Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

FiltersFB

7,439 results

1.41s

  • In Re Kloubec

    247 B.R. 246 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Iowa · Mar 14, 2000

    This Motion is based on the allegation that Debtors do not qualify as family farmers as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101 (18). The Motion to Dismiss and the Motion to Convert are the subjects of this hearing. … Even if established to have merit, the Motion to Convert is the most appropriate choice.

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • In Re Law

    37 B.R. 501 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio · Feb 24, 1984

    It clearly indicated that it would operate to remove nonpossessory nonpurchase-money liens on property that would have been exempt were it not for the lien. See S.Rep. 95-989, supra, at 76. … Such a construction would be contrary to established rules of statutory construction. See Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735 (10th Cir.1977); United States v.

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • In re STN Enterprises, Inc.

    45 B.R. 941 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Vermont · Dec 12, 1984

    All of this would tend to establish that Erdman recognized this transaction as one involving a security interest. … The Court has considered these cases and the facts in each of them are clearly distinguishable from those under consideration herein and for that reason are not apposite.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • In Re Metropolitan Metals, Inc.

    228 B.R. 355 · United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Oct 2, 1998

    This is not to say that KPMG, and probably thousands of other accountants, were not qualified to do the tax returns required by the Trustee. … A review of the extensive Metropolitan record would clearly identify KPMG’s role in this estate to any party that cared to explore it.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Helbling v. Williams (In Re Williams)

    240 B.R. 884 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Nov 3, 1999

    In an earlier fraud case the same court held it improper, however, to require that evidence “leaves no room for doubt” to qualify as clear and convincing. McClintock v. … Code § 5301.234, it clearly has a substantive weight absent in the case of ordinary evidentiary presumptions which, under the federal rules and Ohio law, “burst” and are discarded, once evidence is presented.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Strauss v. Cole (In re Mamtek US, Inc.)

    588 B.R. 72 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Missouri · Jun 22, 2018

    While the California Legislature has enacted statutes to further this policy, exceptions to the homestead protection are well-established. … Cole clearly benefited from the use of those funds; they prevented the foreclosure on her homestead and created equity in the property.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Liebersohn v. Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc. (In re C.F. Foods, L.P.)

    280 B.R. 103 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jul 3, 2002

    Knowledge that future investors will not be paid is sufficient to establish actual intent to defraud them. … However, the Transfers do not qualify for the charitable contribution exception of 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(2) because the Debtor is not a "natural person” and, therefore, the Transfers do not fit the definition of "charitable

    Cited 31 timesPublished
  • Bank of Alex Brown v. Goldberg (In Re Goldberg)

    158 B.R. 188 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. California · Jun 28, 1993

    The Goldbergs failed to qualify for financing, and the sale was canceled. Both Stewart Title and Citation Homes issued full refund checks to the Goldbergs for the $17,000 down payment. … Second, because the check was issued erroneously, Bank’s rights to the check proceeds are clearly greater than those of Mr. Goldberg. Accordingly, Mr.

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • Rey v. Laureda (In Re Rey)

    324 B.R. 449 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. New York · Apr 27, 2005

    The state court denied the Debtor’s motion to dismiss, holding that “the allegations in Laureda’s Complaint establish that [the Debtor’s] debt to her could qualify for exception to discharge under section 523(a)(2)(A) ... … The doctrine was established by two Supreme Court eases (Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 , 44 S.Ct. 149 , 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Pennsylvania Capital Bank v. Allen (In Re Allen)

    228 B.R. 132 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · Dec 18, 1998

    502 , while the other qualified for similar treatment under I.R.C. § 408. … PCB, on the other hand, (a) contends that the “one-year period” in § 8124(b)(l)(ix)(B) refers to multiple “one-year period[s],” and (b) acquiesces, or “concedes,” to the use of the calendar year for the purpose of establishing

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Logal v. Education Credit Management Corp. (In Re Logal)

    381 B.R. 706 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Indiana · Oct 25, 2007

    The foregoing parameters established by the Court were not followed. … The record is devoid of evidence that Logal made any effort whatsoever to establish her inability to pay the State Commission.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • In Re Rabex Amuru of North Carolina, Inc.

    198 B.R. 892 · United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. North Carolina · Feb 8, 1996

    Under this definition, in order to qualify as “disinterested” an attorney must “not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any … Clearly Amura Japan has “an interest materially adverse” to Rabex Japan, an entity which claims to be an equity security holder and/or creditor.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Richardson v. McCullough (In Re McCullough)

    259 B.R. 509 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Rhode Island · Jan 18, 2001

    In his Post-Trial Memorandum the Trustee argues: that a Trust Addendum executed by Juliet McCullough on March 12, 1998, together with the actions of the Debtor and William McCullough, establish clearly that the Debtor alone … Provisions (2) and (4) of the Gallagher definition are clearly met in this case. 5 .

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • In Re Riverbend Leasing LLC

    458 B.R. 520 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Iowa · May 13, 2011

    Agreement by the Bank is clearly not present in this case. … Clearly, including this fee is contrary to Riverbend’s proposed business plan and is therefore not relevant to the comparative cash flow projection for purposes of calculating the allowable interest rate.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Salkin v. Slobodinsky (In Re Saber)

    233 B.R. 547 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. · Feb 24, 1999

    If the Florida Legislature wanted to immunize Florida Land Trusts, it certainly would have explicitly stated that such trusts are exempt from the longstanding and well-established Merger Doctrine. 5 There is no merger in … Clearly, Slobodinsky misinterprets the Ax-tell Court and other courts that describe and apply the Merger Doctrine.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • In Re Stoecker

    128 B.R. 205 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois · May 21, 1991

    In order to qualify as “actual” and “necessary” administrative expenses, expenditures must benefit the estate as a whole rather than just the creditor claimant. … With regard to reimbursement of expenses, W & S bears the burden of establishing that it is entitled to certain expenses which must be fully and clearly described.

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • In Re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P.

    454 B.R. 702 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas · Aug 4, 2011

    But the broader statement of the good faith test requires that the court consider “the totality of circumstances surrounding establishment of a Chapter 11 plan.” Id. … Interest Rate Having determined that it satisfies all the requirements of Code § 1129(a) except section 1129(a)(8), the Plan qualifies to be tested against section 1129(b) to determine if it should be confirmed notwithstanding

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • In Re Bryant Manor, LLC

    422 B.R. 278 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Kansas · Jan 7, 2010

    “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States” would clearly encompass a federal statute defining the mortgagee’s interest in the rents and profits earned by property in a bankrupt estate. … and In re Kingsport Ventures, L.P., 251 B.R. 841, 846-47 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.2000) (both noting that for a debt- or’s property, such as rents or profits, to constitute cash collateral under § 363(a), the property also must qualify

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Chandler v. Lincoln Capital Corp. (In Re Chandler)

    76 B.R. 927 · United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. New York · Aug 17, 1987

    While ratification may be express or implied, the assent necessary to demonstrate ratification, “must be clearly established and may not be inferred from doubtful or equivocal acts or language.... (citation omitted).” … New York case law has established a rather restrictive view of estoppel.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • In Re Rhead

    232 B.R. 175 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Arizona · Feb 24, 1999

    The burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish the legislature acted in an arbitrary, irrational way.” Id. at 483 (citing Usery v. … The clarifying legislation clearly says it applies “notwithstanding any other provision of law.” This is a clear mandate by Congress that the fees be imposed regardless of any potential conflict with the Code.

    Cited 2 timesPublished

Ask Donna

Ask Donna

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.