Case law

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  • Distefano v. State

    532 S.W.3d 25 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Feb 9, 2016

    This statement does not establish that the trial court failed to conduct the balancing *32 test. … —Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd) (“The indictment need not allege evidentiary matters for the purpose of notice when the charging instrument clearly states the offense charged.”).

    Cited 47 timesPublished
  • Fant v. State

    881 S.W.2d 830 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Oct 12, 1994

    This language clearly indicates that the Supreme Court has no question that forfeitures are punishment. … Thus, Halper teaches us that if the statute is remedial in nature, then the further analysis to determine whether it qualifies as punishment does not apply. See Ward, 870 S.W.2d at 663 .

    Reversed by Fant v. State, 931 S.W.2d 299 (1996)Cited 38 timesPublished
  • Railroad Commission of Texas v. Bishop Petroleum, Inc.

    736 S.W.2d 720 · Court of Appeals of Texas · May 28, 1987

    The Commission has established the size and shape of proration units “for the common reservoir” by temporary or permanent field rules, (required by section 102.011) 4. … The evidence did not conclusively establish that the 50% risk penalty assessed against Wiggins Brothers was unreasonably low.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Zaragosa v. Chemetron Investments, Inc.

    122 S.W.3d 341 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Nov 6, 2003

    “Tangible Personal Property” In order for the fifteen-year statute of repose to bar the appellant’s suit under section 16.012, the mixer/blender must qualify as manufacturing equipment, which is equipment and machinery used … By using the ordinary meaning of the phrase “tangible personal property” provided by the Legislature and the Texas Supreme Court, the textured vegetable protein manufactured and processed by the mixer/blender clearly falls

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • Burns v. Gonzalez

    439 S.W.2d 128 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Mar 12, 1969

    If A seeks to impose liability on B for the act of C on the theory that B held C out as having power to do such act, clearly the burden of establishing the facts which constitute such holding out is on A. … Bosquez, after testifying that he had never borrowed money or executed notes in the name of the partnership, qualified this answer by saying that he was not sure, adding, “I may have signed one or two.”

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Bank of Texas v. Childs

    615 S.W.2d 810 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Jan 23, 1981

    The county relies on this distinction, established in Van Allen v. … In neither case, however, had such an exception been established on the basis of another federal statute, as in the case of bank shares, and consequently, such taxes were not clearly embraced within the express exception

    Reversed on other grounds by American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 463 U.S. 855 (1983)Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Jefferson County Criminal District Attorney's Office v. Parker

    766 S.W.2d 573 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Feb 23, 1989

    In this type of proceeding for expunction, the burden is clearly upon the Appellee to show the lack of sufficient cause. This, he has utterly failed to do. … Therefore, I think it is clear that certain findings of fact made by the second judge following the expungement hearing are clearly wrong.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • In re the Estate of Roberts

    661 S.W.2d 177 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Sep 21, 1983

    That the instrument proported [sic] to be the Holographic Will of Lois Bascom Roberts failed to completely describe the property mentioned therein and failed to describe clearly the location of where the land is situated … inasmuch as we have sustained other findings of the trial court which preclude the probate of the proffered instrument as a holographic will we deem it unnecessary to detail the reasons why the instrument further fails to qualify

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Wutke v. Yolton

    71 S.W.2d 549 · Court of Appeals of Texas · May 17, 1934

    Appellee’s witness Walker was qualified to testify as to the value of the converted property. … On this statement of his qualifications this witness gave evidence as to actual value which clearly raised the issue submitted by questions 1 and 2.

    Cited 29 timesPublished
  • Washington v. City of Houston

    60 S.W.2d 519 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Jan 31, 1933

    The defendant in error city admits the soundness of the contention that the purported deed of Maggie Washington was void as such, since the- evidence conclusively established that she was a married woman at the time, but … The undisputed evidence shows that Maggie Washington and Ella Peterson acquired this property by inheritance from their father, Henry Goosby; that Ella Peterson was the duly qualified and acting independent executrix of their

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • De Borde v. Bryan

    253 S.W.2d 63 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Sep 26, 1952

    DeBorde, after his wife was declared insane, was appointed guardian of his wife’s estate on July 11, 1939 and qualified immediately thereafter. … The pleading sought title to the property and, to establish title, sought cancellation of the deed under which DeBorde claimed.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Franks v. Welch

    389 S.W.2d 142 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Mar 25, 1965

    The contract was authorized on behalf of the City by the qualified electors thereof by an affirmative vote of 49,114 to a negative vote of 11,256, and on behalf of the Authority by a resolution of its Board of Directors.” … Kimbrough, Tex.Civ.App. 1963, 365 S.W.2d 941 , aff’d 371 S.W.2d 691 , in which it clearly appears that the taxpayer was undertaking to enjoin the use of city funds by the city in connection with a water project.

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Rivas

    466 S.W.2d 823 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Apr 15, 1971

    Before the adoption of our present Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule of “presumed prejudice” would have made reversal clearly mandatory under the record before us. … It was established that the panel should have been drawn from the jury wheel.

    Reversed by Rivas v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 15 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 339 (1972)Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Coulter v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co.

    248 S.W. 788 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Nov 25, 1922

    the assertion of a new cause of action, although the value of the services and amount of expenses and plaintiff's implied contract to pay same were set up for the first time in the amended cross-plea, and the amendment clearly … That decision also is clearly distinguishable from the one now before us. Fairbanks v.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • State Ex Rel. Pan American Production Co. v. Texas City

    295 S.W.2d 697 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Nov 1, 1956

    Appellants cite cases holding that the word “adjacent” is of elastic meaning, to be determined by the context in which used, surrounding facts and circumstances, and the subject matter which it qualifies. … He must establish such invalidity “clearly or beyond a reasonable doubt, and must overcome, by facts judicially known or proved, not only the evidence sustaining constitutionality, but any state of facts which can be reasonably

    Cited 17 timesPublished
  • Zapata County v. Llanos

    239 S.W.2d 699 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Apr 4, 1951

    that part of the judgment relating to Share No. 4 (the Luz Hein Share) of the Varal Pasture should be reversed, and that portion of the judgment relating to Share No. 2 (the Isabel Hein Share) should be modified so as to clearly … This was not a public road nor one established’ by prescription.

    Cited 19 timesPublished
  • Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Boyles

    456 S.W.2d 714 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Apr 4, 1970

    In such a situation, it has been said that “almost any fact that bears upon the increase or decrease in the market values before, and after the establishment of the public facility, are admissible.” … He would have, however, been an otherwise qualified witness, although one for whose accuracy appellants vouched by his tender.

    Reversed on other grounds by Boyles v. Houston Lighting and Power Company, 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 264 (1971)Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Chew v. Zweib

    29 Tex. Civ. App. 311 · Court of Appeals of Texas · May 5, 1902

    Tierwester survey is known and established and can be identified upon the ground. … Levy, his wife, Mary Levy, to whom he had devised all of his estate and who had qualified as executrix- of his will, conveyed to Henry Wiener and Isaac Levy a tract of 10 1-3 acres of land described as follows: “Ten and one-third

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Rogers v. RREF II CB Acquisitions, LLC

    533 S.W.3d 419 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Nov 17, 2016

    First, Exhibit 5 quite clearly did not originate from a third-party. It is a communication to Rogers from Wimmer, .who was the author of the business records affidavits. … ESTABLISHING SIGNATURE, ASSIGNMENT OF THE NOTE, AND AMOUNT OWING By his seventh issue, Rogers argues that RREF failed to establish three elements of a breach of promissory note claim: that Rogers signed (i.e., executed) the

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • Jones v. Robb

    35 Tex. Civ. App. 263 · Court of Appeals of Texas · Mar 21, 1904

    That it was upon his advice that she qualified as survivor and made herself a party defendant and that he was her attorney representing her when the judgment was rendered. … Austin, the joint owner, had no knowledge of the suit is sufficient under the circumstances to establish its unathorized maintenance by another.

    Cited 8 timesPublished

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