Case law

In Re Daugherty

416 B.R. 582 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas · Sep 9, 2009

Rather, Debtors' purchases were both consistent with prior spending patterns and neither so extravagant nor so clearly undertaken in anticipation of bankruptcy as to indicate abuse. [17] 2. … Daugherty was clearly humbled by his situation.

Signia, Ltd.

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Colorado · Jan 29, 2024

In other words, the clause describes the particular type of qualifying “circumstances.” … Since the Bankruptcy Code “standardizes an expansive (and sometimes unruly) area of law,” it is the Court’s “obligation to interpret the Code clearly and predictably using well established principles of statutory construction

Steege v. at & T (In Re Superior Toy & Manufacturing Co.)

183 B.R. 826 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois · Jun 23, 1995

Under the expansive definition of a copyright, Nolan’s designs qualify as a copyright. Next, Nolan granted, orally, Superi- or a non-exclusive right to use its designs. … The payment of Nolan’s invoices were clearly not in the ordinary course of Superi- or’s business. As a result, Nolan’s § 547(c)(2) defense must be rejected. IV.

Loy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Loy)

557 B.R. 569 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Aug 22, 2016

Res judicata elements one and two are clearly satisfied in the case at bar. … For these reasons, Defendant has established the third element of res judicata.

Rimal v. Wibisono

412 B.R. 747 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Maryland · Mar 16, 2009

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that “reckless conduct could be sufficient to establish fraudulent intent.” Household Credit Services, Inc. v. … See also In re Colodner, 147 B.R. 90, 95 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1992) (“As a 100 percent shareholder of IPM, the debtor had sufficient financial interest in IPM so that the debt owed to the plaintiffs by IPM could qualify as *755

In Re Pettey

288 B.R. 14 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 21, 2003

First, though the Debtor clearly knew of his obligation to Elinore Davey when he filed these documents (whether the obligation had by then been reduced to a contempt judgment or not), nowhere in them did he list her as a … Chapter 13 (I make no ruling at this time on the Belangers’ arguments to the contrary), but the Debtor would first have to reduce his total noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts to below the eligibility limit in order to qualify

Nixon v. Davis Water & Waste Industries, Inc. (In re D.R. Goris Plumbing, Inc.)

49 B.R. 146 · United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida · Apr 18, 1985

This subclause requires that before a transfer can be avoided as a preference, the trustee has a burden to establish that as a result of the transfer, the recipient of the transfer received more than he would have received … The Supreme Court of Florida in the case of City of Sanford v. *150 McClelland, 121 Fla. 253, 257 , 163 So. 513, 514 (1935) held that a lien is a qualified right or a proprietary interest, which may be exercised over the

Andrew Velez Construction, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. (In Re Andrew Velez Construction, Inc.)

373 B.R. 262 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York · Aug 14, 2007

Trustee must establish both the debtor’s and the transferee’s actual fraudulent intent.”) … It is settled law that only funds originating from one of the seven sources enumerated in Lien Law § 70(5) qualify as owner trust funds. Bristol, Litynski, Wojcik, P.C. v.

In re Circle 10 Restaurant, LLC

519 B.R. 95 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. New Jersey · Nov 7, 2014

The Division of Taxation contends that when the New Jersey Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. § 33:1-26, it clearly intended to allow only taxing authorities to treat a liquor license as property. … interest created by N.J.S.A. 33:1-26, a liquor license in New Jersey constitutes “property” within and for the purposes of section 6321, and that as far as the federal government is concerned, N.J.S.A. 33:1-26 could not immunize

Bank of New England, N.A. v. Hanson Industries, Inc. (In Re Hanson Industries, Inc.)

83 B.R. 659 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Minnesota · Mar 7, 1988

Jurisdiction was established under 28 U.S. C. § 1471. … to establish and ordain those courts.

Cano v. GMAC Mortgage Corp. (In Re Cano)

410 B.R. 506 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas · Aug 10, 2009

Upon receiving a discharge, the debtor is immune from personal liability on any discharged debt. … However, § 1322(b)(2) does not immunize a lender’s compliance with other Bankruptcy Code provisions and rules.

In Re Fischer

259 B.R. 23 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. New York · Mar 2, 2001

Although some commentators have criticized the “interest of expectancy” test as vague and unhelpful ... it clearly expresses the judgment that the corporate opportunity doctrine should not be used to bar corporate directors … More fundamentally, however, it does not appear that Mockin is qualified to testify about the purpose for which this loan, to which he was not a party, was made.

Kilen v. United States (In Re Kilen)

129 B.R. 538 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois · Jun 28, 1991

The Court noted that the modifying language in § 101(5) “reflects Congress’ broad rather than restrictive view of the class of obligations that qualify as a ‘claim’ giving rise to a ‘debt’.” Id. at 2130. … In Kilen’s case, on the other hand, all the activities that would establish liability have already occurred. 15 *550 The existence of concrete injury to Kilen is real.

Burtch v. Connecticut Community Bank, N.A. (In Re J. Silver Clothing, Inc.)

453 B.R. 518 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware · Apr 29, 2011

Defendants argue that the parties’ clearly intended for the exchange to be contemporaneous and that the evidence supports a finding in Defendants’ favor. … Defendants have the burden of establishing both elements of § 547(c)(1). 11 U.S.C. § 547 (g).

In Re Blount

276 B.R. 753 · United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Louisiana · May 1, 2002

So, to the extent these cases have said that the type of actions for which the creditor has independent standing can qualify the creditor bringing such an action for treatment of the expenses of the action as an administrative … However, from a structural standpoint, the reasoning offered today provides a clearly visible future road.

Fulton, N.A. v. Robbins (In re Robbins)

562 B.R. 83 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Dec 21, 2016

D.N.D. 2006) (“The language ‘obtained by clearly indicates that the fraudulent conduct occurred at the inception of the debt, i.e., the debtor committed a fraudulent act to induce the creditor to part with its money, property … respecting one's "overall financial condition that are typically used to establish- such standing.”

In Re DeSoto

181 B.R. 704 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Connecticut · May 15, 1995

Second, the Court disagrees that its ruling establishes a substantial incentive to make exemption claims at “full value”. … If it did, the Trustee clearly has an interest to sell, over and above the Debtors’ exemption interest.

Monsanto Co. v. Trantham (In Re Trantham)

286 B.R. 650 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Tennessee · Dec 18, 2002

Clearly, Judge Wiseman affirmed the jury’s finding and conclusively decided the issue of willfulness. … The issue of willfulness is clearly established in the two post-trial memoranda. See the Memoranda dated March 5, 2002, at page 4; plaintiffs Exhibit D.

Hixson v. U.S. Deparment of Education (In Re Hixson)

450 B.R. 9 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York · Mar 24, 2011

He must also establish that his current financial hardship is likely to be long-term.” In re Wells, 380 B.R. at 659 . … program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution; or (ii) an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend; or (B) any other educational loan that is a qualified

Pearson

United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Virginia · Aug 12, 2026

suit is not brought within the time period allotted under state law, the debt cannot be established. … Accordingly, the Plaintiffs failed to meet the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the Debtor had the requisite felonious intent at the time she took the life insurance proceeds to establish