Case law

Wall Industries, Inc. v. United States

15 Cl. Ct. 796 · United States Court of Claims · Nov 22, 1988

Such fees by statute, however, are limited to a rate of $75 per hour unless, of course, Wall can show that a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for that particular proceeding, entitles … If Wall fails to meet one of the indispensable eligibility EAJA requirements, the question then is — whether there is any other basis upon which it can qualify. C.

Alaska Central Express, Inc. v. United States

51 Fed. Cl. 227 · United States Court of Federal Claims · Dec 11, 2001

United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 , 72 S.Ct. 17 , 96 L.Ed. 26 (1951) (“[Statutes which waive immunity of the United States from suit are to be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign.”); AFGE, 258 F.3d at 1301. 2 If the … Instead, plaintiff argues that the traditional requirement of actual and due money damages is qualified by the court’s jurisdiction over CDA cases under section 1491(a)(2).

TG Mo. Corp. v. Comm'r

133 T.C. 278 · United States Tax Court · Nov 12, 2009

It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, Gustafson v. … In each case, section 174(c) clearly requires an examination of the proper tax treatment of the expenditure in the hands of the taxpayer.

SMS Data Products Group, Inc. v. United States

36 Cont. Cas. Fed. 75,820 · United States Court of Claims · Mar 1, 1990

Jurisdiction The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit unless Congress specifically waives immunity. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 , 96 S.Ct. 948, 953 , 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976); Soriano v. … Traditionally, the Government could invoke the clause so long as it did not act in bad faith or clearly abuse its discretion.

Church in Boston v. Commissioner

71 T.C. 102 · United States Tax Court · Nov 1, 1978

It was only after the submission of these documents that respondent determined that petitioner did not qualify as an exempt organization. … Clearly this information precluded respondent from determining whether the grants were made in an objective and nondiscriminatory manner and whether the distribution of such grants was made in furtherance of an exempt purpose

International Genomics Consortium v. United States

104 Fed. Cl. 669 · United States Court of Federal Claims · May 11, 2012

To qualify as an “interested party,” a protestor must establish that: (1) it was an actual or prospective bidder or offeror, and (2) it had a direct economic interest in the procurement or proposed procurement_Assuming that … IGC could not have submitted a qualifying proposal to do the work that SAIC-F was assigned and thus, unlike the protesters in Distributed Solutions, has not “established [itself] as [a] prospective bidder.”

Forshey v. West

12 Vet. App. 71 · United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims · Dec 3, 1998

Generally Applicable Law Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1310 , dependency and indemnity compensation (DIC) is paid to a surviving spouse of a qualifying veteran who died from a service-connected disability. See Hanna v. … [I]n all cases[,] section 105 establishes a presumption in favor of a finding of line of duty.

Systems Application & Technologies, Inc. v. United States

100 Fed. Cl. 687 · United States Court of Federal Claims · Aug 9, 2011

Thus, SA-TECH has established a nontrivial competitive injury. … Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1556 (Fed.Cir.1994) (“A movant that clearly establishes likelihood of success on the merits receives the benefit of a presumption of irreparable harm.”), cited in CW Gov’t Travel, Inc. v.

Greene v. Commissioner

88 T.C. 376 · United States Tax Court · Feb 5, 1987

The notice of deficiency disallowed petitioners’ losses from RRA because “you have failed to establish that you are entitled to any portion of the loss claimed under any provision of the Internal Revenue Code.” … The lessor must have sufficient net worth (without regard to the value of any leases which qualify under section 168(f)(8)) to satisfy any personal liability incurred.

Western States Construction Co. v. United States

38 Cont. Cas. Fed. 76,376 · United States Court of Claims · Jul 24, 1992

This position was clearly set forth in Bowers Hydraulic Dredging Co. v. … Professor Corbin is clearly in accord: In numberless well-considered cases, proof of local or trade usage, custom, and other circumstances has been allowed to establish a meaning that the written words of the contract would

Ampersand Chowchilla Biomass, LLC v. United States

United States Court of Federal Claims · Jan 17, 2018

The Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity and provides this Court with jurisdiction over specific categories of claims against the United States, including those claims “founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of … “[O]ther tangible property” may only qualify for a Section 1603 grant if that property is “used as an integral part of the qualified investment credit facility,” and a “qualified investment credit facility” is one for which

Calvin v. United States

63 Fed. Cl. 468 · United States Court of Federal Claims · Jan 12, 2005

For this court to have jurisdiction, the United States must waive its sovereign immunity, and the plaintiffs’ claims must be within the scope of that waiver. United States v. … NCS Pearson was awarded a contract in March 2002 by the Department of Transportation to help recruit, qualify, and hire the new federal workforce. Pis.' App. at 114-15.

Pusateri v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services

18 Cl. Ct. 828 · United States Court of Claims · Nov 17, 1989

However, the burden should be on counsel in these cases to establish a reasonable rate. This is best accomplished by the establishment of a lodestar rate and a requirement that counsel justify a higher rate. … The court does not feel that $75 per hour is inadequate or unreasonable in the context of the record in this case as it relates to the establishment of liability and to the establishment of a reasonable hourly rate for services

Security Savings & Loan Ass'n v. United States

26 Cl. Ct. 1000 · United States Court of Claims · Sep 10, 1992

Therefore, a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied, but must be unequivocally expressed. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. at 399 , 96 S.Ct. at 953 ; United States v. … In addition, the All Writs Act does not confer power on a court to expand its jurisdiction beyond clearly expressed statutory limits. See Clark v. Busey, 959 F.2d 808 (9th Cir.1992).

Davis v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services

19 Cl. Ct. 395 · United States Court of Claims · Feb 8, 1990

Davis’ opinion that the pertussis immunization was the cause of Mark’s problems. Ex. D. Records of Children’s Hospital show a final diagnosis of “acute Encephalopathy due to pertussis immunication.” Ex. … Weaver and petitioner are sufficient to establish the fact of immunication. Moreover, the subsequent hospital records refer back to it. This satisfies the requirements of § 11(c)(1)(A) and (B) of the Act. 2.

Liberty Ammunition, Inc. v. United States

101 Fed. Cl. 581 · United States Court of Federal Claims · Oct 31, 2011

To establish subject matter jurisdiction over a suit against the federal government, a plaintiff must show both a “waiv[er of] sovereign immunity together with a claim falling within the terms of the waiver.” … At this stage of the litigation, the record does not permit the court to say conclusively whether Liberty qualifies for either of these exceptions.

The Haskell Company

Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals · May 5, 2026

On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the prime’s certification was “valid and not so qualified as to make it ineffective” and concluded that the certification “clearly complied with the chief policy underlying the CDA … In Transamerica, the qualifying language was in a cover letter accompanying the claim. 973 F.2d at 1580. Here, we do not have a CDA-compliant prime certification that is qualified.

Estate of Rinaldi v. United States

38 Fed. Cl. 341 · United States Court of Federal Claims · Jul 11, 1997

Specifically, defendant argues that the Trust established by Rinaldi’s will did not give rise to the “qualifying income interest for life” to which the surviving spouse must be entitled in order to qualify under § 2056(b) … And Rinaldi clearly intended to establish the trust with a condition that would render it ineligible for QTIP treatment.

Berenholz v. United States

1 Cl. Ct. 620 · United States Court of Claims · Nov 23, 1982

This is significant because it clearly establishes the necessity of the Corps to closely monitor the repairs made to plaintiff’s east dike under the un *631 precedented flooding conditions which existed in the spring of 1973 … In addition, since this case involves a taking, the question of § 702c immunity does not arise.

Pelton & Crane Co. v. Commissioner

20 T.C. 967 · United States Tax Court · Sep 10, 1953

In view of the fact that petitioner has not established that it qualifies for relief under section 722 (b) (1) and (4), it is unnecessary to consider its method of reconstructing average base period net income. … (a) General Rule. — In any case In which the taxpayer establishes that the tax computed under this subchapter (without the benefit of this section) results in an excessive and discriminatory tax and establishes what would