Louise Haddad v. Lyft Florida, Inc.

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

LOUISE HADDAD,

Appellant,

v.

LYFT FLORIDA, INC., et al.,

Appellees.

No. 4D2025-0117

[May 13, 2026]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,

Broward County; David Alan Haimes, Judge; L.T. Case No.

062023CA007025AXXXCE.

John Stewart Mills and Jonathan Anthony Martin of The Mills Firm,

P.A., Jacksonville, for appellant.

Brigid F. Cech Samole, James Evans Gillenwater, and Bethany Jane

Matilda Pandher of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Miami, for appellees.

LOTT, J.

Louise Haddad claims she was assaulted by her Lyft driver. She sued

Lyft for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, alleging that

statements on its website led her to believe that the ride would be safe,

thus leading to the personal injuries she suffered at the hands of the

driver.

The merits of her claims are not before us. Instead, Lyft argued that a

relatively new statutory provision, section 627.748(18), Florida Statutes

(2022) (“Subsection 18”), provides it with immunity against her claims. The

trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint.

Haddad appealed, arguing that Subsection 18’s scope of immunity is

not so broad as to cover her claims, which specifically allege that Lyft’s

own negligence caused her injuries.

With the benefit of oral argument, we affirm. The scope of immunity

provided by Subsection 18’s plain text is very broad. It appears to sweep

in practically any claim against Lyft (or a similar rideshare network

operator) for injury suffered during a ride, regardless of how Lyft may have

directly caused or contributed to the injury—so long as Lyft otherwise

complies with the requirements of the rideshare statute (Section 627.748)

and does not engage in criminal conduct.

Whether the legislators who voted on the text of the statute actually

intended to confer such broad immunity is immaterial. 1 Whether it is wise

to confer such broad immunity is not a question for this branch to

answer. 2

1 “Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators’ intentions.” I.N.S. v.

Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452–53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also

Advisory Op. to the Governor re Implementation of Amend. 4, The Voting

Restoration Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020) (“[S]uch extraneous

considerations [i.e., legislative intent] can result in the judicial imposition of

meaning that the text cannot bear, either through expansion or contraction of

the meaning carried by the text.”); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading

Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 393 (2012) (“Each member voting for the

bill has a slightly different reason for doing so. There is no single set of intentions

shared by all. The state of the assembly’s collecting psychology is a hopeless

stew of intentions . . . [y]et the majority has undeniably agreed on the final

language that passes into law. That is all they have agreed on—and that is the

sole means by which the assembly has authority to make law.”).

2 See, e.g., DeSantis v. Fla. Educ. Ass’n, 306 So. 3d 1202, 1218 (Fla. 1st DCA

2020) (“[T]he judiciary may not second guess the policy decisions of the political

branches, no matter how appealing we may find contrary rationales.”) (citation

and quotations omitted); Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 403

(2024) (“Courts interpret statutes, no matter the context, based on the traditional

tools of statutory construction, not individual policy preferences.”); State v.

Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 414 n.2 (Fla. 2004) (“If the legislature did not intend the

results mandated by the statute’s plain language, then the appropriate remedy

is for it to amend the statute.”) (quoting Overstreet v. State, 629 So. 2d 125, 126

(Fla. 1993)).

2

Rather, our job is to discern what the text says. 3 And this text says

that the immunity provided by Subsection 18 is considerably broad.

I. Background

A. Factual Allegations

Haddad alleges that she took a Lyft ride on April 15, 2022. 4 She claims

that during her ride, the driver assaulted her, causing severe and

permanent personal injuries.

Lyft Florida, Inc. is a transportation network company (“TNC”) that uses

a digital network to connect riders with drivers who provide prearranged

transportation services.

Lyft advertises various rider-safety features, including “High safety

standards” and “Proactive safety measures,” and represents that its

drivers must pass background checks, undergo annual re-screening, be

continuously monitored for criminal convictions, and complete a safety

program. Haddad alleges she reviewed Lyft’s website and relied on these

representations in deciding to use Lyft’s services.

Haddad filed suit in 2022. Haddad’s second amended complaint

asserted three counts: negligence of the driver, and both negligent

misrepresentation and fraudulent misrepresentation by Lyft. 5 The claims

against Lyft alleged the company made false or misleading safety

3 See, e.g., Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So. 3d 318, 323 (Fla. 2022) (“In

interpreting a statute, our task is to give effect to the words that the legislature

has employed in the statutory text.”); Levy v. Levy, 326 So. 3d 678, 681 (Fla.

2021) (“We strive to determine the text’s objective meaning through the

application of the text to given facts on the basis of how a reasonable reader, fully

competent in the language, would have understood the text at the time it was

issued.”) (cleaned up); see also Homeowner’s Choice Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v.

Oakes, 2026 WL 758382, at *8 n.2 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar. 18, 2026) (“[I]t is

emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the

law is.”) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).

4 “A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint and does not

determine factual issues. All allegations of the complaint must be taken as true

and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be construed in favor of the

non-moving party.” Doe v. Finkelman, 429 So. 3d 456, 469 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025)

(quotations and citations omitted).

5 The claims against the driver are not pertinent to this appeal.

3

representations, Haddad relied on those representations in agreeing to the

ride, and her injuries resulted from that reliance.

Lyft moved to dismiss based on Subsection 18.

B. Statutory Framework

Section 627.748 was enacted in 2017 as part of a comprehensive

framework governing transportation network companies. In 2020, the

legislature made several changes to the provision, including the addition

of Subsection 18. Section 627.748(18), Florida Statutes (2022), provides:

Vicarious liability.—

(a) A TNC is not liable under general law by reason of owning,

operating, or maintaining the digital network accessed by a

TNC driver or rider, or by being the TNC affiliated with a TNC

driver, for harm to persons or property which results or arises

out of the use, operation, or possession of a motor vehicle

operating as a TNC vehicle while the driver is logged on to the

digital network if:

1. There is no negligence under this section or criminal

wrongdoing under the federal or Florida criminal code on the

part of the TNC;

2. The TNC has fulfilled all of its obligations under this

section with respect to the TNC driver; and

3. The TNC is not the owner or bailee of the motor vehicle

that caused harm to persons or property.

(b) This subsection does not alter or reduce the coverage or

policy limits of the insurance requirements under subsection

(7) or the liability of any person other than the vicarious

liability of a TNC as described in paragraph (a).

We note that this structure parallels the federal Graves Amendment,

49 U.S.C. § 30106 (2022), enacted in 2005, which preempts state laws

imposing vicarious liability on vehicle owners engaged in the business of

renting or leasing motor vehicles. Cf. Seagrave v. State, 802 So. 2d 281,

290 (Fla. 2001) (“Florida’s well-settled rule of statutory construction [is]

that the legislature is presumed to know the existing law when a statute

is enacted . . . .”). The Graves Amendment provides that such owners are

4

not liable under state law solely by reason of ownership for harm arising

from the use of the vehicle during the rental period, so long as the owner

is not negligent or engaged in criminal wrongdoing.

C. Procedural History

Haddad opposed Lyft’s motion to dismiss, arguing that her claims were

not barred because her claims were premised on Lyft’s own alleged

misrepresentations rather than vicarious liability for the driver’s conduct.

The trial court granted the motion, concluding the complaint failed to

allege facts bringing the claims within any exception to Subsection 18’s

default rule of nonliability. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

Haddad makes three arguments—two textual and one procedural—that

her claims for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation are not barred

by Subsection 18. We address and reject each. 6

A. Subsection 18 immunity is broader than traditional vicarious

liability.

Haddad argues that Subsection 18 is not applicable to her claims

because Subsection 18 only bars traditional “vicarious” liability by TNCs.7

But that is simply not what Subsection 18 says.

To be sure, Subsection 18 is titled “vicarious liability.” But as Lyft

correctly counters, “[t]he title of a statute and the heading of a section

cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.” Brooks v. Brooks, 164 So. 3d

162, 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (citation omitted). Instead, any title “must

be read in conjunction with and does not override the text of the statute.”

Id. (citing Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33,

47 (2008)). Courts should attempt to harmonize a header with the

6The standard of review of an order granting a motion to dismiss is de novo.

Aquarius Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Goldberg, 312 So. 3d 86, 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).

7 Cf., e.g., Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 908 So. 2d 459, 467

(Fla. 2005) (“The concept of vicarious liability can be described as follows: A

person whose liability is imputed based on the tortious acts of another is liable

for the entire share of comparative responsibility assigned to the other.”)

(quotations omitted).

5

statutory text to the extent possible, but “[w]here statutory text and title

are inconsistent, we go with the text.” Kanapuram v. Dir., U.S. Citizenship

& Immigr. Servs., 131 F.4th 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2025) (citing Bhd. of

R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1947))

(cleaned up). “[A] title or heading should never be allowed to override the

plain words of a text.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:

The Interpretation of Legal Texts 185 (2012). 8

Subsection 18’s plain text makes clear that the immunity conferred is

much broader than traditional vicarious liability. Breaking it down,

Subsection 18’s operative provision provides that a TNC is:

(1) not liable under general law;

(2) by reason of owning, operating, or maintaining the digital

network accessed by a TNC driver or rider, or by being the

TNC affiliated with a TNC driver;

(3) for harm to persons or property which results or arises

out of the use, operation, or possession of a motor vehicle

operating as a TNC vehicle while the driver is logged onto the

digital network . . .

In other words, this immunity is broad, applying to all claims “under

general law.”

And this broad immunity extends to any claim based upon (“by reason

of”) Lyft “owning, operating, or maintaining” its network, or “being”

affiliated with the driver. That language is far broader than traditional

vicarious liability, and applies to cases in which Lyft’s network affiliation

with the driver is a but-for causal element of Lyft’s alleged liability. See,

e.g., Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 213 (2014) (collecting

authority wherein “the phrase, ‘by reason of,’ requires at least a showing

of ‘but for’ causation”) (citation omitted).

8 Haddad argues that Subsection 18(b) affirms a traditional understanding of

vicarious liability. Subsection 18(b) provides that “[t]his subsection does not alter

or reduce the coverage or policy limits of the insurance requirements under

subsection (7) or the liability of any person other than the vicarious liability of a

TNC as described in paragraph (a).” But the mere reference to “the vicarious

liability of a TNC as described in paragraph (a)” does no more work than

Subsection 18’s title.

6

And Subsection 18 immunity extends to any claim for harm which

“results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of a motor

vehicle” while the driver is logged into the platform. These constructions

(“results or arises out of” / “use, operation, or possession”) likewise extend

broadly. See Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528,

539 (Fla. 2005) (holding the phrase “arising out of” is “broader in meaning

than the term ‘caused by’ and means ‘originating from,’ ‘having its origin

in,’ ‘growing out of,’ ‘flowing from,’ ‘incident to’ or ‘having a connection

with’”); Nat’l Indem. Co. v. Corbo, 248 So. 2d 238, 240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)

(“‘[A]rising out of’ means causally connected with, not proximately caused

by.”).

Here, Haddad brings negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation

claims against Lyft for advertising misrepresentations that she claims

caused her to take a Lyft ride and suffer harm when the driver assaulted

her.

These claims (1) arise under “general law”; (2) causally relate Lyft’s

alleged negligence (i.e., false representations regarding safety) to the harm

suffered (i.e., personal injuries from the driver’s assault) via Lyft “owning,

operating, or maintaining” the TNC network which the driver was logged

into at the time; and (3) seek redress for injuries that arose out of the use,

operation, or possession of the vehicle operating as a TNC vehicle while

the driver was logged on to the network.

Accordingly, the claims fall within Subsection 18’s scope. It does not

matter that the complaint purports to plead negligence by Lyft rather than

a traditional vicarious liability theory. The statute is written to encompass

her claims. 9

B. The complaint does not allege “negligence under this

section.”

Haddad next argues that Subsection 18 immunity does not apply

because she alleges “negligence under this section,” and the statute only

affords immunity “if . . . there is no negligence under this section.”

§ 627.748(18)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2022).

9 And in any event, Lyft’s alleged liability for the harm suffered at the hands of

the driver is “indirect.” Cf. Vicarious, Black’s Law Dictionary (2026) (“Performed

or suffered by one person as substitute for another; indirect; surrogate.”).

7

Haddad argues that the phrase “negligence under this section,” as used

in Subsection 18(a)1., means “related to Lyft’s operation of the digital TNC

network,” because Section 627.748 generally concerns digital TNC

networks.

We disagree.

Rather, the phrase “negligence under this section” means “negligence

under Section 627.748, Florida Statutes,” which plainly means a negligent

failure to meet the statute’s requirements. Section 627.748 provides a

comprehensive set of requirements with which rideshare companies must

comply. Subsection 18 provides an immunity from certain liability so long

as a TNC complies with those requirements (and refrains from criminal

wrongdoing). Thus, “[a] TNC is not liable under general law . . . if . . .

[t]here is no negligence under this section.”

We note also that the phrase “under this section,” does not appear in

the Graves Amendment on which Subsection 18 was based, indicating a

departure from the Graves Amendment’s meaning. The Graves

Amendment provides an exception to the general rule of non-liability

“if . . . there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing . . . .” 49 U.S.C.

§ 30106(a)(2) (2022). The Graves Amendment thus exempts from its

operative non-liability provision any negligence, rather than only

“negligence under this section.”

Haddad argues that giving the phrase this meaning (as compared to

her proposed meaning) would render Subsection 18(a)2.—which provides

no liability if “[t]he TNC has fulfilled all of its obligations under this section

with respect to the TNC driver”—superfluous.

However, each canon of statutory construction is only one permissible

indicator of meaning. Sometimes different canons will cut different ways.

The fact that Subsection 18 is drafted in such a way that makes it

impossible to cleanly apply every canon is a challenge that courts must

confront, rather than an invitation to abdicate our interpretive role. 10

10 See, e.g., Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594, 598 (Fla. 2022) (“Viewed

properly as rules of thumb or guides to interpretation, rather than as inflexible

rules, the traditional canons of statutory interpretation can aid the interpretive

process from beginning to end.”).

8

Though Haddad argues that our interpretation would render

Subsection 18(a)2. mostly superfluous, 11 we note that her interpretation

(negligence “related to Lyft’s operation of the digital TNC network”) would

also render the words “under this section” superfluous relative to the

single word “negligence” in the Graves Amendment. How else would a TNC

network operator be negligent other than through its operation of a TNC

network?

Our goal in this exercise “is to arrive at a fair reading of the text by

determining the application of the text to given facts on the basis of how a

reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have

understood the text at the time it was issued.” Davis, 339 So. 3d at 323–

24 (cleaned up).

So, does “negligence under the section,” as used in Subsection 18,

mean “negligence with respect to the requirements of the section” or

“negligence broadly related to the subject matter of this section”?

Weighing all the indicia of meaning and giving effect to all the words in

context, the former is the better reading.

Thus, Haddad does not allege any “negligence under this section.”

C. The trial court properly tested Subsection 18 immunity at

the motion to dismiss stage.

Haddad argues the trial court improperly applied the Subsection 18

affirmative defense at the motion to dismiss stage. As she argues, “[a]n

affirmative defense is any matter that avoids the action and that, under

applicable law, the plaintiff is not bound to prove initially but the

defendant must affirmatively establish.” Langford v. McCormick, 552 So.

2d 964, 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (citation omitted). And affirmative

defenses “need not be negatived in the complaint.” Avila S. Condo. Ass’n,

Inc. v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599, 604 (Fla. 1977).

We address this argument last so the reader has a more fulsome

understanding, given our previous discussion, of how Subsection 18

operates. With that understanding in mind, Subsection 18 immunity is

11 Cf. Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 176–77 (“Put to a choice, however, a court

may well prefer ordinary meaning to an unusual meaning that will avoid

surplusage. . . . Sometimes drafts do repeat themselves and do include words

that add nothing of substance . . . .”).

9

not a traditional affirmative defense, but a broader immunity cutting to

the core of a cause of action against a TNC.

We see this from the emphatic opening language of the statute—“There

is no liability . . . .” This simply does not sound like an affirmative defense

that the defendant is required to prove. Cf. Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto.

Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 1086, 1096 (Fla. 2010) (“An affirmative defense is an

assertion of facts or law by the defendant that, if true, would avoid the

action and the plaintiff is not bound to prove that the affirmative defense

does not exist.”); Katz v. Riemer, 305 So. 3d 663, 667 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)

(“[A]n affirmative defense is any matter that avoids the action and that the

defendant must affirmatively establish.”) (citation omitted).

And the legislature has not used the language, “there is no liability,” in

the context of affirmative defenses. Rather, it has used that language in

the context of broader immunities. 12

While we recognize some precedent suggests that some immunities are

affirmative defenses, 13 we have not found any precedent recognizing an

12 See, e.g., § 408.910(11)(e), Fla. Stat. (2022) (“There is no liability on the part

of, and no cause of action shall arise against, any member of the board or its

employees or agents for any action taken . . . in the performance of their powers

and duties under this section.”); § 847.013(4)(d), Fla. Stat. (2022) (“[T]here is no

liability on the part of the state or the relator state attorney for costs or damages

sustained by reason of such restraining order . . . .”); § 556.106(1), Fla. Stat.

(2022) (“There is no liability on the part of, and no cause of action of any nature

shall arise against, the board members of the corporation . . . .”); § 631.918, Fla.

Stat. (2022) (“There is no liability on the part of, and a cause of action may not

arise against, the corporation [and related actors] for any action taken . . . in the

performance of their powers and duties under this section[.]”); § 111.09(2)(c), (d),

Fla. Stat. (2022) (“There is no liability on the part of, and no cause of action of

any nature may arise against, the first responder peer for disclosing information

under this paragraph.”); § 651.034(3), Fla. Stat. (2022) (“There is no liability on

the part of, and a cause of action may not arise against, the commission,

department, or office . . . for any action they take . . . under this section.”); §

627.351(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (2022) (“There is no liability on the part of, and no cause

of action shall arise against, [enumerated entities] for any action taken . . . in the

performance of their powers and duties under this subsection.”).

13 See, e.g., Swope v. Krischer, 783 So. 2d 1164, 1166 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)

(“Although immunity is an affirmative defense . . . .”); City of Delray Beach v.

Sherman Williams Am. Legion, Post 188, 358 So. 3d 440, 443 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)

(“[S]overeign immunity is generally an affirmative defense . . . .”); but see City of

Miami v. Robinson, 364 So. 3d 1087, 1091 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (“Much like subject

10

immunity with this statutory language—“There is no liability”—as an

affirmative defense. Based on Subsection 18’s plain language, the rule is

immunity, and the inquiry otherwise stops if the operative conditions for

immunity are satisfied. The complaint needs to plead facts to overcome

the immunity and background state of “no liability,” unlike the case with

a traditional affirmative defense.

Here, Subsection 18 is structured to establish a broad default rule of

immunity, and Subsections (18)(a)1.–3. are exceptions to that general rule

of immunity. Subsection 18 begins with the broad statement that “[a] TNC

is not liable under general law,” for certain types of claims (as discussed

in Part II.A, above) “if” three conditions are met. Indeed, two of these

conditions are expressed in negative terms. 14 The fact that these sub-

provisions are phrased as a positive conditional statement (“if”) followed

by a negative condition (“not”), rather than a negative conditional

statement (“unless”), does not convince us that these sub-provisions are

not exceptions to the general rule of immunity which is clearly expressed

at Subsection 18’s outset.

This sort of construction is not unique. Section 631.918 follows a

similar pattern, providing that “there is no liability” for certain things

“unless such action is found to be a violation of antitrust laws, was in bad

faith, or was undertaken with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting

wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.”

§ 631.918, Fla. Stat. (2022). This language simply does not read like a

traditional affirmative defense that survives a motion to dismiss even if the

plaintiff does not plead an exception—a violation of antitrust laws, bad

faith, etc. And no court has suggested that such language is an affirmative

defense. There, as here, the complaint must allege facts supporting an

“exception” to overcome the general rule that “there is no liability.”

In sum, Subsection 18’s plain language imposes a default rule of non-

liability unless certain exceptions are satisfied. Other statutes using the

same language do the same thing. If Subsection 18’s operative conditions

matter jurisdiction, sovereign immunity isn’t an affirmative defense, and it can

be raised at any time.”).

14 See Subsection 18(a)1. (“if . . . [t]here is no negligence under this section or

criminal wrongdoing . . . .”); Subsection 18(a)3. (“if . . . [t]he TNC is not the owner

or bailee of the motor vehicle.”).

11

are satisfied, 15 then in order to overcome the immunity in a suit against a

TNC, plaintiffs must allege facts to satisfy an exception (in Subsection

18(a)1.–3.) to the general “no liability” rule. Haddad failed to do so here,

even when given the explicit opportunity by the trial court. 16

III. Conclusion

Haddad’s claims for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation are

barred by section 627.748(18), Florida Statutes (2022). The trial court

correctly dismissed the claims with prejudice.

Affirmed.

KLINGENSMITH and SHAW, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.

15 That is, the claim is brought “under general law by reason of owning, operating,

or maintaining the digital network accessed by a TNC driver or rider, or by being

the TNC affiliated with a TNC driver, for harm to persons or property which

results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of a motor vehicle

operating as a TNC vehicle while the driver is logged on to the digital network.”

§ 627.748(18), Fla. Stat. (2022).

16 The trial court’s order on an interim motion to dismiss correctly held that the

complaint “fail[ed] to include factual allegations supporting one or more of the

enumerated exceptions to the default rule of non-liability under Subsection

18(a),” and provided an opportunity to file an amended complaint.

12