Case law

City of Houston v. Catrennia Foreman Sauls, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Dwayne Foreman, And Tristena Christian, as Next Friend of D.F., a Minor

Texas Supreme Court · May 10, 2024

. § 1983 “unequivocally negated the original interpretive premise for qualified immunity”); Zadeh, 928 F.3d at 479-81 (Willett, J., concurring) (criticizing the “clearly established law” standard). … See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 657 (although “federal immunity may be conferred at the summary judgment stage by the court’s finding that the constitutional right at issue was not clearly established,” “[n]o analogous threshold

University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center of Dallas v. Margulis

43 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 288 · Texas Supreme Court · Jan 6, 2000

The motion for summary judgment argued that as a matter of law the plaintiff failed to plead specific facts that would indicate a violation of clearly established law. … The motion then argued extensively that as a matter of law Fain and Winchester were entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

City of Lancaster v. Chambers

37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 980 · Texas Supreme Court · Jun 15, 1994

judgment on qualified immunity is improper.”). … First, federal immunity may be conferred at the summary judgment stage by the court’s finding that the constitutional right at issue was not clearly established. Elder v.

Brown & Gay Engineering, Inc. v. Zuleima Olivares, Individually and as the Representative of the Estate of Pedro Olivares, Jr., & Pedro Olivares

58 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 678 · Texas Supreme Court · Apr 24, 2015

Brown & Gay’s reliance on Filar-sky's qualified-immunity analysis is misplaced. … The federal doctrine of qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

Michael McIntyre and Laura McIntyre, Individually and on Behalf of Their Children, K.M., L.M., C.M., M.M., and L.M. v. El Paso Independent School District, Dr. Lorenzo Garcia, and Mark Mendoza

59 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1387 · Texas Supreme Court · Jun 24, 2016

Here, the McIntyres challenge only the officer’s “entitlement to qualified immunity on the substantive due process claim,” arguing he violated their clearly established rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by “swear[ing] … Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “courts may not award damages against a government official in his personal .capacity unless ‘the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,’ and ‘the right was “clearly

Mission Consolidated Independent School District v. Garcia

55 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1065 · Texas Supreme Court · Jun 29, 2012

in a plea to the jurisdiction. 32 We held in Garcia I that “the TCHRA clearly and unambiguously waives immunity” for suits brought against school districts under the TCHRA. 33 However, the Legislature has waived immunity … The District incorrectly contends that our opinion in Garcia I did not actually address the issue of whether the TCHRA clearly and unambiguously waives immunity for school districts.

Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc.

47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 852 · Texas Supreme Court · Jul 9, 2004

Federal courts recognize a qualified immunity for public officials, which is analogous although not identical to our official immunity. … Qualified immunity protects governmental officers with discretionary authority from liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

Houston Belt & Terminal Railway Co., Bnsf Railway Co., and Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. City of Houston, Texas and Daniel Krueger, in His Official Capacity as Director of Public Works and Engineering

59 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 512 · Texas Supreme Court · Apr 1, 2016

Recognizing our *162 jurisprudence clearly established that suits seeking to require government officers to comply with the law are not barred by governmental immunity because noncompliance’ with the law is an ultra vires … But while Krueger clearly had authority, and while he clearly had to use some judgment in determining “impervious surface,” the court of appeals stopped short of asking whether his authority might nonetheless have some limits

William Marsh Rice University and Gary Spears v. Rasheed Refaey

58 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 741 · Texas Supreme Court · Apr 24, 2015

In Klein, a different statutory scheme enabled a private university teaching hospital to qualify as a state agency, and therefore its employee, the defendant-doctor, qualified as an employee of a state agency for the purpose … According to Refaey, this Black’s-attributed definition is consistent with how “officer” is used in section 51.014(a)(5) and clearly excludes peace officers.

Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center-El Paso v. Loretta K. Flores

Texas Supreme Court · Dec 31, 2024

As we held in Alamo Heights, because a statutory violation is necessary to establish an immunity waiver—such that jurisdiction and the merits intertwine—all three steps of the framework “are relevant to the jurisdictional … Flores does not contend in this Court that she is “clearly better qualified” than Sanchez; rather, she asserts that the reason given by the University for the decision to hire Sanchez over Flores— President Lange’s conclusion

Dr. Behzad Nazari, D.D.S. v. State

561 S.W.3d 495 · Texas Supreme Court · Jun 22, 2018

CODE § 32.0391 (establishing a criminal offense for kickback and bribery schemes). 21 See TEX. HUM. RES. … These allegations are clearly connected and relevant to the parties’ claims, and if the Providers are correct, their counterclaims will rebut the allegations on which the State’s claims are based. See State v.

University of Texas at Arlington v. Sandra Williams and Steve Williams

Texas Supreme Court · Mar 20, 2015

of retention of immunity.” … at issue here are not “clearly within [the statute’s] purview.”

TX. Nat. Res. Con. Com'n v. White

46 S.W.3d 864 · Texas Supreme Court · Jun 21, 2001

has not been clearly and explicitly waived. … clearly intended."

United Blood Services v. Longoria

40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 288 · Texas Supreme Court · Jan 31, 1997

The trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion by rejecting Kramer’s testimony. … See Broders, 924 S.W.2d at 153 (“What is required is that the offering party establish that the expert has ‘knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education’ regarding the specific issue before the court which would qualify

The City of Houston v. Steve Williams

54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 713 · Texas Supreme Court · Mar 18, 2011

Local Government Code Section 271.152’s Waiver of Governmental Immunity Local Government Code section 271.152 waives qualifying local governmental entities’ immunity from suit for certain breach of contract claims, providing … Finding a lack of standing, the court of appeals did not reach the issue of whether the Agreements qualify under section 271.152’s waiver of immunity. See id.

Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers

52 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 511 · Texas Supreme Court · Apr 3, 2009

II The Act outlines a process by which a general contractor qualifies for immunity from common-law tort claims brought by the employees of its subeon-tractors. 1 First, the general contractor and subcontractor must enter … Under this 1917 version, the statutory language broadly established, without qualification, that any subscriber, even a premises owner-subscriber, could qualify as a statutory employer.

Ben Bolt-Palito Blanco Consolidated Independent School District v. Texas Political Subdivisions Property/Casualty Joint Self-Insurance Fund

50 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 344 · Texas Supreme Court · Dec 29, 2006

Chapter 2259 specifically provides that a governmental unit’s establishment and maintenance of a self-insurance program “is not a waiver of immunity.” Id. § 2259.002. … The Fund next contends Section 271.152 does not clearly and unambiguously waive its immunity from suit because some of the Fund’s members, such as counties, do not meet Section 271.151(3)’s definition of a “local governmental

Ben Bolt-Palito Blanco Consolidated Independent School District v. Texas Political Subdivisions property/casualty Joint Self-Insurance Fund

Texas Supreme Court · Dec 29, 2006

“clearly and unambiguously” fall within it). … for such functions: “[t]he establishment and maintenance of a self-insurance program by a governmental unit is not a waiver of immunity . . . .”

City of Corsicana v. Wren

159 Tex. 202 · Texas Supreme Court · Nov 5, 1958

at variance with “well established and well defined” law on the subject, the classification ought to be respected by the courts. … case, supra, and otherwise, clearly upheld and relied on the legislative classification of the activity in question as governmental.

Dawn Nettles v. Gtech Corporation and the Texas Lottery Commission

Texas Supreme Court · Jun 12, 2020

As one commentator has observed, the protection the Supreme Court has extended to government contractors might qualify as a form of “derivative immunity,” but it is not “derivative sovereign immunity,” and certainly not … In the absence of sovereign immunity from suit, the trial courts had jurisdiction State, in doing this work is clearly not liable herein.”) (emphases added); Tillotson v.