Case law

Woo v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.

164 P.3d 454 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 26, 2007

Fireman's responds that the allegations in Alberts' complaint unambiguously establish that Woo's practical joke was not connected to treating Alberts' condition. … The court clearly stated: While Dr.

Nisqually Delta Ass'n v. City of DuPont

103 Wash. 2d 720 · Washington Supreme Court · Mar 7, 1985

This court applies the "clearly erroneous" review standard of RCW 34.04.130(6)(e) *726 directly to the challenged administrative decisions. Department of Ecology v. … To establish and maintain reasonable structural standards for maintenance and development of Du Pont's shoreline. 8.

State v. A.M.

194 Wash. 2d 33 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 12, 2019

"The requirements under RAP 2.5(a)(3) should not be confused with the requirements for establishing an actual violation of a constitutional right or for establishing lack of prejudice under a harmless error analysis if … We nonetheless declined to revisit our established interpretation.

Central Life Assurance Society v. Impelmans

13 Wash. 2d 632 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 4, 1942

Appellant, Central Life Assurance Society, is a corporation having its home office in Des Moines, Iowa, and is qualified to do business in this state, where it invests funds in real estate mortgages. … Forfeitures are not favored in the law and will not be enforced when it clearly appears that it would be inequitable to do so.

State v. Black (In Re Black)

422 P.3d 881 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 2, 2018

Applying Woodlyn here, instruction 5 stated in relevant part: To establish that Mr. Black is a sexually violent predator, the State must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That Mr. … Under these circumstances, the hebephilia controversy rebuttal evidence was clearly relevant and would have been helpful to the jury as it concerned specialized knowledge.

Bostain v. Food Exp., Inc.

153 P.3d 846 · Washington Supreme Court · Mar 1, 2007

. ¶ 16 RCW 49.46.005 states: Whereas the establishment of a minimum wage for employees is a subject of vital and imminent concern to the people of this state and requires appropriate action by the legislature to establish … RCW 49.46.005 describes the purpose of the entire MWA as follows: to establish minimum standards of employment within the state of Washington . . . to establish a minimum wage for employees of this state to encourage employment

State v. Wheaton

121 Wash. 2d 347 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 29, 1993

in the field of psychiatry and that a qualified expert witness could render an opinion regarding the sanity or insanity of a person suffering from the disorder. … This part of the court's reasoning clearly focuses on the alter in control at the time of the criminal acts, but does not explain why that alter should be the focus. The State relies upon these three cases in its brief.

Peterson v. Seattle Traction Co.

23 Wash. 615 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 27, 1900

Clearly such could not have been the intention, as the contract made was a single one which related only to' the services of the deceased and the compensation he was to l’eceive for the same. … He was then no more in the defendant’s service than any other citizen passing along the street, and he was entitled to the same rights and immunities.” In the case of Gillenwater v. Madison & I. R. R.

Abrams v. State

45 Wash. 327 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 15, 1907

Ankeny Avas appointed and qualified as her administrator, and has ever since been in possession, leasing the premises to the defendants N. A. Hebert and C. W. Shomo. … will pass a title good against all the world except the state¡ As an alien may acquire and hold lands in this state in the instances specified, and in case of mineral lands, etc., under the last part of the provision, may clearly

Hines v. Data Line Systems, Inc.

114 Wash. 2d 127 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 22, 1990

The loss of any of these qualified personnel could have a material adverse effect upon the Company. . . . Clerk's Papers, at 319 (cause 55958-9). … The statute clearly does not distinguish between "inside" and "outside" directors, and liability may exist without control person status.

FIRST SMALL BUSINESS INV. CO. OF CA. v. Intercapital Corp. of Oregon

108 Wash. 2d 324 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 11, 1987

Thus, we have not established an absolute rule of disqualification even within the same firm. … Such a holding should be overruled if it lays down or tacitly applies a rule of law which is clearly erroneous, and if to apply the doctrine would work a manifest injustice to one party, whereas no corresponding injustice

In re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Anschell

141 Wash. 2d 593 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 14, 2000

The effect of the sanction on the attorney (sanction must not be clearly excessive); 4. … Gray, 380 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 1980) (lawyer represented client in truth in lending laws case without ever becoming qualified in the area).

Portugal v. Franklin County

Washington Supreme Court · Jun 15, 2023

Does the WVRA facially violate the privileges and immunities clause of article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution? D. … The WVRA can clearly be applied in a manner that does not violate article I, section 12 because, on its face, the WVRA does not grant any privilege or immunity to any class of citizens.

Nguyen v. STATE HEALTH MED. QUALITY ASSUR.

29 P.3d 689 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 23, 2001

Nguyen's professional license clearly represents a property interest to which due process protections apply. … Increased cost is clearly not a fact or concern here.

Allan v. University of Washington

140 Wash. 2d 323 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 20, 2000

Perhaps the majority would here unwittingly overrule the standing portion of the Trades Council decision; but if that is its intent, it should say so clearly. As Mrs. … demonstrated by the fact that, without an express exemption, simple “statements” could otherwise be construed as *345 rules. 4 The language of the “statements” exemption does not support the conclusion that by not expressly qualifying

Banowsky v. Backstrom

193 Wash. 2d 724 · Washington Supreme Court · Jul 25, 2019

We observed: Clearly [petitioner] could have filed his [personal restraint petition] directly in the Supreme Court at his election. … Our power to establish procedural rules governing the judicial branch of government is well *742 established in our precedent and well grounded in our constitutional authority.

State v. Bergeron

105 Wash. 2d 1 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 12, 1985

Officer Wardstrom is trained in dog tracking and is qualified to determine when a dog is on someone's track, and Sarge, Officer Wardstrom's police dog has been successfully trained in tracking. … This contention is borne out by numerous authorities which the diligence of counsel has gathered for the information of this court; and we believe it to be the law in most of the states, and that it would clearly be the law

Farrar v. Tribune Publishing Co.

57 Wash. 2d 549 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 19, 1961

The view was clearly stated in Ecuyer v. New York Life Ins. … Had the rule been otherwise, only the advertiser, who had the malice, would have been liable, and the advertising medium, which had none, would have been immune.

Clean v. City of Spokane

133 Wash. 2d 455 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 13, 1997

The court held, on the only issue before it, that when any portion of a law addresses an emergency, the entire law is immune from referendum. [17] Since the plaintiff conceded that the appropriations provisions of the acts … Instead, this court has upheld declarations of emergency only when the facts established a need for immediate response to public peril.

Ostroff v. Laundry & Dye Works Drivers' Local No. 566

37 Wash. 2d 595 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 14, 1950

This action was brought to enjoin the picketing of plaintiff's cleaning and dyeing establishment by the defendant union. … Alexandrof's testimony clearly demonstrates that the effect of appellant's signing the contracts would be directly, and not incidentally, to coerce appellant's employees to join the union or lose their jobs. *603 Respondent