Case law

Milford Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. United States

675 F.2d 270 · United States Court of Claims · Mar 10, 1982

By our view, such silence would presumptively establish the grant *82 was unrestricted and a heavy burden would rest on anyone contending otherwise. … The hospital clearly did correctly say at all times that it was the unrestricted owner of the money, even though the grounds it said it relied on for saying so were not factually established.

Aiken Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner

56 T.C. 925 · United States Tax Court · Aug 5, 1971

with the petitioner that Industrias was a “corporation” for purposes of article IX, and that it therefore cannot be disregarded, we do not agree with the petitioner’s conclusion that this factor alone was sufficient to qualify … However, “To say that we should give a broad and efficacious scope to a treaty does not mean that we must sweep within the Convention what are legally and traditionally recognized to be * * * taxpayers not clearly, within

Summit Contractors v. United States

36 Cont. Cas. Fed. 75,964 · United States Court of Claims · Nov 8, 1990

In addition, the bid prospectus clearly instructed Summit to inspect the Canyondam sale area to independently ascertain a reliable volume estimate. … Assuming arguendo that the 75 percent requirement was met by plaintiff, Summit would merely qualify for, but not be entitled to, a contract extension.

Peninsula Steel Products & Equipment Co. v. Commissioner

78 T.C. 1029 · United States Tax Court · Jun 17, 1982

In 1956, petitioner was established as a wholly owned subsidiary of Ferry Steel Products, a manufacturer of steel equipment. … ”; petitioner does not contend that its method qualifies under the regulation’s reference to accruals as of the time "the subject matter of the contract is * * * accepted.”

Vidal Suriel v. Commissioner

141 T.C. No. 16 · United States Tax Court · Dec 4, 2013

The parties stipulate that the MSA escrow fund is a qualified settlement fund under section 1.468B-1, Income Tax Regs. The escrow fund was established with Citibank, N.A., which served as the escrow agent. III. … As discussed supra, the MSA documents clearly show that Vibo obligated itself to make the MSA payments.

Downer v. Commissioner

48 T.C. 86 · United States Tax Court · Apr 27, 1967

The failure of the public offering made it 'impossible for Wootten to establish a sales organization. … We think these cases are clearly distinguishable. Peabody Goal Go. and George M.

Shore v. United States

164 F. Supp. 241 · United States Court of Claims · Jul 16, 1958

Persons who limit their availability to specific locations cannot be considered unless qualified candidates prepared to accept assignment to any post *227 are not available. … Plaintiff does not allege that qualified candidates prepared to accept assignment to any post were not available.

Southern Dredging Corp. v. Commissioner

54 T.C. 705 · United States Tax Court · Mar 31, 1970

The right to this exemption is sometimes qualified in the application of section 269(a), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: SEO. 269. ACQUISITIONS MADE TO EVADE OR. AVOID INCOME TAX. … [Respondent contends quite ardently that an examination of the record as a whole points quite clearly to the nonbusiness, tax avoidance motives of Richard and Duane Merritt.

Parker v. United States

United States Court of Federal Claims · Mar 24, 2017

"The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941 ). … The waiver of immunity "may not be inferred, but must be unequivocally expressed." United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003).

Wrona v. United States

40 Fed. Cl. 784 · United States Court of Federal Claims · Apr 22, 1998

The Board found that Network 24’s appeal was “clearly untimely” as it was filed more than 30 days after the final determination was made in Husk’s February 28, 1989 letter. … “Only Congress can lengthen the time period for bringing suit against the United States____ The statute of limitations is an express limitation on the Tucker Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity.” Id. (citing Soriano v.

Red River Holdings, LLC v. United States

87 Fed. Cl. 768 · United States Court of Federal Claims · Jul 17, 2009

Another waiver of sovereign immunity, the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., allows for suits against the United States for negligence. … The claim for contractual liquidated damages was clearly “ ‘arising out of maritime contracts’” and was maritime.

Jorgensen v. Shaff

189 F.2d 264 · Court of Customs and Patent Appeals · Jun 5, 1951

A reading of the counts clearly demonstrates that the construction of the device could be told only by those who had a knowledge of its internal parts. … The third corroborating witness was well qualified in the art of automobile engine construction and operation.

Nathan T. Meidl v. United States

114 Fed. Cl. 607 · United States Court of Federal Claims · Jan 30, 2014

The burden of establishing jurisdiction falls upon the plaintiff. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. … Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990) (holding that the burden is on the plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction); see also RCFC 12(b)(1) (establishing lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a defense).

Wilson v. Commissioner

38 B.T.A. 463 · United States Board of Tax Appeals · Sep 6, 1938

We are of the opinion that Farr’s case for the reasons stated is clearly distinguishable from the instant case, and that the definition of a “short sale” there set out must be qualified by the condition that it is intended … Since the evidence is insufficient to establish the probable life of the house, we must hold on this point for the respondent. Decision will be entered umder Rule 50.

Mattel, Inc. v. United States

624 F.2d 1076 · Court of Customs and Patent Appeals · Jun 19, 1980

Therefore, on the basis of what clearly appears from the record and the exhibits, we further hold that the involved merchandise is classifiable as duty free under item 807.00, TSUS, as the U.S. goods component of articles … Carr & Son, Inc., 61 CCPA 52, C.A.D. 1118, 496 F. 2d 1225 (1974) (individually packaged assortments of fishhooks held qualified for duty-free treatment under item 800.00 TSUS). See F. W. Myers & Co. v.

Neuman & Schwiers Co. v. United States

24 C.C.P.A. 127 · Court of Customs and Patent Appeals · Oct 26, 1936

Inc., supra; that the Congress adopted and gave that interpretation and construction its legislative sanction and approval by continuing to use the same term or words in eight succeeding tariff and revenue acts, thereby clearly … Ten witnesses, well qualified, *133 have testified that the imported goods in question were uniformly, definitely, and generally designated as “sauces” at and prior to the passage of the Tariff Act of 1930.

Loy W. Sockman and Elliott W. Brady v. Robert C. Switzer and Richard A. Ward

379 F.2d 996 · Court of Customs and Patent Appeals · Jun 22, 1967

Plaut, a chemist qualified in the chemical art involved here, also testified on behalf of Sockman with respect to naphthenic acid soaps. … Plaut, we think it is established by the evidence before us that one skilled in the art would not regard the emulsifier of example 2 necessarily as being a liquid.

Professional Analysis, Inc. v. United States

United States Court of Federal Claims · Jun 3, 2025

Offerors are to clearly detail any exceptions taken and the rationale for the exceptions taken to the solicitation. … CACI’s proposal contained reservations and assumptions, though MSC found that none qualified as an “exception” to the Solicitation’s terms.

Zainulabeddin v. United States

United States Court of Federal Claims · Jun 20, 2018

"The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). … Zainulabeddin' s regulatory takings claim, she has failed to establish a plausible claim for relief.

H.B. Zachry Co. v. United States

471 F.2d 1392 · United States Court of Claims · Jan 18, 1973

Once a qualified renegotiation 4 has occurred and repayment is made, a taxpayer must recompute a prior year’s tax in order to determine the amount to be paid in the repayment year. … Clearly, this means -that in computing his tax liability for the year in which the repayment is made, the taxpayer shall not *415 include the amount of .the repayment.