Case law

State v. Mourning

104 Conn. App. 262 · Connecticut Appellate Court · Oct 30, 2007

Under this theory, the court presumably could order the prosecutor to grant a wdtness immunity when the witness’ testimony will be clearly exculpatory and clearly necessary in that it is material yet not cumulative, and where … , nor sua sponte grant immunity from the court.

Jasperson v. Jessica's Nail Clinic

216 Cal. App. 3d 1099 · California Court of Appeal · Dec 20, 1989

Statutes must be upheld unless their constitutionality clearly, positively and unmistakably appears. [Citations.]””’ … Clearly, the ordinance addresses a real and pressing concern.

Center for Molecular Med. v. Tp. of Belleville

357 N.J. Super. 41 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 17, 2003

"[W]hether a particular agreement is a lease depends upon the intention of the parties as revealed by the language employed in establishing their relationship ...." Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. … the asserted immunity. [ 329 N.J.Super. at 418-19 , 748 A. 2d 128 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).]

Dole Citrus v. State of California

60 Cal. App. 4th 486 · California Court of Appeal · Nov 26, 1997

Royster (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 289, 306 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 73 ]: “In order for the state to establish design immunity as a defense, the state must show (1) A causal relationship between the plan and the accident; (2) discretionary … In summary, it is clear that the state presented sufficient evidence to establish the initial applicability of its design immunity defense, and Dole Citrus does not now contend otherwise. (Cameron v.

Wilson v. City of Jersey City

415 N.J. Super. 138 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Aug 4, 2010

However, we find that Burd clearly did not engage in a blind transfer. … Plaintiffs contend that the Jersey City defendants do not qualify for Title 52 immunity because Jersey City was not acting as a PSAP.

Kapil v. Association of Pennsylvania State College

68 Pa. Commw. 287 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 10, 1982

In any event, that dimension of state sovereign immunity clearly preexisted Section 1983 of the federal Civil Rights Act. … City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), the United States Supreme Court stated that: Where the immunity claimed by the defendant was well established at common law at the time §1983 was encated, and where its rationale

Longview Independent School District v. Vibra-Whirl, Ltd.

Texas Court of Appeals, 6th District (Texarkana) · Aug 4, 2005

Governmental Immunity Does Not Bar this Suit It is well established in Texas that sovereign or governmental immunity protects governmental entities from lawsuits for damages, unless consent is given. See Tex. … VW argues that, in light of these later developments, the language granting school districts the authority to "sue and be sued" does not clearly and unambiguously effect a waiver of sovereign immunity.

Township of Bensalem v. Press

93 Pa. Commw. 235 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 27, 1985

It is to be noted that in Pennsylvania, this “waiver” of immunity arose not. from a statute enacted by the legislature, but from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s eradication of a doctrine which it had previously established … S. §704(a). ’ - ■ Appellants do not clearly explain whether they believe Horowitz is entitled to absolute immunity (reserved for high public officials) or a limited immunity which is available to other officials.

Williams v. Chatman

17 S.W.3d 694 · Texas Court of Appeals, 7th District (Amarillo) · Oct 20, 1999

Once established, the immunity applies without regard to the particular theory alleged by the plaintiff. … Examination of that document clearly supports the challenged affidavit statement.

Banfield v. Aichele

51 A.3d 300 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 29, 2012

Thus, if a DRE can provide the requisite permanent physical records when specifically requested, it qualifies as an EVS as defined by the Election Code. … Brau enclosed a check in the requisite statutory amount of $450, and provided the statutorily-required signatures of ten qualified electors.

Ireland v. Crow's Nest Yachts, Inc.

552 N.W.2d 269 · Court of Appeals of Minnesota · Jul 30, 1996

Qualified engineers are needed to exercise the engineering judgment inherent in the selection of traffic control devices, just as they are needed to locate and design the roads and streets which the devices complement. … The Minnesota Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices is a manual adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Transportation pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 169.06, subd. 1 (1994), for the purpose of establishing a uniform

Cook v. State

197 Or. App. 125 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jan 19, 2005

the requirements are established.” … The state contends that it enjoys immunity from plaintiffs ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims; such immunity was the basis for the trial court’s dismissal of those claims.

Courson v. Danville School District No. 118

301 Ill. App. 3d 752 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 18, 1998

Those cases are different from this one because they clearly involved the making of a choice, a policy choice, and not mere inadvertence. … It is sufficient to note that the District is not entitled to summary judgment, because it has not established that the failure to provide the saw guard was a discretionary act. Reversed and remanded.

Moya v. Declemente

2011 Ohio 5843 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Nov 10, 2011

7 {¶ 16} In Sampson, we found that the plaintiff’s claims, including her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, clearly arose out of his employment … Moreover, the allegations of the complaint fail to establish that Moya’s claims arise out of her employment relationship with the school district. Instead, the claims arise out of Moya’s relationship with DeClemente.

Harvey v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF WABASH COUNTY

416 N.E.2d 1296 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 26, 1981

Because by its terms the Sign Statute establishes a ministerial duty, while the Immunity Statute by its terms relieves a governmental entity from liability for failure to do certain discretionary acts, the two *1300 statutes … One, the Immunity Statute is a general statute, and general statutes do not override or supersede specific provisions in other statutes or rules unless there is a clearly expressed intent to do so. State ex rel.

Moss v. Lorain County Board of Mental Retardation

185 Ohio App. 3d 395 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Dec 30, 2009

may be asserted to establish nonliability: In addition to any immunity or defense referred to in division (A)(7) of this section and in circumstances not covered by that division or sections 3314.07 and 3746.24 of the Revised … However, the employees’ argument ignores the plain language of R.C. 2744.03(A)(6), which clearly provides for specific exceptions to employee immunity.

Adult Student Housing, Inc. v. Department of Revenue

41 Wash. App. 583 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Aug 23, 1985

This is consistent with the well established rule of narrowly construing exemption statutes. … RCW 84.36.030 requires more to qualify for an exemption.

Allen v. SUMMIT CIVIC FOUNDATION

250 N.J. Super. 427 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 17, 1991

Defendant's certificate of incorporation clearly sets forth a charitable purpose. … Super. at 138 , 293 A. 2d 431 )] The Parker court went on to say: *433 Defendant clearly falls outside the scope of this definition.

Rich Robins v. State Bar of Texas, Commission for Lawyer Discipline, and Chief Disciplinary Counsel

Texas Court of Appeals, 15th District · Sep 25, 2025

Appellant Robins has interstate involvement that arguably qualifies him for such protections. … SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY WAIVED.

Amylou R. v. County of Riverside

28 Cal. App. 4th 1205 · California Court of Appeal · Oct 3, 1994

Thus, “[t]o establish liability of a public entity for the acts of its employee, the employee must have been acting within the ‘scope of employment.’ ” (Cal. … To the contrary, by specifying that the employee is immune “even if he acts maliciously,” the section clearly extends to proceedings which were not initiated out of a malicious intent, and thus would not constitute malicious