Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
3,545 results
1.01s
79 Wash. 2d 254 · Washington Supreme Court · May 6, 1971
Admittedly aimed at appealing to "a clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at large," the court interpreted Roth to support the suppression of materials directed at "the sexual interests of its intended … Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 , 12 L.Ed.2d 793 , 84 S.Ct. 1676 (1964)), is not and should not be granted immunity from community and moral standards and state law except where to deny such immunity amounts to a deprivation of freedom
Reversed on other grounds by Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972)Cited 9 timesPublishedBoeing Airplane Co. v. Commissioner of the Employment Security Department
39 Wash. 2d 356 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 6, 1951
To unduly restrict the operations of administrative bureaus would defeat the very purpose for which they have been established.” In Morgan v. … adopted by the majority when it states, “It is undoubtedly true that an employee might be justified in voluntarily terminating his employment, if called upon to work for substantially reduced wages . . . ” But, who is best qualified
Cited 14 timesPublishedGunnier v. Yakima Heart Center, Inc.
134 Wash. 2d 854 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 16, 1998
Nicholas Jerns Co., 86 Wn.2d 215, 219 , 543 P2d 338 (1975), the court said that “[u]ntil a plaintiff suffers appreciable harm as a consequence of negligence, he cannot establish a cause of action.” … This language clearly does not provide *860 that the limitations period commences with accrual of a cause of action.
Cited 42 timesPublished139 Wash. 2d 581 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 2, 1999
Pursuant to RCW 70.77.126 and 70.77.236, in order for an explosive device to qualify as a “firework” it must have been classified by the appropriate federal or state government officials. … The affiant’s failure to specifically state that Donald Yokley did not possess an explosives license, when one can easily draw this inference from the affidavit, clearly falls within the category of “negligence” or “innocent
Cited 1 timesPublished151 Wash. 2d 60 · Washington Supreme Court · Mar 4, 2004
. *94 clearly identify the proposition to be voted on.’ ” Majority at 71 (quoting RCW 29.79.035(1)). … Though a corollary to the last antecedent rule provides “the presence of a comma before the qualifying phrase is evidence the qualifier is intended to apply *98 to all antecedents instead of only the immediately preceding
Cited 24 timesPublishedWash. Trucking Ass'ns v. Emp't Sec. Dep't
Washington Supreme Court · Apr 27, 2017
immunity under section 1983. 7 66 F .3d at 1125. … "If the undefined statutory term is not technical, the court may refer to the dictionary to establish the meaning of the word." Id. at 423.
Cited 0 timesPublishedWashington Water Jet Workers Ass'n v. Yarbrough
148 Wash. 2d 403 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 16, 2003
Demands were made to appoint a qualified warden in place of Billings’ hired superintendent. They appropriated $600 per year for such an official. … The Utah Supreme Court clearly understood “contracting” to mean the contract system of convict labor.
Overruled in part by Washington Water Jet Workers Ass'n v. Yarbrough, 151 Wash. 2d 470 (2004)Cited 7 timesPublished179 Wash. 2d 224 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 27, 2013
. *266 ¶98 Such restrictions on who may qualify for domestic partnership might lead to results perceived to be unfair or arbitrary. … Thus, for purposes of our opinion, the notarized agreements among the parties were established facts.
Cited 49 timesPublishedKramarevcky v. Department of Social & Health Services
122 Wash. 2d 738 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 2, 1993
The facts in West clearly render the case inapplicable in this instance. See Harbor Air Serv., Inc. v. … The majority's holding that substantive eligibility is not a requirement for establishing the injury element of estoppel is, thus, clearly incorrect when a party is asserting estoppel against the government.
Cited 111 timesPublishedCarstens Packing Co. v. Southern Pacific Co.
58 Wash. 239 · Washington Supreme Court · May 3, 1910
Clearly, its enactment was prompted by a concern for the public welfare. … But both these elementary principles are subordinate to and qualified by the doctrine that neither by comity nor by the will of contracting parties can the public policy of a country be set at naught.
Cited 17 timesPublishedResidents Opposed to Kittitas Turbines v. State Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council
165 Wash. 2d 275 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 20, 2008
EFSLA instructs that the definitions section applies throughout the statute “unless the context clearly requires otherwise.” RCW 80.50.020. … That section clearly indicates that locating turbines at greater distances from viewers reduces visual impact of those turbines.
Cited 44 timesPublishedPasco Police Officers' Ass'n v. City of Pasco
132 Wash. 2d 450 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 26, 1997
established by the city; 3. … PERC was clearly correct in its analysis.
Cited 51 timesPublishedCooper's Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Simmons
94 Wash. 2d 321 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 25, 1980
The term does not have such an established meaning consistent with only one characterization of a particular item. … For instance, in this case the legislative purpose clearly appears from the following analysis.
Cited 28 timesPublished142 Wash. 2d 135 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 2, 2000
Keene, 131 Wash.2d at 834-35 , 935 P.2d 588 . deElche and Keene firmly ensconced in this area of law the principle that "`absent express statutory provision, or compelling public policy, the law should not immunize tortfeasors … A slightly different regime is established for tort obligations.
Cited 77 timesPublishedDiamond Parking, Inc. v. City of Seattle
78 Wash. 2d 778 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 8, 1971
unless there is maintained at or near the entrance of said garage a sign designating each rate to be charged for such parking or keeping and the hours applicable thereto and the name of the licensee and such sign shall be clearly … The court’s opinion will allow the surviving corporate entity to enter a licensed field of activity without applying and qualifying for a license, for under the aegis of the Uniform Business Corporation Act it may achieve
Cited 13 timesPublishedState ex rel. T.B. v. CPC Fairfax Hospital
129 Wash. 2d 439 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 27, 1996
to establish guidelines beneficial to and protective of their children. … The legislature further finds that *462 it is the right and responsibility of adults to establish laws for the benefit and protection of the society; and that, in the same manner, the right and responsibility for establishing
Cited 20 timesPublishedState v. Reader's Digest Ass'n
81 Wash. 2d 259 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 28, 1972
In order to qualify, however, the addressee *262 must respond. He may return a “yes” form, by which he agrees to purchase advertised goods and enter the drawing, or a “no” form, by which he only enters the drawing. … In recent years there has been a clearly discernible trend to liberalize the requirements for establishing personal jurisdiction over nonresidents.
Modified by Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Insurance, 105 Wash. 2d 778 (1986)Cited 144 timesPublishedHTK Management, L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Authority
155 Wash. 2d 612 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 20, 2005
RCW 35.95A.050(1). 28 Our case law establishes that condemnation procedures may be fairly implied if necessary to effectuate the legislature’s intent. … The Transit Way Agreement between the City of Seattle and Monorail establishes conditions under which Monorail may use the city's rights-of-way. Fully quoted infra p. 646.
Cited 38 timesPublishedHenry Broderick, Inc. v. Baker
151 Wash. 1 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 14, 1929
It clearly appears from respondent’s testimony and from the instrument itself that the agreement was intended by respondent to be definite and complete, and that the same did not contemplate further negotiation between the … Duryee, called as a witness on the part of respondent, testified that appellant read the earnest money receipt when the same was presented to him on the morning of November 16, but, on cross-examination, qualified his testimony
Cited 9 timesPublishedIn Re the Detention of Danforth
173 Wash. 2d 59 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 10, 2011
Danforth moved for summary judgment, arguing that his actions did not constitute a “recent overt act” to qualify him for commitment proceedings under former RCW 71.09-.020(10) (2006), recodified as RCW 71.09.020(12). … Ed. 2d 664 (1969) (holding that statutes that criminalize pure speech “must he interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind”).
Cited 25 timesPublished
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