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  • Legro v. Robinson

    328 P.3d 238 · Colorado Court of Appeals · Oct 25, 2012

    Furthermore, a dog owner is not liable for a bite that occurs on his or her own property if the property is clearly marked with a "no trespassing" or "beware of dog" sign. § 18-21-124(5)(b), C.R.S.2012. … We agree that a possessory interest may, depending on the nature of the interest, establish "control of" a property.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Carney v. Department of Transportation

    145 Mich. App. 690 · Michigan Court of Appeals · Sep 16, 1985

    These findings are not clearly erroneous. Finally, plaintiff seeks to revive her intentional nuisance claim. … We conclude that the findings of fact by the trial court are not clearly erroneous. MCR 2.613(C).

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Buchler v. State Ex Rel. Oregon Corrections Division

    104 Or. App. 547 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Dec 12, 1990

    The state has the burden to establish immunity. Little v. Wimmer, 303 Or 580, 588 , 739 P2d 564 (1987). After this case was argued, the Supreme Court reversed our decision in Lowrimore v. … A traffic officer’s decision to pursue a vehicle * * *, [although discretionary in the sense that it involves the exercise of judgment and choice by the officer, is not one that qualifies its maker to immunity under ORS 30.265

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Kuchinski v. Charge & Ride, Inc.

    21 A.D.3d 1062 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Sep 26, 2005

    “[T]he State is accorded a qualified immunity from liability arising out of a highway planning decision” (Buhr v State of New York, 295 AD2d 462, 463 [2002], quoting Friedman v State of New York, 67 NY2d 271, 283 [1986]). … We agree with the Supreme Court’s determination that Charge and Ride demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by establishing that it exercised only incidental control over Choudhary that was insufficient

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Dalenko v. Wake County Department of Human Services

    157 N.C. App. 49 · Court of Appeals of North Carolina · Apr 1, 2003

    Although plaintiff maintains the allegations of the amended complaint establish a “special relationship” between defendants and Dalenko which pierces their immunity, such an exception applies to the public duty doctrine, … Moreover, the complaint alleges Harmon took various actions in her capacity as social worker for DHS that clearly required the exercise of discretion and were not simply ministerial.

    Cited 19 timesPublished
  • Diana Crouch v. City of Kansas City, Missouri

    444 S.W.3d 517 · Missouri Court of Appeals · Aug 5, 2014

    The mere absence of an emergency does not establish that a function performed by a municipal entity is proprietary. … The charter‟s language in § 408 does not clearly reject or limit the City‟s authority to perform functions such as non-emergency lift assists.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Shempf v. Chaviano

    2019 IL App (1st) 173146 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 28, 2019

    The mandamus ruling was clearly a final judgment. … qualifies as a “governmental entity,” the State was not expressly identified in the statute.

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Gregory Stewart Johnson v. Charles T. Smith

    Texas Court of Appeals, 13th District · May 29, 2008

    Johnston stipulated, and we hold, that the expert was qualified. … Finally, he must be able to clearly and consistently apply the science. Id.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • State v. Libecki

    347 Wis. 2d 511 · Court of Appeals of Wisconsin · Mar 27, 2013

    The investigation also established that bloody boot prints at the scene were from "Texas Steer" brand boots and that Libecki had bought that brand of boots to wear to work in 1999. ¶ 9. … We must uphold a circuit court's determinations of historical fact — e.g., the credibility of trial counsel's testimony about strategy decisions — unless they are clearly erroneous. See State v.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Town of Chandler v. Indiana-American Water Co.

    892 N.E.2d 1264 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 8, 2008

    Section 14 provides that a municipality “may regulate the furnishing of water to the public” and may “establish, maintain, and operate waterworks.” … In this second motion to dismiss, Chandler argued that H.E.A. 1722 amended Indiana Code section 8-1-2-86.5 to clearly remove Chandler from the jurisdiction of the Commission.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Jones v. Robert E. Bayley Construction Co.

    36 Wash. App. 357 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jan 5, 1984

    Public policy requires that an intent to waive the employer's immunity be clearly expressed. Glass v. Stahl Specialty Co., 97 Wn.2d 880, 886 , 652 P.2d 948 (1982); Calkins v. Lorain Div. of Koehring Co., 26 Wn. … "The agreement need only clearly express an intent to provide for indemnification." Noia v. Ferrell-Penning, Inc., supra. Clause L clearly expresses an intent to provide for indemnification.

    Overruled on other grounds by Brown v. Prime Construction Co., 102 Wash. 2d 235 (1984)Cited 10 timesPublished
  • William Acree Ex Rel. John D. Acree v. Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County

    Court of Appeals of Tennessee · Dec 27, 2019

    The court found it was inadmissible because it was “hearsay within hearsay” that did not qualify as a hearsay exception. … The GTLA “reaffirms the general rule of immunity from suit for governmental entities and expressly extends the common-law immunity to proprietary functions.” Id. at 399 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(a)).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Dade Cty. v. Amalgamated Ass'n, Ser & Mc Emp.

    157 So. 2d 176 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Nov 1, 1963

    Unless clearly authorized to do so by the enactment of legislation, the plaintiffs could not recognize as lawful any strike against the plaintiffs by the defendants. … The Board of County Commissioners shall establish and maintain personnel and civil service, retirement, and group insurance programs.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Scott v. Willis

    116 Pa. Commw. 327 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · May 25, 1988

    Clearly, then, the real property ex *334 ception is unavailable to Appellants, and their claims against the School District were correctly dismissed. … Further, Appellants have failed to plead the sufficient factual predicates on which they could establish willful misconduct. See Weissman v. City of Philadelphia, 99 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 403 , 513 A.2d 571 (1986).

    Cited 19 timesPublished
  • Gilmore v. Concerned Parents of Pueblo

    2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 5914 · Colorado Court of Appeals · Oct 26, 2000

    The moving party has the burden of establishing the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact. … Defendant points to certain organizations that it believes were clearly intended to receive immunity under § 18-21-116(2.5) such as scouting organizations and youth sports groups.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Martinez v. Lankster

    595 S.W.2d 316 · Missouri Court of Appeals · Jan 2, 1980

    The standard established by Maryland Heights Concrete Contractors is binding on this court. … Therefore, the application of Whitehead & Kales Co. may be to make the husband a defendant, which is clearly impermissible.

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Terry v. Ottawa County Board of Mental Retardation & Developmental Delay

    165 Ohio App. 3d 638 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Feb 24, 2006

    (Emphasis added.) {¶ 31} Clearly, the trial court, in its decision quoted above, evaluated the evidence upon which Dr. … Ottawa County MR/DD’s motion to dismiss on grounds of governmental immunity was granted. It is not a party to this appeal. 2 .

    Reversed in part, on other grounds by Terry v. Caputo, 115 Ohio St. 3d 351 (2007)Cited 17 timesPublished
  • Smith v. Manson

    806 A.2d 518 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 6, 2002

    Those exceptions must be strictly construed because the legislature, when enacting the Tort Claims Act, clearly intended to insulate local agencies from liability save only in the specifically defined situations. … The Sovereign Immunity Act preserves the sovereign immunity of Commonwealth parties except where it is waived by the exceptions set forth in Section 8522.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Starkman v. City of Long Beach

    106 A.D.3d 1076 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · May 29, 2013

    In their answer, the defendants asserted six affirmative defenses, including an affirmative defense based upon a qualified immunity pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104, and an affirmative defense based upon the common-law … Under the principles of ordinary negligence, Officer DeMarco’s failure to see what was there to be seen established the plaintiffs entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability (see Mohammad v Ning,

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Ollie, Dorothy v. Plano Independent School District

    383 S.W.3d 783 · Texas Court of Appeals, 5th District (Dallas) · Oct 24, 2012

    teaching contract’ The district court ftnand that the lact ()ilie later determined she needed more than twenty months of administrative leave to qualify … operation of a motor vehicle, governmental immunity had not been waived by the TTCA.

    Cited 32 timesPublished

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