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  • Meek v. Department of Transportation

    240 Mich. App. 105 · Michigan Court of Appeals · May 22, 2000

    This finding is not clearly erroneous. … Given the evidence, the trial court’s award of damages was not clearly erroneous. Affirmed.

    Overruled on other grounds by Grimes v. Department of Transportation, 475 Mich. 72 (2006)Cited 21 timesPublished
  • Scavone v. Scavone

    230 N.J. Super. 482 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 9, 1988

    Passive, Immune Asset (Pre-marital, Gift, Inheritance) in One Name. … The immunity of assets acquired in such a manner is stated very clearly in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and its accompanying statements.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Meyer v. Community College of Beaver County

    30 A.3d 587 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 27, 2011

    Clearly, no form of government unit or public authority is expressly included in the definition. What is less clear is whether the phrase “any other legal entities” extends to public agencies. … Such a result is indefensible, clearly not in the public interest, and inconsistent with our *595 charge to liberally construe the CPL to achieve its objectives.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Rick Staly, as Sheriff of Flagler County, Florida v. Nina Izotova

    District Court of Appeal of Florida · Dec 20, 2024

    Notwithstanding this argument, nothing in the record establishes that the Bureau of Consumer Assistance is a subdivision of DFS or that their mailing addresses are the same. … Additionally, Appellee cites no case law supporting her claims that notice to a subdivision of DFS qualifies as notice to DFS for purposes of section 768.28(6)(a).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Reynolds v. Hamilton Cty. Dev. Disabilities Servs.

    233 N.E.3d 1161 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Jan 12, 2024

    But that doesn’t mean that any individual who works for a certified service provider qualifies as an employee. … Reynolds has not met the “rigorous standard” to establish that the exceptions in R.C. 2744.03(6) apply.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • the University of Texas System Operating as the University of Texas at El Paso v. Kenneth Palomino

    498 S.W.3d 711 · Texas Court of Appeals, 8th District (El Paso) · Aug 24, 2016

    We concluded therefore that Duran failed to establish a waiver of immunity under the Tort Claims Act because she had failed to show that her instructors had exercised direct and mandatory control over her actions. … Accordingly, Palomino has failed to establish a waiver of immunity under the Tort Claims Act. We therefore grant UTEP’s issue on appeal.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Brown v. Aztec Rig Equipment, Inc.

    921 S.W.2d 835 · Texas Court of Appeals, 14th District (Houston) · May 23, 1996

    Clearly, Aztec complied with the Act’s notice provisions. … Because: (1) the summary judgment clearly establishes a co-employment relationship; (2) the courts of this state do not prohibit co-employers; and (3) the legislature has expressly recognized such a relationship in the context

    Cited 53 timesPublished
  • Friedland v. Podhoretz

    174 N.J. Super. 73 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 23, 1980

    For example, the court has established a statewide disciplinary review board composed of both attorneys and nonattorneys. … The Ramstead court said that "we think that the legislature, in clearly separating the other classes given an *87 unqualified immunity from those who file a complaint alleging misconduct, evinced the intention to limit the

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • the City of Houston v. Madison T. Garner

    Texas Court of Appeals, 14th District (Houston) · Jul 12, 2022

    The City filed a traditional motion for summary judgment arguing that it was immune from Garner’s suit because Garner could not establish a prima facie case of race discrimination or a hostile work environment. … Race Discrimination To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, the employee must show that he is (1) a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for his position; (3) suffered an adverse employment

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Capital Telephone Co. v. New York Telephone Co.

    146 A.D.2d 312 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · May 4, 1989

    The dismissal was on the ground that, even if the conduct complained of would otherwise have established an actionable violation of Federal antitrust laws, the doctrine of "State action immunity” from antitrust liability … "If however, the [Federal] court in the first action would clearly not have had jurisdiction to entertain the omitted theory or ground (or, having jurisdiction, would clearly have declined to exercise it as a matter of discretion

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Sebring Utilities Com'n v. Home Sav. Ass'n

    508 So. 2d 26 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Jun 5, 1987

    The Sebring Utilities Commission was established by the Florida Legislature pursuant to Chapter 23535, Laws of Florida (1945). … We hold these provisions evidence a clearly expressed state policy to displace competition with monopoly public service.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Parker v. HUNEGNAW

    364 S.W.3d 398 · Texas Court of Appeals, 14th District (Houston) · Mar 27, 2012

    Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692 , 694 n. 3 (Tex.2003) (stating, although courts often use terms “sovereign immunity” and “gov *403 ernmental immunity” interchangeably, sovereign immunity refers to State’s immunity from suit and liability … As Hunegnaw suggests, the Lain court clearly distinguished a suit against a governmental entity, which is barred by sovereign immunity, from a suit against an official of the governmental entity, for which resolution of the

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Cleveland Askew, Jr. v. Trooper Edward Whitworth

    Court of Appeals of Kentucky · Jan 12, 2023

    Thus, bad faith can be predicated on a violation of a constitutional, statutory, or other clearly established right which a person in the public employee’s position presumptively would … So when deciding whether force was excessive or whether our precedent clearly established that result, we must view genuine factual disagreements in the light most favorable to the

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Yellow Cab Transit Co. v. Tuck

    115 S.W.2d 455 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Feb 5, 1938

    Clearly, the purpose of the constitutional amendment and the Enabling Act was to bestow upon all cities falling within the bracket of 5,000 inhabitants or more, the power of local self-government and full authority to do … The privileges and immunities clause of the Federal Constitution (Amend. 14) safeguards to the citizens of one state the right to pass through or to reside in any other state for the purpose of trade, etc.

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • City of Dallas v. VRC LLC

    260 S.W.3d 60 · Texas Court of Appeals, 5th District (Dallas) · Aug 19, 2008

    Here, the undisputed evidence establishes VRC could not plead a valid regulatory takings claim. … “Sovereign immunity” refers to the State's immunity from suit and liability, and it protects the State and its subdivisions.

    Cited 22 timesPublished
  • Mark Kershaw v. City of Kansas City, Missouri

    Missouri Court of Appeals · May 6, 2014

    The City Legal Expense Fund ordinance clearly and unequivocally establishes a duty on the City’s part to pay Starr on the Kershaws’ negligence judgment. … We hold that the City Legal Expense Fund ordinance, specifically section 2-1685(g), clearly and unequivocally establishes a duty on the City‟s part, wholly independent of its duty to Kershaw under the Workers‟ Compensation

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Kirschbaum v. The Village of Homer Glen

    Appellate Court of Illinois · May 11, 2006

    The Third District holds the Tort Immunity Act does not impose duties, but confers immunities. Havens v. Harris Township, 175 Ill. App. 3d 768, 771, 530 N.E.2d 284, 285 (3rd Dist. 1988); Bainter v. … CONCLUSION Because we find that section 3-102 of the Tort Immunity Act does not create a duty for defendants to clear brush from an intersection where there are clearly visible traffic control devices at each corner

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Elizabeth Butala v. The Curators of The University of Missouri

    Missouri Court of Appeals · Mar 24, 2020

    , fails to qualify as a “judgment” pursuant to section 512.020(5),1 1 All statutory references are to the REVISED STATUTES OF MISSOURI 2016, as supplemented. … section 512.020(5), which provides, in relevant part: Any party to a suit aggrieved by any judgment of any trial court in any civil cause from which an appeal is not prohibited by the constitution, nor clearly

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Schleier for Alter v. Alter

    159 Ariz. 397 · Court of Appeals of Arizona · Jan 10, 1989

    See Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 122 at 909 (liability clearly justified “where the parent himself maintains a dangerous instrument such as dynamite caps or a vicious dog in the home.”) … The strict liability remedy established by § 24-521 is limited to dog bite victims bitten when “in or on a public place or lawfully in or on a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog.”

    Limited by BROADBENT BY BROADBENT v. Broadbent, 178 Ariz. 53 (1994)Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Field v. Kearns

    43 Conn. App. 265 · Connecticut Appellate Court · Sep 24, 1996

    As a result, absolute immunity for the content of statements made during a quasi-judicial proceeding, as established in Petyan , applies to bar grievance proceedings. … A rule establishing absolute immunity for bar grievants protects the public confidence and the integrity of our judicial system. See Hearing on Immunity for Ethics Complaints, 96 N.J. 669, 679 , 477 A.2d 339 (1984).

    Cited 57 timesPublished

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