Case law

State v. Hayward

217 P.3d 354 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 2, 2009

"Evidence is admissible under ER 702 if the witness qualifies as an expert and the expert testimony would be helpful to the jury." State v. … The question asked just deals clearly with the legal standard. RP (Apr. 8, 2008) at 39-40.

Andrew Weiser, Appellant/cross v. Michelle Weiser, Respondent/cross

Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 27, 2020

The order also stated that it was intended to “qualify under the [USFSPA], 10 U.S.C. §1408” and that “[a]ll provisions shall be interpreted to make the order qualify.” Id. … Furthermore, the order also stated that it was intended to “qualify under the [USFSPA], 10 U.S.C. §1408” and that “[a]ll provisions shall be interpreted to make the order qualify,” so these provisions must be interpreted

Tst, Llc, Dba Oaks Mobile & Rv Court, V Manufactured Housing Dispute

Court of Appeals of Washington · Apr 27, 2021

“While the APA does not explicitly authorize agencies to use summary judgment procedures, case law has established that judicial review of such summary proceedings must ‘overlay the APA standard of 2 Ruling Accepting … A qualified party shall be considered to have prevailed if the qualified party obtained relief on a significant issue that achieves some benefit that the qualified party sought.

State v. Lillard

93 P.3d 969 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jul 12, 2004

Evidence at trial clearly established that Lillard possessed the property. … statement" as an "oral or written assertion or ... nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion." [29] Out-of-court statements offered for a purpose other than the truth asserted do not qualify

Grey v. Leach

244 P.3d 970 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Dec 13, 2010

(3) "by any act or omission, caused or contributed to the release *974 or threatened release of a hazardous substance at the facility." [13] Only the third limitation is at issue here. ¶ 14 The Leaches contend that they qualify … on the unexpressed subjective intent of the parties." [25] Clear and unambiguous contracts are enforced as written. [26] Words used in a contract are given their ordinary, usual, and popular meaning unless the agreement clearly

State v. Johnston

143 Wash. App. 1 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 25, 2007

Johnston’s claims are correct, he still cannot establish that the trial court abused its discretion. There was clearly a serious potential for a conflict of interest. Ms. … He claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to seek dismissal due to a violation of the speedy trial rule. ¶67 While not clearly explained in Mr.

State of Washington v. Francisco Gonzalez-Gonzalez

Court of Appeals of Washington · May 3, 2016

"The trial court's determination' s to the defendant's resources and ability to pay is essentially factual and should be revie ed under the clearly erroneous standard.'" State v. Bertrand, 165 Wn. … Gonzalez-Gonzalez was indigent and thu qualified for publicly funded counsel both for trial and on appeal, Mr. Gonzalez-Gonza ez testified that he was employed helping a mechanic at the time of his arrest.

Vonage America, Inc. v. City of Seattle

216 P.3d 1029 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Sep 3, 2009

City of Seattle, 164 Wash.2d 35 , 186 P.3d 1032 (2008), which held that Comcast's broadband cable modem business qualified as an Internet service, exempt from tax under the moratorium. … Because of the bundled nature of Vonage's records, it is clearly difficult for the company to provide this information after the service has occurred, but the Code places the burden on the taxpayer to establish the correct

Northwest Motorcycle Ass'n v. State, Iac for Outdoor Recreation

110 P.3d 1196 · Court of Appeals of Washington · May 5, 2005

This intent is clearly expressed in the unambiguous language of the provision. Id. at 810, 982 P.2d 611 . … A refund authorized by law is clearly authorized by the provision.

State Of Washington, App/cross-res. v. Alfred G. Burton, Res./cross-app.

Court of Appeals of Washington · Apr 26, 2016

App. 33, 975 P.2d 1029 (1999), in which Division Three of our court addressed, in the context of a civil suit for false 3 Governor Gregoire vetoed a provision establishing a state registry for qualified patients and … The court in McBride, however, clearly explained that “[t]he self-defense claim did not vitiate probable cause.” Id.

James C. Fuda, Doriane Beaupre & Chad Beaupre, Apps./cross-resps. v. King County, Resp./cross-app.

Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 9, 2017

In order for a decision to qualify as discretionary, the State must show that the decision was the outcome of a conscious balancing of risks and advantages. Id. at 214-15. … Therefore, even if we held that discretionary immunity does not apply, reversal on the guardrail issue would not be warranted, because Fuda has not established cause in fact.

State v. Morgan

99 P.3d 411 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 25, 2004

The court clearly instructed the jury that a superseding, intervening cause relieves the defendant of liability because it breaks the causal chain. … But the fact that a jury instruction is modeled from a pattern instruction does not render it immune from judicial scrutiny.

Wrenn v. Spinnaker Bay Homeowners Ass'n

60 Wash. App. 400 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jan 28, 1991

Once Pinkerton's claim expired, he no longer qualified as a "joinable party" under CR 19 and CR 19 no longer applied to him. … We note, however, that RCW 4.24-.010 clearly indicates that the parents together, whether married or not, have one cause of action.

State Of Washington v. Scott Jesus Barajas

Court of Appeals of Washington · Oct 3, 2017

We disagree.6 The Washington Constitution’s privileges and immunities clause provides that “[n]o law shall be passed granting to any citizen . . . privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally … The order clearly states that Barajas was convicted of violation of a domestic violence no-contact order.

Kirby v. Employment Security Department

179 Wash. App. 834 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 10, 2014

On July 9, 2011, the Department issued a determination notice denying her request for benefits because she was fired for work misconduct and therefore did not qualify for benefits. … 2011 was reasonable, which is required to establish insubordination.

National Merit Insurance v. Yost

101 Wash. App. 236 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jun 9, 2000

Because Yost qualified as an insured under that policy, National General paid her the $100,000 policy limit. … Rather, the plain language clearly indicates the opposite: there is no supplemental insurance over and above the highest amount available under all applicable policies.

Spokane County v. Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearing Board

Court of Appeals of Washington · Sep 10, 2013

We agree with the Neighbors but, as explained below, we choose to clarify the principles we established in Spokane County I. … Even so, we exercise our discretion to further clarify the rule we established in Spokane County I. B.

Aleksey Zorchenko And Nina Zorchenko, App/cr-resps V. City Of Federal Way, Resp/cr-apps

Court of Appeals of Washington · Jun 10, 2024

III In 1961, the legislature enacted a statute waiving the State’s sovereign immunity for governmental functions. LAWS OF 1961, ch. 136 § 1 (codified as RCW 4.92.090). … Where I diverge most clearly from the four-element formulation in Mancini is with regard to causation.

Seatac Committee For Good Jobs v. Bf Foods, Llc

Court of Appeals of Washington · Feb 10, 2014

It is found in Title 35A RCW, the title that allows for the establishment of optional municipal code cities and defines how such cities shall be governed and operated. SeaTac is an optional municipal code city. … They clearly do not fear the popular will—if they did, they would not have granted their residents initiative and referendum powers in the first place.

Bogomolov v. LAKE VILLAS CONDOMINIUM ASS'N

127 P.3d 762 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jan 30, 2006

. ¶ 17 The deed clearly states that second-class shorelands were originally conveyed by the State to the original owners of the land in 1917. … Thus, the Declaration does not provide that only the existing numbered boat slips are limited common areas, but rather explains why the existing boat slips qualify as limited common areas.