision, stating that a towing company may charge “fees for non-consensual towing or related storage services in accordance with a duly-authorized fee schedule established … In violating the regulation, defendants violated a “clearly established legal right” under the TCCWNA.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Mager v. United Hospitals of Newark

    88 N.J. Super. 421 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 16, 1965

    Reading it in its entirety we must conclude that it does not immunize Manufacturers from liability in the circumstances of this case. … Defendant's operation of such a clinic was clearly in its own interest.

    Cited 29 timesPublished

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