Case law

State v. Riggins

Court of Appeals of Kansas · Sep 12, 2025

The only firm time limit Jones established was: "A defendant who waits to invoke [statutory] immunity until appeal after conviction simply waits too long." 298 Kan. at 334. … Riggins timely raised his self-defense immunity claim below, which placed the burden on the State to establish his use of force was unjustified. See K.S.A. 21-5231(b), (c).

Belinda Lasalle v. Honorable Chelsey R. Napoleon, in Her Official Capacity as Clerk of Court for the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans

Louisiana Court of Appeal · Nov 4, 2025

R.S. 11:15131, the Clerks’ Retirement Fund had established 1 La. … The testimony at trial established that Ms.

Martel Enterprises v. City of Chicago

223 Ill. App. 3d 1028 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Nov 15, 1991

The city also contends Martel was required to establish that the fireworks were legal as element of conversion. … The city did not establish that it was substantially prejudiced from the instruction.

Gerard Matzen// Marsha McLane, in Her Official Capacity as Director of Texas Civil Commitment Office, and the Texas Civil Commitment Office v. Marsha McLane, in Her Official Capacity as Director of Texas Civil Commitment Office, and the Texas Civil Commitment Office// Cross-Appellee, Gerard Matzen

Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Mar 6, 2020

Fifth issue: McLane’s entitlement to qualified immunity In his fifth issue, Matzen contends that McLane was not entitled to qualified immunity as to his claims alleging that she was: (1) not performing discretionary … (noting that official immunity is also referred to as qualified immunity). Qualified immunity is not at issue when a government employee is sued only in employee’s official capacity.

James Edward Phelps v. Jacqueline Ann Newman

Court of Appeals of Tennessee · Jan 3, 2013

Newman told the plaintiff that she did what she did in order that Ford would qualify for football tickets, which tickets were given to Coffee. Ford actually worked somewhere other than UT on the day in question. … We are puzzled by the court’s holding and the defendants’ argument; the complaint clearly states at paragraph 53 that “[a]ll the [d]efendants . . . actively and intentionally, maliciously, and/or recklessly, and with malice

Louise Haddad v. Lyft Florida, Inc.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · May 13, 2026

Here, Subsection 18 is structured to establish a broad default rule of immunity, and Subsections (18)(a)1.–3. are exceptions to that general rule of immunity. … which is clearly expressed at Subsection 18’s outset.

Williams v. City of Independence

931 S.W.2d 894 · Missouri Court of Appeals · Sep 10, 1996

Nonetheless, such immunity from liability for injuries caused by the condition of public property is expressly waived if the plaintiff establishes that: the property was in dangerous condition at the time of injury, that … We refuse to find that crossing the center line, travelling through the opposite lane of traffic, and driving across several private lawns before hitting a headwall eight feet off of the roadway qualifies as a “slight deviation

Abruzzo v. City of Park Ridge

374 Ill. App. 3d 743 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 22, 2007

Immunity under the Act qualifies as an affirmative matter properly raised in a section 2 — 619 motion to dismiss. Arteman v. … the defendant in that case had established a fire department with emergency services.

Clay v. Scott

883 S.W.2d 573 · Missouri Court of Appeals · Sep 20, 1994

The amount and type of personal property an offender housed in a department facility may possess shall be established by policy. … (Our emphasis) “Policy-making entails developing a means to an end, and necessarily involves discretionary functions clearly within the scope of official immunity.” Scher v.

State v. Dickerson

142 Idaho 514 · Idaho Court of Appeals · Feb 3, 2006

by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. … Similarly in Saenz , the Court said: [ 0 ]ur cases have not identified any acceptable reason for qualifying the protection ... for “the ‘citizen of State A who ventures into State B’ to settle there and establish a home.”

Medina v. State

2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 4419 · Colorado Court of Appeals · Jul 20, 2000

Under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), the trial court's findings as to jurisdictional facts are entitled to deference and can be set aside only if clearly erroneous. … For the purposes of this subsection (1), a dangerous condition should have been known to exist if it is established that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such a nature that, in the exercise of

Lin v. City of Golden

97 P.3d 303 · Colorado Court of Appeals · Mar 25, 2004

Plaintiffs argued that the evidence established that the City had failed to maintain the public roadway in its original condition. … The burden of proving jurisdiction is on the plaintiff, and the trial court’s findings of fact supporting a determination under the GIA will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Trinity Broad, of Denver, Inc. v.

E. King v. Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority

139 A.3d 336 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · May 27, 2016

As such, the Authority asserted, King did not establish the exception to local agency immunity under 42 Pa. C.S. §8542(b)(5). … Therefore, plaintiff failed to establish any exception to governmental immunity under [42 Pa.

SG v. City of Monroe

843 So. 2d 657 · Louisiana Court of Appeal · Apr 11, 2003

The defendant now seeks immunity for negligence from this suit brought by the plaintiff, who was subsequently arrested. Finding that the immunity under La. C. … Likewise, the facts established by the preliminary examination testimony of the child's mother were either replicated in Dr.

Belt v. Ritter

18 Mich. App. 495 · Michigan Court of Appeals · Mar 31, 1970

Defendants necessarily swore to both of these elements in order to establish a prima facie offense. … their judicial acts, and this_ is well-established in Michigan.

Austin v. City of Lubbock

618 S.W.2d 552 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Apr 30, 1981

Answer: “The City of Lubbock clearly abused its discretion”; or, “The City of Lubbock did not clearly abuse its discretion”. ANSWER: The City of Lubbock clearly abused its discretion. … After it has been established that a zoning ordinance is being violated by the exercise of the eminent domain power, the issue, under the Sunset Valley case, is whether the con-demnor is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably

Leonard v. Cole

134 Pa. Commw. 14 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 2, 1990

Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 , 106 S.Ct. 1092 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer enjoys qualified immunity from damage actions when his request for a warrant allegedly causes an unconstitutional … Only when the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable, will the shield of immunity be lost. Id.

City of Oak Ridge North v. Mendes

339 S.W.3d 222 · Texas Court of Appeals, 9th District (Beaumont) · Mar 24, 2011

’s pleadings cite to a statute establishing that the City waived its right to governmental immunity from being sued for breach of contract. … On appeal, the City contends that the Legislature has not clearly and unambiguously waived the City’s governmental immunity for claims alleging violations of the Texas Wiretap Statute.

Erickson v. State

824 P.2d 725 · Court of Appeals of Alaska · Dec 13, 1991

Erickson next argues that the state presented insufficient evidence to establish his specific intent to bomb Twogood. … Judge Johnstone found that Coletta never made any promises of immunity or implied that he could give Erickson immunity. The state’s position was that if Erickson was being truthful, he did not need immunity.

Dorlon v. City of Springfield

843 S.W.2d 934 · Missouri Court of Appeals · Nov 12, 1992

Both the Regents and the Dorlons contend such admission conclusively establishes the City’s ownership of the sidewalk where Diane was injured. … This language clearly refers to conditions on a public entity’s property where employees perform work in the course of their employment.