Case law

Brinkman v. United States

United States Court of Federal Claims · Feb 17, 2022

corporation, or part thereof, or part of an independent establishment.” § 104. … The annual cap applies despite any perceived unfairness in its application because “[a] cap on premium pay, by definition, prevents individuals from earning premium pay for certain hours that would have otherwise qualified

J. E. Bernard & Co. v. United States

63 Cust. Ct. 390 · United States Customs Court · Nov 14, 1969

The only thing they establish with certainty is that similar articles must be alike in some respects and different in others. … The articles in issue being similar to those articles mentioned in the heading to item 708.45, they qualify for classification thereunder.

Fabricas El Carmen, SA, De CV v. United States

672 F. Supp. 1465 · United States Court of International Trade · Oct 7, 1987

It is not an “application fee, deposit or similar payment paid in order to qualify for, or to receive the benefit of the subsidy.” Cf. … Depending upon the actual rates calculated and other circumstances it may be appropriate to establish one representative country-wide rate.

MONGES

25 I. & N. Dec. 246 · Board of Immigration Appeals · Jul 1, 2010

Pursuant to this mandate, the Department of Justice issued a final rule that established time and number limitations on motions to reconsider and motions to reopen. … Furthermore, the motion does not qualify for any of the permissible exceptions to the time limitations for motions to reopen.

Rotech Healthcare Inc. v. United States

71 Fed. Cl. 393 · United States Court of Federal Claims · Jul 24, 2006

NAICS codes are used by government agencies, and the United States Small Business Administration (SBA), to establish size standards governing which entities qualify as small businesses for preferences or eligibility under … The task of establishing criteria to determine whether individual companies qualify as small businesses, and applying those criteria in individual eases, has been delegated by Congress to the SBA. Id.

Mellon v. Commissioner

36 B.T.A. 977 · United States Board of Tax Appeals · Dec 7, 1937

The record clearly establishes that petitioner had no knowledge of the purchase by Coalesced of the stock of the Pittsburgh Coal Co. until some months after it occurred. … Here the evidence does not establish an improper motive. The sale by petitioner of Pittsburgh Coal Co. stock is clearly demonstrated to have been bona fide and legal in all aspects.

Mendez v. United States

132 Fed. Cl. 55 · United States Court of Federal Claims · May 3, 2017

A plaintiff seeking to establish jurisdiction in this court under the Tucker Act must show that such claim accrued within six years of the date upon which the action was filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2012); John R. … In that communication, AUSA Gonzalez clearly related to Mendez’s attorney the position that no agreement existed other than a “promise” to maintain Mendez’s name in confidence for as long as possible.

STULTZ

15 I. & N. Dec. 362 · Board of Immigration Appeals · Jul 1, 1975

The petitioner believes that the beneficiary qualifies as her step- child 1, and hence as her child, under section 101(b)(1) of the Act. This is the question that must be resolved. … In his denial of the petition the district director stated that because the beneficiary was illegitimate, she could not qualify as the petitioner's child.

Decker v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims · Jan 5, 2021

I find that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that because of her susceptibility to an autoimmune event, the immune response triggered by HAV resulted in molecular mimicry, thereby causing her … Pike used a bee sting analogy to illustrate how an appropriate temporal relationship between acute exposure to an allergen and an immune reaction can establish causality.

Authority of Education Department Administrative Law Judges in Conducting Hearings

Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel · Jan 12, 1990

In that context, the Court held that an administrative law judge is “functionally comparable” to an Article III judge, who enjoys absolute immunity. … The explanatory notes accom ­ panying the proposed regulations clearly indicate that the ALJ is required to stay the proceedings if requested by both parties. See 53 Fed. Reg. 48,866 (1988).

D. Golmakani v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims · Jul 7, 2013

Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-1, et seq., as amended (“Vaccine Act”).3 Petitioner alleges as a result of receiving the influenza (“flu”) vaccination on August 23, 2009 she suffers from “an auto-immune … Petitioner Has Acted in Good Faith and Has Established a Reasonable Basis for the Claim to the Time of Former Counsel’s Withdrawal.

Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. United States

54 Cust. Ct. 804 · United States Customs Court · Apr 26, 1965

The witness, Hayes, an experienced and well-qualified patent lawyer, testified in substance that he had been employed for over 20 years in the Patent Department of Socony Mobil Oil Co. and had practiced patent law extensively … This is particularly so in view of the evidence which establishes that such merchandise was, in fact, sold to persons not licensed to use the cracking process.

US Securities Associates, Inc. v. United States

United States Court of Federal Claims · Nov 13, 2015

The prices were in a relatively close range, and clearly plaintiff does not contend that the intervenor’s price was too high. … Such a risk has plainly not been established here, however.

KAMEN SOAP PRODUCTS COMPANY v. United States

124 F. Supp. 608 · United States Court of Claims · Oct 5, 1954

Kamen, no covering or qualifying letter from plaintiff was read in connection with plaintiff’s bid. Mr. … This is one of the conditions on which the Government gives its consent to be sued and waives its otherwise sovereign immunity.

Clayden v. Commissioner

90 T.C. 656 · United States Tax Court · Apr 11, 1988

He then instructed Clayden to ascertain from Vitagram and Teledent whether the program would qualify for these tax benefits. … films was 10 percent of the applicable percentage of qualified U.S. production costs.

American National Bank & Trust Co. v. United States

37 Cont. Cas. Fed. 76,134 · United States Court of Claims · Jul 9, 1991

Without the proper authority, DLA’s payments to plaintiff were contrary to the law and clearly erroneous. … Established law clearly provides that the Government may recover funds which its agents have wrongfully, erroneously, or illegally paid. No statute is necessary to authorize the Government to sue in such a case.

Aurelia v. Mayang

8 Vet. App. 260 · United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims · Oct 11, 1995

Mayang, who had qualified service. On the oath and certificate of enlistment, the veteran listed the appellant as his sister and someone to be notified in case of an emergency. … The RO found that the appellant had failed to establish service connection for the cause of death and basic eligibility for benefits.

NL Industries, Inc. v. United States

12 Cl. Ct. 391 · United States Court of Claims · May 22, 1987

This court would agree that, as a separate and clearly distinct property interest, plaintiffs market expectations (that is, lost anticipated revenues or profits) would not qualify as “property” within the fifth amendment. … However, expectations which are backed by investment do qualify as such property interests.

Hemphill Contracting Co. v. United States

40 Cont. Cas. Fed. 76,836 · United States Court of Federal Claims · Aug 25, 1995

It is well established that the “existence of jurisdiction ordinarily depends on the facts as they exist when the complaint is filed.” Newman-Green, Inc. v. … This pattern of dissolution and reinstatement establishes that Mr.

CAMARILLO

25 I. & N. Dec. 644 · Board of Immigration Appeals · Jul 1, 2011

Section 239(a)(2) clearly accounts for this reality, outlining the procedures to follow when notice 647 Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 2011) Interim … Thus, the respondent claims that she has established the requisite 7 years of continuous residence under section 240A(a)(2) of the Act, regardless of how the “stop-time” rule is applied. We do not agree.