Case law

Willoughby v. Dept. of Labor & Industries

57 P.3d 611 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 14, 2002

The exception, payment to beneficiaries, clearly has a rational basis. … I would hold that Cain has not established that RCW 51.32.040(3)(a) violates laws against marital discrimination.

In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Placide

190 Wash. 2d 402 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 12, 2018

Does Placide's conduct identified in counts 1 and 6 qualify as an "intrapartnership dispute" not susceptible to the Board's or this court's disciplinary authority? 2. … The statutory provision that the hearing officer used to conclude that Placide committed a crime 24 In re Discipline ofPlacide (Carllene M.), No. 201,639-1 of theft clearly

OneWest Bank FSB v. Erickson

Washington Supreme Court · Feb 4, 2016

The party disputing a foreign order has the burden of establishing lack of jurisdiction. In re Parentage of Infant Child F., 178 Wn. … Because Erickson was clearly aware of and consented to the deed of trust encumbering the Spokane property when it was executed, she should not now be permitted to challenge a technical defect in the notary's certification

In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceeding Against Shepard

239 P.3d 1066 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 9, 2010

But the record clearly establishes that Shepard accepted fees from over 70 clients and did not perform the agreed services. … 104). ¶ 42 The American Bar Association's (ABA) Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions standard 4.4 (1991 & Supp. 1992) (ABA Standards ) spells out, in broad terms, failures of reasonable diligence and promptness that qualify

Veit Ex Rel. Nelson v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp.

249 P.3d 607 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 24, 2011

the subject matter of train speed with respect to track conditions, including the conditions posed by grade crossings."). ¶ 32 Next, the Court rejected plaintiff's appeal to the "second saving clause," of the FRSA, which immunizes … Burks was clearly mistaken, and his subjective beliefs do not alter this analysis. [9] ¶ 44 In sum, Veit cannot establish a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the federal speed limit at the Pine Street crossing

Yousoufian v. Office of Sims

200 P.3d 232 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 15, 2009

We feel uniquely qualified to interpret the law and equally competent to the trial court in determining the facts from a written record. … Instead, the majority applies the test itself and concludes that "a penalty at the high end of the penalty range" is "clearly require[d]."

Brown v. Scott Paper Worldwide Co.

143 Wash. 2d 349 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 5, 2001

The inclusion of this provision establishes that the Legislature intended to reach individual wrongdoers in the workplace, not just the employers themselves. We agree with the Court of Appeals’ observation in Brown v. … An employer’s right to terminate an at-will employee can be contractually modified and, thus, can be qualified by statements contained in employee policy manuals or handbooks issued by an employer to its employees.

State v. Ladson

979 P.2d 833 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 1, 1999

Article I, section 7, is explicitly broader than that of the Fourth Amendment [1] as it "`clearly recognizes an individual's right to privacy with no express limitations'" and places greater emphasis on privacy. … There is no established body of law establishing the "no-pretext rule" envisioned by the majority.

State v. Sullivan

19 P.3d 1012 · Washington Supreme Court · Mar 8, 2001

Knapstad, [32] claiming the State could not establish a prima facie case of barratry against him. … Petitioner asserts that Respondent's demand was somewhat similar to a summons, which would qualify as "judicial process." [66] The "Demand for Particulars" had a caption indicating a court and named parties, directed the

Veit Ex Rel. Nelson v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp.

249 P.3d 607 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 24, 2011

the subject matter of train speed with respect to track conditions, including the conditions posed by grade crossings."). ¶ 32 Next, the Court rejected plaintiff's appeal to the "second saving clause," of the FRSA, which immunizes … Burks was clearly mistaken, and his subjective beliefs do not alter this analysis. [9] ¶ 44 In sum, Veit cannot establish a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the federal speed limit at the Pine Street crossing

In re the Detention of Petersen

138 Wash. 2d 70 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 10, 1999

The trial court concluded the report established a basis, with sufficient factual specificity, to continue his confinement at SCC. … A decision declaring an adult legally incompetent, or an order establishing a conservatorship or guardianship for an adult. (8) Order of Commitment.

State v. Curry

423 P.3d 179 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 16, 2018

Additionally, "a trial court must *183 establish that a defendant, in choosing to proceed pro se, makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel." … At issue *187 here is whether Curry's request was unequivocal. ¶ 34 Here, the trial judge was clearly aware of and applied the correct legal standard to Curry's request for self-representation.

Colbert v. Moomba Sports, Inc.

176 P.3d 497 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 14, 2008

traumatic shock from a close-up view of the loved one's agonizing injuries and, under the undisputed facts here, that distance-100 yards—was clearly too great." … [T]he critical element for establishing such liability is the contemporaneous observance of the injury to the close relative.

Matter of Disciplinary Proceeding Against Anshchell

9 P.3d 193 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 14, 2000

The effect of the sanction on the attorney (sanction must not be clearly excessive); 4. … Gray, 380 So.2d 1292 (Fla.1980) (lawyer represented client in truth in lending laws case without ever becoming qualified in the area).

Christen v. Lee

113 Wash. 2d 479 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 26, 1989

In so deciding, we stated very clearly: In effect, the plaintiff seeks to have this court adopt a theory of strict liability to be applied against one who furnishes liquor whenever a patron commits a tort while intoxicated … To hold otherwise provides an unwarranted measure of immunity for tavern owners and other furnishers of alcohol. See McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 412 (Wyo. 1983); see also Ontiveros v.

Koenig v. Thurston County

175 Wash. 2d 837 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 27, 2012

. *864 ¶61 As these declarations establish, VISs would not be painfully accurate and some would not be available for sentencing purposes if available to the public at large. … Clearly, however, the majority opinion — by requiring disclosure of a complete and unredacted VIS — will impermissibly deter the victim contribution to law enforcement that our constitution deems essential. B.

State v. Leyda

138 P.3d 610 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 20, 2006

However, the plain language of the identity theft statute establishes that the legislature intended for each use to be a "unit of prosecution." … We interpret the legislature's decision to add the words "obtain" and "possess" to the statute as its attempt to combat the rapidly expanding identity theft problem by more clearly defining and broadening the way in which

State v. TVI, Inc.

Washington Supreme Court · Feb 23, 2023

These charitable solicitations are not a mere “veneer,” as the State contends, nor are they an attempt “to immunize false or misleading product information from government regulation simply by including … However, as applied to commercial speech, the CPA’s requirements are well established.

Pierce County v. State

159 Wash. 2d 16 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 7, 2006

Sound Transit is a municipal corporation and, therefore, its contracts qualify as public contracts. … The taxes authorized, after voter approval, are limited in scope and clearly defined.

Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Office of Ins. Comm'r

Washington Supreme Court · Aug 1, 2013

As we have explained above, there is clearly such a nexus between soliciting applications for insurance and inducing middlemen to direct end-consumers to an insurer. … It places the relatively small msurance component with an insurer qualified, by reason of compliance with financial requirements, to underwrite the slight risk that [the UTC] has not properly done its work."' I d.