Case law

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  • Perez v. Weslaco Independent School District

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Aug 24, 2022

    “does not qualify for special education services.”109 In a short analysis, the hearing officer discounted Dr. … The Fifth Circuit has confronted this issue before: “some students may qualify for § 504 protection but not qualify for special services under IDEA.”171 That is the case here.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Leroy v. City of Houston

    648 F. Supp. 537 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Aug 1, 1986

    Korbel's professional experience eminently qualified him for the instant cases. … Washington was uniquely qualified to cross-examine Judson Robinson. Mr.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • VANDERBILT MORTG. AND FINANCE, INC. v. Flores

    746 F. Supp. 2d 819 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Oct 20, 2010

    “Although the elements are not clearly defined and the conduct deemed to constitute an unreasonable collection effort varies from case to case[,]” id. (citing, e.g., Pullins v. … Vanderbilt qualifies as a “debt collector” under the TDCA because it is directly engaged in debt collection. § 392.001.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Coleman v. Chevron Phiilips Chemical Company LP

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Feb 6, 2024

    First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of age discrimination: “(1) he was discharged; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was within the protected class at the time of discharge; and (4) he was … “A showing that the unsuccessful employee was clearly better qualified (as opposed to merely better or as qualified) than the employees who are selected will be sufficient to prove that the employer’s proffered reasons

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Fleet Operators Inc. v. Nautilus Insurance Company

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Jul 18, 2022

    nonmovant will be unable to establish a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). … Similarly, Fieldwood is not a party to the Brokerage Agreement, but does undisputedly qualify as a member of Broker Group, and thus is a third-party beneficiary of Fleet’s indemnity obligations.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Malone v. Zambrano

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Mar 24, 2020

    The Fifth Circuit has extended the Eleventh Amendment immunity specifically to TDCJ officers and officials acting in their official capacities. See Oliver v. … Plaintiff “must establish that he has a personal stake in the alleged dispute and that the alleged injury suffered is particularized as to him.” Id. at 819.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Ahrens

    414 F. Supp. 1235 · District Court, S.D. Texas · May 6, 1976

    The Court cannot conclude with certainty at this point that interpleader jurisdiction clearly should be extended to protect the insureds from other litigation via issuance of similar injunctive relief. … The insureds allege claims to each other’s inter-pleaded funds and probably qualify as claimant-defendants.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Exxon Mobil Corp. v. United States

    335 F. Supp. 3d 889 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Aug 17, 2018

    This qualifier is recognized in Ninth and Tenth Circuit opinions. See W.R. … According to Exxon, Ficca clearly noted any instance in which he also relied on a fact witness. Those fact witnesses were made available for deposition and will be available to testify in court.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • JERRY LANCE PETTY v. CITY OF FREEPORT, TEXAS, et al.

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Jun 29, 2026

    immunity and Monell liability. … THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION Having established that Petty fails to state a claim under federal law, I

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Verde Minerals, LLC v. Koerner

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Dec 3, 2019

    “Each word and phrase should be given its plain, grammatical meaning unless doing so would clearly defeat the parties’ intent.” Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462, 466 (Tex. App. … Accordingly, because Defendants have not established that a breach of covenant claim fails as a matter of law here, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument. C.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Gonzalez v. Smith International, Inc.

    899 F. Supp. 2d 622 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Jan 29, 2010

    Defendants in this case argue that the plaintiffs cannot establish prima facie cases of employment discrimination because none of them can establish that they suffered an adverse employment action. … First, the employee there worked primarily in the shop (Id. at p. 2), whereas Moreno and Garcia’s job responsibilities clearly included driving equipment to well sites, wherever they might be.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Thompson Safety LLC v. Jones

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Sep 6, 2024

    Because a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, it should not be granted unless the movant has clearly carried the burden of persuasion on all four requirements. … “Customer relationships do not qualify as trade secrets just because a company invests time and money to cultivate those relationships.” BCOWW Holdings, 2017 WL 3868184 at *15.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Van Duzer v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n

    995 F. Supp. 2d 673 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Jan 31, 2014

    Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454 , 461 n. 9 (5th Cir.2007) (“[I]t is clearly proper in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to take judicial notice of matters of public record.”); Hebert Abstract Co., Inc. v. … Count VII: Conspiracy to Commit Fraud by the Creation, Operation, and Use of MERS System “To establish a civil conspiracy to commit fraud, the plaintiff must establish (1) a combination of two or more persons; (2) seeking

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • Schweizer v. Canon Inc.

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Jan 16, 2020

    In Jamison, the Fifth Circuit stated that, although typically a Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction,’ it would be unfair to require a Plaintiff to ? … Plaintiff readily admits she does not qualify under the second definition. (Doc.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • J.D. Fields & Co. v. United States Steel International, Inc.

    690 F. Supp. 2d 487 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Feb 17, 2010

    The Fifth Circuit has stated that such qualifying language can prevent a price quote from becoming an offer. See Axelson, 7 F.3d at 1233 . … Fields clearly had notice because of USSI’s arguments regarding J.D. Fields’ promissory estoppel claims.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Pickney v. Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc.

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Mar 25, 2022

    Pearson is certainly qualified. … Pearson is Qualified DOSL does not challenge Dr.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Tow v. Amegy Bank N.A.

    976 F. Supp. 2d 889 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Sep 30, 2013

    Those facts do not establish an inference of discretionary control over Royce Homes. … “To qualify as an intended third-party beneficiary, a party must show that she is either a ‘donee’ or ‘creditor’ beneficiary of the contract.” Stine v. Stewart, 80 S.W.3d 586, 589 (Tex.2002).

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Sarco Creek Ranch v. Greeson

    36 F. Supp. 3d 726 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Jul 3, 2014

    A Sarco Creek Café in Seattle might qualify. … Although his ranch has existed for over fifty years, Parmley did not seek to establish secondary meaning at the injunction hearing.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Nunley v. Commissioner of Social Security

    District Court, S.D. Texas · Mar 6, 2023

    An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (emphasis in original). … Spoor’s opinion that Nunley could perform light work “persuasive because it is consistent with the record as a whole including the IVIG [intravenous immune globulin] infusions” and because it “is supported 3 “Homan’s

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Sharp v. City of Houston

    960 F. Supp. 1164 · District Court, S.D. Texas · Mar 11, 1997

    City of Northlake, “Although [the City’s] five-month delay in responding to [the plaintiffs] harassment complaint may not qualify as an ‘immediate’ response so as to insulate the City from Title YII liability ..., we think … See id. *1177 Sharp states in her complaint and in her response to the motion for summary judgment that the defendants’ actions deprived her of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution of the United

    Cited 3 timesPublished

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