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  • Cheatham v. Cox

    642 So. 2d 323 · Louisiana Court of Appeal · Aug 30, 1994

    As the trial court noted in reason’s for judgment, Cheatham’s petition affirmatively establishes Dr. Cox’s immunity from suit. In Charia v. … Clearly then, appointed psychologists are nonjudicial persons fulfilling quasi-judicial functions and are classified as officers of the court with functions intimately related to the judicial process.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Hildahl v. Bringolf

    101 Wash. App. 634 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jul 28, 2000

    The Act established “a system of compulsory state industrial insurance,” under which “all awards are paid from the accident fund.” Greenleaf v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co., 58 Wn.2d 647, 658 , 364 P.2d 796 (1961). … Nor was Bringolf a qualified self-insurer. U.S. Const, amend XTV, § 1; Wash. Const, art. I, § 12.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Sellers v. Hauch

    183 Mich. App. 1 · Michigan Court of Appeals · Apr 2, 1990

    However, these two cases are clearly distinguishable from Gallegos in that they involve the overruling of established common-law doctrines rather than the constitutional declaration with respect to the validity of a statute … Therefore, the parties on remand are free to relitigate any question of whether plaintiffs qualify for benefits under § 115, as it now stands in the aftermath of East-way. 8 *17 II.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Swenson v. Waseca Mutual Insurance Co.

    653 N.W.2d 794 · Court of Appeals of Minnesota · Dec 10, 2002

    But courts are not to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute if it produces absurd results or it is clearly at odds with the policy of the legislation as a whole. Id. … We conclude that Swenson’s circumstances easily qualify as an emergency scene.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • In re Marriage of Murray

    2014 IL App (2d) 121253 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jul 29, 2014

    App. 3d 78, 80 (1994), the Conservation District argues that the penalty prescribed by section 35 of the Withholding Act qualifies as “ ‘punitive or exemplary damages’ ” under section 2-102 of the Tort Immunity … App. 3d at 82-83. ¶ 50 Further, denying the Conservation District immunity from a penalty under section 35 of the Withholding Act would contravene the well-established policy of section 2-102 of the Tort

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Summers v. Slivinsky

    141 Ohio App. 3d 82 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Jan 31, 2001

    Under the first tier, R.C. 2744.02(A) grants broad immunity to political subdivisions. If immunity is established under R.C. 2744.02(A), such immunity is not absolute, however. … Appellees insist that the cheerleading practice was a governmental function and that no further analysis is necessary to establish immunity. We find appellees’ argument persuasive.

    Overruled by Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co. v. City of Youngstown, 151 Ohio App. 3d 16 (2002)Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Graphic Arts Mutual Insurance v. Time Travel International, Inc.

    23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864 · California Court of Appeal · Feb 2, 2005

    Appellant Qualifies as an “Employer” Division 4 of the Labor Code (§§ 3200-6099) is entitled Workers’ Compensation and Insurance. … Appellant contends that it qualifies as an employer pursuant to section 3850, subdivision (b).

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Stephenson v. Town of Garner

    136 N.C. App. 444 · Court of Appeals of North Carolina · Feb 1, 2000

    While officials are not immune for acts outside the scope of their legislative duties, Scott, 716 F.2d at 1423, and arguably may claim only qualified immunity for “executive” acts (such as enforcement of zoning laws), id. … On the other hand, the action is legislative if the facts involve ‘generalizations concerning a policy or state of affairs’ and the ‘establishment of a general policy’ affecting the larger population”).

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • People Ex Rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago

    325 Ill. App. 3d 196 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Oct 10, 2001

    Although on its face the immunity in section 2 — 201 would apply to alleged constitutional violations because such violations meet the definition of “injury” in section 1 — 204, the title of the Tort Immunity Act clearly … The Diocese’s last argument is that the trial court erred in dismissing its nuisance claim because the City did not establish the elements of local governmental discretionary immunity under the Tort Immunity Act.

    Cited 19 timesPublished
  • Brown v. Northville Regional Psychiatric Hospital

    153 Mich. App. 300 · Michigan Court of Appeals · Apr 11, 1986

    The motion is tested by the pleadings alone and may not be granted unless a claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development can possibly justify a right to recover. … Also, if a clearly established rule or standard exists requiring that the discharge of a patient in the circumstances of the decedent Brown be accompanied by medication and if through oversight, inattention or other negligence

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Kawai America Corp. v. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

    152 N.C. App. 163 · Court of Appeals of North Carolina · Aug 6, 2002

    The Act also establishes that the forum for such suits is the Industrial Commission, rather than the State courts. See id. … Our courts have clearly held that any modification or waiver of the doctrine of sovereign immunity must come from the General Assembly. See Blackwelder v.

    Cited 32 timesPublished
  • Setters v. Permanent General Assurance Corp.

    937 S.W.2d 950 · Court of Appeals of Tennessee · Oct 1, 1996

    The court also noted that a court’s authority to declare public policy is clearly circumscribed. Id. 1991 WL 3311 at *3. As stated by the Supreme Court in Smith v. … There the Supreme Court limited parental immunity, holding that [pjarental immunity in Tennessee is limited to conduct that constitutes the exercise of parental authority, the performance of parental supervision, and the

    Cited 17 timesPublished
  • Lynn Eshleman v. Benjamin Key

    Court of Appeals of Georgia · Mar 28, 2014

    [C]ounty law enforcement officers such as [Eshleman] are entitled to official or qualified immunity for the negligent performance of discretionary acts within the scope of their authority, but they may be … canine was ministerial, to wit, “one that [was] simple, absolute, and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requir[ed] merely the execution of a specific duty.”13 “A ministerial duty may be established

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Burroughs v. Mitchell County

    313 Ga. App. 8 · Court of Appeals of Georgia · Nov 29, 2011

    The doctrine of official immunity, also known as qualified immunity, affords limited protection to public officers and employees for discretionary actions taken within the scope of their official authority, and done without … Accordingly, Burroughs has not established that the failure to install guardrails violated a ministerial duty that waived the official immunity to which Adams and Hatcher are entitled.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • County of Sacramento v. Superior Court

    89 Cal. App. 3d 215 · California Court of Appeal · Feb 6, 1979

    . *217 I We here set forth the facts as established both in support of and in opposition to the motion. … Such policy is clearly expressed by the Senate Legislative Committee comment accompanying section 831.2, and places the statute in unmistakable perspective.

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Amy FIELDS, Appellant v. KLATT HARDWARE & LUMBER, INC., Appellee

    374 S.W.3d 543 · Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · Jun 20, 2012

    Section 82.003’s Plain Language We believe that under the statute’s plain language the nonmanufacturing seller may qualify for the exception without obtaining the manufacturer’s general appearance in the lawsuit. … Klatt also had to prove as a matter of law that Masterjack established minimum contacts with Texas.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Hawkins v. El Paso First Health Plans, Inc.

    214 S.W.3d 709 · Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · Jan 11, 2007

    Rather, it is qualified by the requirement that a state opting to participate in Medicaid must fully comply with the federal statutes and regulations governing the program. See Schweiker v. … To qualify for federal assistance, a state must submit and have approved a "plan for medical assistance,” which must establish a scheme for reimbursing health care providers for medical services provided to Medicaid recipients

    Cited 60 timesPublished
  • Bio-Medical Applications of North Carolina, Inc. v. North Carolina Department of Health & Human Services

    179 N.C. App. 483 · Court of Appeals of North Carolina · Sep 19, 2006

    At no time does BMA assert that it is — and clearly it is not — a person aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case, which is a prerequisite for this statute to apply. … This statute clearly is inapplicable as there has been no decision by the Department of Health and Human Services regarding the issuance, denial or withdrawal of a CON.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Sefzik v. Texas Department of Transportation

    267 S.W.3d 127 · Texas Court of Appeals, 13th District · Oct 2, 2008

    , and it requires a plaintiff to establish his or her right to declaratory relief in order to establish jurisdiction. … This Court's prior holdings treat the constitutional provisions as waivers of immunity and require that the plaintiff plead a valid cause of action thereunder in order to establish immunity.

    Reversed in part, on other grounds by Texas Department of Transportation v. Sefzik, 55 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 42 (2011)Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Barbara A. Lynch, by her sister and next of kin, Celine Hayes, and Celine Hayes as an individual v. Loudon County, Tennessee

    Court of Appeals of Tennessee · Oct 14, 2011

    They also set forth that plaintiffs’ §1983 claims were barred by 1) the fact that plaintiffs failed to allege a violation of Lynch’s clearly established constitutional rights, 2) Blakney’s qualified immunity, and 3) because … Discretionary function immunity is one of the exceptions listed to the removal of immunity under the GTLA. Tenn.Code Ann. § 29–20–205.

    Cited 0 timesPublished

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