Case law

In re the Detention of Martin

163 Wash. 2d 501 · Washington Supreme Court · May 1, 2008

For example, an omission simultaneously qualifying a person for confinement and release is meaningless. Id. at 730. … Certainly naming a specific prosecutor as the filing authority establishes venue; however, venue does not supersede the expression of authority.

Geisness v. Scow Bay Packing Co.

16 Wash. 2d 1 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 28, 1942

The plaintiff has the burden to establish not only the facts from which the warranty springs, but also the facts which show a breach of warranty, i. e., the plaintiff must establish that the food was in fact unwholesome. … Jones to convey the idea that the food poisoning was caused by the salmon, we are clearly of the opinion such conclusion cannot be justified from the facts in this case. See Reese v.

Haley v. Highland

142 Wash. 2d 135 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 2, 2000

A slightly different regime is established for tort obligations. … The award of interest, which dates back to the time of the tortious activity of Highland, clearly indicates that no part of the $2,500 was intended to be an award of attorney fees.

Yarnell v. Marshall School District No. 343

17 Wash. 2d 284 · Washington Supreme Court · Mar 23, 1943

Devices for use on school grounds are not merely for amusement, but are, as designated by § 4706, “athletic apparatus or appliance” clearly indicating instrumentalities for physical development. … If this statute needs interpretation, we may, under well-established principles, look to its history, the law which it limits, and the evils and mischief to be remedied, give to the words used their ordinary and accepted

State v. Rupe

101 Wash. 2d 664 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 7, 1984

Was defendant denied due process by the procedure of death qualifying the jury? Defendant's challenges to his death sentence include: 11. … The above language clearly restricts the admissibility of evidence relating to constitutionally protected behavior.

Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance v. Dan Paulson Construction, Inc.

161 Wash. 2d 903 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 11, 2007

“In order to establish bad faith, an insured is required to show the breach was unreasonable, frivolous, or unfounded.” … establishing which of the Martinellis’ claims were excluded from coverage under DPCI’s policy.

State v. McFarland

Washington Supreme Court · Aug 3, 2017

I cannot come up with any legitimate reason to hold that the circumstances of this case qualify for such special treatment. … The record in Mulholland thus clearly showed that the trial court had an erroneous view of the law. Cf McGill, 112 Wn.

State v. Posey

167 P.3d 560 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 20, 2007

RCW 9A.44.020(3)(d). [1] *566 ¶ 30 In my view, the proffered e-mail evidence is clearly relevant to Posey's defense of consent. See RCW 9A.44.020(3)(d). Justice would have been advanced by its admission. … Harris, 97 Wash.App. 865, 872 , 989 P.2d 553 (1999) ("Evidence tending to establish a party's theory, or to qualify or disprove the testimony of an adversary, is always relevant and admissible.").

State v. Dolan

17 Wash. 499 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 7, 1897

Both these elements were alleged as facts in the information, and it was therefore incumbent upon the state to establish them as facts by competent evidence. … "We do not, of course, desire to be understood as holding, or even intimating, that voluntary intoxication is an excuse for crime actually committed, for such is clearly not the law.

Cornwell v. Microsoft Corp.

430 P.3d 229 · Washington Supreme Court · Nov 29, 2018

This undoubtedly qualifies as an adverse employment action. See Jin Zhu v. N. Cent. Educ. Serv. Dist. … Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 788 (7th Cir. 2009)("Clearly, a superior cannot retaliate against an employee for a protected activity about which he has no knowledge."); Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch.

Poston v. Mathers

77 Wash. 2d 329 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 4, 1969

We agree. [2] It is error to instruct the jury that all rights-of-way are relative and that the duty to avoid accident at intersections rests upon both drivers, unless such instruction is qualified by the statement that the … The rule which we have established hitherto is that a partial new trial may be ordered only when the issues are clearly distinct and separate from each other and justice does not require resubmission of the whole case to

State v. Rabe

79 Wash. 2d 254 · Washington Supreme Court · May 6, 1971

Admittedly aimed at appealing to "a clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at large," the court interpreted Roth to support the suppression of materials directed at "the sexual interests of its intended … Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 , 12 L.Ed.2d 793 , 84 S.Ct. 1676 (1964)), is not and should not be granted immunity from community and moral standards and state law except where to deny such immunity amounts to a deprivation of freedom

State v. Manussier

921 P.2d 473 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 8, 1996

The initiative's goal of improved public safety, stated clearly in RCW 9.94A.392, is a legitimate state objective. [85] And while the offenses included in the enumerated list of crimes in RCW 9.94A.030(21) may be at least … Just as in the case before us today, the trial court, sitting without a jury, determined whether the defendant qualified to be sentenced as a habitual offender.

In re the Recall Charges Against City of Pacific Mayor Cy Sun

177 Wash. 2d 251 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 25, 2013

Legal sufficiency requires that the petition state, with specificity, substantial conduct clearly amounting to misfeasance, malfeasance, or violation of the oath of office. … In West, we expressed concern that the recall petitioner had simply read in the newspaper about the mayor’s alleged quid pro quo offer to a young person and we refrained from “establish [ing] that media articles, categorically

Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority v. Airport Investment Co.

186 Wash. 2d 336 · Washington Supreme Court · Aug 4, 2016

The very fact that the parties litigated to judgment over just compensation establishes that the proceeding was never abandoned. … But such a rule is contrary to established precedent holding that a proceeding is abandoned when the condemnor never takes any property. See Port of Grays Harbor v.

Piel v. City of Federal Way

177 Wash. 2d 604 · Washington Supreme Court · Jun 27, 2013

The city is correct. ¶59 The rule of law established in Korslund does not directly contradict that set forth in Smith. … This court has clearly acknowledged that some statutory schemes will adequately protect the public policy they embody and therefore will foreclose a plaintiff’s access to a claim of WTVP.

Wash. Trucking Ass'ns v. Emp't Sec. Dep't

Washington Supreme Court · Apr 27, 2017

immunity under section 1983. 7 66 F .3d at 1125. … "If the undefined statutory term is not technical, the court may refer to the dictionary to establish the meaning of the word." Id. at 423.

Roake v. Delman

Washington Supreme Court · Jan 11, 2018

The legislature thus clearly knows how to relieve a petitioner from the burden of showing future dangerousness by specific statements or acts. … See RCW 7.90.005 (SAPOs are intended to "be a remedy for victims who do not qualify for a domestic violence order of protection").

Gunnier v. Yakima Heart Center, Inc.

134 Wash. 2d 854 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 16, 1998

Nicholas Jerns Co., 86 Wn.2d 215, 219 , 543 P2d 338 (1975), the court said that “[u]ntil a plaintiff suffers appreciable harm as a consequence of negligence, he cannot establish a cause of action.” … This language clearly does not provide *860 that the limitations period commences with accrual of a cause of action.

Gunnier v. Yakima Heart Center, Inc.

953 P.2d 1162 · Washington Supreme Court · Apr 16, 1998

Nicholas Jerns Co., 86 Wash.2d 215, 219 , 543 P.2d 338 (1975) the court said that "[u]ntil a plaintiff suffers appreciable harm as a consequence of negligence, he cannot establish a cause of action." ( Gazija is not a medical … This language clearly does not provide that the limitations period commences with accrual of a cause of action.