Case law
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Liposchak v. Administrator, Bureau of Workers' Compensation
138 Ohio App. 3d 368 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Mar 23, 2000
First, it cannot be said that Edith qualifies as “wholly” dependent under R.C. 4123.59(B), nor can it be said that Edith qualifies under R.C. 4123.59(C) as partially dependent. … Next, in addition to not qualifying as wholly or partially dependent under subsections (B) and (C), appellant does not qualify under R.C. 4123.59(D)(2) for presumed dependency.
Cited 14 timesPublishedCourt of Appeals of Iowa · May 1, 2019
Because Cooper has not shown a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants acted with actual malice or otherwise abused their immunity under qualified privilege, we affirm the district court’s grant of … Qualified Immunity A qualified privilege from liability for defamation applies to statements of members of subordinate legislative bodies if those statements are “made in the performance of their official duties
Cited 0 timesPublished2023 Ohio 4163 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Nov 17, 2023
In order to determine whether a political subdivision qualifies for immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744, we apply a “three-tiered analysis.” Smith v. McBride, 130 Ohio St.3d 51, 2011-Ohio-4674, 955 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 13. … Since this is an element that must be established in order to trigger the physical defect exception, appellant’s failure to establish it means that the general grant of immunity as to appellees remains intact.
Cited 1 timesPublishedCity of Pharr, Texas v. Heriberto De Leon
Texas Court of Appeals, 13th District · Dec 14, 2023
To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, De Leon must show “(1) he has a ‘disability[’;] (2) he is ‘qualified’ for the job; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment decision because of his disability … The Act waives immunity only for viable claims. See id.
Cited 0 timesPublishedSuperior Court of Rhode Island · Dec 7, 2007
However, the cases cited above clearly establish that such a result was the specific purpose of the Recreational Use Statute, regardless of how counterintuitive this policy choice may seem to some. … For instance, as noted above, if a Defendant qualified for immunity under the statute, then the statutorily prescribed willful and wanton *Page 11 standard requires evidence that the defendant first found the plaintiff in
Cited 0 timesPublishedAsset Acceptance LLC v. Utah State Treasurer
367 P.3d 1019 · Court of Appeals of Utah · Feb 4, 2016
be found to be clearly stated within the provisions of the [Immunity Act+.‛ (footnotes omitted)).7 (…continued) garnishment.‛ Funk v. … So even if Asset Acceptance’s garnishment did qualify as a ‚claim‛ against a governmental entity, it nevertheless does not fall within the plain language of section 63G-7-101.
Cited 4 timesPublished17 Kan. App. 2d 543 · Court of Appeals of Kansas · Oct 30, 1992
The nub of this appeal is whether under K.S.A. 44-503(a) more than one employer in a contractor-subcontractor-employer pyramid may qualify as an injured worker’s statutory employer and be immune from civil liability for the … Clearly, if an employer qualifies as a statutory employer under the above statute, that employer is liable to the injured worker *545 for workers compensation benefits if the worker’s immediate employer does not pay and even
Cited 4 timesPublished254 Ill. App. 3d 951 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 17, 1993
A physician’s duty is to exercise the same degree of knowledge, skill, and care which a reasonably well-qualified physician in the same or similar community would use under similar circumstances. (Purtill v. … following established hospital policy.
Cited 40 timesPublishedKee v. State Highway Administration
68 Md. App. 473 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Nov 10, 1986
in situations where the legislature had clearly intended to waive it. … As we explained earlier, the legislature clearly manifested its intent to waive immunity in this type of action if fiscally possible.
Vacated on other grounds by State Highway Administration v. Kee, 309 Md. 523 (1987)Cited 6 timesPublished115 So. 2d 764 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Oct 8, 1959
from such liability, is clearly explained. … If, therefore, a change in the long established rule of immunity prevailing in this State is to be made, it must come as it did in the States of New York, Washington and California either by constitutional amendment, or by
Cited 44 timesPublishedTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) · May 18, 2012
The role of MERS was clearly established in the deed of trust: Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds any legal title to the interests granted by Borrower in this Security Interest, but, if necessary … This qualified immunity generally 10 applies even if conduct is improper in the context of the underlying lawsuit. Renfroe v.
Cited 0 timesPublishedKorean Presbyterian Church of Seattle Normalization Committee v. Sun Young Lee
75 Wash. App. 833 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Sep 26, 1994
Conduct does not qualify for immunity based upon the privilege if the conduct at issue is not religiously motivated, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 , 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 , 92 S. … The Petitioners’ answer clearly states as an affirmative defense that the conduct was privileged.
Cited 8 timesPublished115 Pa. Commw. 566 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · May 3, 1988
. §8522, to waive the Commonwealths immunity only in “specific, clearly-stated situations” and that therefore the enumerated exceptions to immunity must *579 be strictly construed. Davidow v. Anderson, 83 Pa. … It further states that the city is responsible for establishing a *582 detour in accordance with Section 548 of the Law, 36 PS. §670-548.
Cited 13 timesPublished8 Pa. Commw. 567 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 9, 1973
The Supreme Court, however, has yet to define clearly who is a “high public official.” In Montgomery v. … Clearly, they do not point to such intentionally malicious, wanton or reckless conduct as would overcome a presumption of conditional immunity, and, in no way could they overcome any presumption of absolute immunity.
Cited 47 timesPublished93 Md. App. 25 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Nov 17, 1992
First, the circuit court held that “there is a clear qualified immunity to the police officers, the City and the Chief on the common law counts.” … Nor can the claims of false imprisonment or invasion of privacy, given the probable cause that existed, overcome the appellees’ qualified immunity. Simons v.
Vacated on other grounds by Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70 (1995)Cited 10 timesPublished2012 Ohio 353 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Feb 2, 2012
Burks’s conduct qualifies as willful or wanton misconduct. … No. 72283, 1998 WL 742171 (Oct. 22, 1998) (an amendment to add the phrase “wilful or wanton conduct” to defeat statutory immunity is insufficient without “new allegations of any operative facts which might establish wilful
Cited 3 timesPublished363 N.W.2d 476 · Court of Appeals of Minnesota · May 1, 1985
He was clearly the best qualified candidate for the job. Shortly thereafter, in August 1981, Men-nenga considered recommending Sigurdson for reclassification as a Deputy Assessor. … The mere fact that she filed a grievance and a complaint under the Minnesota Human Rights Act did not make her immune from the duty to observe office rules and practices. III.
Reversed on other grounds by Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 1986 Minn. LEXIS 786 (1986)Cited 5 timesPublishedE.S v. University of Utah Medical Center
2024 UT App 57 · Court of Appeals of Utah · Apr 18, 2024
Act (the Immunity Act). … Because Plaintiffs’ notice of intent was not delivered to the proper party under the Immunity Act, it could not qualify as a strictly compliant notice of claim under the Immunity Act.
Cited 0 timesPublishedAssurance Co. of America v. Yakemore
50 Conn. Supp. 28 · Connecticut Superior Court · May 9, 2005
Thus, govern *44 mental immunity attaches absent an applicable exception to the qualified immunity of municipal agents engaged in discretionary acts. … That court also determined that to permit a direct cause of action under § 52-557n does not abrogate the defense of qualified immunity because that is a defense available only to the municipal employee in the exercise of
Cited 1 timesPublished1 Ill. App. 3d 803 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Nov 5, 1971
The statute specifically grants immunity for failure to establish a police department or otherwise to provide police protection service. … Certainly, the language of the Act which grants immunity for inadequate police protection or failure to prevent the commission of crime, clearly covers the situation where there had been a withdrawal of a previously established
Cited 4 timesPublished
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