Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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4,324 results

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  • City of Pearland v. Alexander

    468 S.W.2d 917 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Apr 22, 1971

    The City did not use its right to qualify, limit or restrict the rights which it was acquiring by condemnation. … The statement was clearly improper, but we cannot say that it was so prejudicial that its effect could not have been allayed by an instruction from the trial judge.

    Reversed on other grounds by City of Pearland v. Alexander, 15 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 382 (1972)Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Fort Worth & Denver City Ry. Co. v. Motley

    87 S.W.2d 551 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Sep 16, 1935

    Error in admitting such testimony is harmless unless it clearly appears that it was prejudicial to the complaining party. Simpson v. De Ramirez, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 25 , 110 S. W. 149 ; Chicago, R. I. & T. Ry. Co. v. … We think the witness was qualified to testify, and overrule the fourth proposition.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Harris v. State

    1 Tex. Ct. App. 74 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Jul 1, 1876

    The court erred in qualifying the charge requested "by defendant’s counsel. 5th. … This Avas hearsay evidence, and clearly inadmissible. As a general rule, hearsay evidence is inadmissible. There are some exceptions to this rule, but this does not come within one of the exceptions.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Slaughter v. Andrews

    83 S.W.2d 721 · Court of Appeals of Texas · May 4, 1935

    Clearly, it could have no other reference but that of interesting and negotiating with a wealthy out-of-town man, a client of Andrews. … We think the evidence falls short of establishing that appellees were the procuring cause of the contracting parties in arriving at an agreement on terms of the lease.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Port v. State

    798 S.W.2d 839 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Dec 19, 1990

    It is a well-established principle that all facts and circumstances bearing on the issue are properly the subject of scrutiny and, therefore, the entire record is subject to review. Clewis v. … The fundamental constitutional right appellant advances is his right to be tried before a constitutionally qualified district judge.

    Cited 24 timesPublished
  • Standley v. Sansom

    367 S.W.3d 343 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Mar 7, 2012

    In this case, the State clearly met this test. 838 S.W.2d 235 (Tex.1992). … The statement was made “on the record” and was not qualified in any way. Maguire also testified candidates frequently used the press to further their own publicity goals.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Tex. & Pac. R'y Co. v. Woodall

    2 Wilson 413 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Nov 29, 1884

    If it stood alone and unqualified, there is no question but that it would be most clearly obnoxious to appellant’s objections. … In actions of tort, when the plaintiff’s right to recover is established, he is entitled to full compensatory damages.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Wilkerson v. Davis

    264 S.W. 545 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Jun 11, 1924

    Mowdy, who did not qualify on market values of land, testified that if he were buying tract No. 7 just east of No. 8, containing 65 acres and drawn by J. A. … Clearly McLane was guilty of laches in his long. delay with knowledge of the facts chargeable to him.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Hernandez v. State

    939 S.W.2d 665 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Nov 7, 1996

    The Harris Court rejected what it characterized as a “formalistic” reading of TexR.CRIM.Evid. 902(10) that would exclude medical records on the basis of the fourteen-day requirement where the defendant clearly had notice … According to Appellant, this evidence was critical and served to establish that Appellant, rather than another suspect, fired the shot.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Moore v. Edna Hospital District

    449 S.W.2d 508 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Dec 31, 1969

    The facts concerning establishment of the County Hospital may be partly summarized as follows. … IX, Sec. 9 clearly prohibits that action.

    Cited 32 timesPublished
  • Anderson v. Snider

    809 S.W.2d 505 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Aug 30, 1990

    Again, we conclude that the Appellant has failed to produce any competent evidence or testimony or any evidence or testimony from a properly qualified expert to raise a genuine issue of a material fact with respect to the … As we understand this record, the Appellant agreed to the amended order and second decree and she clearly chose to do so. We have found no error below and we affirm the judgment. AFFIRMED.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Watson v. Godwin

    425 S.W.2d 424 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Feb 19, 1968

    Carroll, 50 Tex. 17 , 20 said: “The brief contemplated and required by the rules should, in short, embrace nothing but the propositions — set forth clearly, distinctly, and separately — relied upon for the reversal of the … The defense was established by plaintiff’s own admissions under oath in his deposition. They show: “Q.

    Cited 38 timesPublished
  • Doe v. TEXAS ASS'N OF SCHOOL BOARDS, INC.

    283 S.W.3d 451 · Court of Appeals of Texas · May 7, 2009

    To qualify as an intended third-party beneficiary, a party may show that it is a “creditor” beneficiary of the contract. Stine, 80 S.W.3d at 589. … -Fort Worth 1996, no writ) (explaining that status as a third-party beneficiary may be created when the “obligation to the third party is clearly and fully spelled out”).

    Cited 52 timesPublished
  • McEachern v. Glenview Hospital, Inc.

    505 S.W.2d 386 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Feb 1, 1974

    It’s like the soldier getting a simple immunization in his shoulder and will walk a few steps and then faint. This is psychogenic shock. It has nothing to do with blood loss or injury. … Certainly they do not establish the converse. In Houston Fire and Casualty Insurance Co. v.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Houston Belt & Terminal Railway Co. v. Burmester

    309 S.W.2d 271 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Dec 5, 1957

    The question is whether a proper tribunal was established, and not whether an improperly established tribunal acted fairly.” … At twenty-six years of age he went to school again and qualified for a captain’s license.

    Cited 25 timesPublished
  • J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Gauthier

    305 S.W.2d 181 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Sep 24, 1957

    Then it was established that she also selected and received the services of one Dr. Tritico, of her own volition. It was further established that she had been seen by Dr. Curry twice and by Dr. … We hold such action by the trial court to be clearly erroneous, though not reversible error for the reasons hereinafter stated.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Coleman v. Coleman

    348 S.W.2d 384 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Jul 5, 1961

    The evidence conclusively establishes that this similarity is a pure coincidence. There is no evidence that any part of this $4500.00 belonged to appellee. … It was clearly identified in the evidence. Neither the Court, the jury nor any of the parties could possibly have been misled by the description used.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Grocers Supply Co. v. Stuckey

    152 S.W.2d 911 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Jun 5, 1941

    Kum-mel’s Disease, or some fracture, which did not show up in the Jefferson Davis X-rays but did show up 18 days later in the Pasadena Hospital X-rays, and thus the jury was enabled to reconcile the testimony of the highly qualified … court can neither see eye-to-eye with them, nor undertake to unsettle what it conceives to be the rule the other way in Texas; in other words, the rule as to cross-examination with us seems to have been authoritatively established

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • City of Dallas v. Atkins

    197 S.W. 593 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Jun 23, 1917

    Childress, can be established for such assessment. This contention is well taken. … Commissioners were appointed by the county judge and duly qualified.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • In re Kelm

    569 S.W.3d 232 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Nov 20, 2018

    The court included a finding that Scherr "is not qualified to represent Ms. … Kelm contends that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by ruling that she could not retain Scherr to represent her because he lacked a certification purportedly required by the Estates Code.

    Cited 1 timesPublished

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