MOSLEY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

! HONORABLE KAREN M. WILLIAMS

BRYAN MOSLEY,

Plaintiff, Civil Action

No. 22-6489 (KMW-EAP)

v.

EG RB al

O HARBOR CITY ef af i| | MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER

Defendants, — | .

!

a

THIS MATTER comes before the Court by way of Defendant Egg Harbor City

(“Defendant Egg Harbor’), Defendant Police Officer Alexander DeFeo (“Defendant DeFeo”), and

Defendant Police Officer Richard Carpo’s (“Defendant Carpo”) (collectively “Defendants”)

Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 70). Plaintiff Bryan Mosley (“Plaintiff”) opposed (ECF

No. 76) and Defendants replied (ECF No. 80). Plaintiff subsequently filed a letter (ECF No. 81)

responding to Defendants’ reply. The Court has considered all of the parties’ submissions, finds

oral argument unnecessary, and, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1, decides the motion on the

papers; and

WHEREAS, summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is ‘material’ under Rule 56 if its existence or nonexistence might

impact the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law.” Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d

410, 416 Gd Cir. 2015) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see

also MS. by & through Hall vy. Susquehanna Twp, Sch, Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2020)

(“A fact is material if—taken as true—it would affect the outcome of the case under governing

law.”). Moreover, “[a] dispute over a material fact is ‘genuine’ if ‘a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Santini, 795 F.3d at 416 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

The moving party bears the burden of identifying portions of the record that establish the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Jd. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986)). The burden then “shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and come

forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Jd. (quoting Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. vy. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 US. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotations omitted)).

To survive a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and

affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at

256-57, “A nonmoving party may not ‘rest upon mere allegations, general denials or... vague

statements... .’” Yrap Rock Indus,, Inc, v. Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 982 F.2d

884, 890 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 Gd Cir. 1991)).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court views the facts and all reasonable

inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S, at 587; and

THE COURT NOTING that Defendant DeFeo and Defendant Carpo contend that

Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment Excessive Force claim should be dismissed because they are

entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity; and

WHEREAS to establish a right to qualified immunity, the defendant has the burden to

show either that there was no constitutional violation or that the federally protected right that was

allegedly violated was not clearly established. Pearson y. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009);

Mack v. Yost, 63 F.Ath 211, 227 Gd Cir, 2023) (cleaned up), To establish a right to qualified

immunity on summary judgment, the defendant must show that “there was no genuine dispute of

material fact to refute their contention that they did not violate [Plaintiffs] constitutional rights as

he asserted them, or show that reasonable officers could not have known that their conduct

constituted such a violation when they engaged in it.” Halsey v, Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 288 (3d

Cir, 2014).; and

WHEREAS, the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects a persons’

right to be “secure in their persons...against unreasonable...seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. As

such, to establish a Fourth Amendment violation as the result of excessive force, a plaintiff must

first show that a seizure occurred,' and then that, under the specific circumstances, the seizure

itself was unreasonable or that it was conducted in an unreasonable manner. Lamont v, New Jersey,

637 F.3d 177, 183 Gd Cir, 2011). (citing Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599,

(1989); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S, 386, 395-96, (1989)).

The reasonableness of a seizure is an objective question that balances the government’s

interests that were at stake with the nature and quality of the intrusion on the plaintiff. See Graham,

490 U.S. at 396. When competing factual narratives exist, disputed material facts prevent the court

from determining whether, as a matter of law, a defendant’s use of force was objectively

reasonable. McKoy v. Carter, 543 F. App'x 231, 235 (3d Cir. 2013).; and

WHEREAS, Local Civil Rule 56.1 requires the party filing a motion for summary

judgment to separately file a statement of undisputed material facts citing to the record to support

each fact. Loc. Civ. R. 56.1. The opposing party must file a responsive statement, addressing each

fact, “indicating agreement or disagreement and, if not agreed, stating each material fact in dispute

this case, no party argues that Plaintiff was not seized.

and citing to the affidavits and other documents submitted in connection with the motion.” /d, The

opposing party may also file a supplemental statement of facts, which the party that filed the

motion for summary judgment must respond to in the same manner as described above. id.

In this case, Defendants filed a statement of undisputed material facts (“SSMF”) (ECF No.

70-1), to which Plaintiff responded (“RSMF”) (ECF No. 75). Plaintiff also furnished a

supplemental counterstatement of undisputed material facts (““CSMF”) (ECF No. 75), to which

Defendants responded (““RCMF”) (ECF No.80-1), Defendant’s SMF contained eighty (80)

individual paragraphs of undisputed facts. See SMF. In Plaintiff's response, he denies forty-four

(44) of these “undisputed” facts. See RSMF. While some of the facts that Plaintiff denies may not

be material, others go directly to whether Defendants used excessive force.

For example, in their SMF Defendants state: “Mosely then tried to leave the apartment,

which door of which was right next to the stairs, See Exhibit A; See Exhibit KE, 1:44-1:47; See

Exhibit F, 1:38-1:41.” SMF at ¢ 14. Plaintiff responds: “Denied. Plaintiff got up to use the

bathroom and in the state of confusion that he was in and went to the apartment’s front door instead

of the bathroom door. When Plaintiff got up and walked to the door he was unimpeded. See,

Defendant’s Exhibit E, 1:33-2:00; Defendant’s Exhibit F, 1:31-2:00,”

This fact goes to the context of the interaction between Defendants and Plaintiff prior to

Plaintiff being restrained. Under Defendants’ version a reasonable jury could infer that the Plaintiff

was attempting to flee, Under Plaintiffs version, a reasonable jury could infer that Plaintiffs

behavior was the resuit of the severe medical episode he was allegedly experiencing. These two

different inferences that arise from a disputed fact would differently inform the factfinder’s

determination of whether the force Defendants later used was reasonable or not.

This is but one example of the disputed facts that the Court identified in the supplemental

papers alone. Upon review, the Court identified at least twenty-seven (27) of the forty-four

disputed facts that were equally material to the determination of whether Defendants’ use of force

was reasonable.” Given that there are clearly disputed facts as to whether Defendants’ use of force

was reasonable, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Defendants did not use excessive

force; and

THE COURT NOTING that Defendant Carpo and Defendant DeFeo contend that they

are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's Excessive Force claim because Plaintiff's rights

were not clearly established at the time of the incident; and

WHEREAS, a right is clearly established if “[t]he contours of the right fare] sufficiently

clear that a reasonable official wouid understand that what he is doing violates that right.”

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Additionally, “in the light of pre-existing law

the unlawfulness [of the challenged actions] must be apparent.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739

(2002). Therefore, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question

confronted by the official beyond debate.” Plumhoffy. Rickard, $72 U.S. 765, 779 (2014). (cleaned

up). This precedential requirement mandates that “the rule must be settled law, which means it is

dictated by-controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority.” D.C. □□

Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018). (cleaned up). Accordingly, courts in the Third Circuit “look first

for applicable Supreme Court precedent. If none exists, [courts] consider whether there is a case

of controlling authority in [the Third Circuit] or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority

? This alone would be enough to conclude that there are material facts that are disputed such that summary judgment

is not appropriate. However, the Court notes that in Plaintiff's CSMF, Plaintiff listed ninety-nine (99) individual facts

and twenty-four (24) supplemental bullet points to fact ninety-nine (99), Defendants—the moving parties with the

burden to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact—denied eighty-one (81) of those facts, as well as

a categorical denial of all twenty-four (24) bullet points. Many of the facts that Defendants denied would materially

alter the inferences a jury could reasonably draw, indicating that there are disputed facts that must be resolved by a

jury and that summary judgment is not appropriate.

in the Courts of Appeals.” New Jersey Chinese City. Cir. v. McAleer, No. CV 21-08320 (GC)

(RLS), 2025 WL 1564869, at *9 (D.N.J. June 3, 2025) (citing Porter v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 974

F.3d 431, 449 (3d Cir, 2020)); and

WHEREAS, the Third Circuit has expressly held that “the right of an arrestee to be free

from the use of excessive force in the course of his handcuffing” is clearly established and that “‘a

reasonable officer would have known that employing excessive force in the course of handcuffing

would violate the Fourth Amendment.” Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 778 Gd Cir. 2004). In Kopec,

the Court analyzed established law from our sister circuits, including Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d

1433 (9th Cir.1993). In Palmer, the Court denied summary judgment on qualified immunity when

an officer “allegedly employed excessive force by handcuffing plaintiff so tightly that he was in

pain and was left bruised for several weeks.” Jd, at 1436.

Just as in Kopec and Palmer, cases which both significantly predate the events alleged here,

Plaintiff had a right to be free from the excessive use of force in the course of handcuffing.

Defendants cannot convincingly argue that they were not on notice that their conduct would violate

Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right when Plaintiff persistently complained that the handcuffs were

causing him pain, he repeatedly requested that Defendants remove the handcuffs, and Defendants

could observe the handcuffs cutting Plaintiff's wrists. Further evidence indicates that Defendants

observed and acknowledged that the handcuffs were cutting Plaintiff's wrists, which prompted a

discussion about a prior incident in which an individual sustained such severe wrist injuries from

handeuffing that Defendants were unsure whether he lost consciousness due to blood loss or

sedation. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s right to be free from excessive force in the

course of handcuffing was clearly established at the time of the incident and Defendants are not

entitled to qualified immunity; and

THE COURT NOTING that Defendant DeFeo and Defendant Carpo contend that

Plaintiff's Failure to Intervene claim should be dismissed because, as a matter of law, there was

no constitutional violation, and, alternatively, that if there are disputed facts as to whether there

was a constitutional violation, Defendants DeFeo and Carpo did not have a reasonable opportunity

to intervene; and

WHEREAS a law enforcement officer is liable under § 1983 ifhe observes another officer

committing a constitutional violation, such as the use of excessive force, and fails to intervene

when he had a reasonable opportunity to do so. See Smith vy. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 651 (3d

Cir. 2002). For summary judgment to be appropriate, Defendants must show that there are no

material facts in dispute as to whether Plaintiffs constitutional right was violated, and as to

whether Defendants had a reasonable opportunity to intervene. See White v. City of Vineland, 500

F, Supp. 3d 295, 306 (D.N.J. 2020). Generally, if an officer is “in the vicinity when a constitutional

violation occurs [he] has the opportunity to intervene, at least for purposes of summary judgment.”

Id. Further, “the duration of the incident is key to determining whether there was a reasonable

opportunity to intervene. There may be a genuine issue of fact regarding a reasonable opportunity

to intervene where the allegedly excessive force lasts about fifteen minutes, or where the event

unfolds in multiple stages.” E/ v. City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 335 Gd Cir, 2020) (cleaned

up).

In this case, Defendant DeFeo and Defendant Carpo were both in the vicinity for the

duration of the alleged use of excessive force, which their Body Worn Camera (“BWC”) footage

shows lasted up to forty-two (42) minutes, a period of time that clearly exceeds fifteen (15)

minutes. Further, the alleged events unfolded in multiple stages, beginning when Defendants

arrived at the Plaintiff's residence in response to a medical emergency and handcuffed him less

than six (6) minutes later. Next, Plaintiff was removed from the apartment while still handcuffed

and complaining of pain and was then transferred onto a stretcher with his hands still handcuffed

behind his back, Finally, Plaintiff remained laying on his handcuffed hands and complaining of

pain even after he was no longer acting, as Defendants described, agitated and aggressively,

including after he was sedated and contained in the ambulance with multiple EMTs and Defendant

DeFeo during transport to the hospital.

The Court’s finding supra that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether excessive

force was used, coupled with the extended timeframe of the alleged force and the incident

unfolding in multiple stages lead to the conclusion that summary judgment is not appropriate as to

Plaintiff's Failure to Intervene claim against Defendant Carpo and Defendant DeFeo; and

THE COURT NOTING that Defendant DeFeo and Defendant Carpo contend that

Plaintiff's False Arrest/False Imprisonment and Illegal Search and Seizure claims must be

dismissed because probable cause existed to detain Plaintiff? and

WHEREAS, probable cause exists when “the facts and circumstances within the arresting

officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an

offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Colfins v. Christie, 337 F.

App'x 188, 191 (3d Cir, 2009), Whether probable cause existed is a mixed question of fact and law

that is typically determined by a jury. /d. at 192. However, the question may be resolved by a court

when the court concludes that “probable cause exist[ed] as a matter of law [because] the evidence,

viewed most favorably to Plaintiff, reasonably would not support a contrary factual finding.” fd.

However, summary judgment is not appropriate when issues of material fact exist as to whether

> Defendants collapse their arguments for dismissal of Plaintiff's claims for False Arrest/Imprisonment and Illegal

Search and Seizure into a single section. As such, the Court will analyze the merits of those arguments as one as

the officer had probable cause to detain the plaintiff such that a reasonable jury could properly

draw inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d

628, 635 (3d Cir. 1995); Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1998); Harvard v.

Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 199 (3d Cir. 2020),

Under the Community Caretaking Doctrine,’ officers may detain an individual without

criminal probable cause when they do so to protect the detained individual or the surrounding

community. Vargas v. City of Philadelphia, 783 F.3d 962, 972 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that the

community caretaking doctrine can apply when “a person outside of a home has been seized for a

non-investigatory purpose and to protect that individual or the community at large and that

summary judgment is appropriate when the undisputed facts show that the officer’s actions were

objectively reasonable.”).

In Vargas v. City of Philadelphia, the Court found that, as a matter of law, the defendant

police officers acted objectively reasonably when “[t]hey were responding to a volatile situation

4 Phe Court acknowledges Plaintiff's objection to Defendants’ argument in their Reply (ECF No. 80) regarding the

Community Caretaking Doctrine. Plaintiff argues in a letter (ECF No. 81) filed in response to Defendants’ reply, that

Defendants did not raise the Community Caretaking Doctrine argument in their Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF

No. 70} and that they instead improperly raised it in their Reply (ECF No. 80). Upon review, Plaintiffis correct in □□□□

Defendants did not, by name, raise the Community Caretaking Doctrine in their moving brief. However, Defendants

did substantively argue that the principles that underly the Community Caretaking Doctcine—that there is probable

cause for a non-investigatory detention when officers act to protect the detained individual or others—-applied in the

circumstances of this case. (Defs.’ Br. at p. 24) (“In the instant matter, Officers DeFeo and Carpo were dispatched to

respond to a call regarding a medical emergency involying a male inside an apartment. SOF 71. Upon their arrival,

the officers were quickly directed to Plaintiff's presence in the apartment. SOF 92-3. Mosley was incoherent, not

speaking intelligibly, exhibiting erratic movements and appeared to possibly be under the influence of drugs. SOF

When the officers attempted to engage Plaintiff in conversation, he was immediately agitated and failed to

follow any directions. Jd. He then attempted to leave the apartment, even though EMS was then arriving and Plaintiff

clearly needed medical attention. SOF f9!13-16, 30-32. At this point in time, there is no question that probable cause

existed for Plaintiff to be detained for his own safety and the safety of everyone else present while he was assessed

medically by the EMS personnel, Mosely’s erratic and aggressive behavior was creating a danger for everyone present,

Plaintiff was subsequently placed under control by Officers DeFeo and Carpo by the placing of handcuffs upon him.

SOF 435.”}. In response to this argument, Plaintiff’s opposition stated: “There is no such thing as probable cause to

detain Plaintiff so that he could allegedly receive medical treatment.” (P1.’s Opp. at p. 18), Plaintiff’s argument invites

Defendants to respond, which they do by pointing to case law that establishes that probable canse to detain an

individual can exist in a non-investigatory capacity outside of the criminal context when officers act to ensure the

safety of the individual or the community at large. (Defs.’ Reply at p. 8-10). The Court finds nothing improper about

Defendants’ argument in their Reply regarding the Community Caretaking Doctrine.

which they did not initially know involved a medical emergency, and any brief seizure that may

have occurred was a result of the officers' concern for the safety of everyone involved.” 783 F.3d

at 972. Nothing in the facts of Vargas indicate that the plaintiff, who was suffering a medical

emergency, was handcuffed or physically detained at any point. /d. Rather, the alleged detainment

was the result of the defendant officer’s oral directive to the plaintiff to wait for an approaching

ambulance to arrive, which was imminent, See Id, Additionally, the alleged non-physical

detainment lasted no longer than “a few minutes” at most. /d.

These are not the facts of this case. Here, Defendants were dispatched explicitly to assist

Plaintiff with a medical emergency occurring inside his residence. During the interaction

Defendants observed that Plaintiff “clearly needed medical attention.” Defs.’ Br. at p. 24. Plaintiff

was handcuffed, allegedly for his safety and the safety of others, less than six minutes after

Defendant Carpo and Defendant DeFeo arrived, and he remained handcuffed even after he was

sedated and arrived at the hospital more than forty (40) minutes later. (Defs,’ SMF at J 58-68;

Ex. E 5:42-48:20,) Assuming the Community Caretaking Doctrine were to apply in this

situation, the Court still cannot conclude as a matter of law, even based on a non-investigatory

probable cause standard, that Defendants acted objectively reasonably. Therefore, summary

judgment is not appropriate as to Plaintiff's claims of False Imprisonment/Arrest and [legal Search

and Seizure; and

THE COURT NOTING that Defendant Egg Harbor argues that Plaintiff has not

established a viable Afonel/ Claim for failure to train, supervise, or monitor officers because

Plaintiff does not offer evidence of Defendant Egg Harbor’s deliberate indifference to a pattern of

constitutional violations; and

10

WHEREAS, to establish Monel! liability for a failure to train, a plaintiff must prove two

essential elements: deliberate indifference and causation, Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d

217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014). Specifically, when the alleged policy “concerns a failure to train or

supervise municipal employees, liability under section 1983 requires a showing that the failure

amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of persons with whom those employees will come

into contact.” Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 357 Gd Cir.1999) (quoting Citv of Canton,

Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989)). Additionally, the alleged deficiency in

training must have “actually caused the police officers’ indifference to [Plaintiff's] medical needs.”

Canton, 489 U.S. at 379. This means that “Jijn resolving the issue of a city's liability, the focus

must be on adequacy of the training program in relation to the tasks the particular officers must

perform.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). Summary judgment is not

appropriate when “a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether the need for more or

different training for [defendants] was obvious, and the failure to provide that was very likely to

result in a violation of constitutional rights.” Forrest vy. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 110 Gd Cir, 2019),

In this case, Defendants admitted, at least partially, to the following facts:

10. The only training that Officer Carpo received regarding medical

calls was performing CPR and lifesaving measures. Defendants’

Exhibit D, 21:12-19,

11. Officer Carpo had no training regarding how to deal with a

person who is suffering from a seizure. Defendants’ Exhibit D,

22:20-23.

12, Officer Carpo possessed no knowledge of whether to handcuff a

person who is having a seizure. Defendants’ Exhibit D, 23:7-18.

13, Officer DeFeo also did not receive any formal training regarding

individuals who are suffering from a seizure but learned through on-

the-job training that you should not restrain an individual who is

actively having a seizure. Defendants’ Exhibit C, 15:8-24, 16:3-8,

30:7-9.

11

14, Officer DeFeo indicated that in his experience when someone is

coming out of a seizure, they can be unconscious, barely conscious,

not speaking, eyes open or closed and might appear confused or

intoxicated. Defendants’ Exhibit C, 16:16-17:6.

Pl.’s CSMF at Jf 10-14; Defs.” RCMF at fff 10-14.

Although Defendants admit each of these facts in some respect, many such admissions are

qualified, with Defendants denying material portions or supplementing the facts with additional

evidence that could reasonably alter the inferences drawn by a jury. For example, Defendants

admitted that “Officer DeFeo indicated that in his experience when someone is coming out of a

seizure, they can be unconscious, barely conscious, not speaking, eyes open or closed, and might

appear confused or intoxicated.” PL’s CSMF ¥ 14; Defs.” RCMF § 14. However, Defendants

qualified that admission by citing additional testimony wherein Defendant DeF eo stated that “there

are no specific guidelines for treating post-seizure individuals and that the goal is ‘to do your best

to keep them and all parties in the area safe.’” Id.

The inferences to be drawn from these facts differ depending on which party’s version the

jury credits more heavily, For example, under Plaintiff's account, a reasonable jury could infer

that if Defendant DeFeo had been sufficiently trained in responding to medical emergencies, he

would have recognized the behavior he described as agitated and aggressive as signs of a seizure,

especially given that he was dispatched to Plaintiff’s residence explicitly for a man experiencing

a seizure. Conversely, if a jury were to credit Defendants’ expanded account, it could reasonably

infer that Defendant DeFeo had sufficient training to identify potential signs of a seizure and was

awate of the applicable practices, if any, governing treatment of such individuals.

These types of competing inferences regarding the quality, scope, and existence of

Defendants’ training in responding to medical emergencies would weigh heavily in a factfinder’s

12

determination of whether Defendant City of Egg Harbor was deliberately indifferent to a risk of

constitutional violations arising from inadequate training. Accordingly, summary judgment on

Plaintiff's Monell failure-to-train claim is not appropriate; and

THE COURT NOTING that Defendants contend that Plaintiffs claims for violations of

the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”) should be dismissed because Plaintiff has

failed to show that he would have been treated differently but-for his alleged disability; and

WHEREAS, to establish a claim for discrimination under the NJLAD, a plaintiff must

show that: (1) the police operate a place of public accommodation; (2) the plaintiff is disabled

within NJLAD’s definition; and (3) the plaintiff was denied equal treatment based on his disability,

JPLD., 659 F, Supp. 3d 471, 477 (D.N.J. 2023); Greene v. Lance, No, CV2114399, 2022

WL 1241309, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2022); Vergara v. Keyes, No. 20-1460, 2020 WL 7778080,

at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2020).

“The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division has held that a ‘police

department—both the building and the individual officers—~is a place of public accommodation,’”

K.F 659 F. Supp at 477. (citing Praszynski vy, Uwaneme, 371 N.J.Super. 333, 853 A.2d 288, 297

(Ct. App. Div, 2004)). Further, “the discriminatory acts of law enforcement officers are considered

public accommodation discrimination under the NJLAD.” Vandegrift v. Bowen, No. CIV.A 07-

2623, 2009 WL 1913412, at *3 (D.N.J. Tune 30, 2009),

New Jersey Courts have recognized that under the NJLAD, the definition of “disability” is

broad, encompassing broader protections than federal law. Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly & Co., 636 F.

App’x 831, 848 n. 30 (3d Cir. 2016). The NJILAD expressly adopts seizure disorders as a disability.

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-5,

13

The final element, causation, proceeds by way of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting

framework, which initially requires the plaintiff to establish a prime facie case of discrimination,

Once plaintiff has established a prime facie case, the defendant must then show that a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason existed for the adverse treatment. Rich v. State, 294 F. Supp. 3d 266,

279 (D.N.J, 2018), Ifthe defendant articulates such a reason, the burden then shifts back to plaintiff

to show that the defendant’s “proffered reason was merely a pretext for discrimination.” /d.

Under the NJLAD, an individual may be liable based on a theory of aiding and abetting.

K.J., 659 F. Supp. at 477. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e) provides that it is unlawful “[flor any person,

whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any

of the acts forbidden under this act, or to attempt to do so.” N.JLS.A. 10:5-12(e).° To hold a

defendant individually liable for aiding and abetting, “the employer must also be liable under the

LAD.” Ivan v. Cuty. of Middlesex, 595 F,. Supp. 2d 425, 463 (D.N.J. 2009),

In this case, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Egg Harbor discriminated against him by

failing to train its police officers how to properly manage a medical emergency and that this failure

has resulted in a widely held practice of disparate treatment for those suffering from disabilities

that is tantamount to discrimination, In support of this assertion, Plaintiff cites a conversation

between Defendants DeFeo and Carpo and EMTs wherein Defendant DeFeo described a prior

encounter with an individual who was experiencing a medical emergency. In that incident,

Defendant DeFeo apparently restrained the individual in handcuffs which cut the individual so

severely that officers and EMTs were not sure if he lost consciousness from blood loss or sedation.

> A defendant employee may be liable for aiding and abetting if the plaintiff establishes that: (1) the party whom the

defendant aided performed a wrongful act that caused an injury; (2) the defendant was generally aware of his role as

part of an overall ilegal or tortious activity at the time that he provided assistance; and (3) the defendant knowingly

and substantially assisted the principal violation. Tarr v. Crasufli, 181 N.J. 70, 84, 853 A.2d 921 (2004)

(quoting Hurley v, Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 127 (3d Cir, 1999)).

14

Defendant points to a lack of evidence regarding derogatory statements that would

demonstrate that the Defendants treated Plaintiff with animus because of his seizure disability.

Defendants further point to the fact that Defendant DeFeo and Defendant Carpo did not engage in

any use of force whatsoever until Plaintiff's “erratic and aggressive behavior resulted in the

officers and EMTs being physically shoved,” which they argue indicates that they would have

treated any other individual that did not have a disability in the same manner. Defs.’ Opp. at p. 36.

These competing narratives present genuine issues of material fact that would permit a reasonable

jury to draw different inferences regarding whether Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff

because of his disability. As such, summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims of violations of the

NJLAD is not appropriate; and

THE COURT NOTING that Defendants contend that Plaintiffs claim for damages for

emotional distress should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to

demonstrate that he has suffered emotional injuries that would entitle him to damages; and

WHEREAS, to establish a right to compensatory recovery for emotional distress under §

1983, a plaintiff must show that a constitutional violation occurred, that the plaintiff “in fact

suffered emotional distress, embarrassment and/or humiliation” and that the defendant’s conduct □

“proximately caused plaintiff's injury.” Atwmiller vy. Univ. of Delaware, 434 F. Supp. 1273, 1310

(D, Del. 1977), Expert evidence is not required to establish plaintiffs emotional injuries, however

there must be some evidence in the record that would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the

plaintiff suffered an emotional injury. Bolden vy. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 21 F.3d 29, 34

(3d Cir. 1994). As such, courts reject claims for emotional distress when a plaintiff cannot point

to evidence in the record showing that their emotional distress was caused by the constitutional

violation. Padilla v, Miller, 143 F. Supp. 2d 479, 494 (M.D. Pa. 2001).

15

In this case, Plaintiff argues that he is in constant fear of the police and that his “phobia” is

so intense that he is afraid that he will have another medical episode requiring the assistance of

first responders. PL.’s Opp. at p. 28. Further, Plaintiff contends that he “sought professional help

to deal with this tumult.” /d. Defendants, while explicitly conceding that evidence of medical

treatment and medication for emotional distress are not necessary to establish a claim for emotional

distress, nonetheless argue that Plaintiff “did not go to a doctor and did not receive any medication

as a result of his alleged emotional distress.” Defs.’ Br. at p, 37. Defendants then argue that none

of the evidence in the record indicates that Plaintiff was “rendered physically and/or emotionally

debilitated in a manner which would disable him from performing normal work or social

activities.” Id.

Given Plaintiffs contention that he sought “professional services” for his emotional

injuries and was “briefly treated for same” and Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff has not sought

medical intervention for his emotional distress, a genuine issue of material fact remains regarding

whether Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to establish a claim for emotional distress. As

such, summary judgment as to Plaintiffs claim for emotional distress is not appropriate; and

THE COURT NOTING that Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims for punitive

damages should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not established evidence that Defendant DeFeo

and Defendant Carpo acted with the requisite state of mind.®; and

WHEREAS, when a Plaintiff seeks punitive damages against individual capacity

defendants under § 1983 “a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages...when the

® Defendants also argue that Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against Defendant Egg Harbor should be dismissed

because § 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities. Plaintiff responds that he does not seek

punitive damages against Defendant Egg Harbor and only seeks punitive damages against Defendant DeFeo and

Defendant Carpo in their individual capacities, as permitted under § 1983,

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defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless

or callous indifference to the federaliy protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S, 30, 56

(1983),

Here, Defendants make a conclusory statement that no reasonable jury could find that

Defendant Carpo and Defendant DeFeo possessed the requisite state of mind to award punitive

damages, Plaintiff argues that while experiencing a medical emergency, which Defendants were

aware of, he was handcuffed, tackled to the ground, and held down by multiple people. Plaintiff

further argues that the handcuffs were subsequently tightened multiple times despite Plaintiff's

repeated complaints of pain and that Defendants never adjusted the handcuffs in response to those

complaints. Plaintiff remained restrained for more than forty (40) minutes, even after he had been

sedated and transported to the hospital.

Genuine questions of material fact exist as to whether Defendant DeFeo and Defendant

Carpo acted with the requisite recklessness or callous indifference to justify an award of punitive

damages. As such, summary judgment as to Plaintiffs request for punitive damages is not

appropriate,

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY on tis2l Ly of March, 2026, □

ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.70) is DENIED.

United States District Judge

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