Case law

In Re Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.

230 B.R. 715 · United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Louisiana · Feb 11, 1999

The court finds that this factor clearly weighs in favor of approving the settlement. (c)Arm’s Length Bargaining. … While he did not qualify as an “expert” under Rule 702, Fed.R.Evid., his testimony was certainly admissible under Rule 701 107 . Objections to Mr.

Valentine v. Elliott

357 B.R. 744 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia · Jan 4, 2007

The Marshall opinion is clearly not intended to overturn the principles of res judicata, and contrary to the plaintiffs assertions, much of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine remains intact following Marshall . … The standard is even stricter where the state officials allegedly involved in the conspiracy are immune from suit, as are the state court judges here.” (emphasis added; citations omitted)).

In Re Morrell

394 B.R. 405 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. West Virginia · Aug 14, 2008

To establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States....” … A state statute “must be regarded as valid, unless it can be clearly shown to be in conflict with the constitution.” Id. at 393 , 16 S.Ct. 43 ; see also Oakland Club v.

Matter of Berryhill

127 B.R. 427 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Indiana · May 7, 1991

In the absence of objection, the order of October 25 clearly and unambiguously required the debtors to do one of two things by a date certain. … Nonetheless, “[t]he debt- or has time after time failed to comply with the Court’s Orders, the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and it simply no longer qualifies for any additional leniency.”

First Recovery, LLC v. Sanders

United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. North Carolina · Jan 9, 2023

The bankruptcy court granted the motion, concluding under both that plaintiff failed to establish reasonable or justifiable reliance, and appellants appealed. … Levin, 772 F.2d 1150, 1153 n.3 (4th Cir. 1985).1 “Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, but findings of fact will only be set aside if clearly erroneous.” Schlossberg v.

Keast Enterprises Inc.

United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Iowa · Feb 24, 2020

The Vorthmanns ignore the terms of the Purchase Agreement that clearly state that they, as the Sellers, granted all of the identified easements in their own real estate. … A determination that the MSA qualifies as an express easement, or an easement by implication, necessity or prescription is not supported by the record.

In Re Zurface

95 B.R. 527 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio · Jan 11, 1989

Donald Zurface, Jr.’s dominance of the corporate affairs of H-D from the date of H-D’s incorporation until the present time was established by the record. 30. … In order to qualify for such a tax-free exchange, Debtors would have had to retain at least fifty percent (50%) control over H-D (Tr. 267-69). 35.

Delta Financial Corp. v. Westchester Surplus Lines Insurance (In Re Delta Financial Corp.)

398 B.R. 382 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware · Dec 15, 2008

Where the intention of the parties is clearly and unambiguously set forth, effect must be given to the intent as indicated by the language used. … Delta Financial of the Contributed Cash Flow Certificates to Delta LLC, which constituted inadequate consideration, in connection with Delta Financial’s purchase of securities issued by'any company and does Delta Financial qualify

Teeslink v. United States, Department of the Treasury (In Re Teeslink)

165 B.R. 708 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia · Mar 14, 1994

These statutes and accompanying legislative history clearly indicate that Congress did not intend to allow a taxpayer to escape liability by protecting his assets in a bankruptcy proceeding until the statute of limitations … Although I have ruled that the IRS has not waived its sovereign immunity with regard to actions brought against it in tort for violation of a § 524 discharge injunction, see In re Hardy, 161 B.R. 320 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1993),

Moser v. Bank of Texas (In Re Chambers)

384 B.R. 460 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Texas · Feb 25, 2008

The Archer Trust Burl Archer (the “Settlor”) established an intervivos trust on August 14, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the “Archer Trust ”). … The Archer Trust is clearly a spendthrift trust. Michelle Chambers does not have legal title to the corpus of the Archer Trust or any right to alienate her interest in the Archer Trust.

In re Palmaz Scientific Inc.

562 B.R. 331 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Texas · Nov 22, 2016

Palmaz also requested this Court award attorney’s fees and costs after a hearing to establish the amount of said fees. … Movant and Trustee argue that the definition of D & 0 Claims clearly places the Respondents’ claims against Dr.

Lincicome v. Anthony Roofing, LLC

United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Jul 16, 2019

Plaintiff failed to establish the falsity of Defendant’s statement concerning a 20 year watertight guarantee. … His testimony did not conclusively establish the wear was the result of used product, nor did he establish the wear was to product that the parties’ contract required to be new.

In Re Utex Communications Corp.

457 B.R. 549 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Texas · Sep 21, 2011

UTEX alleges that AT & T has refused to work with UTEX on establishing MPB. … UTEX argues this “revelation clearly warrants discovery and a hearing on the facts” (docket no. 199, p. 31).

Smiley v. Associates Financial Services (In Re Smiley)

26 B.R. 680 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Kansas · Jun 17, 1982

Clearly, a claim, proof of which has not been filed, cannot be allowed under the terms of section 502. … There is no provision in § 522(f) for avoiding liens on automobiles unless the vehicle qualifies as a “tool of the trade”.

In Re Libby

200 B.R. 562 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. New Jersey · Sep 19, 1996

relevant bankruptcy court cases across the country, all of which were cited and analyzed by this court at length in Eastwood, 192 B.R. 96 , the language on the face of the second mortgage document itself, which language clearly … CONCLUSION We rule therefore, that based upon the law as has been established by this Circuit and for the reasons as aforestated, the debtors’ motion to bifurcate and strip down the second mortgage lien currently held by

Keats v. Cogan

United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Kentucky · Jan 10, 2020

Kentucky courts view veil piercing as an equitable remedy that allows a court to impose personal liability on otherwise immune corporate officers, directors and shareholders for the corporation’s wrongful acts. … While the evidence supports that MC could be defined as an “insider”, there clearly is no evidence to support a claim of veil piercing against MC.

Yust v. Henkel (In re Henkel)

490 B.R. 759 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio · Apr 19, 2013

As such, it seems evident that the Debtor’s Counterclaims qualify as compulsory counterclaims. The Debtor in fact admits as much. … Accordingly, Yust has established the third element of claim preclusion.

In re American Suzuki Motor Corp.

494 B.R. 466 · United States Bankruptcy Court, C.D. California · Jun 4, 2013

The former proposition is clearly erroneous, and it is not clear that the latter proposition fares any better. … Walter’s credentials, has no doubt of his expertise, and continues to believe he is an expert qualified in the areas required in this case.

In Re Johnson

454 B.R. 882 · United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida · Jul 8, 2011

However, in Hager, the debtors had failed to complete Schedule B22C and failed to advance any justification for the necessity of three vehicles. *893 Clearly, Hager is distinguishable from this case. … But as applied by the IRS, the means test requires a debtor to qualify for a deduction by actually incurring an expense in the relevant category.

Buckley v. Carrier Corp. (In Re Globe Holdings, Inc.)

366 B.R. 186 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Alabama · Mar 28, 2007

Globe paid the third invoice in 51 days, and the fourth invoice in 64 days, both clearly within the preference period. … There is no bright-line rule for the number of payments prior to the preference period required to establish a course of dealing between parties.